green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
38.5 score
“obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person's conduct merely renders the officer's task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.”
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dre Martina Roberts v. County of Loudoun
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person's conduct merely renders the officer's task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis Edward Lacy v. Commonwealth of Virginia and the City of Lynchburg
Although obstruction can be passive, it “does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” Maldonado, 70 Va. App. at 563 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Douglas Dale Gindlesberger v. Commonwealth of Virginia
He further relies on Maldonado to argue that “actions that merely - 13 - frustrate a police officer’s investigation, but do not ‘oppose, impede, or resist’ an officer’s lawful efforts to conduct an investigation, do not constitute obstruction of justice as contemplated by Code § 18.2-460(A).” Id. at 569-70 (citing Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 431 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Destin N'Dia Tranay Wright v. Commonwealth of Virginia
But the actions in question must go beyond actions that “merely frustrate a police officer’s investigation,” into conduct that “‘oppose, impede, or resist’ an officer’s lawful efforts to conduct an investigation.” Id. at 569 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 431 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Taylor Neal Lickey v. Commonwealth of Virginia
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But we have long recognized that “obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” Maldonado, 70 Va. App. at 563 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Caron Nazario v. Joe Gutierrez
That is, an obstruction of justice has not occurred “when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” See Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jason Edward Via v. Commonwealth of Virginia
See Lucas v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 334 , 344 (2022) (“[A] suspect’s flight, alone, does not constitute obstruction of a law-enforcement officer.”); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429-30 (1998) (holding that “hiding or seeking ‘to escape [an] officer by merely running away [is] not such an obstruction as the law contemplates’” because “‘[t]here is a broad distinction between avoidance and resistance or opposition’” (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478 (1925))).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Stout v. Sheriff Harris
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Va. Feb. 7, 2022). “[O]bstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 398 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph v. Moore
Put simply, “actions that merely frustrate a police officer’s investigation, but do not ‘oppose, impede, or resist’ an officer’s lawful efforts to conduct an investigation, do not constitute obstruction of justice as contemplated by Code § 18.2-460(A).” Id. at 569–70 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 431 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McKenna v. Bristol VA City Police Department
“Merely making the officer’s task more difficult but not impeding or preventing the officer from performing that task is not obstruction.” Id. (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Travor Lamont Lucas v. Commonwealth of Virginia
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
We have consistently held, however, that a conviction for obstruction of justice cannot be sustained merely on evidence that “a person fail[ed] to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely render[ed] the officer’s task more difficult but [did] not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stout v. Sheriff Harris
Cf Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down a California stop and identify statue on vagueness grounds). 2 Section 18.2-460(A) of the Virginia obstruction statute criminalizes knowingly obstructing “any law enforcement officer . . . in the performance of his duties . . . or fail[ing] or refus[ing] without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested.” Section 18.2-460(B) forbids knowing attempts by threat or force “to intimidate or impede . . . any law-enforcement officer .. . lawfully engaged in his duties.” “[O]bstruction of justice does not occur when a person…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Stout v. Harris
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
But failing to identify does not violate Virginia law, nor does it violate the obstruction statute, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2 - 460(A).* See Crimes and Offenses Generally: Crimes Against the Administration of Justice, Op. Va. Atty’s Gen. 02-082 (Oct. 10, 2002). “[O]bstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Casler
The Commonwealth presented no direct evidence, however, that the defendant’s statements *** reasonably could have led police astray in this manner.”); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing conviction of obstruction of justice, holding that, although defendant’s conflicting statements may have frustrated the police officer’s investigation, “the statements did not oppose, impede, or resist [the officer’s] efforts to conduct an investigation.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cromartie v. Billings
Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lamberto Maldonado, a/k/a Lamberto Moldanado v. Commonwealth of Virginia
We also recognize, however, that “obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s Subsection (A) prohibits obstruction of justice without “threats or force.” Compare 2 Code § 18.2-460(A), with Code § 18.2-460(B). -7- task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Ramirez v. Jefferson Sessions III
Under Virginia law, to constitute obstruction, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent [an] officer from performing his duty.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (Va. 1925)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Amir Fareed Suluki
It requires proof only of acts “indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 479 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)); see Thorne v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 248, 255 , 784 S.E.2d 304, 308 (2016) (holding that “direct obstruction” includes circumstances in which “the officer seeks to make the defendant act directly and the defendant refuse…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Raymond Dorell Warren v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925) (citation omitted)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Clarence Epps, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in relevant part: If any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law-enforcement officer . . . in the performance of his duties as such or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such . . . law-enforcement officer . . . he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. -3- To violate Code § 18.2-460(A), there need not “be an actual or technical assault upon the officer.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 12…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lauren Graham v. C. Gagnon
(2×)
In Wilson, we explained that “[t]he Virginia courts ... have subjected the Statute to a limiting construction, under which a person must do more than merely render an arrest more difficult or inconvenient than it might otherwise have been ... in order to be criminally liable.” 337 F.3d at 399 (citing Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shawanda S. Thorne v. Commonwealth of Virginia
See, e.g., Jones, 141 Va. at 477-80 , 126 S.E. at 76-77 (ruling that a fleeing suspect did not obstruct justice when he threw an incriminating object into the road in front of a pursuing officer’s vehicle because the circumstances did not prove that the object interfered with the pursuit); Atkins v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 340, 344 , 678 S.E.2d 834, 836 (2009) (holding that flight from the scene alone does not constitute obstruction); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 430-31 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389-90 (1998) (ruling that the defendant’s conflicting statements may have frustrated the…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kal Robert Molinet v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 639, 648 , 643 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2007) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[OJbstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lashawn M. Miles v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in relevant part: If any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law-enforcement officer . . . in the performance of his duties as such or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such . . . law-enforcement officer . . . he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. -5- To violate Code § 18.2-460(A), there need not “‘be actual or technical assault upon the officer.’” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 ,…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Josiah A. Cary v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Pursuant to Code § 18.2-460, a defendant is guilty of obstruction of justice if he “without just cause knowingly obstructs a . . . law-enforcement officer . . . in the performance of his duties as such or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such . . . law-enforcement officer.” We have held that “‘there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to obstruct ordinarily implies opposition to or resistance by direct action.’” Craddock .v Commonwealth, 4…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Herbert W. Lux, s/k/a Herbert W. Lux, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
The Supreme Court has held that, to sustain a conviction of obstruction of justice under Code § 18.2-460(A), “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to -8- prevent the [judicial] officer from performing his duty, as to obstruct ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Herbert W. Lux, s/k/a Herbert W. Lux, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
The Supreme Court has held that, to sustain a conviction of obstruction of justice under Code § 18.2-460(A), “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to -8- prevent the [judicial] officer from performing his duty, as to obstruct ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. Ray
For example, an accused’s hiding or seeking ‘to escape [an] officer by merely running away [is] not such an obstruction as the law contemplates.’ ” 28 Va.App. 428, 429-30 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lawrence Wesley Roberts v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Rather, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tyree v. United States
Obstruction of justice does not require physical interference with the officer, “ ‘but there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his *366 duty.’ ” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson v. Brickey
Although it is not necessary for the officer to suffer an actual or technical assault, there must still be “ ‘acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty.’ ” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mychila Debra Tabron v. Commonwealth of Virginia
(2×)
According to Code § 18.2-460, a person is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor if she “knowingly obstructs . . . any law-enforcement officer, . . . in the performance of his duties as such or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such . . . law-enforcement officer . . . .” Our Supreme Court has held that, while “it is not necessary” for the Commonwealth to prove “an actual or technical assault upon the officer” to convict a defendant for obstruction, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to pr…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jonathan Wayne Brown v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Likewise, we have interpreted this statute to mean that obstruction “does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Arnold Edwin Kee v. City of Hampton
“As the Supreme Court of Virginia has held, . . . ‘obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.’” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones, 141 Va. at 478 , 126 S.E. at 76 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atkins v. Commonwealth
(2×)
It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[Obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult” or “frustrates] [his or her] investigation.” Id. at 429, 431, 505 S.E.2d at 389, 390 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stacey Pettaway, s/k/a Stacey Matthew Pettaway
To violate this statute, there need not “‘be an actual or technical assault upon the officer.’” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Earl Lamont Boxley, Sr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” 2 Id. at 648, 643 S.E.2d at 171 (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[O]bstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher Richmond Coleman v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Applying the standard adopted in Jones and reiterated in Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998), we held, inter alia, that Craddock’s “physically resist[ing] a lawful search” was “obstructive behavior” that was “sufficient to demonstrate Craddock’s intent to prevent the officers from performing their duties.” Craddock, 40 Va. App. at 553 , 580 S.E.2d at 461 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodrissa Elizabeth Polite Collins v. Commonwealth of Virginia
To violate the statute, there need not “‘be an actual or technical assault upon the officer.’” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Anthony Lamont Washington v. Commonwealth
However, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Craddock, 40 Va. App. at 553 , 580 S.E.2d at 461 ; Ruckman v. -2- Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Burrell v. Virginia
He urges that, under Virginia law, "a person must do more than merely render an arrest more difficult or inconvenient than it might otherwise have been — by, for example, speaking to an officer as he works — in order to be criminally liable." Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir.2003) (citing Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Burrell v. Commonwealth of VA
He urges that, under Virginia law, “a person must do more than merely render an arrest more difficult or inconvenient than it might otherwise have been — by, for example, speaking to an officer as he works — in order to be criminally liable.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir.2003) (citing Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moneer R. Ishtiwi, s/k/a Mooner R. Ishtiwi v. Commonwealth
However, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Craddock, 40 Va. App. at 553 , 580 S.E.2d at 461 (internal quotations omitted); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. City of Danville
However, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Craddock, 40 Va.App. at 553 , 580 S.E.2d at 461 (internal quotations omitted); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Veney v. Ojeda
(2×)
Dec.2, 2003) (applying the statute); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389-90 (1998) (interpreting and applying the statute). 22 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Thomas Wilson v. Barry A. Kittoe, and Anthony S. Tokach
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
The Virginia courts, however, have subjected the Statute to a limiting construction, under which a person must do more than merely render an arrest more difficult or inconvenient than it might otherwise have been — by, for example, speaking to an officer as he works — in order to be criminally liable. 3 Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (“As the Supreme Court [of Virginia] has held, and as the plain language of the statute states, obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Craddock v. Commonwealth
Rather, “there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Kittoe
(2×)
It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925) ( quoting Brill’s Cyc. of Criminal Law § 1156); see also Polk v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 590, 594 , 358 S.E.2d 770, 772 (Va.App.1987); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998); Smith v. Tolley, 960 F.Supp. at 995 .
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Cited as authority (rule)
Willingham v. Crooke
(2×)
It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.’ ” Rogers, 249 F.3d at 291 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[Obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult” or “frustratefs] [his or her] investigation.” Ruckman, 505 S.E.2d at 389, 390 .
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Cited as authority (rule)
Rogers v. Pendleton
(2×)
Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. App. 1998).
Maynard RUCKMAN, Jr., S/K/A Maynard F. Ruckman, Jr.
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
2499972.
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Oct 20, 1998.
Robert E. Hawthorne, Jr. (Hawthorne & Hawthorne, P.C., on brief), Kenbridge, for appellant., Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Coleman, Willis, Bumgardner.
Cited by 66 opinions | Published
COLEMAN, Judge.
Maynard F. Ruckman, Jr. was convicted in a bench trial for obstruction of justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A). On appeal, Ruckman contends the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knowingly obstructed a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties. We agree and reverse the conviction.
Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f any person without just cause knowingly obstructs ... any law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such ... law enforcement officer, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.”
“To constitute an obstruction of an officer in the performance of his duty, it is not necessary that there be an actual or technical assault upon the officer, but there must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action ---- It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” ... [Tjhere is a broad distinction between avoidance and resistance or opposition.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has held, and as the plain language of the statute states, obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from performing that task. For example, an[*430] accused’s hiding or seeking “to escape [an] officer by merely running away [is] not such an obstruction as the law contemplates.” Jones, 141 Va. at 478, 126 S.E. at 76.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991), the evidence established that on October 20, 1996, Virginia State Police Trooper J.R. White responded to the scene of an automobile accident involving a truck in which Ruckman and another man, James Marlin, were riding. When interviewed by Trooper White, Ruckman stated that he “felt he was too intoxicated to drive ... and that the other gentleman was driving.” In a second interview in April 1997, Ruckman again told the officer that he was not driving the truck. But, in a third interview in June 1997, Ruckman told Trooper White that he could not remember who was driving the truck but that he was too intoxicated to have been driving.
Trooper White charged Ruckman with obstructing a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duty based upon the fact that White claimed he could not complete an accident report to the Division of Motor Vehicles without further information as to who was operating the truck. Based on Trooper White’s evidence concerning the variation in Ruck-man’s accounts, the trial court found that Ruckman “knowingly impeded [Trooper White] in the performance of his duty” to investigate the traffic accident and convicted Ruckman of obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A).
The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because it failed to prove that Ruckman “obstructed]” White’s investigation of the accident. No proof was offered that Ruckman opposed or resisted Trooper White’s investigation of the accident or White’s attempt to file his report with the Division of Motor Vehicles. Trooper White was fully able to investigate the single vehicle accident. On at least three occasions, he questioned witnesses and gathered facts about the accident. The fact that during the third interview Ruck-[*431] man stated that he could no longer remember who was driving the truck did not oppose or impede the trooper from performing the investigation. Ruckman did not oppose or impede Trooper White’s efforts to locate or interview witnesses. Rather, in the course of his investigation, the trooper received what he may have considered conflicting statements from Ruckman as to whether Ruckman could remember who was driving the truck. Cf. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga.App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (Ga.Ct.App.1975) (defendant attempted to mislead police officers by falsely stating that suspect was in another city and was not present in defendant’s home). Although Ruckman’s apparently conflicting statements may have frustrated Trooper White’s investigation, the statements did not oppose, impede, or resist White’s efforts to conduct an investigation. Therefore, Ruckman did not “obstruct” Trooper White in the performance of his duties as contemplated by Code § 18.2-460(A).
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.
Reversed and dismissed.