A. Unless otherwise provided in this section or by other statute, every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, and every action for damages resulting from fraud, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.
B. Every action for injury to property, including actions by a parent or guardian of an infant against a tort-feasor for expenses of curing or attempting to cure such infant from the result of a personal injury or loss of services of such infant, shall be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues. An infant's claim for medical expenses pursuant to subsection B of § 8.01-36 accruing on or after July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the applicable statute of limitations that applies to the infant's cause of action.
C. The two-year limitations period specified in subsection A shall be extended in actions for malpractice against a health care provider as follows:
1. In cases arising out of a foreign object having no therapeutic or diagnostic effect being left in a patient's body, for a period of one year from the date the object is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered;
2. In cases in which fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevented discovery of the injury within the two-year period, for one year from the date the injury is discovered or, by the exercise of due diligence, reasonably should have been discovered; and
3. In a claim for the negligent failure to diagnose a malignant tumor, cancer, or an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma, for a period of one year from the date the diagnosis of a malignant tumor, cancer, or an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma is communicated to the patient by a health care provider, provided that the health care provider's underlying act or omission was on or after July 1, 2008, in the case of a malignant tumor or cancer or on or after July 1, 2016, in the case of an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma. Claims under this section for the negligent failure to diagnose a malignant tumor or cancer, where the health care provider's underlying act or omission occurred prior to July 1, 2008, shall be governed by the statute of limitations that existed prior to July 1, 2008. Claims under this section for the negligent failure to diagnose an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma, where the health care provider's underlying act or omission occurred prior to July 1, 2016, shall be governed by the statute of limitations that existed prior to July 1, 2016.
However, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to extend the limitations period beyond 10 years from the date the cause of action accrues, except that the provisions of subdivision A 2 of § 8.01-229 shall apply to toll the statute of limitations in actions brought by or on behalf of a person under a disability.
D. Every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person as set forth in subdivision 6 of § 8.01-249 shall be brought within 20 years after the cause of action accrues.
D1. For a cause of action accruing on or after July 1, 2020, every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse, other than those actions specified in subsection D, shall be brought within 10 years after the cause of action accrues.
D2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections D and D1, every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring when the person was 18 years old or older by a person of authority over a victim shall be brought within 15 years after the cause of action accrues. For the purposes of this subsection, "person of authority" means a person in a position of trust having influence over the victim's life.
E. Every action for injury to property brought by the Commonwealth against a tort-feasor for expenses arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle shall be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.
Code 1950, § 8-24; 1954, c. 589; 1973, c. 385; 1977, c. 617; 1986, cc. 389, 454; 1987, cc. 294, 645, 679; 2008, c. 175; 2011, cc. 617, 641; 2013, cc. 551, 689; 2014, c. 586; 2016, c. 190; 2020, c. 1125; 2023, c. 27.
Notes of Decisions
Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. United Land Corp. of Am., 795 S.E.2d 875 (Va. 2017).
· cites it 16× “Each of the pleas in bar asserted that the POAs' trespass and nuisance claims accrued as early as 2003 and no later than 2005 and thus were barred by Code § 8.01-243(B), which provides that "[e]very action for injury to property .”
Pigott v. Moran, 341 S.E.2d 179 (Va. 1986).
· cites it 24× “In 1977, as part of the revision of the general laws of Virginia relating to civil remedies and procedure, the General Assembly enacted Code §§ 8.01-243 and -248, dealing with statutes of limitation.”
Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond, 594 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 2004).
· cites it 14× “01-246, or the five-year limitations period for injury to property, Code § 8.01-243. Richmeade, L.R, owns approximately 25 acres of land in the City of Richmond, known as the Windsor Apartment Complex.”
Eric DePaola v. Harold Clarke, 884 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 2018).
· cites it 3× “See Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). The court also held that DePaola had failed to allege sufficiently that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need.”
McPike v. Zero-Gravity Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 800 (E.D. Va. 2017).
· cites it 9× “1— - 204 for which the right to bring such action first accrues on or after July 1, 1995, shall be commenced within two years after such ac-cruál.”
Nunnally v. Artis, 492 S.E.2d 126 (Va. 1997).
· cites it 16× “He filed a plea invoking Code § 8.01-243, which imposed a time limitation of two years on personal injury actions.”
Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 596 (Va. 2001).
· cites it 14× “(“Moneta”) is governed by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Code § 8.01-243(B) or by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code § 8.”
Lavery v. Automation Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 360 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1987).
· cites it 16× “) Lavery also correctly asserts that the cross references following Code § 8.01-243 contain the following statement: "As to limitation of action for unauthorized use of name or picture, see § 8.”
Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 551 S.E.2d 615 (Va. 2001).
· cites it 10× “01-248, rather than the limitation period and accrual date applicable to a cause of action for fraud set forth in Code §§ 8.01-243(A) and 8.01-249(1), respectively.”
Bader v. Cent. Fid. Bank, 427 S.E.2d 184 (Va. 1993).
· cites it 13× “Bader’s claim arises out of the alleged fraudulent conduct of Robert Bader and, hence, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in Code § 8.01-243(A). Central Fidelity argued, alternatively, that Mrs.”
Unlimited Screw Prods., Inc. v. Malm, 781 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Va. 1991).
· cites it 12× “Va.Code § 8.01-243 (1984). The 1984 statute applies to this case; however, this version is substantially the same as the current version, with the addition of fraud to part A.”
Glascock v. Laserna, 439 S.E.2d 380 (Va. 1994).
· cites it 14× “Code § 8.01-243 states in relevant part: A.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(8) — 3 cases
Pigott v. Moran, 341 S.E.2d 179 (Va. 1986).
“In 1977, as part of the revision of the general laws of Virginia relating to civil remedies and procedure, the General Assembly enacted Code §§ 8.01-243 and -248, dealing with statutes of limitation.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) — 287 cases
Eric DePaola v. Harold Clarke, 884 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 2018).
“See Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). The court also held that DePaola had failed to allege sufficiently that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need.”
Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 551 S.E.2d 615 (Va. 2001).
“01-248, rather than the limitation period and accrual date applicable to a cause of action for fraud set forth in Code §§ 8.01-243(A) and 8.01-249(1), respectively.”
Nunnally v. Artis, 492 S.E.2d 126 (Va. 1997).
“He filed a plea invoking Code § 8.01-243, which imposed a time limitation of two years on personal injury actions.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A)(1984) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B) — 114 cases
Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. United Land Corp. of Am., 795 S.E.2d 875 (Va. 2017).
“Each of the pleas in bar asserted that the POAs' trespass and nuisance claims accrued as early as 2003 and no later than 2005 and thus were barred by Code § 8.01-243(B), which provides that "[e]very action for injury to property .”
Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 596 (Va. 2001).
“(“Moneta”) is governed by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Code § 8.01-243(B) or by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code § 8.”
Pigott v. Moran, 341 S.E.2d 179 (Va. 1986).
“In 1977, as part of the revision of the general laws of Virginia relating to civil remedies and procedure, the General Assembly enacted Code §§ 8.01-243 and -248, dealing with statutes of limitation.”
Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond, 594 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 2004).
“01-246, or the five-year limitations period for injury to property, Code § 8.01-243. Richmeade, L.R, owns approximately 25 acres of land in the City of Richmond, known as the Windsor Apartment Complex.”
Lavery v. Automation Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 360 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1987).
“) Lavery also correctly asserts that the cross references following Code § 8.01-243 contain the following statement: "As to limitation of action for unauthorized use of name or picture, see § 8.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C) — 5 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C)(1) — 5 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C)(2) — 12 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C)(3) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(D) — 4 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(E) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(a) — 9 cases
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