47 U.S.C. § 407

Order for payment of money; petition for enforcement; procedure; order of Commission as prima facie evidence; costs; attorneys’ fees

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If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the district court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the line of the carrier runs, or in any State court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties, a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages, and the order of the Commission in the premises. Such suit in the district court of the United States shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that on the trial of such suits the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless they accrue upon his appeal. If the petitioner shall finally prevail, he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 27 cases, 1980–2016 · leading case: NetworkIP, LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 548 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

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NetworkIP, LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 548 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2008). · cites it 4× “Like § 407 does, § 16(2) allowed "any person for whose benefit [an agency's] order was made" (an "adjudged-injured party") to file a suit against a party who "d[id] not comply with an order for the repayment of money" (an "adjudged-injuring party").”

Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). · cites it 2× “" 47 U. S. C. § 407 . There was identical language in § 3(p) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.”

Watts v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 482 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “We therefore look to the Administrative Procedure Act, as we have done before when an agency’s direct-review statute did not define “order.”

Sherman Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., No. 05-2733 Cv, 436 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006). “§ 214 (c) (authorizing injunction by any court of general jurisdiction for extension of lines or discontinuation of services contrary to certificates of public convenience and necessity); 47 U.S.C. § 407 (authorizing suit in federal court or state court of general jurisdiction…”

Int'l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Commc'ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997). “§ 214 (c) (authorizing injunction by any court of general jurisdiction for extension of lines or discontinuation of services contrary to certificates of public convenience and necessity); 47 U.S.C. § 407 (authorizing suit in federal court or state court of general jurisdiction…”

Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consum. Advocates v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 457 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2006). “47 U.S.C. § 407 (a). The Hobbs Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to “determine the validity of [ ] all final orders of the [Commission].”

Chair King, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees v. Houston Cellular Corp., Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Karen Laake, Etc., 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997). “§ 214 (c) (authorizing any court of general jurisdiction to issue injunction for extension of lines or discontinuation of services); 47 U.S.C. § 407 (authorizing suit in federal or state court of general jurisdiction for common carrier’s failure to comply with order of payment);…”

Erienet, Inc. Sandra MacKenzie John Knauer Frank Mezler, Jr. v. Velocity Net, Inc. Thomas Dylewski Chad Ferenack, 156 F.3d 513 (3rd Cir. 1998). “§ 214 (c) (any court of competent jurisdiction may issue injunction); 47 U.S.C. § 407 (authorizing suit for carrier’s noncompliance with order for payment in United States district court or in any state court of general jurisdiction); 47 U.”

Harold Nordlicht, on Behalf of Himself & All Others Similarly Situated v. New York Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1986). “1980), states that "the [Communications] Act vests exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages for statutory violations of the Act in the federal courts or the FCC, 47 U.S.C. § 407 ." The citation to section 407, which concerns district court jurisdiction to enforce…”

Diane W. Oates & Deborah S. Wogan v. Beverly W. Oates, Andrew M. Fishman, Former-Defendant, 866 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1989). “Examples cited include section 407 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 407 (“a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed as a part of the costs of the suit”) (emphasis added), section 3, subd.”

Foster v. Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 174 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y 1997). “In Rule 54(d)(2), the mechanism for obtaining such an award is set forth, providing that, in general, “[cjlaims for attorneys’ fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made by motion .”

Montgomery & Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n & Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc. & Gilbert Kaap, 816 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “, 47 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) (Communications Act of 1934) (substantially identical language).”

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