28 U.S.C. § 463
Expenses of litigation
Whenever a Chief Justice, justice, judge, officer, or employee of any United States court is sued in his official capacity, or is otherwise required to defend acts taken or omissions made in his official capacity, and the services of an attorney for the Government are not reasonably available pursuant to chapter 31 of this title, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may pay the costs of his defense. The Director shall prescribe regulations for such payments subject to the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24
cases, 1938–2005 · leading case: John McBryde v. United States
John McBryde v. United States (2002)
“Because we conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted and applied 28 U.S.C. § 463 and the Compensation Clause of the United States Constitution to the undisputed facts of this case, we affirm.”
Tashima v. Administrative Office of the United States Courts (1989)
“Respondents thus concluded that “this authorization does not extend to the payment of private counsel to represent [petitioner] in challenging the local rule in question, whether the challenge is framed in terms of the rule’s constitutionality or in terms of some other asserted…”
Bryan v. Murphy (2003)
“Further statutory support for the representation of federal judges by the United States Attorney’s Office can be found at 28 U.S.C. § 463 . According to Congress, [w]henever a Chief Justice, justice, judge, officer, or employee of any United States court is sued in his [or her]…”
Hopi Tribe v. United States (2002)
“Moreover, in construing 28 U.S.C. § 463 , the court determined that the purpose of the act, preserving the independence of the judiciary, could only be upheld if a judge was entitled to an attorney at government expense.”
A. Wallace Tashima, United States District Judge v. Administrative Office of the United States Courts L. Ralph Mecham, D (1992)
“the judges of the Central District and a named defendant in these suits, requested that the AO authorize funds for him to obtain private counsel to defend him under 28 U.S.C. § 463 . Judge Tashima held the view that the challenged rule was unconstitutional, “outmoded and wrong.”
Contreras v. United States (2005)
“With the language of the text, the structure and purpose of the law, and the legislative history all against them, plaintiffs nevertheless maintain that FLEPRA is money-mandating based on cases concerning the only two statutes which the Federal Circuit has held to contain a…”
Hartmann v. Sloan (1938)
“940 , 28 U.S.C.A. § 463 . The Seventy-Fifth Congress, however, by Public Act No.”
McBryde v. United States (2001)
“This is a suit for reimbursement of litigation expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 463 (1994). Plaintiff, a United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of Texas, seeks recovery of attorneys’ expenses and fees he incurred in pursuing a mandamus action to challenge…”
United States ex rel. Angelica v. Hammond (1938)
“The Act amends 28 U.S.C.A. § 463 (a) by inserting a proviso so that it shall read thus: “In a proceeding in habeas corpus in a district court, or before a district judge, or a circuit judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the circuit court of appeals…”
Novell, Inc. v. United States (2000)
“The second problem with defendant’s reliance on Tashima is that Lifetime Communities stands for a less ambitious proposition than that advanced by defendant.”
United States ex rel. Dilling v. McDonnell (1942)
“Removal proceedings were instituted in the Western District of Pennsylvania resulting in an order of removal, a writ of habeas corpus was issued and, after hearing, discharged.”
Weinberg v. United States (1942)
“28 U.S.C.A. § 463 (a); cf. United States ex rel.”
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