Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App. 1987). · Go Syfert
Search
Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
147 citation events (87 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ex Parte Arturo Galvan (texapp, 2021-09-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Arturo Galvan
Tex. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Victor Dewayne White v. Ector County Appraisal District
Tex. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. 7 App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); see Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476 , 480–81 (5th Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curtis Wayne Ratliff v. Linda Ann King
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
“However, an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person in every court proceeding.” Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165 (citing Zuniga v. Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curtis Wayne Ratliff v. Linda Ann King
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
"However, an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person in every court proceeding." Z.L.T. , 124 S.W.3d at 165 (citing Zuniga v. Zuniga , 13 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Pruske v. Dempsey , 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. ONCOR ELEC. DELIVERY CO. LLC
Tex. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in the Interest of G.M.S., a Child
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Armstrong, 881 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); accord Byrd, 877 S.W.2d at 569 ; Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in the Interest of G.M.S., a Child
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Armstrong, 881 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); accord Byrd, 877 S.W.2d at 569 ; Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ulysses Sinai Lopez v. Max Kushner and Sara Kathryn Kushner
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Dodd , 17 S.W.3d at 716 ; Birdo v. Holbrook , 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ulysses Sinai Lopez v. Max Kushner and Sara Kathryn Kushner
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 716 ; Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. McKenzie
Miss. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The court upheld the dismissal and concluded that “[t]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] is incarcerated or acting pro se does not accord him special treatment or otherwise excuse him from prosecuting his case with due diligence.” Id. at 2 (citing Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex.Ct.App.1987)). ¶ 18.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Derrick K. Eaglin v. State
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App--Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guadalupe Guajardo, Jr. v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles
Tex. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 820 (1977); Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Prueske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guadalupe Guajardo, Jr. v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles
Tex. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 820 (1977); Nance v. Nance , 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Prueske v. Dempsey , 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jim H. Hamilton, Jr. v. Crystal J. Campbell
Tex. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Armstrong , 881 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Stone v. Morris , 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); Byrd , 877 S.W.2d at 569 ; Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jim H. Hamilton, Jr. v. Crystal J. Campbell
Tex. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Armstrong, 881 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); Byrd, 877 S.W.2d at 569 ; Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carson v. Serrano (2×)
Tex. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Arthur X. Carson v. A. Serrano and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
Tex. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of Z.L.T.
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
He does not show why such testimony could not have been given by deposition, telephone, affidavit, or otherwise.”); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (“His application for writ of attachment contains no basis or argument for granting it.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jacinto Benitez v. Maria Melendez
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Sys. , 960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); Nance v. Nance , 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jacinto Benitez v. Maria Melendez
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Sys., 960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in Re I v. a Minor Child
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re IV
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hubert Earl Teague, Jr. v. the City of Austin Sgt. Randy Sharp And Officer Chris Vallejo
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Pedraza v. Crossroads Security Sys. , 960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); Nance v. Nance , 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Taylor
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Armstrong, 881 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir.1976)); accord Byrd, 877 S.W.2d at 569 ; Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Taylor
Tex. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Armstrong, 881 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); accord Byrd, 877 S.W.2d at 569 ; Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McDade, Nathan v. Lucia, Michael
Tex. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Pedraza , 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Zuniga v. Zuniga (4×)
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aguilar v. Alvarado
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In re M.M., 980 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; Armstrong v. Randle, 881 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence Edward Thompson v. Michael F. Miller, General Counsel to the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Armstrong v. Randle , 881 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1994, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William C. Zinger v. Erika R. Lacey
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 820 (1977); Nance v. Nance , 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Pruske v. Dempsey , 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, no writ); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pedraza v. Crossroads Security Systems (2×)
Tex. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (citing Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ), and Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.- Dallas 1987, no writ)); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 , -, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 820 , 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310-11 (5th Cir.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence Edward Thompson v. Attorney General of Texas (2×)
Tex. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Birdo v. Holbrook , 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Nance v. Nance (6×)
Tex. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1987, no writ); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir.1976); but see Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, no writ).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. Randle (8×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
There is, however, no absolute right for an inmate to appear in court in a civil ease. 6 See Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ); Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); Doyle v. Doyle, 482 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 , 93 S.Ct. 195 , 34 L.Ed.2d 100 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Birdo v. Holbrook
Tex. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited "see" Luke Adam Stanton, Sr. v. Kimberly Faye Stanton
Tex. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163 , 165–66 (Tex. 2003); Armstrong v. Randle, 881 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. App.— 3 Texarkana 1994, writ denied); see Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited "see" Ex Parte Ronald Darnell Cephus (2×)
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex.2004). *421 “A prison inmate’s right to access the courts does not entail the right to appear personally.” Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" in Re Tracey W. Murphy
Tex. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brewer v. Taylor , 737 S.W.2d 421 , 424 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Bridwell v. Mulder
Tex. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421 , 424 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" in Re: The State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brewer v. State, 737 S.W.2d 421 , 424 n.3 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" in Re: The State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brewer v. State , 737 S.W.2d 421 , 424 n.3 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Handley
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421 , 424 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ). 3 .
discussed Cited "see" In the Interest of D.S., a Child (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
In re I.V., 61 S.W.3d at 796 ; Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; see Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
discussed Cited "see" In Re DS (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
In re I.V., 61 S.W.3d at 796 ; Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; see Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Peeler v. Hughes & Luce
Tex. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421 , 423 n. 2 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Buddington v. Kelly
Fairfax Cir. Ct. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also 82 A.L.R.4th 1063 (1990).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In the Interest of Z.L.T.
Tex. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
As the court in Pedraza noted, since a prisoner has no absolute right to be present in a civil action, it follows that the prisoner requesting a bench warrant must justify the need for his presence. 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; see also Brewer, 737 S.W.2d at 424 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re ZLT
Tex. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
As the court in Pedraza noted, since a prisoner has no absolute right to be present in a civil action, it follows that the prisoner requesting a bench warrant must justify the need for his presence. 960 S.W.2d at 342 ; see also Brewer, 737 S.W.2d at 424 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jones v. Jones
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Daugherty, 42 S.W.3d at 335 ; Armstrong v. Randle, 881 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied); see also Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Marriage of Daugherty
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Armstrong v. Randle, 881 S.W.2d 58 , 57 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied); see also Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 428 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
Freddie Louis BREWER, Appellant,
v.
L.C. TAYLOR, Appellee
05-86-00713-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Sep 21, 1987.
737 S.W.2d 421
Freddie L. Brewer, pro se., Samuel Theodore Foutz, Dallas, for ap-pellee.
Devany, Rowe, Hecht.
Cited by 65 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 44%
HECHT, Justice.

Freddie Louis Brewer, an inmate in the Texas Department of Corrections, filed this malpractice action pro se against his criminal defense attorney, L.C. Taylor. Although Brewer announced ready for trial, he failed to appear at the appointed time because he was not at liberty to quit his place of confinement. The district court dismissed Brewer’s action for want of prosecution and denied his motion to reinstate, which Brewer complains was an abuse of discretion. We disagree with Brewer, overrule his two points of error, and affirm the judgment.

Brewer filed this action pro se on March 10, 1985, while serving a life sentence in the Texas Department of Corrections. He alleged that Taylor, the lawyer appointed to represent him in a 1979 criminal prosecution, was negligent in conducting the defense of that case. Taylor generally denied Brewer’s allegations, and additionally, answered that Brewer’s action was barred by res judicata, because the same action in federal court had been dismissed in 1981, and by limitations, because this action was filed more than two years after it accrued in 1979. [1]

Trial was originally set for April 14, 1986. Several months earlier, on December 11, 1985, Brewer filed an application for writ of attachment to have himself brought from prison to court for trial. Brewer never sought or obtained a ruling on his application. On April 11, 1986, Brewer filed an announcement of ready for trial. The trial court, however, postponed the trial date to May 27, 1986. When Brewer failed to appear for trial on that date either in person or by counsel, the district court dismissed the case for want of prosecution.

Brewer moved to reinstate the case, complaining that he was not afforded an opportunity to move for continuance before the trial date because the district court had not ruled on his application for attachment. The district court denied his motion.

Brewer first complains that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his action for failure to appear for trial when he was incarcerated. A case may be dismissed for want of prosecution for failure of any party seeking affirmative relief or his attorney to appear for any hearing[*423] or trial of which the party or attorney had notice. Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a. Brewer does not deny that he had notice of the trial setting but complains that his incarceration made it impossible for him to appear.

A person seeking affirmative relief who cannot appear for trial because of incarceration must move for a continuance. Hobbs v. Hobbs, 691 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d). He cannot simply ignore a trial setting with impunity. Essex Int’l Ltd. v. Woods, 646 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1983, no writ). Although Brewer had made known the fact of his incarceration to the trial court in his application for writ of attachment some months prior to trial, he did not file a motion for continuance. On the contrary, he filed an announcement of ready for trial. Having made such an announcement and then failed to appear, Brewer cannot now complain that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his case.

Brewer also complains that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reinstate. Brewer argues that his failure to appear was involuntary and not intentional or consciously indifferent, and therefore his action should have been reinstated. Wyatt v. Texas Oklahoma Express, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1985, no writ).

A prison inmate’s right to access the courts [2] does not entail the right to appear personally. Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir.1976); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480-481 (5th Cir.1977); Craigo v. Marshall, 331 S.E.2d 510, 514-515 (W.Va.1983); see Doyle v. Doyle, 482 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont), cer t. denied, 409 U.S. 855, 93 S.Ct. 195, 34 L.Ed.2d 100 (1972).

As long as the inmate and his counsel are afforded adequate opportunity to confer confidentially and to petition the courts about matters in controversy, the right of access is satisfied....
... [I]t is within the discretion of the court to determine whether a prison inmate shall attend court proceedings held in connection with an action initiated by the inmate....
... [T]he trial court must weigh the interest of the plaintiff in presenting his testimony in person against the interest of the state in maintaining the confinement of the plaintiff-prisoner.

Stone, 546 F.2d at 735. The factors the trial court is to consider are:

—The cost and inconvenience of transporting the prisoner between his place of incarceration and the courtroom;
—The security risk and potential danger to the court and public of allowing the prisoner to attend court;
—Whether the prisoner’s claims are substantial;
—Whether a determination of the matter can reasonably be delayed until the prisoner is released;
—Whether the prisoner can and will offer admissible, non-cumulative testimony which cannot be offered effectively by deposition, telephone, or otherwise;
—Whether the prisoner’s presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility compared with that of other witnesses;
—Whether the trial is to the court or to a jury; and
—The prisoner’s probability of success on the merits.

See Stone, 546 F.2d at 735-736; Ballard, 557 F.2d at 480-481; Craigo, 331 S.E.2d at 514-515. The trial court must weigh protection of the integrity of the correctional[*424] system against the prisoner’s right of access to the courts and strike a balance that is fundamentally fair.

Inasmuch as a prisoner has no right to appear in court in a civil case he has initiated, it follows that he must show why his personal appearance is justified. Brewer made no such showing. His application for writ of attachment contains no basis or argument for granting it. [3] Even if it did, Brewer did not request or obtain a ruling on it and therefore cannot complain that it was not granted. See Moore v. Rotello, 719 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). Moreover, the record does not reflect any compelling reason to allow Brewer to attend trial in this case. Brewer is serving a life sentence at a state prison facility more than 80 miles from the district court in Dallas. The risks of allowing him to attend court are both obvious and real. No jury was demanded. There is no indication what Brewer’s testimony would be, other than that it would presumably relate to his malpractice allegations, nor why it could not be offered by deposition or telephone. Given this state of the record, the district court’s refusal to reinstate the case was not an abuse of discretion.

Having taken on the role of a pro se litigant, Brewer was liable to prosecute his action with diligence, like any other litigant. See Johnson v. McLean, 630 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ). This he clearly failed to do. Accordingly, we overrule his points of error and affirm.

1

. We merely refer to Taylor’s claims and, of course, offer no opinion here on whether the limitations period applicable to legal malpractice actions is two years or four years, or when such actions accrue. See Wilis v. Maverick, 723 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1986), writ granted, 30 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 572 (July 15, 1987).

2

. Taylor does not argue that Brewer was not entitled to bring this action. Although the question has never been answered directly in Texas as far as we know, Texas courts appear to assume that an incarcerated felon has the right to initiate a civil action unrelated to his conviction or imprisonment. See San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W. 213, 215 (Tex.Civ.App.—1903, writ refd); see also Dancer v. City of Houston, 384 S.W.2d 340, 344-345 (Tex.1964); see generally Annotation, Right in Absence of Express Statutory Authorization, of One Convicted of Crime and Imprisoned or Paroled, to Prosecute Civil Action, 74 A.L.R.3d 680 (1976). Such assumption is properly based upon the constitutional prohibition of outlawry. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 20; Tex.Code. Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.18 (Vernon 1977).

3

. We do not doubt the power of the district court to order that a prisoner be brought before the court to testify in a civil case, whether initiated by himself or someone else. Cf. Doyle v. Doyle, 482 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855, 935 S.Ct. 195, 34 L.Ed.2d 100 (1972) (“We have found no provision in the law of this state authorizing a trial judge to issue a bench warrant in a civil case.”). The type of order to be used is sometimes referred to as an attachment or bench warrant. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 24.13 (Vernon 1966). More properly, the order is a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. See 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 30 (1957); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1977). The district courts are vested with jurisdiction to issue such a writ. See Tex. Const, art. 5, § 8.