The cause of action in the actions herein listed shall be deemed to accrue as follows:
1. In actions for fraud or mistake, in actions for violations of the Consumer Protection Act (§ 59.1-196 et seq.) based upon any misrepresentation, deception, or fraud, and in actions for rescission of contract for undue influence, when such fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered;
2. In actions or other proceedings for money on deposit with a bank or any person or corporation doing a banking business, when a request in writing be made therefor by check, order, or otherwise;
3. In actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, when the relevant criminal or civil action is terminated;
4. In actions for injury to the person resulting from exposure to asbestos or products containing asbestos, when a diagnosis of asbestosis, interstitial fibrosis, mesothelioma, or other disabling asbestos-related injury or disease is first communicated to the person or his agent by a physician. However, no such action may be brought more than two years after the death of such person. The diagnosis of a nonmalignant asbestos-related injury or disease shall not accrue an action based upon the subsequent diagnosis of a malignant asbestos-related injury or disease, and such subsequent diagnosis shall constitute a separate injury that shall accrue an action when such diagnosis is first communicated to the person or his agent by a physician;
4a. In actions for injury to the person resulting from the exposure to a substance or a combination of substances or the use of a product, when such injury is latent, other than (i) those asbestos-related injuries specified in subdivision 4 and (ii) claims against health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1, when the person knew or should have known of the injury and its causal connection to an injury-causing substance or product. However, no such action may be brought more than two years after the death of such person. For purposes of this subdivision, "latent" refers to injuries that remain dormant or do not develop and, therefore, are undiagnosable during the period of limitations set forth in subsection A of § 8.01-243;
5. In actions for contribution or for indemnification, when the contributee or the indemnitee has paid or discharged the obligation. A third-party claim permitted by subsection A of § 8.01-281 and the Rules of Court may be asserted before such cause of action is deemed to accrue hereunder;
6. In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of (i) the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.01-229; (ii) when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist; or (iii) when corroborative evidence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered. As used in this subdivision, "corroborative evidence" means independent evidence to support some essential allegation or issue of such injury, including (a) physical evidence, including biological samples, as defined in § 59.1-593, scientifically reliable test results, or records or other forms of data compilation however stored and regardless of physical form or characteristics, including business records, recordings, or photographs; (b) witness statements regarding an essential allegation or issue or alleging that the individual or entity against whom such action may be brought committed another act of the same or similar character; or (c) a confession or admission of the individual or entity against whom such action may be brought, and "sexual abuse" means sexual abuse as defined in subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 and acts constituting rape, sodomy, object sexual penetration or sexual battery as defined in Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2. Any action brought against an entity under clause (iii) shall only be for a cause of action occurring on or after July 1, 2026;
7. In products liability actions against parties other than health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1 for injury to the person resulting from or arising as a result of the implantation of any prosthetic device for breast augmentation or reconstruction, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the implantation is first communicated to the person by a physician;
8. In actions on an open account, from the later of the last payment or last charge for goods or services rendered on the account;
9. In products liability actions against parties other than health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1 for injury to the person resulting from or arising as a result of the implantation of any medical device, when the person knew or should have known of the injury and its causal connection to the device.
Code 1950, §§ 8-13, 8-14; 1964, c. 219; 1966, c. 118; 1977, c. 617; 1985, c. 459; 1986, c. 601; 1991, c. 674; 1992, c. 817; 1993, c. 523; 1995, c. 268; 1997, cc. 565, 801; 2005, c. 213; 2013, c. 292; 2016, c. 353; 2020, cc. 99, 180; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 195; 2026, cc. 251, 252.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
216
cases (
36 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case:
Haynes v. Haggerty, 784 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 2016).
Haynes v. Haggerty, 784 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 2016).
· cites it 24× “In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.”
Hansen v. Stanley Martin Companies, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 567 (Va. 2003).
· cites it 16× “" Code § 8.01-249(1). We, therefore, review the trial court's grant of summary judgment to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute as to whether the statute of limitations began to run before November 17, 1998, two years before the plaintiffs filed…”
Graham v. City of Manassas Sch. Bd., 390 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2019).
· cites it 14× “In their complaints, plaintiffs purport to rely on section 8.01-249(6) of the Virginia Code, which provides that any action "for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy .”
Kopalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 645 S.E.2d 439 (Va. 2007).
· cites it 13× “However, no such action may be brought more than ten years after the later of (i) the last act by the same perpetrator which was part of a common scheme or plan of abuse or (ii) removal of the disability of infancy or incompetency.”
Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1992).
· cites it 10× “NOTES [1] Clause one of the Act now appears as subsection 6 of Code § 8.01-249 entitled "When cause of action shall be deemed to accrue in certain personal actions.”
Schmidt v. Household Fin. Corp., II, 661 S.E.2d 834 (Va. 2008).
· cites it 4× “However, "[i]n actions for fraud or mistake, [or] in actions for violations of the Consumer Protection Act [the cause of action accrues] when such fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should…”
McPike v. Zero-Gravity Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 800 (E.D. Va. 2017).
· cites it 5× “8 Yet it is also true that a statute of limitations question under Va. Code § 8.01-249(1) may be resolved on a threshold motion to dismiss, but only if all the facts necessary for resolution of the motion appear on the face of the complaint or are otherwise indisputable.”
Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 551 S.E.2d 615 (Va. 2001).
· cites it 4× “01-243(A) and the time of accrual in Code § 8.01-249(1), both of which pertain to an action for fraud.”
Pigott v. Moran, 341 S.E.2d 179 (Va. 1986).
· cites it 4× “Code § 8.01-249 provides, as pertinent here, that a cause of action for fraud shall be deemed to accrue "when such fraud .”
Unlimited Screw Prods., Inc. v. Malm, 781 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Va. 1991).
· cites it 5× “See Va.Code § 8.01-249(1). Furthermore, even if Virginia’s statute of limitations for fraud does not apply to defendant’s misrepresentation counterclaim, the court would grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this counterclaim.”
STB Mktg. Corp. v. Zolfaghari, 393 S.E.2d 394 (Va. 1990).
· cites it 4× “Code § 8.01-249 provides that a cause of action shall be deemed to accrue “[i]n actions for fraud .”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(1) — 56 cases
Hansen v. Stanley Martin Companies, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 567 (Va. 2003).
“" Code § 8.01-249(1). We, therefore, review the trial court's grant of summary judgment to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute as to whether the statute of limitations began to run before November 17, 1998, two years before the plaintiffs filed…”
Schmidt v. Household Fin. Corp., II, 661 S.E.2d 834 (Va. 2008).
“However, "[i]n actions for fraud or mistake, [or] in actions for violations of the Consumer Protection Act [the cause of action accrues] when such fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should…”
McPike v. Zero-Gravity Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 800 (E.D. Va. 2017).
“8 Yet it is also true that a statute of limitations question under Va. Code § 8.01-249(1) may be resolved on a threshold motion to dismiss, but only if all the facts necessary for resolution of the motion appear on the face of the complaint or are otherwise indisputable.”
Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 551 S.E.2d 615 (Va. 2001).
“01-243(A) and the time of accrual in Code § 8.01-249(1), both of which pertain to an action for fraud.”
Unlimited Screw Prods., Inc. v. Malm, 781 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Va. 1991).
“See Va.Code § 8.01-249(1). Furthermore, even if Virginia’s statute of limitations for fraud does not apply to defendant’s misrepresentation counterclaim, the court would grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this counterclaim.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(2) — 1 case
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(3) — 5 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(4) — 17 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(5) — 19 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(6) — 17 cases
Haynes v. Haggerty, 784 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 2016).
“In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.”
Graham v. City of Manassas Sch. Bd., 390 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2019).
“In their complaints, plaintiffs purport to rely on section 8.01-249(6) of the Virginia Code, which provides that any action "for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy .”
Kopalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 645 S.E.2d 439 (Va. 2007).
“However, no such action may be brought more than ten years after the later of (i) the last act by the same perpetrator which was part of a common scheme or plan of abuse or (ii) removal of the disability of infancy or incompetency.”
Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1992).
“NOTES [1] Clause one of the Act now appears as subsection 6 of Code § 8.01-249 entitled "When cause of action shall be deemed to accrue in certain personal actions.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(8) — 2 cases
— Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(9) — 2 cases
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