U.S. Code » Title 18 » Part PART I— CRIMES › Chapter CHAPTER 42— EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

18 U.S.C. § 891

Definitions and rules of construction

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 18 CasesGoogle Scholar
For the purposes of this chapter:(1) To extend credit means to make or renew any loan, or to enter into any agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or claim, whether acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, and however arising, may or will be deferred.(2) The term “creditor”, with reference to any given extension of credit, refers to any person making that extension of credit, or to any person claiming by, under, or through any person making that extension of credit.(3) The term “debtor”, with reference to any given extension of credit, refers to any person to whom that extension of credit is made, or to any person who guarantees the repayment of that extension of credit, or in any manner undertakes to indemnify the creditor against loss resulting from the failure of any person to whom that extension of credit is made to repay the same.(4) The repayment of any extension of credit includes the repayment, satisfaction, or discharge in whole or in part of any debt or claim, acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, resulting from or in connection with that extension of credit.(5) To collect an extension of credit means to induce in any way any person to make repayment thereof.(6) An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.(7) An extortionate means is any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.(8) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and territories and possessions of the United States.(9) State law, including conflict of laws rules, governing the enforceability through civil judicial processes of repayment of any extension of credit or the performance of any promise given in consideration thereof shall be judicially noticed. This paragraph does not impair any authority which any court would otherwise have to take judicial notice of any matter of State law.(Added Pub. L. 90–321, title II, § 202(a), May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 160.)Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesCongressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose

Pub. L. 90–321, title II, § 201, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 159, provided that:“(a) The Congress makes the following findings:“(1) Organized crime is interstate and international in character. Its activities involve many billions of dollars each year. It is directly responsible for murders, willful injuries to person and property, corruption of officials, and terrorization of countless citizens. A substantial part of the income of organized crime is generated by extortionate credit transactions.“(2) Extortionate credit transactions are characterized by the use, or the express or implicit threat of the use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to person, reputation, or property as a means of enforcing repayment. Among the factors which have rendered past efforts at prosecution almost wholly ineffective has been the existence of exclusionary rules of evidence stricter than necessary for the protection of constitutional rights.“(3) Extortionate credit transactions are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate and foreign commerce and through the means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where extortionate credit transactions are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate and foreign commerce.“(4) Extortionate credit transactions directly impair the effectiveness and frustrate the purposes of the laws enacted by the Congress on the subject of bankruptcies.“(b) On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a) of this section, the Congress determines that the provisions of chapter 42 of title 18 of the United States Code are necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the powers of Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform and effective laws on the subject of bankruptcy.”

Annual Report to Congress by Attorney General

Pub. L. 90–321, title II, § 203, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 162, directed Attorney General to make an annual report to Congress of activities of Department of Justice in enforcement of this chapter, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 97–375, title I, § 109(b), Dec. 21, 1982, 96 Stat. 1820.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 197 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: Damon Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2018).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Damon Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2018). · cites it 10× “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 894 (a)(1). “An extortionate means is any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person,…”
United States v. Alexander Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1977). · cites it 5× “At the completion of the government’s case-in-chief and after the defense rested, appellant moved for acquittal on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence presented to prove that there had been an extension of credit as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 891 and 894. The motions…”
United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007). · cites it 2× “” 18 U.S.C. § 891 (6) (emphasis added). The states of mind of the defendant and the debtor are, therefore, both essential elements of the crime of making extortionate extensions of credit under § 892.”
Accardo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 634 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2011). · cites it 4× “Accardo again appealed to the Board, which declined to review its earlier decision and dismissed Accardo’s appeal from the order of removal.”
United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1975). · cites it 5× “See 18 U.S.C. § 891 (7). The transactions which come under the purview of this statute are normally usurious and, therefore, are unenforceable in courts of law.”
United States v. Nathan Wall (95-5007) & Donald Wall (95-5008), 92 F.3d 1444 (6th Cir. 1996). · cites it 4× “Section 891 primarily regulated intrastate activity and did not contain any jurisdictional interstate element. However, attached to it were extensive legislative findings and history that analyzed the burden that extortionate credit practices placed on interstate commerce.”
United States v. Frank Joseph, 781 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1986). · cites it 3× “” The court found that the definition of “extortionate” in 18 U.S.C. § 891 (7) had been met due to implicit threats of violence.”
United States v. Ilario M.A. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990). “18 U.S.C. § 891 (6). 10 . The evidence showed that, in respect to the $2000 "piece” of the debt which Zannino assigned to Isabella, Smoot was charged interest equivalent to 104% per annum.”
United States v. Angelo Pepe & Thomas Miglionico, United States of Am. v. Albert Joseph Facchiano, Francis Santo, Paul Santo, 747 F.2d 632 (11th Cir. 1984). · cites it 2× “” 18 U.S.C. § 891 (5) (1982). We think this is a proper definition of the term “collection” in RICO as well.”
United States v. Gale Nace & Nathan J. Warren, Sr., United States of Am. v. Ned Warren, Sr., & Gale Nace, 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1977). · cites it 3× “The issue first arose at pretrial when appellants made a motion to dismiss the indictment because, they argued, the Extortionate Credit Transactions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891 et seq., applied only to organized crime and to those seeking to enforce debts which had their origins in…”
United States v. Vito Spillone, United States of Am. v. John Clyde Abel, United States of Am. v. Frank Citro, 879 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1989). · cites it 2× “” 18 U.S.C. § 891 (6) (1982) (emphasis added).”
United States v. John Scotti, United States of Am. v. Robert Rodriguez, 47 F.3d 1237 (2d Cir. 1995). · cites it 3× “” 18 U.S.C. § 891 (7). The jury instruction that prompted Judge Nickerson to order a new trial was a “conscious avoidance” charge on the element of “knowingly participates” under § 894(a)(1).”
Show all 197 citing cases →
— 18 U.S.C. § 891(1) — 1 case
United States v. Joseph Briola, 465 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1972).
— 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) — 1 case
Singletary v. Sunbit Now LLC (E.D. Va. 2025).
— 18 U.S.C. § 891(7) — 1 case
United States v. Carvelli, 340 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.N.Y 1972).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.