Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.410 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) The lawful beneficiary, assignee, or payee of a life insurance policy, other than an annuity, heretofore or hereafter effected by any person on his or her own life, or on the life of another, in favor of a person other than himself or herself, shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of the policy against the creditors and representatives of the insured and of the person effecting the insurance, and such proceeds and avails shall also be exempt from all liability for any debt of such beneficiary, existing at the time the proceeds or avails are made available for his or her own use.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply

(a) whether or not the right to change the beneficiary is reserved or permitted in the policy; or

(b) whether or not the policy is made payable to the person whose life is insured or to his or her estate if the beneficiary, assignee or payee shall predecease such person; except, that this subsection shall not be construed so as to defeat any policy provision which provides for disposition of proceeds in the event the beneficiary shall predecease the insured.

(3) The exemptions provided by subsection (1) of this section, subject to the statute of limitations, shall not apply

(a) to any claim to or interest in such proceeds or avails by or on behalf of the insured, or the person so effecting the insurance, or their administrators or executors, in whatever capacity such claim is made or such interest is asserted; or

(b) to any claim to or interest in such proceeds or avails by or on behalf of any person to whom rights thereto have been transferred with intent to defraud creditors; but an insurer shall be liable to all such creditors only as to amounts aggregating not to exceed the amount of such proceeds or avails remaining in the insurer's possession at the time the insurer receives at its home office written notice by or on behalf of such creditors, of claims to recover for such transfer, with specification of the amounts claimed; or

(c) to so much of such proceeds or avails as equals the amount of any premiums or portion thereof paid for the insurance with intent to defraud creditors, with interest thereon, and if prior to the payment of such proceeds or avails the insurer has received at its home office written notice by or on behalf of the creditor, of a claim to recover for premiums paid with intent to defraud creditors, with specification of the amount claimed.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section a policy shall also be deemed to be payable to a person other than the insured if and to the extent that a facility-of-payment clause or similar clause in the policy permits the insurer to discharge its obligation after the death of the individual insured by paying the death benefits to a person as permitted by such clause.

(5) No person shall be compelled to exercise any rights, powers, options or privileges under any such policy.

[ 2009 c 549 s 7074; 1947 c 79 s .18.41; Rem. Supp. 1947 s 45.18.41.]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 13 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1956–2023 · leading case: In Re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).

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In Re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968). · cites it 22× “'" The case at bar illustrates clearly the needed and binding character of the decision of this court to the question certified. The whole reason for invoking the certified question procedure is to obtain an authoritative decision of this court as to the meaning of RCW 48.”

Aetna Life Ins. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993 (Wash. 1988). · cites it 6× “II Petitioner argues alternatively that the ownership character of the policy makes no difference in this case since she is the designated beneficiary of the policy and is entitled to take free of all creditors, including minor children for whom the deceased had an antenuptial…”

Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 821 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1991). · cites it 7× “The statute at issue in this case is thé life insurance proceeds exemption statute, RCW 48.18.410 (henceforth the Act), which provides in relevant part: (1) The lawful beneficiary .”

Standing v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 598 P.2d 725 (Wash. 1979). “RCW 48.18.410. Since there exists a rationed basis for classifying insurance proceeds in a different manner than the victim's other assets, RCW 7.”

Woodard v. Gramlow, 95 P.3d 1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “RCW 48.18.410; Milton, 48 Wn.2d at 392 . It then determined that the testator’s intent to use exempt property, such as insurance proceeds, to pay the debts of the estate must appear in the will or testamentary trust “by clear and apt language.”

Porter v. Porter, 726 P.2d 459 (Wash. 1986). “In view of our finding that (1) the term insurance proceeds were community property, and Porter was entitled to dispose of approximately $46,000, or one-half the proceeds of the term policy; (2) the effect of RCW 48.18.410 is to allow his one-half of the proceeds of the policy,…”

In Re Milton's Est., 294 P.2d 412 (Wash. 1956). “[1] By both the state and Federal statutes, the proceeds of an insurance policy such as the one here involved are exempt from the claims of creditors.”

Woodard v. Gramlow, 95 P.3d 1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “RCW 48.18.410; Milton, 48 Wash.2d at 392 , 294 P.”

In re Gutke, 528 B.R. 798 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015). “Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 48.18.410 . 6 As to this law, a Washington court has observed: Washington’s statute is very liberal in protecting all classes of beneficiaries, all proceeds (including cash values), and in exempting the proceeds from both the insured’s and the…”

Est. of Meyer v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 41 (1976). · cites it 4× “While the language "inure to her separate use and benefit" does not in so many words purport to convert a community asset to the wife's separate property, the proviso which follows, referring specifically to community vis-a-vis separate property, creates an apparent inference…”

Livingston v. Shelton, 526 P.2d 385 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). · cites it 2× “Had the bank elected to proceed against the other security, rather than against the life insurance proceeds, these proceeds would have been exempt from the claim of any creditor of decedent or plaintiff under RCW 48.18.410. 2 While the assignment permitted the bank at its option…”

Portwood v. Minkler, 294 P.2d 412 (Wash. 1956). “By both the state and Federal statutes, the proceeds of an insurance policy such as the one here involved are exempt from the claims of creditors.”

Show all 13 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.410(1) — 2 cases

Aetna Life Ins. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993 (Wash. 1988). “II Petitioner argues alternatively that the ownership character of the policy makes no difference in this case since she is the designated beneficiary of the policy and is entitled to take free of all creditors, including minor children for whom the deceased had an antenuptial…”

Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 821 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1991). “The statute at issue in this case is thé life insurance proceeds exemption statute, RCW 48.18.410 (henceforth the Act), which provides in relevant part: (1) The lawful beneficiary .”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.410(3)(b) — 1 case

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