Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
50 citation events (36 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re QFP II, LP and RGV II, LLC v. the State of Texas (texapp, 2025-08-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re QFP II, LP and RGV II, LLC v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Co., 284 S.W.3d at 414 ; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 240 S.W.3d at 4 ; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); see also In re Jackson, 2024 WL 1102888 , at *2; In re Son, No. 12-22-00233-CV, 2022 WL 13643034 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 21, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Alolabi v. Chretien, No. 01-20- 00761-CV, 2022 WL 2976377 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re Chong, 2019 WL 2589968 , at *2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Joseph Jackson Baylor Asset Management LLC RL 360 Funding LLC JCLZ Legacy LLC DCT Entity Management LLC DVI Opportunities Unlimited, Inc, Kilgore Commons, LLC v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Like Moss and Chong, this case involves “the use of funds obtained from the plaintiff to purchase real property.” Chong, 2019 WL 2589968 , at *3; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 762-63 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Huffines Retail Partners, L.P.
5th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Petroleum Corp. v. Lloyd, 908 S.W.2d 23 , 24–25 (Tex. App. 1995); Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W. 2d 762, 763 (Tex. App. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in Re Howard Chong
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding)).2 In Moss, the plaintiff alleged fraud, traced the proceeds obtained through that fraud to a specific property, filed a notice of lis pendens, and sought to impose a constructive trust on the property “to the extent it was purchased with the proceeds.” 722 2 Plaintiff argues that Flores is distinguishable because the parties filing the lis pendens sought a constructive trust on the proceeds, not on the real properties.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jetall Companies, Inc. v. Gene Van Dyke and Astrid Van Dyke
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Code § 12.008; Olbrich v. Touchy, 780 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding); Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); Helmsley–Spear of Tex., Inc. v. Blanton, 699 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, orig. proceeding)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) First Bank & Trust Company v. Centura Land Corporation F/K/A Iori Centura, Inc.
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); Jordan v. Hagler, 179 S.W.3d 217, 222 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)(“Jordan does not seek to recover title to the Haglers’ property; he appears to claim an ownership interest in the property only as security for the recovery of damages he may be awarded on his fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract claims.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Cohen
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Flores, 915 S.W.2d at 478 (holding notice of lis pendens was improper because “plaintiffs seek a constructive trust in the purchased properties only to satisfy the judgment they seek against” the defendant, which “is no more than a collateral interest in the property”); In re Watts, No. 01-02-01247-CV, 2003 WL 204879 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 30, 2003, orig. proceeding [mand. denied] ) (mem. op.) (holding that “notice of lis pendens was improperly filed” because plaintiff sought constructive trust in real property only to satisfy a money judgment against…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in Re Jay H. Cohen
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Flores , 915 S.W.2d at 478 (holding notice of lis pendens was improper because “plaintiffs seek a constructive trust in the purchased properties only to satisfy the judgment they seek against” the defendant, which “is no more than a collateral interest in the property”); In re Watts , No. 01-02-01247-CV, 2003 WL 204879 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 30, 2003, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.) (holding that “notice of lis pendens was improperly filed” because plaintiff sought constructive trust in real property only to satisfy a money judgment aga…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Long Beach Mortgage Co. v. Evans
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (pleading that a lien be imposed against property was essentially a prayer for a judgment lien, affecting the property only collaterally, and did not support lis pendens).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard
Tex. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Flores, 915 S.W.2d at 478 ; In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d at 806 ; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. James A. Howard, Receiver for Tesher Corp.
Tex. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Flores , 915 S.W.2d at 478 ; In re Wolf , 65 S.W.3d at 806 ; Moss v. Tennant , 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) texapp 2007
Tex. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Flores, 915 S.W.2d at 478 ; In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d at 806 ; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in Re: Thomas J. Watts, Sr., Susan K. Watts, and TJW SR/SKW Investments, Ltd.
Tex. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Moss v. Tennant , 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Francis v. Sterling
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flores v. Haberman
Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Khraish v. Hamed (4×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Helmsley was followed by Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (same facts as Helms-ley, Helmsley applied with scant discussion); see also Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Hurwitz-Nordlicht Joint Venture, 676 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.App.— Austin 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (affirming trial court order can-celling lis pendens).
discussed Cited "see" County Investment, LP v. Royal West Investment, LLC, Series E and Shawn Shabazi
Tex. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ), stating that the “pleading that a lien be imposed against the Nodaway property is essentially a prayer for a judgment lien, affects the property only collaterally, and does not come within the provisions of §12.007.” Appellees note that the Texas courts have not yet ruled on the issue of whether the judicial privilege applies to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 12.002(a) (C.R. 19-21).
discussed Cited "see" in Re Burk Collins, Fountain Mall, Inc., and Mall Group, Ltd.
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); see also Hughes, 647 S.W.2d at 7 (holding that lis pendens was proper when filed against partnership-owned property in suit by partner that alleged contract for sale of property had been procured by fraud). 18.
discussed Cited "see" in Re Burk Collins, Fountain Mall, Inc., and Mall Group, Ltd.
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
Code Ann. § 12.007(a); see also Kroupa-Williams, 2005 WL 1367950 , at *3 (holding that claim of community property interest in real property in divorce proceeding was sufficient to support lis pendens); In re Fitzmaurice, 141 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding) (“Those cases in which lis pendens has been disallowed are those in which the subject property is collateral to the litigation.”). 17: See Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); see also Hughes, 647 S.W.2d at 7 (holding that lis pendens was proper wh…
discussed Cited "see" In Re Collins
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); see also Hughes, 647 S.W.2d at 7 (holding that lis pendens was proper when filed against partnership-owned property in suit by partner that alleged contract for sale of property had been procured by fraud). 18 .
cited Cited "see" Olbrich v. Touchy
Tex. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Helmsley-Spear of Texas, Inc., v. Blanton, 699 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." in Re: Saleh Elisa and Carzone Investors, Inc.
Tex. App. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Flores v. Haberman, 915 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (concluding that seeking constructive trust as to real property allegedly purchased with converted funds only to satisfy judgment constituted seeking a collateral interest in the property, which did not render property subject to lis pendens); see also Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.— –8– Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding) (in fraud action by home purchaser against vendors of home and property, “constructive trust” that purchaser sought to impose against different propert…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jordan v. Hagler
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Flores v. Haberman, 915 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding); see also Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding) (holding that suit seeking lien as security to recover damages affected property collaterally, not directly); Blanton, 699 S.W.2d at 645 (same).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." John Joseph Jordan D/B/A Premier Construction Services v. Burl and Brenda Hagler
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Flores v. Haberman , 915 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); see also Moss v. Tennant , 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding) (holding that suit seeking lien as security to recover damages affected property collaterally, not directly); Blanton , 699 S.W.2d at 645 (same).
cited Cited "see, e.g." First National Petroleum Corp. v. Lloyd
Tex. App. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding); see also Prappas v. Meyerland Com.
Douglas C. MOSS, Katherine M. Moss, and Commonwealth Mortgage Corporation, Relators,
v.
the Honorable Geraldine TENNANT, Judge, 113th Judicial District, Respondent
A14-86-871-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Dec 18, 1986.
722 S.W.2d 762
Lew W. Harpold, Houston, for relators., J. Christopher Reynolds, Houston, for respondent.
Brown, Pressler, Murphy.
Cited by 33 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice.

In this original petition for writ of mandamus, relators ask us to require the Honorable Geraldine Tennant to cancel a lis pendens. On December 9, 1986, we granted leave to file the petition. We conditionally grant the mandamus.

Relators are intervenors in the suit out of which this petition for writ of mandamus arises. The plaintiff is Ron E. Hoffman. John Jeffrey Guise and Marcie L. Guise are co-defendants.

In May 1982 the Guises sold a home on Bluebonnet Street in Houston to Hoffman. In August 1982 the Guises bought a home on Nodaway Street in Spring. In June 1983 Hoffman filed suit against the Guises and others, alleging causes of action for the recovery of damages based upon breach of warranty, negligence, deceptive[*763] trade practices, and fraud arising out of the sale of the Bluebonnet property. On July 5,1985, Hoffman amended his petition alleging the Guises had purchased the Nod-away property with the proceeds of the sale of the Bluebonnet property. Hoffman alleged he was the beneficial or equitable owner of an interest in the Nodaway home, “to the extent it was purchased with the proceeds of the sale to Hoffman,” by virtue of a constructive trust. On July 25, 1985, Hoffman filed a notice of lis pendens on the Nodaway property.

In May 1986 the Guises sold the Noda-way home to relators, Douglas and Katherine Moss. The Mosses conveyed the property by deed of trust to C.E. Rogers, trustee, for the benefit of relator Commonwealth Mortgage Corporation as security for the funds for the purchase. In September 1986 the relators intervened in Hoffman’s pending suit and filed their motion to quash the notice of lis pendens. The motion was denied by respondent December 1, 1986.

Relators argue the lis pendens is void and failure to cancel the notice constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. The real party in interest contends the notice is valid and relators have an adequate legal remedy.

A lis pendens may be filed during the pendency of an action involving title to real property, the establishment of an interest in real property, or an enforcement of an encumbrance against real property. TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 12.007.

The real parties in interest contend their cause below falls within the ambit of § 12.007 because their action arises out of fraud and seeks a constructive trust on the Nodaway property. They rely on Hughes v. Houston Northwest Medical Center, 647 S.W.2d 5 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism’d).

In Hughes, the plaintiffs were minority stockholders who asked the trial court to impose a constructive trust on the title to land and to cancel a proposed sale of the land from the corporation to another entity. They alleged the proposed sale had been procured through fraud. The stockholders filed a notice of lis pendens which was set aside by the trial court. The appeals court reversed.

The property in Hughes on which the lis pendens notice was placed was the subject matter of the suit. The lien sought in Hughes thus affected real property directly, not collaterally, and quite properly came within the provisions of § 12.007.

Hoffman’s suit, however, does not seek recovery to the title to relator’s property nor to establish an interest in the home except as security for the recovery of any damages he may be awarded against the Guises on his fraud allegation and only to the extent he can trace the proceeds from the Bluebonnet sale to the Nodaway purchase. His pleading that a lien be imposed against the Nodaway property is essentially a prayer for a judgment lien, affects the property only collaterally, and does not come within the provisions of § 12.007. Helmsley-Spear of Texas, Inc. v. Blanton, 699 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.App. [14th Dist.] — Houston, 1985). Accordingly, the lis pendens is void.

The real party in interest contends relators may vindicate their alleged right of cancellation by other legal remedies. We do not agree. Mandamus is a discretionary remedy and ordinarily will be denied if another remedy is available and adequate. State v. Archer, 163 Tex. 234, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962). Availability of other remedies, however, does not prevent mandamus to set aside a void order of a trial court. Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.1973). Respondent’s refusal to cancel the notice of lis pendens amounted to a reaffirmation of a void action. We hold that when a trial court affirms a void action, the availability of other remedies will not prevent issuance of mandamus.

The lis pendens in this matter is void. Respondent should have granted relators’ request to cancel it. We assume respondent will comply with the opinion of this Court. In the event she fails to do so[*764] before January 5, 1987, a writ of mandamus will issue.

The writ is conditionally granted.