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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 36Chapter 36.70A

Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.295 (2025)

Growth management hearings board—Direct judicial review

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1998–2016 18citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 18 opinions since 1998. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (3 cases).

The 18 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.295 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 36.70A.295 2×subsections: (1) (3)cited by 267 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“ANALYSIS RCW 36.70A.295(1) provides for judicial review of Board decisions in superior court.”
The case’s holding
Courts accord deference to agency interpretations of law where the agency possesses specialized expertise, though they are not bound by such interpretations.
Later courts cite it for
“we accord deference to an agency interpretation of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in dealing with such issues, but we are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute.” · 9 citing courts
2
GREENWenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan Cnty., 4 P.3d 123 (Wash. 2000).
cites § 36.70A.295 2×cited by 255 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Except as provided in GMA, RCW 36.70A.295, LUPA does not allow direct judicial review of land use decisions that must go before a GMHB: “This chapter [LUPA] does not apply to .”
The case’s holding
Failure to timely challenge a site-specific rezone bars a collateral attack on the validity of that rezone in a subsequent challenge to a project permit.
Later courts cite it for
“under the substantial evidence standard, there must be a sufficient quantum of evidence in the record to persuade a reasonable person that the declared premise is true.” · 7 citing courts
3
GREENDavidson Serles & Assocs. v. City of Kirkland, 159 Wash. App. 616 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 36.70A.295 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“RCW 36.70A.295. To allow direct review of challenges properly within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction outside of RCW 36.”
The case’s holding
The Growth Management Hearings Board has exclusive jurisdiction over SEPA challenges to comprehensive plans and development regulations, so superior courts lack jurisdiction over them.
Later courts cite it for
“on summary judgment review, we may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis within the record.” · 7 citing courts
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“RCW 36.70A.295. Parties who are aggrieved by a hearings board’s final decision must appeal the decision to the superior court within 30 days.”
5
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Similarly, the legislature specifically chose to apply the civil rules in RCW 36.70A.295, which governs direct judicial review of growth management hearings board decisions and consolidation of a petition for judicial review and a pending civil action.”
6
GREENDiehl v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 103 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2004).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Similarly, the legislature specifically chose to apply the civil rules in RCW 36.70A.295, which governs direct judicial review of growth management hearing board decisions and consolidation of a petition for judicial review and a pending civil action.”
The case’s holding
Superior court civil rules are procedural rules applicable only after the commencement of an action and do not extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
Later courts cite it for
“superior court civil rules are procedural rules, applicable only after the commencement of an action, and thus do not purport to extend subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENDAVIDSON SERLES v. City of Kirkland, 246 P.3d 822 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 36.70A.295 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“The GMA contains a specific provision providing for direct judicial review where all parties to the proceeding before the Board have agreed to such direct review in the superior court.”
Later courts cite it for
“on summary judgment review, we may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis within the record.” · 3 citing courts
8
cites § 36.70A.295 1×subsections: (1)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“” RCW 36.70A.295(1). City of Redmond, 136 Wn.”
9
GREENWells v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt., 997 P.2d 405 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×subsections: (4)(b)(iii)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Kitsap County, supra, Order on Dispositive Motions, at 8. [31] Alpine v.”
The case’s holding
A local government subject to a prior invalidity determination bears the burden to show revised provisions responding to it no longer substantially interfere with Growth Management Act goals.
Later courts cite it for
“w hen a local government is subject to a determination of invalidity, it bears the burden under rcw 36. 70a.320( 4).” · 2 citing courts
10
REDThurston Cnty. v. W. WASH. BD., 154 P.3d 959 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 7 cases
Reversed in part by Thurston County v. W. WASH. GROWTH MANAGEMENT (2008): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case ("CONCLUSION ¶ 49 We affirm the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part.").
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Separation of Powers ¶ 20 But the County argues that the legislature's grant of participation standing without a showing of injury-in-fact violates the separation of powers doctrine.”
The case’s holding
A county's comprehensive plan is presumed valid and the challenger bears the burden of proving noncompliance; a board may not shift that burden to the county, even on rural density provisions.
Later courts cite it for
“the board considers a density of not more than one dwelling unit per five acres to be rural.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENWoods v. Kittitas Cnty., 130 Wash. App. 573 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“RCW 36.70A.295; Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wn.”
12
REDThurston Cnty. v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 137 Wash. App. 781 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Separation of Powers ¶20 But the County argues that the legislature’s grant of participation standing without a showing of injury-in-fact violates the separation of powers doctrine.”
13
GREENWells v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 100 Wash. App. 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×subsections: (4)(b)(iii)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“290(3); RCW 36.70A.295(4)(b)(iii); RCW 36.70A.390.”
14
GREENWenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan Cnty., 4 P.3d 123 (Wash. 2000).
cites § 36.70A.295 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“Except as provided in GMA, RCW 36.70A.295, LUPA does not allow direct judicial review of land use decisions that must go before a GMHB: "This chapter [LUPA] does not apply to .”
The case’s holding
A party's failure to timely appeal a site-specific rezone bars it from challenging the rezone's validity in a later petition opposing a development application.
15
GREENWoods v. Kittitas Cnty., 123 P.3d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“RCW 36.70A.295; Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wash.”
16
NEUTRALMoore v. Whitman Cnty., 18 P.3d 566 (Wash. 2001).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“See RCW 36.70A.295. More fundamentally the courts themselves serve as the traditional, if not preferred, forum to resolve legal disputes.”
17
NEUTRALCity of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound, 65 P.3d 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 36.70A.295 1×subsections: (1)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“" [9] RCW 36.70A.295(1). [10] Redmond, 136 Wash.”
18
cites § 36.70A.295 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 36.70A.295
“RCW 36.70A.295. Parties who are aggrieved by a hearings board's final decision must appeal the decision to 12 New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199820072016

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2000. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.10Wash.8
By subsection
(1)3 cases
City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 959 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1998).“ANALYSIS RCW 36.70A.295(1) provides for judicial review of Board decisions in superior court.”
City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 65 P.3d 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).“” RCW 36.70A.295(1). City of Redmond, 136 Wn.”
City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound, 65 P.3d 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).“" [9] RCW 36.70A.295(1). [10] Redmond, 136 Wash.”
(3)1 case
(4)(b)(iii)2 cases
Wells v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt., 997 P.2d 405 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).“Kitsap County, supra, Order on Dispositive Motions, at 8. [31] Alpine v.”
Wells v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 100 Wash. App. 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).“290(3); RCW 36.70A.295(4)(b)(iii); RCW 36.70A.390.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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