25 U.S.C. § 1302
Constitutional rights
In this section, the term “offense” means a violation of a criminal law.
Nothing in this section affects the obligation of the United States, or any State government that has been delegated authority by the United States, to investigate and prosecute any criminal violation in Indian country.
Section 304(c) of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, referred to in subsec. (d)(1)(B), probably means section 234(c) of title II of Pub. L. 111–211, which is classified to section 1302a of this title. See par. (13) of H. Con. Res. 304 (111th Congress), which is not classified to the Code.
2010—Pub. L. 111–211, § 234(a)(1), designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and inserted subsec. heading.
Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 111–211, § 234(a)(2)(A), inserted “(except as provided in subsection (b))” after “assistance of counsel for his defense”. Amendment was executed to reflect the probable intent of Congress, notwithstanding errors in the directory language in quoting the text to be inserted.
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 111–211, § 234(a)(2)(B), added par. (7) and struck out former par. (7) which read as follows: “require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both;”.
Subsecs. (b) to (f). Pub. L. 111–211, § 234(a)(3), added subsecs. (b) to (f).
1986—Par. (7). Pub. L. 99–570, which directed that “for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both” be substituted for “for a term of six months and a fine of $500, or both”, was executed by making the substitution for “for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both” as the probable intent of Congress.
Pub. L. 111–211, title II, § 234(c),
Pub. L. 99–570, title IV, § 4217,
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 447
cases (27 in the last 5 years), 1969–2026 · leading case: Miranda v. Anchondo
Miranda v. Anchondo (2011)
“On habeas review, the district court concluded that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (7) (2009), 1 prohibited the tribal court from imposing consecutive sentences cumulatively exceeding one year for multiple criminal violations arising from a single criminal…”
United States v. Bryant (2016)
“25 U. S. C. §1302 (a)(7) (2006 ed.).2 Congress has since expanded tribal courts’ sentencing authority, allowing them to im- pose up to three years’ imprisonment, contingent on adop- tion of additional procedural safeguards.”
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978)
“§ 1343 (4) and 25 U. S. C. § 1302 (8). The court apparently concluded, first, that the substantive provisions of Title I impliedly authorized civil actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, and second, that the tribe was not immune from such suit.”
Kevin Howlett v. The Salish and Kootenal Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana (1976)
“Kevin Howlett and Bernard Clairmont, members of the Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana [herein Tribes] who contend that the refusal of the Tribes to declare them eligible candidates for tribal council membership deprived them of their right to travel…”
Fortino Alvarez v. Randy Tracy (2016)
“He was sentenced to five years in prison. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), tribes may not deny criminal defendants facing imprisonment “the right, upon request, to a trial by jury.”
Jessica Tavares v. Gene Whitehouse (2017)
“See also 25 U.S.C. § 1302 . Nor does the dissent explain why it would be an intrusion on tribal sovereignty to prevent a tribe from excluding non-members, but not an intrusion to prevent a tribe from excluding former or current tribe members.”
Russell Means v. Dick Wilson (1975)
“§ 1985 or 25 U.S.C. § 1302 , but rested its decision on the section 1302 claim on the determination that no claim was alleged under that section.”
State v. Madsen (2009)
“] Madsen argued below that the hotel security guards were agents of the Tribe and in that capacity were required to adhere to Fourth Amendment principles by virtue of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2). Madsen contended that violations of the reasonableness…”
United States v. Cavanaugh (2011)
“*594 The district court, recognizing that the Sixth Amendment imposes no duty on Indian tribes to provide counsel for indigent defendants, noted that the prior convictions were valid at their inception and that the prior terms of incarceration were not in violation of the United…”
Cannon v. University of Chicago (1979)
“49 , which involved Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1302 (8): "No Indian tribe .”
Gaming Corporation of America Golden Nickel Casinos, Inc. v. Dorsey & Whitney, a Partnership, in Re Dorsey & Whitney, a (1996)
“Count IX alleged that Dorsey had violated the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 . The management companies claimed damage in excess of $100 million.”
Nevada v. Hicks (2001)
“Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) makes a handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in tribal courts, 25 U. S. C. § 1302 , "the guarantees are not identical," Oliphant, 435 U.”
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) — 1 case
Janis v. Wilson (1974)
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2) — 1 case
Loncassion v. Leekity (1971)
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2)(1996) — 1 case
Nevayaktewa v. Hopi Tribe (1998)
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) — 1 case
Lomayestewa v. Hopi Tribe (2006)
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) — 1 case
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) — 8 cases
Janis v. Wilson (1974)
— 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2) — 1 case
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