29 U.S.C. § 1001a

Additional Congressional findings and declaration of policy

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(a) Effects of multiemployer pension plansThe Congress finds that—(1) multiemployer pension plans have a substantial impact on interstate commerce and are affected with a national public interest;(2) multiemployer pension plans have accounted for a substantial portion of the increase in private pension plan coverage over the past three decades;(3) the continued well-being and security of millions of employees, retirees, and their dependents are directly affected by multiemployer pension plans; and(4)(A) withdrawals of contributing employers from a multiemployer pension plan frequently result in substantially increased funding obligations for employers who continue to contribute to the plan, adversely affecting the plan, its participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management relations, and(B) in a declining industry, the incidence of employer withdrawals is higher and the adverse effects described in subparagraph (A) are exacerbated.(b) Modification of multiemployer plan termination insurance provisions and replacement of programThe Congress further finds that—(1) it is desirable to modify the current multiemployer plan termination insurance provisions in order to increase the likelihood of protecting plan participants against benefit losses; and(2) it is desirable to replace the termination insurance program for multiemployer pension plans with an insolvency-based benefit protection program that will enhance the financial soundness of such plans, place primary emphasis on plan continuation, and contain program costs within reasonable limits.(c) PolicyIt is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act—(1) to foster and facilitate interstate commerce,(2) to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans,(3) to provide reasonable protection for the interests of participants and beneficiaries of financially distressed multiemployer pension plans, and(4) to provide a financially self-sufficient program for the guarantee of employee benefits under multiemployer plans.(Pub. L. 96–364, § 3, Sept. 26, 1980, 94 Stat. 1209.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

This Act, referred to in subsec. (c), is Pub. L. 96–364, Sept. 26, 1980, 94 Stat. 1208, known as the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1980 Amendment note set out under section 1001 of this title and Tables.

Codification

Section was enacted as part of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, and not as part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 which comprises this chapter.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective Sept. 26, 1980, see section 1461(e)(1) of this title.

Study and Report Respecting Collective Bargaining for Contributions to, and Benefits From, Multiemployer Plans

Pub. L. 96–364, title IV, § 412(b), Sept. 26, 1980, 94 Stat. 1309, directed Secretary of Labor to study feasibility of requiring collective bargaining on both issues of contributions to, and benefits from, multiemployer plans, and submit a report on the study to Congress within 3 years of Sept. 26, 1980.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 63 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: United Food & Commercial Workers Union-Employer Pension Fund v. Rubber Associates, Inc.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union-Employer Pension Fund v. Rubber Associates, Inc. (2016) ca6 · cites it 2× “29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c). In light of these objectives, ERISA provides four statutory methods for calculating withdrawal liability: (1) the presumptive method, (2) the modified presumptive method, (3) the rolling-5 method, and (4) the direct attribution method.”
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Findlay Indus., Inc. (2018) ca6 “See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a ; PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co.”
Ralph Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. And Revised Pension Plan of Michael Schiavone& Sons, Inc. (1982) ca2 · cites it 2× “As the emphasis illustrates, and as the policy of Congress — “many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits,” 29 U.S.C. § 1001a (1976 & Pub.L.No.96-364, § 3, 94 Stat.”
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co. (1988) scotus “1209 , 29 U. S. C. § 1001a (a)(4). 9 See MPPAA § 104, 94 Stat.”
Trustees of the Amalgamated Insurance Fund v. McFarlin's, Inc. (1986) ca2 “” MPPAA § 3(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4). Congress was concerned that, unless a withdrawing employer assumed such a liability, the remaining employer participants would be unable to shoulder the increased burden caused by the withdrawal, which might lead to a collapse of the…”
Carpenters Southern California Administrative Corp. v. El Capitan Development Co. (1991) cal · cites it 2× “" (29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(3), (4).) The express preemption clause in ERISA is directed at state law generally, including both statutory and decisional law.”
In Re Pulaski Highway Express, Inc. (1986) tnmb · cites it 2× “MPPAA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c) (1985). 5 It is defined as the amount of “unfunded vested benefits” allo-cable to the employer, subject to certain adjustments not relevant here.”
Louis F. Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (1983) ca7 “29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1981).”
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. (1995) scotus “MPPAA helped eliminate this problem by changing the strategic considerations. It transformed what was only a risk (that a withdrawing employer would have to pay a fair share of underfunding) into a certainty.”
Board of Trustees, Michigan United Food and Commercial Workers Unions and Food Employers Joint Pension Fund v. Eberhard (1987) ca6 · cites it 2× “§ 1001a, expressly states that “withdrawals of contributing employers from a multiemployer pension plan frequently result in substantially increased funding obligations for employers who continue to contribute to the plan, adversely affecting the plan, its participants and…”
SUPERVALU, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Southwestern Pennsylvania & Western Maryland Area Teamsters & Employers Pens (2007) ca3 “” 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a). It intended for the MPPAA to uniformly impose withdrawal liability and to “ ‘relieve the funding burden on remaining employers and to eliminate the incentive to pull out of a plan which would result if liability were imposed only on a mass withdrawal by…”
Shelter Framing Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (1983) ca9 “1208 (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001a et seq. (Supp. V 1981).”
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(4)(A) — 2 cases
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a) — 2 cases
SUPERVALU, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Southwestern Pennsylvania & Western Maryland Area Teamsters & Employers Pens (2007) ca3 “” 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a). It intended for the MPPAA to uniformly impose withdrawal liability and to “ ‘relieve the funding burden on remaining employers and to eliminate the incentive to pull out of a plan which would result if liability were imposed only on a mass withdrawal by…”
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(3) — 2 cases
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4) — 9 cases
Trustees of the Amalgamated Insurance Fund v. McFarlin's, Inc. (1986) ca2 “” MPPAA § 3(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4). Congress was concerned that, unless a withdrawing employer assumed such a liability, the remaining employer participants would be unable to shoulder the increased burden caused by the withdrawal, which might lead to a collapse of the…”
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. (1995) scotus “MPPAA helped eliminate this problem by changing the strategic considerations. It transformed what was only a risk (that a withdrawing employer would have to pay a fair share of underfunding) into a certainty.”
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4)(A) — 11 cases
Louis F. Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (1983) ca7 “29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1981).”
Board of Trustees, Michigan United Food and Commercial Workers Unions and Food Employers Joint Pension Fund v. Eberhard (1987) ca6 “§ 1001a, expressly states that “withdrawals of contributing employers from a multiemployer pension plan frequently result in substantially increased funding obligations for employers who continue to contribute to the plan, adversely affecting the plan, its participants and…”
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4)(B) — 2 cases
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(b)(2) — 1 case
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c) — 9 cases
In Re Pulaski Highway Express, Inc. (1986) tnmb “MPPAA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c) (1985). 5 It is defined as the amount of “unfunded vested benefits” allo-cable to the employer, subject to certain adjustments not relevant here.”
United Food & Commercial Workers Union-Employer Pension Fund v. Rubber Associates, Inc. (2016) ca6 “29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c). In light of these objectives, ERISA provides four statutory methods for calculating withdrawal liability: (1) the presumptive method, (2) the modified presumptive method, (3) the rolling-5 method, and (4) the direct attribution method.”
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(1) — 1 case
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(2) — 4 cases
— 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(3) — 3 cases
Carpenters Southern California Administrative Corp. v. El Capitan Development Co. (1991) cal “" (29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(3), (4).) The express preemption clause in ERISA is directed at state law generally, including both statutory and decisional law.”
United Food & Commercial Workers Union-Employer Pension Fund v. Rubber Associates, Inc. (2016) ca6 “29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c). In light of these objectives, ERISA provides four statutory methods for calculating withdrawal liability: (1) the presumptive method, (2) the modified presumptive method, (3) the rolling-5 method, and (4) the direct attribution method.”
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