Meeks v. Hodges, 306 S.E.2d 879 (Va. 1983). · Go Syfert
Meeks v. Hodges, 306 S.E.2d 879 (Va. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
48 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Integrated Composite Construction Systems, LLC, etc. v. Premier UHPC, LLC (vactapp, 2024-04-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Integrated Composite Construction Systems, LLC, etc. v. Premier UHPC, LLC
Va. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Soc’y v. Navy Yard Credit Union, Inc., 237 Va. 679, 683 (1989) (quoting Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Telegraph Square II, A Condominium Unit Owners v. 7205 Telegraph Square, LLC
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“The issue becomes one of law, to be decided by a court, only when reasonable minds could not differ concerning the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 144-45 (citing Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Telegraph Square II, A Condominium Unit Owners v. 7205 Telegraph Square, LLC
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“The issue becomes one of law, to be decided by a court, only when reasonable minds could not differ concerning the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 144-45 (citing Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Telegraph Square II, A Condominium Unit Owners v. 7205 Telegraph Square, LLC
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“The issue becomes one of law, to be decided by a court, only when reasonable minds could not differ concerning the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 144-45 (citing Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Patricia Spivey v. Annitavia Latrice Thomas
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
The issue of contributory negligence becomes a question of law for the court “only when reasonable minds could not differ.” Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Spencer Cady v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
As such, he was “on notice” of a defect with his vehicle that could have interfered with his ability to control it, and thus by continuing to operate it the defendant had breached his “duty to use ordinary care to keep his vehicle under proper control.” Id. at 473 (quoting Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Ferguson v. National Freight Inc.
4th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
See RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260 , 764 S.E.2d 8 , 21 (2014) (in order to prevail on appeal, appellant must show “that there is no conflict in the evidence on contributory negligence, and that there is no direct and reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole to sustain a conclusion that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983) (noting that issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are ordinarily issues to be decided by fact finder).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Bell Lillibridge v. City of Newport News
Va. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
What constitutes a reasonable distance must, in each instance, depend upon the particular facts involved." Clifton v. Gregory, 212 Va. 859, 862 , 188 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1972). "'[T]he driver of a vehicle has a duty to use ordinary care to keep his vehicle under proper control.'" Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 469, 473 , 339 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1986) (quoting Meeks v. Hodge, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Florists' Mutual Insurance v. Tatterson
E.D. Va. · 1992 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equipment Co.
Va. · 1990 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blankenship v. Commercial Distributors, Inc.
Roanoke County Cir. Ct. · 1989 · confidence medium
In evaluating defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence, this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency in his favor." Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) F. Kenneth Christopher v. Madison Hotel Corporation
4th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court "must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve any reasonable doubt to its sufficiency in his favor." Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cuna Mutual Insurance Society v. Navy Yard Credit Union, Inc.
Va. · 1989 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983) (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court . . . should grant the motion only when it conclusively appears that the plaintiff has proved no cause of action against the defendant, or when it plainly appears that the trial court would be compelled to set aside any verdict found for the plaintiff as being without evidence to support it.” Newton v. Veney & Raines, 220 Va. 947, 951 , 265 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1980) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott Neil Krzywda v. The Hertz Corporation, Kazuaki Perkins
4th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court "must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve any reasonable doubt to its sufficiency in his favor." Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Von Lubowiecki v. Donnell
Va. · 1988 · confidence medium
“When the sufficiency of a plaintiffs evidence is challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any reasonable doubt as to its sufficiency in his favor.” Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McGowan v. Lewis
Va. · 1987 · confidence medium
Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 320 , 315 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1984); Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983); Riley v. Harris, 211 Va. 359, 362 , 177 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Litchford v. Hancock
Va. · 1987 · confidence medium
The driver of a motor vehicle has a duty to use ordinary care to maintain a proper lookout, Todt v. Shaw, 223 Va. 123, 127 , 286 S.E.2d 211, 213-14 (1982), and to keep his vehicle under proper control, Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Banks v. City of Richmond (2×)
Va. · 1986 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Medcom, Inc. v. C. Arthur Weaver Co.
Va. · 1986 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kennedy v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Code § 46.1-190(a) makes it reckless driving to operate a vehicle when not under proper control. “[T]he driver of a vehicle has a duty to use ordinary care to keep his vehicle under proper control.” Meeks v. Hodge, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983) (citing Voight v. Reber, 187 Va. 157, 164 , 46 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1948)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Virginia and Maryland R. Co. v. White (2×)
Va. · 1984 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Griffin v. Shively (3×)
Va. · 1984 · confidence medium
Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109 , 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983); VEPCO v. Winesett, 225 Va. 459, 464 , 303 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1983); Community Bus Co. v. Windley, 224 Va. 687, 689 , 299 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1983).
Gary Meeks
v.
John Edward Hodges; John Edward Hodges v. Gary Meeks
Record 810262; Record 810233.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Sep 9, 1983.
306 S.E.2d 879
Ralph B. Rhodes (Hutcherson & Rhodes, on brief), for appellant. (Record No. 810262.), James R. Austin (William O. Tune, Jr.; Harry F. Hambrick, Jr.; Michaux Raines, III; Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore; Davis, Davis, Raine, Davis & Welch, on brief), for appellee. (Record No. 810262.), Michaux Raines, III (William O. Tune, Jr.; Harry F. Ham-brick, Jr.; Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, on brief), for appellant. (Record No. 810233.), David A. Furrox (Ralph B. Rhodes; Hutcherson & Rhodes, on brief), for appellee. (Record No. 810233.)
Stephenson.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
STEPHENSON, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This litigation arises out of a two-vehicle accident occurring in Franklin County. Gary Meeks sued John Edward Hodges for injuries caused by Hodges’ negligent operation of an automobile. Hodges counterclaimed, asserting his injuries were proximately caused by Meeks’ negligence. Although a jury was impaneled, the trial court struck the evidence of each party, holding as a matter[*108] of law that neither party was negligent. The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to submit each claimant’s case to the jury. *

The highway at the scene of the accident was “[bjasically straight and level.” The paved portion was 19 feet wide. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour and the road was dry. Conflicting evidence was presented concerning holes in the road east of where the accident occurred. Meeks, driving a pickup truck, and Hodges, operating an automobile, were both proceeding westbound. The vehicles were traveling at essentially the same speed, between 40 and 50 miles an hour, with Hodges approximately 40 feet behind Meeks.

The Meeks truck, without giving any signal or warning, suddenly ran off the pavement to the right and traveled along the right-hand shoulder for approximately 90 feet. It then turned abruptly to its left, crossing the highway perpendicularly.

Upon seeing Meeks leave the pavement, Hodges removed his foot from the accelerator and veered slightly to his left. He applied his brakes when he saw the Meeks truck coming across the highway. His vehicle slid to the left, leaving skid marks of 130 feet before colliding with Meeks in the eastbound lane. The right side of Hodges’ car struck the left side of Meeks’ truck. The car came to rest on its top and the truck on its right side. Meeks received a concussion and had no recollection of the accident or the events immediately preceding. His only passenger also was unable to explain why the truck left the pavement and later swerved left across the road.

The next day, a broken left-front leaf spring was discovered on the Meeks truck. An experienced automobile mechanic examined the spring three to four months after the accident. Although he was unable to determine how or when it was broken, he opined from the presence of rust it was an old break, reasoning that a new break would be “shiny.” He related that a driver could operate a vehicle without knowledge of the broken spring. However, upon striking a hole, traveling over an uneven area, or applying brakes forcefully, the broken spring probably would cause the vehicle to “shimmy” and become uncontrollable.

[*109] Meeks contends Hodges followed the truck more closely than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances and this negligence proximately caused the accident. Hodges argues his following distance was reasonable as a matter of law and further contends the accident was a result of Meeks’ failure to use ordinary care to keep his vehicle under proper control. Meeks responds that the evidence conclusively shows a mechanical defect caused his vehicle to go out of control.

The trial court held as a matter of law that neither party was guilty of negligence because “the broken spring leaf [sic] caused the [Meeks truck] to go out of control” and “Hodges operated his vehicle at a reasonable distance behind the Meeks’s vehicle.” We conclude these rulings were erroneous.

Negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are ordinarily issues for a jury’s determination. They are decided by a court only when reasonable minds could not differ. Riley v. Harris, 211 Va. 359, 362, 177 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1970). When the sufficiency of a plaintiffs evidence is challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any reasonable doubt as to its sufficiency in his favor. Semones v. Johnson, 217 Va. 293, 295, 227 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1976).

In construing Code § 46.1-213(a), we held that a driver has “the right to follow another vehicle as closely as is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.” Clifton v. Gregory, 212 Va. 859, 862, 188 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1972). Additionally, the driver of a vehicle has a duty to use ordinary care to keep his vehicle under proper control. Voight v. Reber, 187 Va. 157, 164, 46 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1948); Code § 46.1-190(a).

There was evidence that Hodges, while traveling 40 to 50 miles per hour, was following Meeks at a distance of approximately 40 feet. We hold that reasonable minds could differ in determining whether Hodges was following more closely than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. See Clifton, 212 Va. at 862, 188 S.E.2d at 206. We also are of opinion that fair-minded persons could differ as to whether Meeks failed to use ordinary care to keep his vehicle under proper control, or, on the other hand, whether his loss of control was caused by an unknown mechanical defect.

[*110] Because the trial court erred in failing to submit these issues to the jury, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial consistent with the views expressed herein.

Reversed and remanded.

*

Hodges also assigned error to the admission of expert testimony regarding a broken spring. We find this assignment meritless. The evidence was not speculative, as argued by Hodges, but was relevant and probative. Its weight was for the jury’s determination. See Martin v. Penn, 204 Va. 822, 826, 134 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1964).