Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas OPINION ON REMAND No. 04-20-00486-CR

Jemadari Chinua WILLIAMS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. B19-346 Honorable Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding

CORRECTED OPINION

Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 16, 2025

REVERSED AND REMANDED

After a jury trial, Jemadari Chinua Williams was convicted of Aggravated Promotion of Prostitution–Enhanced and was sentenced to forty years of imprisonment. Williams was represented by appointed counsel through the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. He then invoked

his right to self-representation, and after being admonished about the risks of self-representation, represented himself during the punishment phase. Williams later filed a pro se notice of appeal.

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To ensure Williams was properly admonished, this court abated this appeal and ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to fully admonish Williams of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation on appeal. This court then reinstated this appeal and accepted the trial court’s recommendation, made after fully admonishing Williams, that Williams be allowed to proceed pro se on appeal. In his pro se brief, Williams brought the following issues:

1. Whether section 43.04 of the Texas Penal Code is “unconstitutionally vague”;

2. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction;

3. Whether “structural error to the probable cause proceedings rendered the commitment order and capias which arose out of said proceedings void, depriving [Williams] of his constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures”;

4. Whether “prosecutorial misconduct and trial court errors denied [Williams] notice, due process, and his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury”;

5. Whether he was “deprived of his right to counsel where his court-appointed attorney tendered him ineffective assistance of counsel prior to and during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial.”

Within his fourth issue, Williams brought the following sub-issues:

4a. Whether the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ().

4b. Whether there was prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and closing argument.

4c. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment, resulting in the denial of his right to fair notice of the specific charged offense and preventing him from preparing for trial.

4d. Whether the “trial court erred in denying his motion to inspect grand jury lists” “where [Williams] has a statutory right to test the qualifications of the grand jurors that indicted him.”

4e. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

4f. Whether the trial court erred by allowing photographs to be entered in evidence.

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4g. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict.

4h. Whether the trial court “erred by overruling the several objections by” Williams “to the prosecutor’s closing argument.”

4i. Whether the trial court erred in overruling his “objection to the jury charge and his request for [a] definitional instruction” regarding “the element ‘two or more prostitutes.’”

4j. Whether the trial court “erred by removing [Williams] from the courtroom during jury deliberations where, during said deliberations, the jury submitted questions to the court.”

In an opinion dated October 19, 2022, this court reached Issues 2, 4c, and 4g. 1 See Williams v. State, 668 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022), rev’d, 685 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. Crim. App.

2024) (“Williams I”). Explaining that a “challenge to a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict is reviewed under the same standard used to review a sufficiency challenge,” this court

held that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated promotion of prostitution. Id. at 62 n.1, 65. Relying on State v. Ross, 573 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019), this court also held that the trial court should have granted Williams’s motion to quash the indictment and the error was harmful. See Williams I, 668 S.W.3d at 66-68. This court thus reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 69.

After granting the State’s petition for discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals noted that this court had “quoted the following maxim from Ross: ‘[I]f the prohibited

conduct is statutorily defined to include more than one manner or means of commission, then the State must, upon timely request, allege the particular manner or means it seeks to establish.’”

Williams v. State, 685 S.W.3d 110, 112-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (“Williams II”). According to the court of criminal appeals, this court “construed that maxim to mean that the State had to pick

The original panel in this appeal was Justice Chapa, Justice Watkins, and Justice Rodriguez. On remand, Justice 1

Brissette, Justice Spears, and Justice Meza have been assigned pursuant to Rule 9(k)(iii) of this court’s Internal Operating Procedures for the Handling of Cases.

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one of the methods allowed by statute and alleged in the indictment.” Id. at 113. The court of criminal appeals noted that this court “held solely as a matter of notice and did not hold that the different statutory methods of commission were different offenses.” Id. The court of criminal appeals then stated the following with respect to separate offenses:

Understanding the State’s brief to implicitly raise the issue, [Williams] argues in his brief that the six methods of committing aggravated promotion of prostitution are separate offenses. But he did not raise this claim at the trial court or in the court of appeals. To the contrary, his claim before both courts treated the six methods as alternative manners and means, and his argument was that there was a notice problem with the indictment not being specific enough. Because he did not timely raise the separate-offenses issue to the trial court (failing in fact, to raise it at all), that issue has been forfeited. Even if it had not been forfeited at trial, the issue is not properly before us because [Williams] did not raise it in the court of appeals, and that court did not resolve the issue on its own. Consequently, we will assume that the six methods of committing aggravated promotion of prostitution are alternative methods of committing the same offense.

Id. at 113-14 (citations omitted). The court of criminal appeals then explained that the “maxim articulated by Ferguson [v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 849-51 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981),] and later recited by Ross[,] developed as an exception to the general rule that statutory definitions

do not have to be included in a charging instrument.” Williams II, 685 S.W.3d at 115. “Even in that context, it can, at most, require the State allege more detail in a charging instrument; it would never require the State to abandon a manner and means in the charging instrument.” Id. (emphasis in original). “As long as the charging instrument specifies all the manner and means upon which the State is permitted to rely, there is no notice problem.” Id. The court of criminal appeals thus reversed this court’s judgment and remanded the cause so that we could “address [Williams’s] remaining points of error.” Id.

On remand, Williams’s pro bono counsel filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental

brief. Emphasizing that Williams had previously filed a pro se brief, his pro bono counsel “[f]or the sake of justice and the law” requested leave to file a supplemental brief on remand. We granted 04-20-00486-CR

the motion and allowed pro bono counsel to file a supplemental brief on remand. In the supplemental brief, pro bono counsel brought the following issues:

1. The trial court erred in denying Williams’s motion to quash because the indictment used undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning, and more specific pleading was required.

2. The jury charge was erroneous because it failed to require unanimity on each element of one of the six alleged aggravated promotion of prostitution “offenses” in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions.

Because we agree the indictment used undefined terms of indeterminate or viable meaning, we conclude the trial court should have granted Williams’s motion to quash.

BACKGROUND

Williams was arrested after communicating via telephone and text with Investigator Hirl, an undercover officer, who posed as a rancher in the Kerrville area named “Scott.” Williams agreed to provide “Scott” with a group of women for sexual services for a party “Scott” was having at his ranch. Williams also offered to provide illegal drugs, which could be purchased on a “Point of Sale basis.” On the agreed day, Williams called “Scott” to say that he and the women were on their way. Investigator Hirl testified that he later received another phone call from Williams, who stated that he was unable to find the address given and was “out in the middle of nowhere.” Hirl testified that he tried to guide Williams to the ranch, but then told Williams he would come down and meet

Williams and the women at the ranch’s gate. Hirl testified that the other officers involved in the operation were waiting at the address given to Williams and had seen Williams’s vehicle pass them. According to Hirl, Williams called again, saying that he had pulled off the side of the road and would wait there. Hirl then told the other officers to go ahead with the arrest.

Investigator Purvis testified that on the day of the arrest, he had let his team know when

Williams was en route and provided a description of the vehicle driven by Williams, a “red Jeep.”

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After a red jeep passed officers who were stationed at the address given to Williams, Purvis was advised by Hirl that Williams was lost. Purvis was able to listen to the conversation between Hirl and Williams. He heard Hirl tell Williams that Hirl would come out to meet Williams. Hirl then told Purvis that “the suspect is parking now.” According to Purvis, he then saw a red Jeep park and turn off its lights. Purvis saw a “black male get out of a vehicle with a white female.” Purvis

testified he called the marked units to approach. The black male and white woman were detained, along with three other women who were inside the Jeep. A search of the Jeep and the individuals yielded “some heroin, syringes, and some pills.” Williams and the four women were arrested. As a result of a search incident to an arrest, the officers found “methamphetamine and a methamphetamine pipe” on Williams.

Purvis testified the four women arrested were Julia Nicole Anderson, Nichole Mendoza, Maria Luna, and Chelsea Hogan. According to Purvis, during his interviews with the women, one of them described Williams as “being a pimp” and said “they were going to try to come up [to

Kerrville] and make some money.” Purvis also testified that the women were “very uncooperative” and some denied being prostitutes.

MOTION TO QUASH

In his pro bono counsel’s supplemental brief, Williams argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash because the indictment uses undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning, and more-specific pleading was required. In response, the State argues that

Williams had sufficient notice by the plain meaning of the terms at issue. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash an indictment de novo. State v. Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017).

The indictment in this case charged Williams as follows: 04-20-00486-CR

IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

THE GRAND JURORS FOR THE COUNTY OF KERR, STATE OF TEXAS, DULY SELECTED, IMPANELED, SWORN, CHARGED AND ORGANIZED AS SUCH AT THE JANUARY TERM, A.D., 2019, OF THE 198TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAID COUNTY, UPON THEIR OATHS PRESENT IN AND TO THE COURT, THAT JEMADARI CHINUA WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT,

ON OR ABOUT APRIL 5, 2019, AND BEFORE THE PRESENTMENT OF THIS INDICTMENT, IN SAID COUNTY AND STATE, DID THEN AND THERE KNOWINGLY OWN, INVEST IN, FINANCE, CONTROL, SUPERVISE, OR MANAGE A PROSTITUTION ENTERPRISE THAT USED AT LEAST TWO PROSTITUTES.

PRIOR CONVICTION ENHANCEMENT: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT, PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION OF THE AFORESAID OFFENSE, ON THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 2010, IN CAUSE NUMBER 27-CR-10-20273 IN THE HENNEPIN CRIMINAL DOWNTOWN COURT OF HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA, THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE FELONY OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY-1ST DEGREE.

AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE.

Williams argues several of the statutory methods of committing the offense alleged in this indictment are “undefined terms of variable meaning,” including “controls,” supervises,”

“manages,” “invests in,” and “finances.” Williams argues that he was entitled, at a minimum, to pleading notice of how the State contended he knowingly owned, invested in or financed, managed

or supervised, or controlled a prostitution enterprise. Further, Williams emphasizes that the indictment is not saved by the State’s “conceptual groupings” argument. Williams contends the indictment contains at least three distinct conceptual groupings: (1) owning; (2) investing in or financing; and (3) controlling, supervising, or managing. While “investing in” is conceptually similar to “financing”, and “controlling” is conceptually similar to “supervising” or “managing,”

Williams emphasizes that these groupings are conceptually distinct from each other and from

“owning.” According to Williams, 04-20-00486-CR

The investor in [a store] does not own the enterprise, nor controls it. The store manager controls and supervises a part of the [store’s] enterprise, but she does not necessarily invest in or finance it, and does not “own” it. The owner of the [store’s] enterprise does not necessarily manage or control it. There is a fuzzy line between investing and financing, but a clear line between investing or financing on the one hand, and owning on the other. The fact that the verbs are so conceptually disparate militates in favor of a requirement that the State specify how the verbs were committed.

(emphasis added).

The offense in an indictment “must be set forth in plain and intelligible words.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02(7). “Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.” Id. art. 21.03. An indictment is sufficient if it

charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged . . . .

Id. art. 21.11. The face of an indictment, among other things, must allege the facts necessary to

“give the defendant notice of precisely what he is charged with.” Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). An indictment must go beyond the statutory language only when the statute is not “completely descriptive of the offense.” Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

Because a defendant is presumed to be on notice of statutory definitions, when a term is

defined in the penal statutes, an indictment that tracks the elements of a statute, as a general rule, provides adequate notice to the accused of the charged offense. See State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d

248, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). That is, “[w]hen a statutory term or element is defined by a statute, the charging instrument does not need to allege the definition of the term or element.” State

v. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 251. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. One exception, as noted above, was addressed by this 04-20-00486-CR court in Williams I. A second exception is the one now brought by Williams on remand. It applies when “the statutory language fails to be completely descriptive” of the offense because it “uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning.” 2 Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 907. In such

circumstances, “more specific pleading [is] in order to notify the defendant of the nature of the charges against him.” Id.; see Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 251; State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 407

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Williams argues the indictment in this case, which tracked the language of the statute, used undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning, and he was entitled to more specific pleading to be notified of the charges against him.

In analyzing whether a charging instrument provides adequate notice, we engage in a two-

step analysis. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 907. First, we identify the elements of the offense. Id. Next, we consider whether the statutory language is sufficiently descriptive of the charged offense. Id.

A person commits the offense of aggravated promotion of prostitution if the person “knowingly owns, invests in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages a prostitution enterprise that uses two

or more prostitutes.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.04(a). The parties in this case dispute whether the statutory methods of committing aggravated promotion of prostitution (i.e, owns, invest in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages) constitute separate offenses or whether they are manners and means. Indeed, Williams argues in his jury charge issue that they are separate 04-20-00486-CR offenses. However, in his motion to quash filed in the trial court, Williams argued that they are manners and means of committing the offense. Thus, like the court of criminal appeals in Williams

II, we will assume for purposes of this issue that they are manners and means of committing the offense. See Williams II, 685 S.W.3d at 113-14.

We next consider whether the statutory language is sufficiently descriptive of the charged

offense. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 907. The statutory methods of committing the offense (i.e, owns, invest in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages) are not defined by statute. ^[3] Rules of statutory construction provide that undefined terms in a statute “are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Floyd v. State, 575 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). “In determining

plain meaning, words and phrases must be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Wagner v. State, 539 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011(a) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”).

In considering whether the indictment was sufficient, the court of criminal appeals has held that the following undefined terms required more-specific pleading:

• “torture” a dog in the context of an information alleging animal cruelty, see Haecker, 571 S.W.2d at 921-22;

• “cause bodily injury” in the context of an indictment alleging aggravated robbery by using a deadly weapon, see Cruise v. State, 587 S.W.2d 403, 404-05 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979);

• “receive” bets and offers in the context of an indictment alleging gambling promotion, see Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185, 187-88 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981), overruled on other grounds by Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);