Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980). · Go Syfert
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Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
48 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Taylor v. Taylor (utah, 2022-08-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Taylor (2×)
Utah · 2022 · confidence medium
But that does not end our inquiry. ¶42 ―If,‖ after looking at plain language, ―there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions‖ at issue, Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980), ―we attempt to construe [the provisions] in harmony, and such that ‗effect is given to every provision,‘‖ I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110 , ¶ 26, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted); see also Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1998) (―[I]t is the Court‘s duty to harmonize and reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court cannot presume th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Schofield
Utah · 2002 · confidence medium
Furthermore, “[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same stat- *670 ute and ‘with other statutes under the same and related chapters.’ ” Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 17 , 5 P.3d 616 (quoting Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (further citations omitted)); see also Silver v. Auditing Div., 820 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). ¶ 9 The plain language of the statute in question creates two classes of offenders for…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Burns
Utah · 2000 · confidence medium
George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Price Development Co., LP v. Orem City
Utah · 2000 · confidence medium
See id.; see also Business Aviation of South Dakota, Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1994) (holding that statutory language must be read in the context of the complete act); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980) (holding that where provisions of an act are ambiguous, court must analyze act in its entirety). ¶ 14 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there are no provisions within *1244 the Development Act which specifically preempt the entire field of economic planning.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lyon v. Burton (2×)
Utah · 2000 · confidence medium
The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and "with other statutes under the same and related chapters." Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Silver v. Auditing Div., 820 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evans v. State
Utah · 1998 · confidence medium
George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)). *185 Looking at the statute’s language, we find that the term “subject to regulation” is ambiguous.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement District
Utah · 1998 · confidence medium
George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission (2×)
Utah · 1997 · confidence medium
George-Dixie Lodge #1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)), cert: denied, 510 U.S. 869 , 114 S.Ct. 195 , 126 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wall (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
The dissent asserts that cases issued by the supreme court after Ivie cite to Jones as good law, citing Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981), Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981), and Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) De Baritault Ex Rel. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp.
Utah · 1996 · confidence medium
In addition, “ ‘if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.’ ” Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) V-1 Oil Co. v. Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Environmental Response & Remediation
Utah Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Additionally, “ ‘[i]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission
Utah · 1995 · confidence medium
George-Dixie Lodge # 1713, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (“If doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act’s provisions, the court should analyze the act in its entirety and ‘harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.’ ” (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 1743
Utah · 1993 · confidence medium
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980); see also Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ("This Court’s primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to give effect to the legislature’s underlying intent." (citations omitted)); Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Souza (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Third, “ ‘[i]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.’ ” Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1087, 1045 (Utah 1991) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Commission
Utah Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
"If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.” Osuala v. Aetna Lije & Casualty Co., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). 7 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Vigil
Utah · 1992 · confidence medium
E.g., Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ferro v. Utah Department of Commerce (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Utah Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
The Division’s interpretation is also supported by another cardinal rule of construction: “If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.” Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Butterfield Lumber, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp.
Utah Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
If ambiguity exists, “it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in the light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.” Ward v. Richfield, 798 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1990) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort
Utah · 1991 · confidence medium
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted). 43 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ward v. Richfield City
Utah · 1990 · confidence medium
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) McCaffery v. Grow (3×) also: Cited "see"
Utah Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
However, "[a]n important aspect of the Act is the requirement that the PIP protections for an injured motorist are to be paid by his own insurer." Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. (2×)
Utah · 1989 · confidence medium
Although legislative intent is important, see Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980), the best indication of legislative intent is the statute's plain language.
cited Cited "see" Evinger v. Greeley Gas Co.
Colo. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980).
cited Cited "see" Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking
Utah · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, Utah, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Board of Education of the Granite School District v. Salt Lake County (2×)
Utah · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Osuala v. Aetna Lite and Casualty, Utah, 608 P.2d 242 (1980) which held that statutes should be harmonized in order to carry out the intent and purpose of the law.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Broadcast International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission
Utah Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980) ("If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.”). 6 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Disconnection of Certain Territory From Highland City (2×)
Utah · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, Utah, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (1980).
Oscar OSUALA, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY, a Corporation, Defendant and Respondent
16491.
Utah Supreme Court.
Mar 4, 1980.
608 P.2d 242
Richard Richards, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant., Richard Campbell, Ogden, for defendant and respondent.
Crockett, Hall, Maughan, Stewart, Wilkins.
Cited by 40 opinions  |  Published
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff Oscar Osuala, an uninsured motorist who was injured in an automobile collision with a truck driven by Clark Olson and owned by Olson Construction Co., [1] brought this action against the construction company’s insurer, Aetna Life & Casualty, to obtain personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. [2]

The trial court agreed with the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff was neither an insured, nor a person entitled to protection under the insurance policy the defendant had issued on the Olson truck, and consequently granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff appeals, contending that he is entitled to recover by virtue of section 31 — 41-6 of the Act:

Every insurance policy . . . shall provide personal injury protection providing for payments to the insured and to all other persons suffering personal injury arising out of an accident involving any motor vehicle, except as otherwise provided in this act, in at least the following minimum amounts .

The plaintiff relies on the general language of that section and asserts that the purpose of our no-fault law is to require everyone to provide coverage for others who might be injured as a result of an automobile accident and that the only exceptions to section 31 — 41-6 are provided in section 31-41-10,[*243] which he claims are not applicable in this case. [3]

The defendant’s sound rejoinder is that the general statement of the above quoted section must be considered in connection with the more specific and limiting language of the next succeeding section, 31-41-7, which reads:

(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be applicable to :
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured in an accident in this state involving any motor vehicle.
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occurring in this state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedestrian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle. [All emphasis added.]

The defendant’s argument is that since Section 7 specifically provides that only three classes of persons are covered, and that the plaintiff falls within none of them, that is, he is neither an insured, nor an occupant of an insured vehicle, nor a pedestrian injured in an accident involving an insured vehicle, he is not entitled to receive no-fault benefits from the insurer of the other vehicle involved (defendant Aetna Life & Casualty Co.).

There are some cardinal rules of statutory construction to be considered in relation to this controversy. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, [4] in the light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. [5] A further basic rule to be applied in connection therewith is that specific provisions prevail over more general expressions. [6]

The stated purposes of the No-Fault Insurance Act are to effectuate savings in the ever-increasing costs of automobile insurance, and to minimize the difficulties and hardships that often result from delays in the determination of fault, by providing for expeditious payment to injured persons of certain basic expenses and loss of income (referred to as PIP’s) without regard to fault. [7]

In regard to the plaintiff’s urgence that the no-fault law is intended to provide coverage for others who might be injured as a result of an automobile accident, it is pertinent to observe that he himself has not met that requirement, because he was driving without insurance. An important aspect of the Act is the requirement that the PIP protections for an injured motorist are to be paid by his own insurer. [8] To permit the plaintiff to violate the Act, [9] and never[*244] theless insist upon compensation from the other motorist’s insurer, regardless of fault, would reward him for his wrong, and would tend to defeat the purposes of the Act.

On the basis of our discussion herein as to the rules of statutory construction, and of the purposes of the No-Fault Act, it is our conclusion that the trial court was correct in its ruling that the plaintiff was not covered by the policy of insurance issued by the defendant to the Olson Construction Company, and in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.

Affirmed. Costs to defendant.

MAUGHAN, WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.
1

. The accident occurred near Ogden on July 12, 1978 when the plaintiff collided with the rear of the tryck driven by Mr. Olson.

2

. 31-41-1 et seq., U.C.A., 1953.

3

. That section allows insurers to exclude those persons from coverage who: (1) sustain an injury while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured which is not insured under the policy; (2) operate the vehicle either without the expressed or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession of it; and (3) intentionally cause injury to themselves or sustain an injury while committing a felony.

4

. Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah.2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Barnes, Colo., 552 P.2d 300 (1976); Easom v. Farmers Ins. Co., 221 Kan. 415, 560 P.2d 117 (1977); Matter of Estate of Hutchinson, Alaska, 577 P.2d 1074 (1978).

5

. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., Utah, 559 P.2d 958 (1977).

6

. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, Okl., 328 P.2d 414 (1958); Matter of Estate of Hutchinson, supra, note 5.

7

. See statement in 31^41-2.

8

. See statements in Am.Jur.2d New Topic Service, No-Fault Insurance, sections 1, 2, and 8; Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., Utah, 592 P.2d 609 (1979); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Newcomb Hospital v. Fountain, 141 N.J.Super. 291, 357 A.2d 836, 837 (1976); Marc-Charles v. Krug, 93 Misc.2d 603, 403 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1978). This is said in awareness that, under Section 31-41-11, this responsibility may be ultimately shifted to a wrongdoer who causes the injury.

9

. 31-41-4(1) requires every resident owner of a motor vehicle to have no-fault coverage. That a failure to do so is a misdemeanor, see 31 — 41— 13(1).