Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.063
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(1) It is the intent of the legislature to minimize trauma to a child involved in an allegation of sexual or physical abuse. The legislature declares that removing the child from the home or the care of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian often has the effect of further traumatizing the child. It is, therefore, the legislature's intent that the alleged abuser, rather than the child, shall be removed or restrained from the child's residence and that this should be done at the earliest possible point of intervention in accordance with RCW 10.31.100, chapter 13.34 RCW, this section, and RCW 26.44.130.
(2) In any judicial proceeding in which it is alleged that a child has been subjected to sexual or physical abuse, if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that an incident of sexual or physical abuse has occurred, the court may, on its own motion, or the motion of the guardian ad litem or other parties, issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction restraining or enjoining the person accused of committing the abuse from:
(a) Molesting or disturbing the peace of the alleged victim;
(b) Entering the family home of the alleged victim except as specifically authorized by the court;
(c) Having any contact with the alleged victim, except as specifically authorized by the court;
(d) Knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a specified location.
(3) If the caretaker is willing, and does comply with the duties prescribed in subsection (8) of this section, uncertainty by the caretaker that the alleged abuser has in fact abused the alleged victim shall not, alone, be a basis to remove the alleged victim from the caretaker, nor shall it be considered neglect.
(4) In issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the court may impose any additional restrictions that the court in its discretion determines are necessary to protect the child from further abuse or emotional trauma pending final resolution of the abuse allegations.
(5) The court shall issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting a person from entering the family home if the court finds that the order would eliminate the need for an out-of-home placement to protect the child's right to nurturance, health, and safety and is sufficient to protect the child from further sexual or physical abuse or coercion.
(6) The court may issue a temporary restraining order without requiring notice to the party to be restrained or other parties only if it finds on the basis of the moving affidavit or other evidence that irreparable injury could result if an order is not issued until the time for responding has elapsed.
(7) A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction:
(a) Does not prejudice the rights of a party or any child which are to be adjudicated at subsequent hearings in the proceeding; and
(b) May be revoked or modified.
(8) The person having physical custody of the child shall have an affirmative duty to assist in the enforcement of the restraining order including but not limited to a duty to notify the court as soon as practicable of any violation of the order, a duty to request the assistance of law enforcement officers to enforce the order, and a duty to notify the department of any violation of the order as soon as practicable if the department is a party to the action. Failure by the custodial party to discharge these affirmative duties shall be subject to contempt proceedings.
(9) Willful violation of a court order entered under this section is a misdemeanor. A written order shall contain the court's directive and shall bear the legend: "Violation of this order with actual notice of its terms is a criminal offense under chapter 26.44 RCW, is also subject to contempt proceedings, and will subject a violator to arrest."
(10) If a restraining order issued under this section is modified or terminated, the clerk of the court shall notify the law enforcement agency specified in the order on or before the next judicial day. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from any computer-based criminal intelligence system.
[ 2017 3rd sp.s. c 6 s 325; 2008 c 267 s 4; 2000 c 119 s 12; 1993 c 412 s 15; 1988 c 190 s 3; 1985 c 35 s 1.]
Notes:
Effective date—2017 3rd sp.s. c 6 ss 102, 104-115, 201-227, 301-337, 401-419, 501-513, 801-803, and 805-822: See note following RCW 43.216.025.
Conflict with federal requirements—2017 3rd sp.s. c 6: See RCW 43.216.908.
Application—2000 c 119: See note following RCW 10.31.100.
Orders prohibiting contact: RCW 10.99.040.
Temporary restraining order: RCW 26.09.060.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32
cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc. (2008)
“" RCW 26.44.063(8) (emphasis added). ś19 The legislature's consistent pronouncements over the last 30 years evince a clear public policy to prevent domestic violenceâ a policy the legislature has sought to further by taking clear, concrete actions to encourage domestic violence…”
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc. (2008)
“” RCW 26.44.063(8) (emphasis added). ¶19 The legislature’s consistent pronouncements over the last 30 years evince a clear public policy to prevent domestic violence — a policy the legislature has sought to further by taking clear, concrete actions to encourage domestic violence…”
State v. Hogan (2008)
“a person without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe that: (a) An order has been issued of which the person has knowledge under RCW 26.44.063, or chapter 7.90,10.99, 26.”
State v. Hogan (2008)
“34 RCW restraining the person and the person has violated the terms of the order restraining the person from acts or threats of violence, or restraining the person from going onto the grounds of or entering a residence, workplace, school, or day care, or prohibiting the person…”
State v. Wofford (2009)
“100(2)(a), an officer must arrest a suspect when the officer has probable cause to believe that [(1)] [a]n order has been issued of which the person has knowledge under RCW 26.44.063, or chapter 7.90,10.99, 26.”
City of Seattle v. Eun Yong Shin (1988)
“For example, RCW 26.44.063 6 relates to parents or others who inflict child abuse and provides for the issuance of temporary restraining orders "in any judicial proceeding" in order to enjoin abuse.”
In Re The Dependency Of: Z.A. (2023)
“home, and that: (a) There is no parent or guardian available to care for such child; (b) The parent, guardian, or legal custodian is not willing to take custody of the child; or (c) The court finds, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, a manifest danger exists that the…”
State v. Madrid (2008)
“100(2)(a) reads, “An order has been issued of which the person has knowledge under RCW 26.44.063, or chapter 7.90,10.99, 26.”
State v. Madrid (2008)
“100(2)(a) reads: "An order has been issued of which the person has knowledge under RCW 26.44.063, or chapter 7.90, 10.99, 26.”
Tyner v. Department of Social & Health Services (1998)
“See RCW 26.44.063. See chapter 13.34 RCW. The purpose of a shelter care hearing is to decide whether a child who is alleged to be dependent should be placed in the State’s custody.”
In re Dependency of Z.A. (2024)
“Under that subsection, an out-of-home- placement may be ordered when “[t]he court finds, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, a manifest danger exists that the child will suffer serious abuse or neglect if the child is not removed from the home and an order under RCW…”
State v. Wofford (2009)
“100(2)(a), an officer must arrest a suspect when the officer has probable cause to believe that: [1] An order has been issued of which the person has knowledge under RCW 26.44.063, or chapter 7.90, 10.99, 26.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.063(5) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.063(8) — 2 cases
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc. (2008)
“" RCW 26.44.063(8) (emphasis added). ś19 The legislature's consistent pronouncements over the last 30 years evince a clear public policy to prevent domestic violenceâ a policy the legislature has sought to further by taking clear, concrete actions to encourage domestic violence…”
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc. (2008)
“” RCW 26.44.063(8) (emphasis added). ¶19 The legislature’s consistent pronouncements over the last 30 years evince a clear public policy to prevent domestic violence — a policy the legislature has sought to further by taking clear, concrete actions to encourage domestic violence…”
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