Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
40 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Brandon Keith Harris v. the State of Texas (texapp, 2025-06-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brandon Keith Harris v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Samuel Deleon Garza v. State
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“One who witnesses an offense but who has not yet testified in a trial involving that offense is a prospective witness.” Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d) (citing Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Melvin Carter v. State
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Solomon v. State , 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, pet. ref'd).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Melvin Carter v. State
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DENSEY v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
E.g., Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, pet. ref d) (striking panelist in part for being “acquainted with a family, several members of which had been convicted of drug dealing or possession of drugs” held “not clearly erroneous”); Logans v. State, No. 03-99-00348-CR, 2000 WL 1124981 , at *3, 2000 Tex.App.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth Burkett Giddens v. State
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
App. 1993); Solomon v. State , 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref'd).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Danny Wayne Martin v. State
Tex. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
App. 1993); Solomon v. State , 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref'd).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Awyunah Ali Williams v. State
Tex. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
B.P.H. , 83 S.W.3d at 407; Solomon v. State , 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of B.P.H. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, pet. refd).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re BPH (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, pet. ref'd).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rudolph v. State
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Davis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1994, no pet.); Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref'd).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arnold v. State
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir.1949) (any corrupt endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any party or witness, whether successful or not, constitutes obstruction of justice prohibited by statute); see also United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651-52 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding conviction of defendant who corruptly persuaded witness to destroy or conceal evidence when defendant expected federal grand jury investigation or trial in foreseeable future and intended to make items unavailable for use in such proceeding); United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804 , *9…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Muhammad v. State
Tex. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Irvine v. State, 857 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref d); see Roberson v. State, 866 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no pet.); Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. refd).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. State
Tex. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Gambel v. State, 835 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d).
cited Cited "see" Irvine v. State
Tex. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Belton v. State
Tex. App. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Irvine v. State, 857 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. refd); see also Solomon v. State, 830 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.App. — Texar-kana 1992, pet. refd).
Roy Lee SOLOMON, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
6-91-042-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Mar 31, 1992.
830 S.W.2d 636
Matt Keil, Texarkana, Ark., for appellant., John P. Miller, Jr., Bowie Dist. Atty., Bi-State Justice Building, Texarkana, for ap-pellee.
Cornelius, Bleil, Grant.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice.

Roy Lee Solomon was convicted of retaliation. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 36.06 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.1992). Punishment, enhanced by prior felony convictions, was set by the jury at ninety-nine years’ confinement.

The indictment charged Solomon with unlawfully and knowingly threatening to kill Jennifer Qualls in retaliation for her service as a prospective witness. The evidence showed that Jennifer Qualls, a prostitute, took a wallet and money from a male customer. She took the money and wallet and gave them to Solomon, with whom she was associated in prostitution. He in turn hid them in a clothes basket in a closet. As a result of the incident, Qualls was arrested by the Texarkana police, and[*637] a charge of felony theft was lodged against Solomon.

Qualls testified that Solomon tried on several occasions to dissuade her from testifying against him and expressly threatened to kill her if she became a witness.

Solomon raises two points of error. In the first, he asserts that the evidence is insufficient because it fails to show that Qualls was a prospective witness. Solomon’s argument is based on the fact that no trial had been set on the charge against him, and Qualls had not been notified by the authorities that she would be a witness. He contends that, in these circumstances, there was no proof that Qualls was a prospective witness. We disagree.

“Prospective” is not defined in the statute. In ordinary usage, however, it means “anticipated” or “expected to be.” Webster’s Dictionary 945 (9th ed. 1985). One who witnesses an offense but who has not yet testified in a trial involving that offense is a prospective witness. Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Moreover, whether one is a prospective witness must be judged from the standpoint of the one who retaliates. If Solomon anticipated that Qualls would be a witness against him and threatened to harm her if she did testify, the offense is complete even though Qualls was not formally called as a witness, or even if there was not at that time a charge pending against Solomon. The evidence here shows that Solomon anticipated that Qualls would be a witness against him and threatened to kill her if she testified. It is thus sufficient to sustain the conviction.

In his other point of error, Solomon contends that the State peremptorily challenged veniremen Norton, Willis, Matlock, and Griffin for racial reasons in violation of the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and Chambers v. State, 784 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

The prosecutor testified to racially neutral reasons for striking the panel members. He said he struck Norton because he was acquainted with a family, several members of which had been convicted of drug dealing or possession of drugs. Norton also exhibited attitudes which appeared to be out of sympathy with the State’s case. The prosecutor struck Willis because he was poorly groomed, was uncooperative with the court’s instructions, and was inattentive during the State’s presentation on voir dire. Matlock was excused because she said her daughter was mixed up in narcotics and she had a poor opinion of persons involved with narcotics. The evidence showed that the State’s main witness and Solomon were both involved in illicit narcotics. Furthermore, she said she could not give credibility to the State’s witnesses. The prosecutor struck Griffin because he stated that he would have trouble believing the State’s main witness because she was a prostitute.

The trial court found that the prosecutor’s reasons for peremptorily challenging these panel members were not racial. Under the record, that finding is not clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). No error is shown.

The judgment is affirmed.