1 U.S.C. § 3
DEFINITIONS.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 238
cases (26 in the last 5 years), 1930–2026 · leading case: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013). “The Dis- trict Court found the floating home to be a “vessel” under the Rules of Construction Act, which defines a “vessel” as including “every de- scription of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” 1…”
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005). “Section 3’s definition, repealed and recodified in 1947 as part of the Rules of Construction Act, 1 U. S. C. § 3 , has *490 remained virtually unchanged from 1873 to the present.”
Ashley R. Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc., a Missouri Corp. Sir Joseph, an Inland River Towboat, Her Engines, Boilers, Etc., 419 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2005). “Noting courts had long recognized similar craft as vessels, the Court observed that, at the time the LHWCA and the Jones Act were enacted, “1 U.S.C. § 3 defined the term ‘vessel’ for purposes of those statutes.”
Breaux v. St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc., 68 So. 3d 684 (La. Ct. App. 2011). “" "The word `vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." 1 U.S.”
Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. 2010). “Because a district court’s authority to arrest a ship and to adjudicate an in rem proceeding against it requires the attachment of a maritime lien, both the lien and the district court’s jurisdiction depend on a ship’s status as a “vessel.”
Baker v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 834 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2016). “The LHWCA does not meaningfully define the term “vessel,” so the 'Supreme Court incorporated the definition provided in the Rules of Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. § 3 . See Stewart v. Dutra Const.”
Foremost Ins. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982). “, 1 U. S. C. § 3 (" `vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water").”
DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 106 (D.R.I. 1993). “Defendant seems to agree with plaintiff that the definition of vessel set forth in the General Provisions of the United States Code at 1 U.S.C. § 3 provides the definition of a vessel for purposes of § 905(b).”
City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2011). “On partial summary judgment, the district court concluded that it had admiralty jurisdiction over the Defendant because the Defendant was indeed a “vessel” under 1 U.S.C. § 3 , and that the Defendant was liable for maritime trespass.”
Bd. of Com'rs of Orleans v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008). “The court emphasized the phrase “capable of being used” within the definition of vessel in 1 U.S.C. § 3 , and held: The “Carol Ann” was an artificial contrivance capable of being used as a means of water transportation.”
In Re of Two-J Ranch, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 671 (W.D. La. 2008). “1118 , the Supreme Court held that the term “vessel” under the LHWCA (and thus the Jones Act) is defined in the Rules of Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. § 3 , as follows: “The word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of…”
United States v. Robert E. Boyden & Jean Boyden, 696 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1983). “It held that the houseboats built by the Boydens were vessels under 1 U.S.C. § 3 and therefore were not structures under 33 U.”
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