O'BRIAN v. Langley Sch., 507 S.E.2d 363 (Va. 1998). · Go Syfert
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O'BRIAN v. Langley Sch., 507 S.E.2d 363 (Va. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“he purpose of a liquidated damages provision is to obviate the need for the nonbreaching party to prove actual damages.”
119 citation events (109 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Winners Circle Imports, LLC v. Whitney's Automotive Venture Enterprise, LLC (vaed, 2025-10-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) vaed 2025
E.D. Va. · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he purpose of a liquidated damages provision is to obviate the need for the nonbreaching party to prove actual damages.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winners Circle Imports, LLC v. Whitney's Automotive Venture Enterprise, LLC
E.D. Va. · 2025 · confidence medium
A liquidated damages clause becomes an unenforceable penalty “when the damage resulting from a breach of contract is susceptible of definite measurement, or where the stipulated amount would be grossly in excess of actual damages.” O’Brian v. Langley School, 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Va. 1998) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bistro Manila, LLC v. Alvah I, LLC (2×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
That is, “[s]uch a provision also may constitute an unenforceable penalty if the agreed amount is ‘grossly in excess of actual damages.’” Id. (quoting O’Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 551 (1998)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mattawoman Energy, LLC v. Cove Point LNG, LP (3×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465, 484 (2008) (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260 (2008)). -5- “Generally, the granting or denying of discovery . . . will not be reversed on appeal unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’” O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 (1970)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shiye Qiu v. Chaoyu Huang, Anna Ouspenskaya and Arlene Starace (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Additionally, where the stay prevents or limits civil discovery, such a restriction does not amount to an abuse of discretion “unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’” See Nizan, 274 Va. at 500 (quoting O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 (1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shiye Qiu v. Chaoyu Huang, Anna Ouspenskaya and Arlene Starace (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Va. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Additionally, where the stay prevents or limits civil discovery, such a restriction does not amount to an abuse of discretion “unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’” See Nizan, 274 Va. at 500 (quoting O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 (1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JTH Tax LLC v. D'Souza
D. Haw. · 2021 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Sanders, 353 S.E.2d 745 , 746–47 (Va. 1987) (citing Crawford v. Heatwole, 66 S.E. 46 , 47–48 (1909)). “[T]he construction of such stipulations depends upon the intent of the parties as evidenced by the entire contract viewed in light of the circumstances under which the contract was made.” Id. at 747 (citing Crawford, 66 S.E. at 47 ) (other citation omitted). “[A] liquidated damages clause is invalid only when the actual damages contemplated at the time of the agreement are shown to be certain and not difficult to determine or the stipulated amount is out of all proportion …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. International Business Machines Corporation
W.D. Va. · 2021 · confidence medium
However, a liquidated damages clause constitutes an unenforceable penalty “when the damage resulting from a breach of contract is susceptible of definite measurement, or where the stipulated amount would be grossly in excess of actual damages.” O’Brian v. Langley School, 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Va. 1998) (quoting Brooks v.Bankson, 445 S.E.2d 473, 479 (Va. 1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White Oak Power Constructors v. Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems Americas, Inc. (2×)
E.D. Va. · 2020 · confidence medium
O'Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 551 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Townes v. Virginia State Board of Elections
Va. · 2020 · confidence medium
“Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the [circuit] court and will not be reversed on appeal unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’” O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 (1970)) (alteration in original).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Lewis Daniel Nimety v. Commonwealth of Virginia (3×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Ordinarily, “the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998), quoted with approval in Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 407, 450, 611 S.E.2d 631, 652-53 (2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp.
Va. · 2014 · confidence medium
O'Brien v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Terrye L. Richter and Rudy Richter v. Diana Nichole Manning, n/k/a Diana Nichole Perry
Va. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Rule 4:10(a) (emphasis added). 5 “Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’” O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 , 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970)); see Nizan v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn. N.A., 274 Va. 481, 500-01 , 650 S.E.2d 497, 507 (2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hovas Construction, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
Miss. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
In Virginia, “a liquidated damages clause will be construed as an unenforceable penalty ... 'where the stipulated amount would be grossly in excess of actual damages.’ " O'Bri an v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1998) (quoting Brooks v. Bankson, 248 Va. 197 , 445 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Razieh Makoui v. Cyrus Makoui
Va. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
“Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the [circuit] court and will not be reversed on appeal unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial -9- rights.’” O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 , 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Barrie School v. Patch (3×) also: Cited "see"
Md. · 2007 · confidence medium
See American Car Rental, Inc. v. Comm’r of Consumer Prot, 273 Conn. 296 , 869 A.2d 1198, 1209-10 (2005) (noting that “[t]he mere fact that expected damages resulting from breach are uncertain in amount or difficult to prove does not justify enforcement of whatever amount the contract includes as damages for breaeh[.]”); O’Brian, 507 S.E.2d at 365 (stating that “[t]he fact that a party enters into a contract containing a liquidated damages clause does not prevent that party from later litigating the validity of the clause.”).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Barrie School v. Patch (3×) also: Cited "see"
Md. · 2007 · confidence medium
See American Car Rental, Inc. v. Comm'r of Consumer Prot., 273 Conn. 296 , 869 A.2d 1198, 1209-10 (2005) (noting that "[t]he mere fact that expected damages resulting from breach are uncertain in amount or difficult to prove does not justify enforcement of whatever amount the contract includes as damages for breach[.]"); O'Brian, 507 S.E.2d at 365 (stating that "[t]he fact that a party enters into a contract containing a liquidated damages clause does not prevent that party from later litigating the validity of the clause.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Food Lion Store Number 622
Portsmouth Cir. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nelson v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Decisions involving discovery issues are within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts will not reverse those decisions “unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’ ” O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 , 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Saundra L Ash v. Raymond D Ash (3×) also: Cited "see"
Va. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Rule 4:1(b)(1) provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party . . . ." "[T]he granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court," but a discovery ruling may be reversed on appeal if "'the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.'" O'Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (quoting Rakes …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co.
Va. · 2001 · confidence medium
O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (noting that, “[generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles S. Rowe v. Mary Ann Rowe
Va. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
"Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless 'the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.'" O'Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 , 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mary Ann Rowe v. Charles S. Rowe
Va. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Wife asserts that she was “not given time to develop evidence through discovery and was not permitted to present evidence to the trial court because the trial court unexpectedly ruled on all issues before allowing for any discovery or an evidentiary hearing.” Wife requests that, on remand, the trial judge be directed to permit discovery and hold an evidentiary hearing. *273 “Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’ �…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc. (2×)
Va. · 1999 · confidence medium
“Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless ‘the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.’ ” O’Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (quoting Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 , 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gordonsville Energy, L.P. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Va. · 1999 · confidence medium
Such a provision also may constitute an unenforceable penalty if the agreed amount is “grossly in excess of actual damages.” O’Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 551 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1998).
discussed Cited "see" In re Outer Banks Ventures, Inc. (2×)
Bankr. E.D.N.C. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See O’Brian v. Lanley School, 256 Va. 547, 551 , 507 S.E.2d 363 (1998).
discussed Cited "see" Ross Kinnison Hall v. Marlene Sue Hall (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See O’Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998); see also Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 271 , 498 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1998) (holding that “‘a trial court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law’”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Job v. Simply Wireless, Inc. (2×)
E.D. Va. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., O’Brian, 256 Va. at 551 , 507 S.E.2d 363 (noting that “a party,” as opposed only to “a defendant,” can challenge the validity of a liquidated damages clause).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sagatov Builders, L.L.C. v. Hunt (2×)
Fairfax Cir. Ct. · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., O’Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 551 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1998).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Doral Bank PR v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (3×)
4th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Cir. 1996); see also O’Brian v. Langley School, 507 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Va. 1998) (applying the same test under Virginia law).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Schwartz v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Furthermore, we review a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to quash the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum “under an abuse of discretion standard.” America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 359 , 542 S.E.2d 377, 382 (2001); see also O’Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998) (noting that, “generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." America Online, Inc. v. Nam Tai Electronics, Inc. (2×)
Va. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
DISCUSSION “We review the trial court’s refusal to quash the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum . . . under an abuse of discretion standard.” AOL v. APTC, 261 Va. at 359 , 542 S.E.2d at *591 382; see also O’Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 552 , 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1998).
William E. O’Brian, Jr., Et Al.
v.
Langley School
Record 972717.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Nov 6, 1998.
507 S.E.2d 363
William E. O’Brian, Jr. (Fern P. O’Brian, on briefs), for appellants., Howard B. Silberberg for appellee., Amicus Curiae: Virginia Association of Independent Schools (David Craig Landin; Lori Elliott Guzman; Hunton & Williams, on brief), in support of appellee.
Kinser.
Cited by 42 opinions  |  Published
JUSTICE KINSER

delivered the opinion of the Court.

[*549] This appeal concerns a liquidated damages clause requiring parents to pay tuition for an entire academic year to a school for failure to give timely notice of their decision to withdraw their daughter from the school. Because the circuit court entered summary judgment for the school before permitting the parents to conduct discovery with regard to their defense that the clause is an unenforceable penalty, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

I.

William E. O’Brian, Jr., and Fern P. O’Brian (the O’Brians) enrolled their daughter as a student at Langley School (Langley) for the 1995-96 academic year. On February 29, 1996, the O’Brians executed the “Langley School 1996-97 Membership Agreement” (the Agreement) to enroll their daughter in the second grade for the ensuing academic year. Pursuant to the Agreement, they paid a deposit in the amount of $1,055 to Langley. The O’Brians subsequently decided to withdraw their daughter from Langley, and, in a letter dated June 13, 1996, they notified Langley of their decision.

In response, Langley informed the O’Brians in two separate letters dated June 18 and June 20, 1996, that they were obligated to pay the entire amount of the 1996-97 tuition because they had not timely notified Langley of their decision to withdraw their daughter. Langley based its demand on paragraphs D(l) and (4) of the Agreement. These paragraphs state:

D. WITHDRAWALS AND REFUNDS:

1. All withdrawals MUST BE made by June 1, 1996, as follows:
a. The withdrawal must be made in writing stating the name and grade of the children) to be withdrawn.
b. This notice must be received by an authorized administrative employee of the School no later than 4:30 p.m. on June 1, 1996.
* * * *
4. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE SHALL BE NO REFUND OF OR RELIEF FROM ANY PORTION OF THE FULL TUITION OR ANY OTHER OBLIGATION ACCEPTED HEREIN FOR ANY REASON IF WRITTEN NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF ANY CHILD IS NOT[*550] RECEIVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE PROCEDURE. SINCE DAMAGE TO THE SCHOOL DUE TO SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE, MEMBER AGREES TO PAY AGREED-UPON TUITION AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, TOGETHER WITH ANY COURT COSTS AND/ OR LEGAL FEES THE SCHOOL MAY BE OBLIGED TO INCUR IN THE COLLECTION OF SUCH LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN THE EVENT OF WITHDRAWAL AFTER JUNE 1, 1996.

The O’Brians refused to pay the agreed-upon tuition as liquidated damages. Consequently, Langley filed a motion for judgment on September 4, 1996, alleging that the O’Brians had breached the terms of the Agreement. Langley sought judgment against the O’Brians for the tuition that was due under the Agreement, plus late fees and attorney’s fees.

During pretrial proceedings, the O’Brians submitted written interrogatories to Langley. In one of the interrogatories, the O’Brians asked Langley whether it had made reasonable efforts to fill the spot made available by the withdrawal of the O’Brians’ daughter. In response, Langley stated that it “does not so contend because it has no obligation to do so by virtue of” the Agreement. Langley either partially answered or objected to the remaining interrogatories. The O’Brians then filed a motion to compel discovery, which the circuit court denied. Thereafter, Langley moved for summary judgment. After considering memorandum and oral argument from both parties, the circuit court granted Langley’s motion and entered judgment on October 3, 1997, against the O’Brians in the amount of $9,745, plus late payment fees from June 1, 1996, and an attorney’s fee in the amount of $8,900. The O’Brians appeal.

n.

The dispositive issue in this case is whether the circuit court erred by awarding summary judgment before permitting the O’Brians to conduct discovery with regard to their defense that paragraph D(4) of the Agreement is not a valid liquidated damages clause. Langley asserts that the circuit court did not err because the O’Brians were asserting a defense that is not legally cognizable. We do not agree.

We have previously enunciated the test for determining the validity of a liquidated damages clause:

[*551] [P]arties to a contract may agree in advance about the amount to be paid as compensation for loss or injury which may result from a breach of the contract “[wjhen the actual damages contemplated at the time of the agreement are uncertain and difficult to determine with exactness and when the amount fixed is not out of all proportion to the probable loss.”

301 Dahlgren Ltd. Partnership v. Bd. of Supervisors of King George County, 240 Va. 200, 202-03, 396 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1990) (quoting Taylor v. Sanders, 233 Va. 73, 75, 353 S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1987)). However, a liquidated damages clause will be construed as an unenforceable penalty “when the damage resulting from a breach of contract is susceptible of definite measurement, or where the stipulated amount would be grossly in excess of actual damages.” Brooks v. Bankson, 248 Va. 197, 208, 445 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1994) (citing Taylor, 233 Va. at 75, 353 S.E.2d at 747); accord 301 Dahlgren, 240 Va. at 203, 396 S.E.2d at 653.

The fact that a party enters into a contract containing a liquidated damages clause does not prevent that party from later litigating the validity of the clause. The party opposing the imposition of liquidated damages is entitled to conduct discovery and present relevant evidence that the damages resulting from breach of the contract are susceptible of definite measurement or that the stipulated damages are grossly in excess of the actual damages suffered by the non-breaching party. Upon proof of either of these elements, a liquidated damages clause becomes an unenforceable penalty. Brooks, 248 Va. at 208, 445 S.E.2d at 479.

As the party challenging the validity of paragraph D(4) of the Agreement, the O’Brians bear the burden of proof on that issue. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atlantic Tele-Network Co., 946 F.2d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 1991); Little v. Rohauer, 707 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Colo. App. 1985); St. Margaret’s-McTernan School, Inc. v. Thompson, 627 A.2d 449, 451 (Conn. App. 1993); Joyce’s Submarine Sandwiches, Inc. v. California Pub. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 395 S.E.2d 257, 259 (Ga. App. 1990); Rodriguez v. Learjet, Inc., 946 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Kan. App. 1997); Shallow Brook Assoc. v. Dube, 599 A.2d 132, 138 (N.H. 1991); Metlife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Washington Ave. Assoc., L.P., 713 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1998); P.J. Carlin Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 399 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y.A.D. 1977); R. Conrad Moore & Assoc., Inc. v. Lerma, 946 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. App. 1997); Young Elec. Sign Co. v. United [*552] Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988); but see AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 593 So.2d 673, 676 (La. App. 1991); Pacheco v. Scoblionko, 532 A.2d 1036, 1039 (Me. 1987); Story v. City of Bozeman, 856 P.2d 202, 215 (Mont. 1993); Fisher v. Schmeling, 520 N.W.2d 820, 822 (N.D. 1994); Patterson v. Anderson Motor Co., Inc., 319 S.W.2d 492, 501 (Tenn. App. 1958). We believe this allocation of the burden of proof is appropriate since the O’Brians initially assented to the clause when they signed the Agreement. Moreover, the purpose of a liquidated damages provision is to obviate the need for the nonbreaching party to prove actual damages. This purpose would not be served if the nonbreaching party, instead of proving actual damages, had to show that “the damage resulting from a breach of contract is [not] susceptible of definite measurement” and that “the stipulated amount [is not] grossly in excess of actual damages.” Brooks, 248 Va. at 208, 445 S.E.2d at 479. However, if the O’Brians are successful in proving that paragraph D(4) is an unenforceable penalty, Langley must then prove its actual damages as in any breach of contract action where the contract does not contain a liquidated damages provision. Stony Creek Lumber Co. v. Fields & Co., 102 Va. 1, 7-8, 45 S.E. 797, 799 (1903); accord Metlife, 713 A.2d at 537; Rodriquez, 946 P.2d at 1013-14.

In the present case, the circuit court precluded any inquiry into the validity of the liquidated damages clause by denying the O’Brians’ motion to compel and subsequently awarding summary judgment before hearing any relevant evidence on the issue. Generally, the granting or denying of discovery is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless “the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.” Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546, 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970). However, the court’s actions here substantially affected the O’Brians’ ability and right to litigate the validity of the liquidated damages clause.

For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.