U.S. Code » Title 18 » Part PART I— CRIMES › Chapter CHAPTER 110A— DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STALKING

18 U.S.C. § 2264

Restitution

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 18 CasesGoogle Scholar
(a)In General.—Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law, the court shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.(b)Scope and Nature of Order.—(1)Directions.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).(2)Enforcement.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.(3)Definition.—For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for—(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;(D) lost income;(E) attorneys’ fees, plus any costs incurred in obtaining a civil protection order;(F) veterinary services relating to physical care for the victim’s pet, service animal, emotional support animal, or horse; and(G) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.(4)Order mandatory.—(A) The issuance of a restitution order under this section is mandatory.(B) A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because of—(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.(c)Victim Defined.—For purposes of this section, the term “victim” means the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter, including, in the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.(Added Pub. L. 103–322, title IV, § 40221(a), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1928; amended Pub. L. 104–132, title II, § 205(d), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1231; Pub. L. 115–334, title XII, § 12502(a)(3), Dec. 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 4983.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2018—Subsec. (b)(3)(F), (G). Pub. L. 115–334 added subpar. (F) and redesignated former subpar. (F) as (G).

1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(1), inserted “or 3663A” after “3663”.

Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(2)(A), reenacted heading without change and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “The order of restitution under this section shall direct that—

“(A) the defendant pay to the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court, pursuant to paragraph (3); and

“(B) the United States Attorney enforce the restitution order by all available and reasonable means.”

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(2)(B), struck out “by victim” after “Enforcement” in heading and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “An order of restitution also may be enforced by a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”

Subsec. (b)(4)(C), (D). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(2)(C), struck out subpars. (C) and (D), which related to court’s consideration of economic circumstances of defendant in determining schedule of payment of restitution orders, and court’s entry of nominal restitution awards where economic circumstances of defendant do not allow for payment of restitution, respectively.

Subsec. (b)(5) to (10). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(2)(D), struck out pars. (5) to (10), which related, respectively, to more than 1 offender, more than 1 victim, payment schedule, setoff, effect on other sources of compensation, and condition of probation or supervised release.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(3), (4), added subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which read as follows: “Affidavit.—Within 60 days after conviction and, in any event, not later than 10 days before sentencing, the United States Attorney (or such Attorney’s delegate), after consulting with the victim, shall prepare and file an affidavit with the court listing the amounts subject to restitution under this section. The affidavit shall be signed by the United States Attorney (or the delegate) and the victim. Should the victim object to any of the information included in the affidavit, the United States Attorney (or the delegate) shall advise the victim that the victim may file a separate affidavit and assist the victim in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Subsecs. (d) to (g). Pub. L. 104–132, § 205(d)(3), struck out subsecs. (d) to (g), which related, respectively, to objection, additional documentation and testimony, final determination of losses, and restitution in addition to punishment.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1996 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–132 effective, to extent constitutionally permissible, for sentencing proceedings in cases in which defendant is convicted on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 211 of Pub. L. 104–132, set out as a note under section 2248 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1998–2026 · leading case: United States v. Wayne Hayes
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
United States v. Wayne Hayes (1998) ca2 · cites it 15× “GERSHON, District Judge: The primary issue presented by this appeal is the scope of a mandatory restitution order issued pursuant to one provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2264 . Concluding that the district court’s restitution order was authorized by the…”
United States v. Ho Ka Yung (2022) ca3 · cites it 2× “” 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (b)(3)(E), (G); see also Lagos v.”
Vicky v. United States (2013) ca8 · cites it 2× “3d at 137 , quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (b)(3). The Second Circuit held, “Reading [subs]ection 2264(b)(3)(E) together with [subs]ection 2264(b)(3)(F), attorneys’ fees and costs of obtaining a protection order are among the ‘losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the…”
United States v. Papagno (2011) cadc “§ 2259 (sexual exploitation of children); 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (domestic violence); 18 U.”
Rock v. BAE Systems, Inc. (2014) ca11 “18 U.S.C. § 2264 (a), (b)(1). Nevertheless, having carefully reviewed § 2261A, we cannot find anything in its plain language to indicate that it is more than a “bare criminal statute.”
United States v. James Hobgood (2017) ca8 “18 U.S.C. §§ 2264 (b)(3)(F), 3664(e). In her written victim impact statement, KB stated that she was frightened because Hob-good sent correspondence to her apartment, and she implied that she changed addresses to avoid stalking by Hobgood.”
United States v. Shawn Thomason (2021) ca8 “18 U.S.C. § 2264 . There was no breach. Thomason’s plea agreement stated that the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act applied, but did not provide that it was the only basis for restitution.”
United States v. Kyle Stevens (2026) ca3 · cites it 6× “3 II3 A The restitution statute for cyberstalking permits victims to recover “the full amount of [their] losses,” 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (b)(1), defined to include, “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense,” id.”
United States v. Shrader (2010) wvsd · cites it 5× “Additionally, the United States argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (c) (“Section 2264”) provides contextual support for its position.”
(PS) Ryan v. Fuentes (2025) caed · cites it 2× “§ 3771 ), Restitution Law ( 18 U.S.C. § 2264 ), and 24 Interstate Stalking and Cyberstalking (18 U.”
United States v. Villongco (2016) dcd “§ 2259 (sexual exploitation of children); 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (domestic violence); 18 U.”
United States v. Shawn Thomason (2021) ca8 “18 U.S.C. § 2264 . There was no breach. Thomason’s plea agreement stated that the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act applied, but did not provide that it was the only basis for restitution.”
Show all 16 citing cases →
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.