28 U.S.C. § 715

Staff attorneys and technical assistants

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(a) The chief judge of each court of appeals, with the approval of the court, may appoint a senior staff attorney, who shall be subject to removal by the chief judge with the approval of the court.(b) The senior staff attorney, with the approval of the chief judge, may appoint necessary staff attorneys and secretarial and clerical employees in such numbers as the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may approve, but in no event may the number of staff attorneys exceed the number of positions expressly authorized in an annual appropriation Act. The senior staff attorney may remove such staff attorneys and secretarial and clerical employees with the approval of the chief judge.(c) The chief judge of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with the approval of the court, may appoint a senior technical assistant who shall be subject to removal by the chief judge with the approval of the court.(d) The senior technical assistant, with the approval of the court, may appoint necessary technical assistants in such number as the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may approve, but in no event may the number of technical assistants in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exceed the number of circuit judges in regular active service within such circuit. The senior technical assistant may remove such technical assistants with the approval of the court.(Added Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 120(c)(1), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 34.)Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as an Effective Date of 1982 Amendment note under section 171 of this title.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 2 cases, 1931–1946 · leading case: Blackmer v. United States

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Blackmer v. United States (1931) cadc “” Section 5 (28 USCA § 715) as we have already ruled, authorizes the quasi in rem proceeding whenever property of the recusing witness may be attached, but the contumacy of the witness depends, not upon the ownership of property, but upon the question whether he, without cause,…”

Arkansas State Board of Optometry v. Dodge (1946) ark “As the witness is liable to punishment by fine if, upon the hearing, lie is found guilty of contempt, no reason appears why his property may not be seized to provide security for the payment of the penalty.”

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