Brooks v. Commonwealth, 258 S.E.2d 504 (Va. 1979). · Go Syfert
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 258 S.E.2d 504 (Va. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gerald E. Wood, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia (vactapp, 2016-12-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerald E. Wood, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“Evidence of other crimes or convictions may be admitted for the purpose of, among other things, . . . proving a relevant issue or element of the offense charged, such as motive, intent, common scheme or plan, knowledge or identity.” Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 288, 293 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1998) (en banc). - 4 - “Where a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even the slightest tendency to establish or negate such intent.” Mughrabi, 38 Va. App. at 546 , …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Andrew Kelley v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Code § 18.2-108; Wilson, 220 Va. at 33 , 255 S.E.2d at 468 . “[W]here the motive, intent, or knowledge of the accused is at issue, evidence of other offenses is admissible if,” inter alia, “it . . . negates the possibility of accident or mistake.” Moore, 222 Va. at 76 , 278 S.E.2d at 824 . “‘[W]here a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused[,] both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even the slightest tendency to establish or negate such intent,’ including evidence of similar frauds.” Brooks v…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Iris Cynthia Franklin v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Also, “‘[w]here a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even the slightest tendency to establish or negate such intent,’ including evidence of similar frauds.” Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979) (quoting Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 268, 273 , 227 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1976)); see -6- Charles E.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burrell v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979) (per curiam) (decided under the former statute for welfare fraud, Code § 63.1-124).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mughrabi v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
“In order for evidence that the accused has committed other crimes to be admissible, it need only be relevant to prove a material fact or issue, and its relevance must outweigh the prejudice inherent in proving *546 that an accused has committed other crimes.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 213, 220 , 429 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1993) (citing Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 89 , 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990)). “ ‘Where a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kader Mustafa Murgrabi, s/k/a, etc v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
"In order for evidence that the accused has committed other crimes to be admissible, it need only be relevant to prove a material fact or issue, and its relevance must outweigh the prejudice inherent in proving that an accused has committed other crimes." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 213, 220 , 429 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1993) (citing Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 89 , 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990)). "'Where a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even the slightest t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Kurt Sensabaugh v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
"Where a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even the slightest tendency to establish or negate such intent." Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mckinney v. Rees
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 56 (D.C.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); Anonymous v. State, 507 So.2d 972, 973-74 (Ala.1987); State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169 , 268 A.2d 368, 369 (1970); Brown v. State, 197 Ga.App. 155 , 398 S.E.2d 34, 34 (1990); People v. Kannapes, 208 Ill.App.3d 400 , 153 Ill.Dec. 419, 421-22 , 567 N.E.2d 377, 379-80 (1990); Penley v. State, 506 N.E.2d 806, 808 (Ind.1987); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976); Commonwealth v. Chalifoux, 362 Mass. 811 , 291 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1973); State v. Clark, 801 S.W…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKinney v. Rees
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 56 (D.C.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); Anonymous v. State, 507 So.2d 972, 973-74 (Ala.1987); State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169 , 268 A.2d 368, 369 (1970); Brown v. State, 197 Ga.App. 155 , 398 S.E.2d 34, 34 (1990); People v. Kannapes, 208 Ill.App.3d 400 , 153 Ill.Dec. 419, 421-22 , 567 N.E.2d 377, 379-80 (1990); Penley v. State, 506 N.E.2d 806, 808 (Ind.1987); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664 , 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976); Commonwealth v. Chalifoux, 362 Mass. 811 , 291 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1973); State v. Clark, 801 S.W…
cited Cited as authority (rule) LaForce v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1983 · confidence medium
Id. at 450; Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 406-07 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979); Kirkpatrick, supra, 211 Va. at 272 , 176 S.E.2d at 805 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bunch v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1983 · confidence medium
And in Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 406-07 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979), a case of welfare fraud, we sustained the admission into evidence of the defendant’s convictions on four similar charges one month before the date of the offense on trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1981 · confidence medium
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272 , 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970); Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 862 , 871 (1878).
examined Cited "see" Hall v. Commonwealth (4×)
Va. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" Evans v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 405, 407 , 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1979); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272 , 176 S.E.2d *774 802, 805 (1970); Williams v. Commonwealth, 128 Va. 698, 711-12 , 104 S.E. 853, 860-61 (1920).
Edith Marshall Brooks
v.
Commonwealth of Virginia
Record 781756.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Oct 5, 1979.
258 S.E.2d 504
Martin Randolph Shelton for appellant., Robert H. Herring, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Marshall Coleman, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Edith Marshall Brooks, defendant, was convicted by a jury on four felony indictments charging that she obtained public assistance money[*406] to which she was not entitled by means of willful false statements in violation of Code § 63.1-124, as amended. Defendant was also convicted on four misdemeanor indictments charging that while obtaining public assistance funds, she received funds that materially affected her eligibility or the amount of assistance she could lawfully receive and failed to notify the local board of such change in violation of Code § 63.1-112, as amended. The jury fixed her punishment at six months in jail on each of the misdemeanor convictions and one year on each of the felony convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant on two of the felony convictions and two of the misdemeanor convictions and suspended the imposition of sentences on the other convictions.

We granted defendant a writ of error limited to the question whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior convictions for similar offenses.

The evidence shows that the defendant, who was separated from her husband, received welfare assistance for her support and that of her six minor children in August, November, and December 1977 and February 1978, among other months. As a condition of receiving the payments, defendant pledged to notify immediately the local social service bureau of any change in her income or financial circumstances. Although the social welfare worker told the defendant on several occasions that it was her duty to report any change in her financial situation, she did not do so. In fact, when questioned by a representative of the social service bureau, she denied receiving monies from her estranged husband during the periods she was drawing welfare funds.

Defendant testified that she had received funds from her husband while receiving welfare payments. She said, however, that she did not report the payments because she believed they were gifts and did not constitute support. Thus, she concluded that she “didn’t feel that legally [she] had to tell” the social worker that she was receiving payments. She further testified that she did not tell the social worker she had received money from her estranged husband because she felt she “was being discriminated against and . . . [consequently] rebelled.”

On cross-examination, defendant admitted that she had been convicted on four charges of welfare fraud one month before the first of the offenses on which she was charged in the present case.

Defendant argues that it was error to admit into evidence her prior convictions for welfare fraud because it constituted an attack on her character even though she had not put her character into evidence. We do not agree.

[*407] Generally, evidence establishing that a defendant has committed an unrelated crime is inadmissible against him. King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 912, 914, 234 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1977); Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 343, 200 S.E.2d 577 (1973). We have consistently held, however, that evidence of other offenses is admissible in order to establish facts such as intent, motive, or knowledge of the accused if such facts are related to the offense for which accused is on trial. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970); Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 578 (1829). Moreover, “[w]here a material element of the crime is the fraudulent intent of the accused both the Commonwealth and the accused are allowed broad scope in introducing evidence with even the slightest tendency to establish or negate such intent,” including evidence of similar frauds. Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 268, 273, 227 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1976). Accord, Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 61, 67, 109 S.E.2d 100, 105 (1959).

The prior convictions of welfare fraud only one month prior to the first of the offenses involved in the present case fall within the exception to the general rule. Under Code § 63.1-112 and § 63.1-124, the Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant willfully made false statements or willfully failed to notify the authorities of changes in her financial circumstances. Evidence concerning the prior convictions of the recent and similar offenses is probative of the issue of fraudulent intent. It indicates an awareness of the duty to report all income and indicates a pattern of conduct evidencing an intent to defraud. Thus, defendant’s prior convictions were admissible for the purpose of showing fraudulent intent.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.