v.
Monique Riker
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON f-o X CT5 V>c~ DIVISION ONE o-\ ^c c_ ~('"- cr Pn i— .-_ C : In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 72963-2-1 V-' -rj CHANDLER H. RIKER, CO X>~Tj 23. c/>m as r^;j"':- Respondent, o UNPUBLISHED OPINION •c- ~"1 c; and U3
MONIQUE HETRICK RIKER, Appellant. FILED: July 18, 2016 Schindler, J. — Monique Hetrick Riker appeals entry of the final parenting plan designating Chandler H. Riker as the residential parent. At the conclusion of the trial on August 11, 2014, the court found Monique engaged in conduct that created the danger of serious psychological damage and had an adverse effect on the best interests of the children.1 Nonetheless, the court agreed to designate Monique as the residential parent "at least initially," but the decision was subject to compliance with mandatory requirements under RCW 26.09.191(3). The court entered a parenting plan and retained jurisdiction. Four months later, the court found Monique did not comply with the requirements and entered the final parenting plan designating Chandler as the residential parent. Monique claims the trial court did not have the authority to change 1We refer to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity and mean no disrespect by doing so. No. 72963-2-1/2 designation of the residential parent for violation of the conditions imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3) without compliance with the statutory requirements for modification of a parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260. We disagree, and affirm. FACTS Monique and Chandler married in August 1999. In 2007, Monique gave birth to a daughter. In 2009, Monique agreed to move with Chandler to the east coast for his work. At the time, Monique was pregnant with twins. Chandler moved to the east coast before the birth of the twins in October 2009. Monique decided not to move back east and remained in Washington with the children. At some point in 2011, Monique and Chandler separated. Chandler filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage and entry of a parenting plan. The record for these proceedings is scant. Monique has designated only the trial brieffiled by Chandler, the court's oral ruling, and the parenting plan entered after the August 2014 trial. In his trial brief, Chandler states the court should designate Monique as the residential parent subject to "restrictions/requirements." Chandler alleged Monique "engaged in severe parental alienation" and refused to allow him to play "an active part" in the life of his children. In the oral ruling at the conclusion of trial, the court awarded Monique all proceeds from the sale of the family home and $45,000 for her portion ofa 401K retirement fund. No. 72963-2-1/3 The court found that in the previous year, Monique and her family had "made every effort" to alienate the children. What is really clear though is that in the last year, [Monique] and her family have made every effort to try and alienate the children from Mr. Riker. And that's been a real problem because she's, you know, first cut off the face time,[2] then cut off all contact, then forced all of the things that have gone on since then. The court found Monique's mother has been "in a practically delusional state in dealing with this. . . . [Rjeferring to the idea of the girls going with their father for two weeks as 'the horrific event.'" The court found Monique engaged in abusive use of conflict by bringing false claims of stalking, harassment, refusing to show up or provide the children when that was supposed to be done, filing at the last minute for a protection order just because [she was] unhappy with a visitation provision that's coming up. The court ruled that "[i]n spite of all that," it would "adopt, at least initially, [Chandler]'s proposed parenting plan" designating Monique as the residential parent.[3] The court ruled that the decision to designate Monique as the residential parent was subject to compliance with conditions designed to address the adverse and harmful effect of Monique's conduct on the children. The court told Monique that if she did not comply with the mandatory requirements, the court would designate Chandler as the residential parent. I want to make it clear to you that this is basically your last chance to shape up, because if you don't, I'm going to end up transferring the children to Mr. Riker. Because you can't continue with this process of trying to repeatedly alienate the children from their father and manipulating the legal system.
[*10]No. 72963-2-1/11
The court rejected Monique's request for a continuance to comply with the parenting plan conditions.
[W]e have no guarantee based on what's happened in the past four months that [Monique] is going to move forward with this evaluation, and then we're going to be back here again in a couple months and she is going to have more excuses. Because that's what she does. She makes excuses as to why she doesn't want to follow a court's order.
The court found Monique in contempt.
Monique Riker has not complied with the provisions of the parenting plan and had the ability to comply with the parenting plan, and is currently unwilling to comply. The noncompliance with the provisions of the parenting plan is in bad faith.[111 The order states Monique can purge the contempt by obtaining a psychological evaluation and following recommended treatment.
Based on violations of the mandatory requirements of the parenting plan entered on August 11, 2014, the court entered an "Order Re Modification/Adjustment Of No. 72963-2-1/12
[*11]Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule" and "FINAL" parenting plan designating Chandler as the residential parent.
The Order Re Modification/Adjustment Of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule states, in pertinent part:
This order is based on the terms of the Parenting Plan entered August 11, 2014, wherein the court required [Monique] to complete certain requirements and follow certain restrictions in order to protect the children. The court reserved the right to change primary residential placement if [Monique] failed to follow the terms and conditions under 3.10 of the Parenting Plan.
The order states the court has the authority under the case law to retain jurisdiction to change the residential placement of the children in the event Monique did not comply with the requirements imposed "to protect the children." The court granted the request to change the residential placement of the children because Monique did not comply with the terms of the initial parenting plan entered on August 11, 2014. The Order Re Modification/Adjustment Of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule states, in pertinent part:
This court specifically retained jurisdiction to address [Chandler]'s request to change primary residential placement of the children in the event [Monique] failed to follow section 3.10 of the final Parenting Plan. The court relies on Court of Appeals ruling fin re Marriage of Possinqer, 105 Wn. App. 326, 19 P.3d 1109 (2001)] and Supreme Ct's reference to same in Mn re Parentage of CM.F., 179 Wn.2d 411, 314 P.3d 1109 (2013)].
The court clearly set forth fact at end of trial and in 3.10 of Parent Plan that placement of children with [Monique] depended on her following 3.10. 3.10.6 states if [Monique] fails [to] follow terms court has ability to change primary placement.
[*12]No. 72963-2-1/13
[ChandlerJ's request to modify/adjust the custody decree or parenting plan/residential schedule is granted.112' The final parenting plan designates Chandler as the residential parent. The court required Monique to obtain a psychological evaluation and ordered supervised visits with the children until she completed the evaluation and began treatment. The court denied the motion for reconsideration.
[*13]No. 72963-2-1/14
ANALYSIS
Monique contends the court did not have the authority to order a change in the designation of the residential parent without complying with the requirements for modification of a final parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260.13
A trial court has broad discretion in adopting a parenting plan. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 51-52, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). We review the trial court's decision to modify the parenting plan for manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014); In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012); Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 46-47. "A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard." In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. 657, 664, 50 P.3d 298 (2002).
If supported by substantial evidence, we treat the trial court's findings offact as verities on appeal. Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 642. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 766, 976 P.2d 102 (1999). We do not review the trial court's determinations as to the credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence. In re Marriage of Rich, 80 Wn. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234 (1996).
Modification of a final parenting plan is generally governed by RCW 26.09.260. Under RCW 26.09.260(1), a court shall not modify a final parenting plan unless the courtfinds "a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the No. 72963-2-1/15
[*14]nonmoving party" and "the modification is in the best interest of the child and is necessary to serve the best interests of the child." Because changes in designation of the residential parent can be "highly disruptive to children," there is a strong presumption against modification. In re Marriage of McDole. 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993). Nonetheless, because trial courts have "broad discretion in matters dealing with the welfare of children," our appellate courts have recognized that a trial court has equitable power to defer a permanent decision on a parenting plan for a limited period of time after entry of the decree. McDole, 122 Wn.2d at 610; In re Marriage of Possinger, 105 Wn. App. 326, 336-37, 19 P.3d 1109 (2001); In re Marriage of Adler, 131 Wn. App. 717, 725, 129 P.3d 293 (2006); In re Marriage of True. 104 Wn. App. 291, 298, 16 P.3d 646 (2000); In re Parentage of CM.F.. 179 Wn.2d 411, 426-27, 314 P.3d 1109(2013). When this occurs, the deferred decision is based on the criteria for establishing a permanent parenting plan in RCW 26.09.187, not the substantial change in circumstances standard of RCW 26.09.260(1). Possinger, 105 Wn. App. at 337; see ajso In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn.2d 183, 194, 634 P.2d 498 (1981). In support of her argument that the trial court did not have the authority to change the residential placement of the children, Monique relies on a number of cases holding that after entry of the final parenting plan, the parenting plan can be modified only under RCW 26.09.260. See e^u, In re Marriage of Coy, 160 Wn. App. 797, 804, 248 P.3d 1101 (2011); In re Custody of Halls, 126 Wn. App. 599, 606-07, 109 P.3d 15 (2005). But here, the record establishes the court did not enter a final parenting plan on August 11, 2014. The decision of the court to designate Monique as the residential parent was an "initial" decision subject to compliance with the mandatory terms of the parenting No. 72963-2-1/16
[*15]plan. Specifically, the requirements the court imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3) to address adverse conduct detrimental to the best interests of the children. The court's oral decision and the parenting plan make clear that violation of the mandatory requirements under RCW 26.09.191 (3) shall be a basis to designate Chandler as the residential parent.
The trial court expressly relied on Possinger and the reference to Possinger in C.M.F. as authority to retain jurisdiction to change the residential designation for failure to comply with the requirements imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3).
In Possinger, the court designated the father as the residential parent but reserved ruling and retained jurisdiction on a final residential parenting plan for a year. Possinger, 105 Wn. App. at 328. Following the review hearing, the court designated the mother as the residential parent. Possinger. 105 Wn. App. at 331. On appeal, we held the trial court has the equitable power to defer a final decision on the designation of the residential parent for a one-year period and use the best interests of the child criteria rather than the statutory criteria for modification of a parenting plan. Possinger, 105 Wn. App. at 336-37.
[W]here the best interests of the child requires it, the trial court is not precluded by the Parenting Act [of 1987, chapter 26.09 RCW,] from exercising its traditional equitable power derived from common law to defer permanent decision making with respect to parenting issues for a specified period of time following entry of the decree of dissolution of marriage. Possinger, 105 Wn. App. at 336-37.
In C.M.F., the court addressed whether an adjudicated father was required to follow the requirements for modification under RCW 26.09.260 where no parenting plan had been entered but the order allowed either party to file a motion to establish a No. 72963-2-1/17
[*16]residential schedule. C.M.F., 179 Wn.2d at 416-17. The court distinguished Possinger and other cases where the court "retained jurisdiction for only about a year after the entry of the parenting plan," stating in none of those cases was there "an open-ended reservation." C.M.F., 179 Wn.2d at 427. The court concluded the provision that allowed "a 'reservation' of final residential placement to extend indefinitely runs contrary to the overriding policy considerations identified in RCW 26.09.002." C.M.F., 179 Wn.2d at 427; see RCW 26.09.002 ("In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties' parental responsibilities."). The court held the trial court erred in failing to follow the requirements for modification under RCW 26.09.260 and .270. C.M.F., 179 Wn.2d at 426-27. Monique argues that as in C.M.F., the trial court impermissibly retained jurisdiction after entry of the August 11, 2014 parenting plan for an "open-ended" period of time. The record does not support her argument. Unlike in C.M.F., the terms of the parenting plan make clear the court did not retain jurisdiction for an open-ended period of time. Although the trial court did not identify a timeline, the mandatory conditions under RCW 26.09.191(3) required Monique to take immediate steps to address conduct that was harmful and adverse to the best interests of the children. For example, the parenting plan states Monique "shall obtain a psychological evaluation," the children "shall not stay overnight with the maternal grandmother," and Monique "shall not schedule medical or appointments for the children with other professionals without notifying [Chandler] first."14 The court retained No. 72963-2-1/18
[*17]jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the mandatory requirements under RCW 26.09.191(3) designed to address Monique's conduct that was adverse to the best interests of the children, and the court made clear the failure to do so would result in designating Chandler as the residential parent. Further, the hearing on the motion to modify the parenting plan to change the designation of the residential parent occurred only four months after entry of the August proposed parenting plan.
Monique claims the court did not have the authority to modify a parenting plan for violation of the conditions imposed under RCW 26.09.191(3). We disagree.
RCW 26.09.191(3) gives the court the authority to limit any provision in the parenting plan where it finds the parent's "involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child's best interests" and any of the factors listed in section (3) are present. RCW 26.09.191(3) states, in pertinent part:
A parent's involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child's best interests, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of the parenting plan, if any of the following factors exist:
(e) The abusive use of conflict by the parent which creates the danger of serious damage to the child's psychological development; (f) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a protracted period without good cause; or (g) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child.
The court designated Monique as the residential parent but only on the condition that she comply with the requirements to address her conduct under RCW 26.09.191(3). The unchallenged findings establish that Monique's conduct had an adverse effect on the children. She engaged in "the abusive use of conflict which creates the danger of serious damage to the children's psychological development."
[*18]No. 72963-2-1/19
She "engaged in parental alienation which is harmful to the children" and without good cause, she interfered with Chandler's access to the children.
Under its broad power to protect the best interests of the children, the court has the authority to specify the terms under which parenting plans may be modified. In True, the court held a trial court has the authority to retain jurisdiction for several months to review the efficacy of the parenting plan. True, 104 Wn. App. at 298. On appeal, we upheld the authority of the court to retain jurisdiction and held the decision was not subject to a threshold determination. True. 104 Wn. App. at 298.
After having the parties before it in a contentious parenting plan hearing, back and forth from mediation, and after entering the order modifying the parenting plan, a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the matter for a limited period of time in order to review the efficacy of its decision and to maintain judicial economy following its order. This is especially true where, as here, the finality of the plan by its own terms is open to review and review is likely to be sought and likely to occur. True. 104 Wn. App. at298.15
The undisputed record shows the conduct the court identified under RCW 26.09.191(3) had an adverse effect on the best interests of the children that justified the requirements the court imposed in the initial parenting plan and the decision to change the designation of the residential parent in the final parenting plan.[16] No. 72963-2-1/20
[*19]We affirm.[17] S^Qjl^oq WE CONCUR: -T/;<ktT, ^0 6,
[*20]