Flanary v. Commonwealth, 112 S.E. 604 (Va. 1922). · Go Syfert
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 112 S.E. 604 (Va. 1922). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kevin Diaz Gomez, s/k/a Kevin Diaz-Gomez v. Commonwealth of Virginia (vactapp, 2020-06-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1922 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1922 1974 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kevin Diaz Gomez, s/k/a Kevin Diaz-Gomez v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
See also Booth v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 794, 795-96 (1936) (holding that the defendant’s variance argument was without merit because he made it “for the first time on appeal”); Honaker v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 752, 755 (1923) (declining to consider the defendant’s “objection to the sufficiency of the indictment” because it lacked the date of the offense, when the defendant made “no demurrer or exception, nor [asked for] any instruction”); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 665, 667-68 (1922) (holding that the defendant could not argue on appeal “that the indictment is defective…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Taylor
Chesapeake Cir. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 665, 667 , 112 S.E. 604, 604 (1922) (quoting Va. Const., Art.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Saifullah K. Niazi v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Puckett v. -9- Commonwealth, 134 Va. 574, 584-85 , 113 S.E. 853, 856 (1922); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 665, 667 , 112 S.E. 604, 604 (1922).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wolfe v. Commonwealth
Va. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 713 , 324 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1985); Washington v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 185, 192 , 217 S.E.2d 815, 822 (1975); Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 550, 551 , 186 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1972); McDougal v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 547, 549 , 186 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1972); Forester v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 764, 767 , 173 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1970); Council v. Smyth, 201 Va. 135, 138 , 109 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1959); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 822 , 71 S.E.2d 368, 372 (1952); Honaker v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 752, 754 , 118 S.E. 85, 86 (1923); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 133 Va.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Grier v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 665, 667-68 , 112 S.E. 604, 604 (1922).
discussed Cited "see" Woods v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1924 · signal: see · confidence high
See Flanary’s Case, 133 Va. 655 , 112 S. E. 604 .” The necessity for the appellate court to pass upon an assignment of error of the character just disposed of will never arise if the atorneys for the Commonwealth will only be diligent in the inspection of the indictments before they are handed to the grand jury and see that the essential dates are inserted.
discussed Cited "see" Puckett v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. · 1922 · signal: see · confidence high
See Flanary’s Case, 133 Va. 665 , 112 S. E. 604 . 3.
Flanary
v.
Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Jun 20, 1922.
112 S.E. 604
W. S. Cox, for the plaintiff in error., John B. Saunders, Attorney-General, J. D. Hank, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, and Leon M. Bazile, Second Assistant Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth.
Burks.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
Burks, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of unlawfully transporting ardent spirits, upon an indictment which charged that the offense was committed on the --------------------day of.....:.........................., in the year nineteen hundred and ............. There was no demurrer or other objection to the indictment until after a verdict of conviction, which was abundantly supported by the testimony. The plaintiff in error then moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence, but the motion was overruled, and this is the only error assigned.

The motion came too late. Section 4879 of the Code provides that, “Judgment in any criminal case shall not be arrested or reversed upon any exception or objection, made after a verdict, to the indictment or other accusation, unless it be in violation of the Constitution.” The revisors, in their note to this section, say: “As this section stood before the revision, it read as follows: ‘Judgment in any criminal case, after a verdict, shall not be arrested or reversed upon any exception to the indictment or other accusation, if the offense be charged therein with sufficient cer[*667] tainty for judgment to be given tbereon, according to the very right of the ease.’ The new language is intended to be broader than the old, preserving, however, as it must, constitutional rights.”

Certainly, the language of the indictment is sufficiently certain to enable the court to give judgment thereon' “according to the very right of the case,” and does not violate any constitutional right of the accused. It is true, as claimed, that he had the right to demand “the cause and nature of his accusation,” but he made no such demand by demurrer, objection, motion to quash, calling for a bill of particulars, or in any other manner, and the indictment accurately charged him with the offense in every particular except as to the date of the commission of the offense. If this objection had been raised, it could have been corrected at the bar by the prosecuting attorney on mere motion. Code, section 4876, provides: “An amendment of any defect in an indictment or presentment for a misdemeanor that does not change the nature of the offense charged, may be made by the court before which the trial is had, at any time before judgment is entered; but if such amendment operates as a surprise to the defendant, he shall be entitled, upon request, to a continuance of the case.”

Technically, the indictment should have alleged the commission of the offense within twelve months prior to the finding of the indictment, and the failure to make such allegation was fatal to the indictment, independently of statute, but section 4879 was intended to meet such cases, and to require persons charged with crime to assert their rights and to make their defenses before verdict, and thereafter to cut off all defenses not made before verdict unless prohibited by the Constitution. The Constitution gives to the[*668] accused the right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, and this right cannot be taken away from him, but there is no inhibition on the legislature to fix a stage of the procedure beyond which he cannot go in the assertion of his constitutional right. He must be given a full and fair opportunity of asserting his tight, but after this has been afforded him and he has failed to avail himself of it, he cannot complain. Within the limits mentioned, the order. in which. defenses shall be presented, and the stages at which they may be forbidden, is entirely within the powers of the legislature. In the instant case, the accused having taken his chances before the jury and lost, cannot now raise the objection that the indictment is defective for failure to state the time of the commission of the offense.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Scott county is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.