17 U.S.C. § 117

Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs

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(a)Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.(b)Lease, Sale, or Other Transfer of Additional Copy or Adaptation.—Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.(c)Machine Maintenance or Repair.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if such copy is made solely by virtue of the activation of a machine that lawfully contains an authorized copy of the computer program, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that machine, if—(1) such new copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed immediately after the maintenance or repair is completed; and(2) with respect to any computer program or part thereof that is not necessary for that machine to be activated, such program or part thereof is not accessed or used other than to make such new copy by virtue of the activation of the machine.(d)Definitions.—For purposes of this section—(1) the “maintenance” of a machine is the servicing of the machine in order to make it work in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that machine; and(2) the “repair” of a machine is the restoring of the machine to the state of working in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that machine.(Pub. L. 94–553, title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2565; Pub. L. 96–517, § 10(b), Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 3028; Pub. L. 105–304, title III, § 302, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2887.)Historical and Revision Noteshouse report no. 94–1476

As the program for general revision of the copyright law has evolved, it has become increasingly apparent that in one major area the problems are not sufficiently developed for a definitive legislative solution. This is the area of computer uses of copyrighted works: the use of a work “in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information.” The Commission on New Technological Uses is, among other things, now engaged in making a thorough study of the emerging patterns in this field and it will, on the basis of its findings, recommend definitive copyright provisions to deal with the situation.

Since it would be premature to change existing law on computer uses at present, the purpose of section 117 is to preserve the status quo. It is intended neither to cut off any rights that may now exist, nor to create new rights that might be denied under the Act of 1909 or under common law principles currently applicable.

The provision deals only with the exclusive rights of a copyright owner with respect to computer uses, that is, the bundle of rights specified for other types of uses in section 106 and qualified in sections 107 through 116 and 118. With respect to the copyright-ability of computer programs, the ownership of copyrights in them, the term of protection, and the formal requirements of the remainder of the bill, the new statute would apply.

Under section 117, an action for infringement of a copyrighted work by means of a computer would necessarily be a federal action brought under the new title 17. The court, in deciding the scope of exclusive rights in the computer area, would first need to determine the applicable law, whether State statutory or common law or the Act of 1909. Having determined what law was applicable, its decision would depend upon its interpretation of what that law was on the point on the day before the effective date of the new statute.

Editorial NotesAmendments

1998—Pub. L. 105–304 designated existing provisions as subsecs. (a) and (b), inserted headings, and added subsecs. (c) and (d).

1980—Pub. L. 96–517 substituted provision respecting limitations on exclusive rights in connection with computer programs for prior provision enunciating scope of exclusive rights and use of the work in conjunction with computers and similar information systems and declaring owner of copyright in a work without any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under the law, whether this title or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on Dec. 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by the court in an action brought under this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 115 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1981–2025 · leading case: Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng'g, Inc., 924 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2019).
Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng'g, Inc., 924 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2019). · cites it 10× “2(d) of the EPA authorized MSEI and MTA's use of the source code; (2) the Final Customer Acceptance letter granted MSEI ownership of the source code; (3) the evidence offered by Universal as to damages was insufficient as a matter of law; (4) Universal's copyright and…”
Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006). · cites it 5× “§ 107 ; and (2) an “essential step” defense under 17 U.S.C. § 117 (a)(1). As described above, the Sheriffs Department argued that, even though it had installed RUMBA Office onto 6,007 workstations, it had configured the software so that the software could only be accessed by…”
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). · cites it 6× “While Quaid concedes that it has actual knowledge that its product is used to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material, it contends that the RAMKEY portion of its CopyWrite diskettes serves a substantial noninfringing use by allowing purchasers of programs on PROLOK…”
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). · cites it 3× “1999) (“Sun I”); 17 U.S.C. § 117 (a). As to the scope of the license, ToU § 4(B), “Limitations on Your Use of the Service,” provides: You agree that you will not .”
Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Resources, Inc., 542 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2008). · cites it 4× “§§ 2201-2202 , seeking a declaration that, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 117 of the United States Copyright Act, “Weitzman is the rightful owner of a copy of custom computer software,” and that the company may therefore “use, maintain, and/or modify its custom computer software”…”
Storage Tech. Corp. (Doing Bus. as Storagetek) v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., & David York, 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). · cites it 4× “Specifically, CHE argues that the copying is protected by sections 117(a) and 117(c) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 117 (a), 117(c), and the doctrine of fair use.”
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). · cites it 3× “” 17 U.S.C. § 117 (a)(1). The Copyright Act provides that an “owner of a copy” of copyrighted software may claim the essential step defense, and the “owner of a particular copy” of copyrighted software may claim the first sale doctrine.”
Itofca, Inc. v. Megatrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2003). · cites it 3× “Later it filed a supplemental registration stating that the program had been created in 1991 and listing ICI as a coauthor and hence as a copyright owner, but asserting that ITOFCA was the owner of the original program, which had been developed in 1986.”
Sega Enter. Ltd., a Japanese Corp. v. Accolade, Inc., a California Corp., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). · cites it 2× “” 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1). Accolade contends that section 117 authorizes disassembly of the object code in a copyrighted computer program.”
Dsc Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., Defendant-Cross, 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). · cites it 4× “Pivotal to the proper resolution of DSC's copyright infringement claim is the interpretation and application of section 117 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 117 . Because the Fourth Circuit has not had occasion to construe section 117, we have no direct guidance as to how that…”
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). “§ 101 (defining “computer program[s]” as “set[s] of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”); 17 U.S.C. § 117 (a) (describing “limitations on exclusive rights” for “computer programs” and providing that…”
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (1st Cir. 2005). “The Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana statute conflicted with the rights of computer program owners under the Copyright Act, specifically 17 U.S.C. § 117 , which permits a computer program owner to make an adaptation of a program provided that the adaption is either created…”
— 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) — 1 case
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