Cheski v. Arlington Cnty. Pub. Schs., 434 S.E.2d 353 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). · Go Syfert
Cheski v. Arlington Cnty. Pub. Schs., 434 S.E.2d 353 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
96 citation events (63 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Corporate Operations, d/b/a Sunrise Senior Living v. Elizabeth Nassar (vactapp, 2023-12-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Corporate Operations, d/b/a Sunrise Senior Living v. Elizabeth Nassar
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 (1993)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jennifer Johnson, Widow of David Johnson v. General Dynamics Corp.and New Hampshire Ins. Company (3×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Public Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938-39 (1993)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Alberto Gomez v. Garcia Construction Company, Inc. and American States Insurance Company
Va. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cochran Industries VA and Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Timothy M. Meadows
Va. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va.App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (quoting Redmond, 12 Va.App. at 614 , 405 S.E.2d at 634 ); see also Colgan, 36 Va.App. at 505 , 553 S.E.2d at 150-51 (affirming the commission’s decision to accept, as a claim, a signed, handwritten note and a mostly complete copy of the First Report of Injury even though the documents did not contain all of the “should set forth” elements of Commission Rule 1:1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Dealer's Lot, Inc. and Erie Insurance Exchange v. Lydia Carol Jenkins
Va. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Sch., 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993) (quoting John Driggs Co. v. Somers, 228 Va. 729, 734 , 324 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1985)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hampton Inn v. King (3×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
However, “the doctrine of imposition does not apply where a carrier’s or employer’s acts are consistent with an endeavor to comply with the Act.” Odom, 20 Va.App. at 234 , 456 S.E.2d at 143 (citing Cheski v. Arlington County Public Schools, 16 Va.App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Masonite Holdings, Inc. v. Cubbage
Va. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va.App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (emphasis in original)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wainwright v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va.App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (quoting Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va.App. 610, 614 , 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gladys D. Morton v. Joseph A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. and Centennial Insurance Company
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (quoting Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610, 614 , 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joseph A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. and Centennial Insurance Company v. Gladys D. Morton
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (quoting Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610, 614 , 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nelson County Schools & Compmanagement, Inc. v. Woodson
Va. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va.App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Giant Food Inc. and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Joann Webb
Va. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610, 614 , 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert Dale Burroughs v. Frederick (County of ) School Board
Va. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carol Remington v. Global One Communication
Va. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Patricia F. Mills v. Falling Creek Sportswear, Inc.
Va. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sharon Kay Dalton v. Dept of ABC/Commonwealth of VA
Va. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ronald W. Craft v. Commercial Courier Express, etc
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Massey Builders Supply Corp. v. Colgan (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va.App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freny Werbinski v. City of Norfolk Police Dept.
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
IMPOSITION The doctrine of imposition "empowers the commission in appropriate cases to render decisions based on justice shown by the total circumstances even though no fraud, mistake or concealment has been shown." Avon Products, Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7 , 415 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992). - 5 - The commission correctly held that the doctrine of imposition did not apply because the Department's actions were "consistent with those of an employer endeavoring to comply with the Act. [The Department] did not use superior knowledge and economic power to achieve the payment of less benefits than re…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Strong v. Old Dominion Power Co.
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Cheski v. Arlington County Public Schools, 16 Va.App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jenkins v. Ford Motor Co. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va.App. 936, 939 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gerald Albert Adkins v. Nabisco Biscuit
Va. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Butler v. City of Virginia Beach
Va. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
See Somers, 228 Va. at 734-35 , 324 S.E.2d at 697 ; Odom, 20 Va.App. at 235 , 456 S.E.2d at 143 ; Cheski v. Arlington County Public Schools, 16 Va.App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C&S Sovran Corp. v. Sally Stevens
Va. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Also, it must 'fairly apprise the commission that a claim [is] being made.'" Cheski v. Arlington County Public Schools, 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993) (quoting Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610, 614 , 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Linda P. Williams v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.
Va. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Employer did not use superior knowledge and economic power to achieve the payment of less benefits than required by the Act." Cheski v. Arlington Co. Public Schools, 16 Va. App. 936, 940 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kathy A.M. Sexton v. Sentara Norfolk Gen. Hosp etal
Va. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Schs., 16 Va. App. 936, 938 , 434 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1993).
examined Cited "see" Home Beneficial Corporation v. M.M. Jackson (4×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 938 , 434 S.E.2d at 354 .
JANE DUCKWORTH CHESKI
v.
ARLINGTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Et Al.
Record No. 2481-92-4.
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Aug 24, 1993.
434 S.E.2d 353
Counsel, George C. Towner, Jr., for appellant., (Russell G. Henshall; Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, on brief), for appellee.
Barrow.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

Opinion

BARROW, J.

The appellant, an employee of Arlington County Public Schools, appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission barring her claim because she did not file it with the commission within the time required by law. Because the evidence fails to establish, as a matter of law, that she, or anyone on her behalf, filed her claim within the time allowed, that the employer induced her to refrain from filing a claim, or that the employer caused her to refrain from filing a claim, we affirm the commission’s decision.

The employee, a teacher’s aide, suffered a herniated disc in a work related accident. She submitted a “Notice of Injury/Illness” report and an “Investigation” report with the employer. She selected a physician from an panel of physicians approved by the employer.

[*938] She obtained medical care for her injury from physicians approved by the employer. The physician she initially chose treated her for approximately four months. When she became dissatisfied with his care, she changed physicians, later obtaining the consent of the employer.

The employee received various correspondence concerning her disability. This correspondence included a letter from the employer advising her to submit a physician’s certificate regarding her absences from work, a letter from a vocational rehabilitation consultant requiring her to have an examination, and a “blue letter” from the commission. She identified á copy of the “blue letter” which instructed her of the necessity to file a claim.

The employee did not file a claim with the commission during the two years following the accident. Approximately two-and a half years after the accident, the employer’s insurance carrier notified her that it would no longer provide medical treatment or compensation for her injury. Five months later she retained an attorney and filed an application for a hearing before the commission.

CLAIM FILED

We are unable to conclude, as urged by the employee, that information sufficient to constitute a claim was filed with the commission. Neither the material she gave to her employer nor copies of two letters written to the employee by the employer’s agent that were sent to the commission are sufficient to constitute a claim.

A claim for an employee’s right to compensation must be filed with the commission within two years of the accident. Code § 65.2-601. This requirement is satisfied only by filing the claim with the commission, not by filing it with the employer or anyone else. By giving information and filing reports with her employer, the employee did not satisfy the requirement that the claim be filed with the commission, regardless of her belief that this would constitute the filing of a claim for workers’ compensation. See id.

Such a claim must identify the employer, the date of the accident, the location of the accident, and the injuries suffered. Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610, 614, 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991). Also, it must “fairly apprise the commission that a claim [is] being made.” Id. The two letters from the employer’s risk management administrator to the employee do not constitute a claim because[*939] they do not identify the location of the accident or the injuries suffered. More importantly, they do not apprise the commission that a claim on behalf of the employee is being made.

ESTOPPEL

An employer’s voluntary payment of compensation estops the employer from asserting the statute of limitations if the employer makes representations to the employee that induce the employee to refrain from filing a claim with the commission. Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25, 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff’d, 245 Va. 337, 428 S.E.2d 905 (1993). The representation need not be false and the employer need not intend to induce the employee to rely on the representation. Id. “[Pjroof of a representation, reliance, change of position, and detriment is sufficient to establish equitable estoppel.” Id. An employee, however, is “deemed not prejudiced if ... he has received after the accident a workers’ compensation guide ... or a notice” describing the need to file a claim with the commission. Code § 65.2-602.

The commission made various factual findings related to the employee’s contention that the employer induced her to refrain from filing a claim. It found that the employer did not advise the employee that she should not file a claim with the commission; that the employee did not rely on a letter from the employer telling her that any medical treatment required because of her accident would be covered by workers’ compensation; that no document, other than that letter, was sufficient to mislead her; and that the employee received a letter from the commission instructing her of the need to file a claim with the commission. Credible evidence supports these findings; therefore, we are bound by them. Code § 65.2-706; Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 411, 302 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1983). Consequently, unless we can conclude, as a matter of law, that other evidence sustains the employee’s burden of proving that representations made by the employer induced the employee to refrain from filing a claim with the commission, we must affirm the commission. See Tomko v. Michael’s Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970); Manis Constr. Co. v. Arellano, 13 Va. App. 292, 294, 411 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1991).

The employee contends that the employer’s “course of conduct” induced her to not file a claim with the commission. The course of conduct she describes consists of (l) telling her that certain documents — a report of the accident, an acknowledgement that she received a[*940] list of approved panel physicians, and the employer’s first report of accident — would be filed with the commission, (2) requiring her to use a panel physician, (3) requiring her to seek approval before changing physicians, (4) requiring her to participate in vocational rehabilitation assessments, (5) sending copies of correspondence to the commission, (6) requiring her to obtain medical certificates to verify the reason for her absences from work, and (7) recognizing that she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. This course of conduct acknowledges that the employee’s accidental injury was compensable and may well have induced the employee to believe that she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. However, the employer’s actions are no more than those one would expect from an employer conscientiously complying with the Workers’ Compensation Act. They did not, as a matter of law, induce the employee to believe that she did not need to file a claim with the commission.

IMPOSITION

Finally, the employee asserts that the employer’s actions constituted an imposition upon her. The commission may “do full and complete justice” where the actions of an employer constitute an imposition on an employee. John Driggs Co. v. Somers, 228 Va. 729, 734, 324 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1985). Imposition may result when an employer, using superior knowledge and the economic leverage derived from being able to withhold benefits, pays less benefits than required without consulting or advising the employee of an alternative that would require the payment of greater benefits. Id. at 735, 324 S.E.2d at 697.

The employee contends that imposition resulted from the same actions of the employer that she says induced her to refrain from filing a claim. These acts were, as we previously said, consistent with those of an employer endeavoring to comply with the Act. The employer did not use superior knowledge and economic power to achieve the payment of less benefits than required by the Act.

For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence fails to establish, as a matter of law, that a claim was filed within the time allowed, that the employer induced the employee to refrain from filing a claim, or that the employer imposed upon the employee to refrain from filing a claim. The commission’s decision is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

Coleman, J., and Koontz, J., concurred.