18 U.S.C. § 3162

Sanctions

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(a)(1) If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.(2) If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant. The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the Government shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under subparagraph 3161(h)(3). In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice. Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.(b) In any case in which counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government (1) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial; (2) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit; (3) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining a continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or (4) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with section 3161 of this chapter, the court may punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:(A) in the case of an appointed defense counsel, by reducing the amount of compensation that otherwise would have been paid to such counsel pursuant to section 3006A of this title in an amount not to exceed 25 per centum thereof;(B) in the case of a counsel retained in connection with the defense of a defendant, by imposing on such counsel a fine of not to exceed 25 per centum of the compensation to which he is entitled in connection with his defense of such defendant;(C) by imposing on any attorney for the Government a fine of not to exceed $250;(D) by denying any such counsel or attorney for the Government the right to practice before the court considering such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days; or(E) by filing a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee.The authority to punish provided for by this subsection shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to such court.(c) The court shall follow procedures established in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in punishing any counsel or attorney for the Government pursuant to this section.(Added Pub. L. 93–619, title I, § 101, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2079.)

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1,162 cases (82 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: United States v. Jason Brown, 819 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2016).

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United States v. Jason Brown, 819 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2016). · cites it 39× “For the following reasons, we VACATE Brown’s convictions at trial based on the Speedy Trial Act violation below and REMAND to the district court for a determination as to whether the indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice based on the factors articulated in the…”

United States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 2011). · cites it 12× “" 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2) (emphasis added).”

United States v. Koerber, 813 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2016). · cites it 24× “See 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2). Applying the § 3162(a)(2) factors, the government argued that Koerber’s Ponzi scheme was “unquestionably a serious offense” and that Koerber, not the government, had delayed progress toward trial.”

United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2016). · cites it 10× “The government, conceding that the Speedy Trial Act had been violated, argued that the dismissal should be without prejudice, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(1). Ruling from the bench, the district court rejected Bert’s constitutional argument, but concluded that the…”

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006). · cites it 4× “The District Court then addressed petitioner directly and appears to have attempted to explain the operation of a provision of the Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3162 (a)(2), under which a defendant whose trial does not begin on time is deemed to have waived the right to move for dismissal…”

United States v. Jeffrey Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2022). · cites it 5× “” 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2). A court’s decision whether to dismiss the charges with or without prejudice depends on a “careful application” of these factors to each particular case.”

State v. Hern, 323 P.3d 1241 (Haw. App. 2013). · cites it 11× “2d at 1044 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2) of the federal Speedy Trial Act).”

United States v. Jimmie White, 920 F.3d 1109 (6th Cir. 2019). · cites it 4× “White did not raise the automatic-exclusion issue, but it was not his issue to raise.”

United States v. Terrell Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412 (3rd Cir. 2016). · cites it 4× “Guided by three factors the Speedy Trial Act requires trial courts to consider, see 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2), the District Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate.”

United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012). · cites it 4× “[7] Although we have yet to squarely address this issue, it is not necessary for us to do so here, as Valdivia has waived, or at least forfeited, his STA claim. Generally, under the Act, a defendant's failure to move for dismissal of the charging instrument prior to trial "shall…”

United States v. Michael Gerald Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(1). Because Gamboa was arrested on the federal complaint on May 31, 2002, the Speedy Trial Act clock for filing the indictment began running on that date.”

United States v. Kenneth S. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1988). · cites it 5× “When seventy days next following indictment had elapsed without commencement of trial, Hastings moved to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2). Finding no excludable time, the district court dismissed the charges because of the delay, as required by the Act.”

Show all 1,162 citing cases →

— 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) — 7 cases

United States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Randolph Blackmon (88-5784), Randolph Haywood (88-5827), 874 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1989).

United States v. Gerold Oliver, 238 F.3d 471 (3rd Cir. 2001).

United States v. Havelock, 560 F. Supp. 2d 828 (D. Ariz. 2008).

United States v. Floyd Dorman, Thomas K. Darr, & Roger Nells Henderson, 752 F.2d 595 (11th Cir. 1985).

— 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) — 4 cases

United States v. Reyes, 102 F.3d 1361 (5th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Kevin P. McKinney, 395 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Hernandez-Amparan, 600 F. Supp. 2d 839 (W.D. Tex. 2009).

United States v. Stephens (5th Cir. 2007).

— 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) — 1 case

United States v. Jonathan Cooper, in Re Norman Zalkind, 872 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).

— 18 U.S.C. § 3162(h)(5) — 1 case

United States v. Gaffney (D.D.C. 2025).

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