green
Positive treatment
20.8 score
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982
2004
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
in Re Anibar Barrera, Jr.
App. 2008) (“There are . . . a few instances in which the district attorney is legally disqualified from acting.”). 2 See In re Cox, No. 02-15-00132-CV, 2015 WL 6951583, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 5, 2015, orig. proceeding) (reh’g en banc) (citing Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Cox
A trial court’s authority to disqualify a prosecutor comes from the court’s duty to protect the accused’s constitutional due-process rights, see, e.g., Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (orig. proceeding), and the: statute barring a prosecutor from representing the State in the same matter on which he or she has been previously employed adversely, see Tex. Code Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
in Re Carla Lorene Cox
A trial court’s authority to disqualify a prosecutor comes from the court’s duty to protect the accused’s constitutional due-process rights, see, e.g., Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
in Re Carla Lorene Cox
A trial court’s authority to disqualify a prosecutor comes from the court’s duty to protect the accused’s constitutional due-process rights, see, e.g., Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marvin Carson v. State
Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marvin Carson v. State
Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kenneth Jermaine Cooks v. State
Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kenneth Jermaine Cooks v. State
Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Appeals at Texarkana
Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
in Re Gary D. Young
Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State Ex Rel. Young v. SIXTH JUD. DISTRICT
For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that a trial court has authority to disqualify an elected district or county attorney if his continued representation of the State would violate the defendant's due-process rights. [16] In re Goodman, supra, at 811 . [17] Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). [18] In Morgan and Spain , both supra, we held that probation-revocation proceedings constituted the same cases as the underlying prosecutions that resulted in the probations in the first place.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Beth Suzanne Landers v. State
(2×)
Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Landers v. State
(2×)
Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); see also Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 133-34 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Tex. Comm, on Profl Ethics,' Op. 538, 64 Tex. B.J. 698 (2001) (discussed further below).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marquis Richardson v. State
Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Goodman
(2×)
Morgan, 616 S.W.2d at 626; see also Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 538, 64 Tex. B.J. 698 (2001) (discussed further below).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
in Re: Leslie Gene Goodman
A trial court's authority to disqualify a prosecutor comes from the court's duty to protect the accused's constitutional due-process rights, see, e.g. , Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Roy Jon v. Reginaldo Stanley
(2×)
Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hernandez v. State
See Eidson, 793 S.W.2d at 6 ; Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
cited
Cited "see"
Eleby v. State
See Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
examined
Cited "see"
In Re Reed
(3×)
Ann. art. 2.07(b-1) (Vernon Supp.2003), and the district attorney’s prior representation of the defendant in the same case, ie., when the district attorney “has been, before [her] election, employed adversely.” Id. at art. 2.01; see Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132,134 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
cited
Cited "see"
Opinion No.
See Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) and Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
cited
Cited "see"
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
See uparte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
in Re Thomas Allen Simon
See, e.g., Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Buntion v. State
Eidson, 793 S.W.2d at 6-7 ; see also Ex parte Morgan, . 616 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Grim.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Landers, Beth Suzanne
Id. ("when a prosecutor proceeds against a defendant whom he formerly represented as defense counsel in the same case, no specific prejudice need be shown by the defendant"; such a violation of article 2.01 constitutes a violation of due-process); see also Ex parte Morgan , 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Landers, Beth Suzanne
Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. (“when a prosecutor proceeds against a defendant whom he formerly represented as defense counsel in the same case, no specific prejudice need be shown by the defendant”; such a violation of article 2.01 constitutes a violation of due-process); see also Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Landers v. State
(2×)
Id. [22] Id. [23] Id. ("when a prosecutor proceeds against a defendant whom he formerly represented as defense counsel in the same case, no specific prejudice need be shown by the defendant"; such a violation of article 2.01 constitutes a violation of due-process); see also Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (following Spain ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
John Richard Simons v. State
See also Garrett v. State, 252 S.W. 527, 529 , 94 Tex.Crim. 556 (1922) (op. on rehearing) (quoting predecessor to article 2.01). 4 participated in the revocation proceedings.” Id.5 The holding in Morgan was based on the analysis in Spain. 616 S.W.2d at 626 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ex Parte Golden
(2×)
See, e.g, Ex parte Jackson, 616 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (denied); Ex parte Kanaziz, 423 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Crim.App.1968) (dismissed); Ex parte Eiland, 420 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Crim.App.1967) (denied without prejudice); Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)(denied without prejudice).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ex Parte Johnson
(2×)
See also Ex parte Jackson, 616 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), and Ex parte Emmons, 660 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (stating axiomatically that Art. 11.07 requires that an application contain sworn allegations of fact rather than mere conclusions, citing Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 .) .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
State Ex Rel. Sherrod v. Carey
See also Ex parte Morgan, 616 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
Ex Parte Frank MORGAN
67801.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jun 3, 1981.
Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for State.
Tom G. Davis.
Cited by 40 opinions | Published
OPINION
This is a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Art. 11.-07, V.A.C.C.P.
On August 15, 1975, petitioner was convicted in a trial before the court following his plea of guilty of burglary of a building. Punishment was assessed at 10 years, probated. The probation was revoked on July 2, 1980, after the court found that petitioner had violated the conditions of his probation by committing the offenses of driving while intoxicated and public intoxication.
Petitioner maintains he was denied due process of law because the prosecutor who filed the State’s motion to revoke probation and who represented the State at the revocation hearing had originally represented petitioner as defense counsel when petitioner pled guilty and was granted probation. The record supports petitioner’s factual allegations.
In Ex Parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Cr.App.), this Court granted relief in a factual situation identical to that now presented. There, it was stated:
“When a district attorney prosecutes someone whom he previously represented in the same case, the conflict of interest is obvious and the integrity of the prosecutor’s office suffers correspondingly. Moreover, there exists the very real danger that the district attorney would be prosecuting the defendant on the basis of facts acquired by him during the existence of his former professional relationship with the defendant. Use of such confidential knowledge would be a violation of the attorney-client relationship and would be clearly prejudicial to the defendant. See Gajewski v. United States, 321 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1963). The prosecutor in this case should never have initiated or participated in the revocation proceedings.” (Emphasis in original). Id. at 134.
The relief sought is granted and the order revoking probation in Cause No. 5360 is set aside. Petitioner is ordered released from confinement and returned to probationary status under the jurisdiction of the 118th Judicial District Court of Howard County.
It is so ordered.