Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.260
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(1) The entry of a decree of adoption divests any parent or *alleged father who is not married to the adoptive parent or who has not joined in the petition for adoption of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the adoptee, except past-due child support obligations. The adoptee shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to the parent. The adoptee shall be, to all intents and purposes, and for all legal incidents, the child, legal heir, and lawful issue of the adoptive parent, entitled to all rights and privileges, including the right of inheritance and the right to take under testamentary disposition, and subject to all the obligations of a natural child of the adoptive parent.
(2) Any appeal of an adoption decree shall be decided on an accelerated review basis.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.33.160 (3) and (4)(h), no person may challenge an adoption decree on the grounds of:
(a) A person claiming or alleging paternity subsequently appears and alleges lack of prior notice of the proceeding; or
(b) The adoption proceedings were in any other manner defective.
(4) It is the intent of the legislature that this section provide finality for adoptive placements and stable homes for children.
Notes:
*Reviser's note: RCW 26.33.020 was amended by 2019 c 46 s 5034, changing the definition of "alleged father" to "alleged genetic parent."
Finding—1995 c 270: See note following RCW 74.13A.040.
Inheritance by adopted child: RCW 11.04.085.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1991–2023 · leading case: Franks v. State (In re M.-A.F.-S.)
Franks v. State (In re M.-A.F.-S.) (2018)
“RCW 26.33.260 provides, in pertinent part: (1) The entry of a decree of adoption divests any parent .”
Sunderland v. Department of Social & Health Services (2007)
“8 We hold that a party alleging a constitutional violation necessarily presents sufficient grounds for challenging an adoption decree under RCW 26.33.260. ¶13 “Because the process of adoption is a creature of statute, the adoption statutes must be strictly followed.”
Schwebke v. Lutheran Social Services (1991)
“011(4) (defining "parent"); RCW 26.33.260 (effect of adoption decree is to make the adoptee the legal equivalent of a biological child); Smith v.”
In Re The Adoption Of: M.j.w. (2019)
“The trial court’s first conclusion of law was, “Adoption of the child will terminate and divest everyone except the adoptive parents of legal rights to the child per RCW 26.33.260.” CP at 482. This conclusion was an accurate recitation of RCW 26.”
In Re Dependency of TCCB (2007)
“[27] RCW 26.33.260(1). [28] RCW 26.33.295 provides in relevant part: .”
In re the Dependency of T.C.C.B. (2007)
“RCW 26.33.260(1). RCW 26.33.295 provides in relevant part: (2) Agreements regarding communication with or contact between child adoptees, adoptive parents, and a birth parent or parents shall not be legally enforceable unless the terms of the agreement are set forth in a written…”
In Re Estate of Fleming (2001)
“Similarly, RCW 26.33.260(1) provides that an adoptive child enjoys complete inheritance rights from the adoptive parent.”
Navajo Nation v. SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF WASH. (1999)
“§ 26.33.260(3). The statute does not specifically reference Indian tribes, neither to encompass nor exclude them from the statute of limitations.”
In Re Adoption of RLM (2007)
“[8] We hold that a party alleging a constitutional violation necessarily presents sufficient grounds for challenging an adoption decree under RCW 26.33.260. ¶ 13 "Because the process of adoption is a creature of statute, the adoption statutes must be strictly followed.”
In Re The Interest Of Desiree Evans, V. Carol Duvey (2021)
“260(3)(a) to support her assertion that an adoption decree cannot be vacated due to procedural deficiencies or errors.”
Marzan v. Kovacs (2001)
“Similarly, RCW 26.33.260(1) provides that an adoptive child enjoys complete inheritance rights from the adoptive parent.”
In Re The Estate Of Deborah E. Reid (2017)
“020 with RCW 26.33.260, we hold that as a result of his adoption, Saludares became the “child, legal heir, and lawful issue” of his adoptive parents and not of his biological mother “for all legal incidents,” including wrongful death actions.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.260(1) — 13 cases
Franks v. State (In re M.-A.F.-S.) (2018)
“RCW 26.33.260 provides, in pertinent part: (1) The entry of a decree of adoption divests any parent .”
In Re Dependency of TCCB (2007)
“[27] RCW 26.33.260(1). [28] RCW 26.33.295 provides in relevant part: .”
In re the Dependency of T.C.C.B. (2007)
“RCW 26.33.260(1). RCW 26.33.295 provides in relevant part: (2) Agreements regarding communication with or contact between child adoptees, adoptive parents, and a birth parent or parents shall not be legally enforceable unless the terms of the agreement are set forth in a written…”
In Re The Adoption Of: M.j.w. (2019)
“The trial court’s first conclusion of law was, “Adoption of the child will terminate and divest everyone except the adoptive parents of legal rights to the child per RCW 26.33.260.” CP at 482. This conclusion was an accurate recitation of RCW 26.”
In Re Estate of Fleming (2001)
“Similarly, RCW 26.33.260(1) provides that an adoptive child enjoys complete inheritance rights from the adoptive parent.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.260(3) — 3 cases
Sunderland v. Department of Social & Health Services (2007)
“8 We hold that a party alleging a constitutional violation necessarily presents sufficient grounds for challenging an adoption decree under RCW 26.33.260. ¶13 “Because the process of adoption is a creature of statute, the adoption statutes must be strictly followed.”
Navajo Nation v. SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF WASH. (1999)
“§ 26.33.260(3). The statute does not specifically reference Indian tribes, neither to encompass nor exclude them from the statute of limitations.”
In Re Adoption of RLM (2007)
“[8] We hold that a party alleging a constitutional violation necessarily presents sufficient grounds for challenging an adoption decree under RCW 26.33.260. ¶ 13 "Because the process of adoption is a creature of statute, the adoption statutes must be strictly followed.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.260(3)(a) — 1 case
In Re The Interest Of Desiree Evans, V. Carol Duvey (2021)
“260(3)(a) to support her assertion that an adoption decree cannot be vacated due to procedural deficiencies or errors.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.260(4) — 4 cases
Sunderland v. Department of Social & Health Services (2007)
“8 We hold that a party alleging a constitutional violation necessarily presents sufficient grounds for challenging an adoption decree under RCW 26.33.260. ¶13 “Because the process of adoption is a creature of statute, the adoption statutes must be strictly followed.”
In Re Adoption of RLM (2007)
“[8] We hold that a party alleging a constitutional violation necessarily presents sufficient grounds for challenging an adoption decree under RCW 26.33.260. ¶ 13 "Because the process of adoption is a creature of statute, the adoption statutes must be strictly followed.”
In Re The Estate Of Deborah E. Reid (2017)
“020 with RCW 26.33.260, we hold that as a result of his adoption, Saludares became the “child, legal heir, and lawful issue” of his adoptive parents and not of his biological mother “for all legal incidents,” including wrongful death actions.”
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