Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 412 P.2d 449 (Utah 1966). · Go Syfert
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Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 412 P.2d 449 (Utah 1966). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Peeples v. State of Utah (utahctapp, 2004-09-23)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peeples v. State of Utah (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Finally, as complained of by the State, it is undeniably brief. 4 Peeples’s satisfaction of these factors complies with the “brief statement of the facts” requirement of the Act. 5 ¶ 11 Even if we were to view the brevity of Peeples’s claim as a defect, “defects in the form or content of notices of claim do not always act to bar a claim.” Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct.App.1994); cf. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362 , 412 P.2d 449, 450 (1966) (finding sufficient notice of claim despite f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brittain v. State Ex Rel. Utah Department of Employment Security (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
While defects in the form or content of notices of claim do not always act to bar a claim, see Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 363-64 , 412 P.2d 449, 450 (1966), courts have consistently barred claims in situations where either no notice or only one of the two required notices was filed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Standard Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride
Utah · 1991 · confidence medium
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) (Medical Malpractice Act’s notice provision intended to allow parties opportunity to resolve claims prior to filing of action); Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 363 , 412 P.2d 449, 450 (1966) (notice requirement under Governmental Immunity Act intended to give governmental entity opportunity to conduct inquiry).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Johnson v. City of Bountiful (2×)
D. Utah · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362 , 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (excusing failure to state amount of damages under prior statute that required claim to be filed within SO days on grounds that damages could not be known by then); Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) (holding notice of claim for physical and emotional distress resulting from alleged assault and battery at the hands of police officers was insufficient description of nature of claim asserted).
Frances SPENCER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent
10485.
Utah Supreme Court.
Mar 18, 1966.
412 P.2d 449
Thomas A. Duffin, Salt Lake City, for appellant., Homer Holmgren, City Atty., A. M. Marsden, Asst. City Atty., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
McDonough, Henriod, Crockett, Wade, Callister.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
McDonough, Justice:

Plaintiff Frances Spencer sued Salt Lake City alleging that on the night 'of June 27, 1964, she suffered injuries when she tripped and fell on a defective sidewalk where tree roots had raised it about four to six inches in front of 463 Douglas Street.

Our statutes impose upon the City the duty of maintenance of streets arid sidewalks, and it is established that the City is liable for negligence in performing this duty; see Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114. Section 10-7-77, U.C.A.1953 provides that a person must file a claim within 30 days after the injury.

At pre-trial the district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss on the ground (a) that the plaintiff had not filed her claim within 30 days; and (b) that the claim which was filed was insufficient in that it did not state the amount of damages claimed.

As to (a), it is alleged that the accident occurred on June 27, 1964. The claim is dated July 25, 1964, and was filed with the City Recorder on July 27, 1964. This is within the 30 days allowed by the statute.

As to (b): The claim gave the time, place and stated generally the nature of the alleged defect and the injury. Even if the fact that the. amount of damages was not stated be regarded as a defect, that[*364] surely should not be considered as rendering the claim a complete nullity. There is a wide difference between presenting no claim at all and presenting one of the kind shown here which evidently fulfills the main purpose of the statute: of giving the City the essential facts as soon as reasonably possible after the injury so that it will have ample opportunity to make a proper investigation. See Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213. In such circumstances as this it is the duty of the court to look to substance rather than to technicality in order that plaintiff may have a fair adjudication of her claim. It seems unreasonable and captious to deprive her entirely of that opportunity for failing to specify the amount of damages she suffered within 30 days of her injury when it is obvious that neither she nor anyone else would know just what those figures were at that time.

Inasmuch as the plaintiff filed her claim within the 30 days allowed by statute, and the claim was sufficient to constitute substantial compliance with the statute and apprise the City of the essentials thereof, it is our opinion that the dismissal was in error. It is vacated and the case remanded for trial. No costs awarded.

HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, WADE, and CALLISTER, JJ. concur.