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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 64Chapter 64.40

Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.010 (2025)

Definitions—Defense in action for damages

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1986–2025 30citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 30 opinions since 1986, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (6) (16 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.010 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENLutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cnty., 829 P.2d 746 (Wash. 1992).
cites § 64.40.010 4×subsections: (1) 3× (5)cited by 143 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Agency is defined in RCW 64.40.010(1) as "the state of Washington, any of its political subdivisions, including any city, town, or county, and any other public body exercising regulatory authority or control over the use of real property in the state.”
The case’s holding
A county and its council are not immune from suits brought against a hearing examiner in his official capacity for arbitrary land use decisions (RCW 64.40.020).
Later courts cite it for
“attaches to persons or entities who perform functions that are so comparable to those performed by judges that it is felt they should share the judge's absolute immunity while carrying out those functions.” · 7 citing courts
2
GREENManna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., 295 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 64.40.010 6×subsections: (2) 2× (1) (4) (6)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“) ¶13 The definitions section in RCW 64.40.010 includes the following: (2) “Permit” means any governmental approval required by law before an owner of a property interest may improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise put real property to use.”
Later courts cite it for
“is well settled that a landowner has a vested right to develop land under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time the permit application is submitted.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENBirnbaum v. Pierce Cnty., 274 P.3d 1070 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 64.40.010 6×subsections: (4) 3× (6) 3×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“RCW 64.40.010(4). ¶9 Birnbaum makes claims under each statutory prong.”
The case’s holding
Statutory damages are recoverable only for losses incurred after a cause of action arises, meaning pre-decision permit delays are not compensable under the final-decision prong.
Later courts cite it for
“a claim for arbitrary delay occurring prior to a final decision ... may be brought once the permit decision is final.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENCallfas v. Dep't of Constr. & Land Use, 120 P.3d 110 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 64.40.010 4×subsections: (6) 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“The court also addressed the argument that the Callfases had failed to meet the statutory limit for filing their suit: In the end, I found myself in agreement with the City Attorney’s analysis of the language, structure and policy of the statutes in question: RCW 64.40.010(6),…”
Later courts cite it for
“indeed, a permit applicant like the callfases would have a claim under chapter 64.40 rcw for delay damages, as we noted above, without a writ once the tardy permit was issued.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENWilson v. City of Seattle, 863 P.2d 1336 (Wash. 1993).
cites § 64.40.010 4×subsections: (1) 2× (4) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“RCW 64.40.010(1). "Damages" mean reasonable expenses and losses incurred between the time a cause of action arises and relief is granted, but does not include speculative damages, diminution in value or damage to real property.”
The case’s holding
A statutory cause of action for damages under RCW 64.40.020 is not a tort and does not require a prior claim filing as a condition precedent to suit.
Later courts cite it for
“claim under rcw 64.40.020, a statutorily created cause of action for damages to property rights caused by governmental actions in processing permit applications.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENHayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706 (1997).
cites § 64.40.010 2×subsections: (3) (4)cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“” Thus, a claimant under the Washington statute does not have to establish either a vested right or "legitimate claim of entitlement” (Roth) to the action he or she desires the agency to take, as in a § 1983 claim; he or she need only establish an ownership interest in the…”
7
GREENCobb v. Snohomish Cnty., 935 P.2d 1384 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 64.40.010 2×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“" See RCW 64.40.010(4); see also Fleming v. County of Kane, 898 F.”
The case’s holding
The party whose wrongful conduct caused the damages bears the burden of proving the injured party failed to mitigate damages.
Later courts cite it for
“the party whose wrongful conduct caused the damages ... has the burden of proving the failure to mitigate.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENMission Springs Inc. v. City of Spokane, 954 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1998).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (1)cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Therefore we have rather a straightforward situation where clear legal rights of the *257 citizen were violated by city council members acting in excess of their lawful authority and by a City Manager acting in excess of his own lawful authority but at the urging of the City…”
9
GREENMission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947 (1998).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (1)cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Therefore we have rather a straightforward situation where clear legal rights of the citizen were violated by city council members acting in excess of their lawful authority and by a City Manager acting in excess of his own lawful authority but at the urging of the City Council.…”
The case’s holding
A municipality may not withhold a ministerial land use permit for reasons extraneous to the satisfaction of lawful ordinance or statutory criteria.
Later courts cite it for
“the talisman of a taking is government action which forces some private persons alone to shoulder affirmative public burdens, 'which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” · 6 citing courts
10
GREENHayes v. City of Seattle, 888 P.2d 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 64.40.010 2×subsections: (6) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“4 Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary to address the City’s argument that the Council’s action was not an "act” for purposes of RCW 64.40.010(6). " 'Act’ shall not include lawful decisions of an agency which are designed to prevent a condition which would…”
11
GREENHayes v. City of Seattle, 934 P.2d 1179 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (3)cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“RCW 64.40.010(3) defines property interest as "any interest or right in real property in the state.”
The case’s holding
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if findings are too conclusory to demonstrate consideration of the underlying facts and circumstances (basis).
Later courts cite it for
“final action on applicant's request for a permit did not occur until the city council ultimately approved his application following judicial review of the council's initial determination....” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENWestway Constr., Inc. v. Benton Cnty., 151 P.3d 1005 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (3)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“RCW 64.40.010(3) defines “property interest” as “any interest or right in real property in the state.”
Later courts cite it for
“a court must dismiss any action commenced in violation of a 10 statutorily mandated claim filing condition precedent.” · 4 citing courts
13
REDSmoke v. City of Seattle, 902 P.2d 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 64.40.010 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by Smoke v. City of Seattle (1997): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Senate Journal, 47th Legislature (1982), at 1449; see also RCW 64.40.010(1), 64.40.010(4), (6) (limiting damages to those caused by an "act", defined to be a final decision by an agency).”
Later courts cite it for
“a respondent must cross-appeal when seeking reversal of an adverse ruling on a distinct claim or cause of action.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENCox v. City of Lynnwood, 863 P.2d 578 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (4)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Under RCW 64.40.010(4) "[dlamages" means reasonable expenses and losses, other than speculative losses or profits, incurred between the time a cause of action arises and the time a holder of an interest in real property is granted relief as provided in RCW 64.”
The case’s holding
Substantive due process is violated when a local jurisdiction makes a land use decision that is irrational, arbitrary, capricious, lacks a legitimate governmental purpose, or involves improper motive.
Later courts cite it for
“substantive due process is denied if a local jurisdiction makes a land use decision irrationally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, its decision utterly fails to serve a legitimate governmental purpose, or was tainted by improper motive.” · 1 citing court
15
REDChelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 20 P.3d 416 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 64.40.010 2×subsections: (2) (6)cited by 4 cases
Reversed by Chelan County v. Nykreim (2002): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Additionally, the BLA may not meet the definition of a "permit" under RCW 64.40.010(2). Under this provision, a "permit" is defined as "any governmental approval required by law before an owner of a property interest may improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise put real property to…”
The case’s holding
A planning director's approval of a boundary line adjustment is ministerial rather than quasi-judicial, so it is not final under res judicata and may be withdrawn and declared void if invalid.
Later courts cite it for
“upon determination that the proposed adjustment meets the criteria in step 1, and contains the information called for in step 2, the form will be forwarded to the chelan county auditor for recordation.” · 2 citing courts
16
REDPleas v. City of Seattle, 746 P.2d 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (6)cited by 11 cases
Reversed by Pleas v. City of Seattle (1989): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“RCW 64.40.010(6). Third, the act does not apply unless the government agency knew or reasonably should have known its acts were unlawful or exceeded lawful authority.”
Later courts cite it for
“is a clear break with the past” · 1 citing court
17
GREENBrower v. Pierce Cnty., 984 P.2d 1036 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (4)cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“RCW 64.40.010(4) states in part: “Damages” means reasonable expenses and losses, other than speculative losses or profits, incurred between the time a *566 cause of action arises and the time a holder of an interest in real property is granted relief as provided in RCW 64.”
18
NEUTRALCoy v. City of Duvall, 298 P.3d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 64.40.010 5×subsections: (6) 3× (4) 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“We held that, pursuant to its plain meaning, the statutory definition of “damages” set forth in RCW 64.40.010(4) “authorizes damages only for expenses and losses that are incurred after a cause of action under the statute arises.”
19
REDChelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 105 Wash. App. 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 64.40.010 1×subsections: (2)cited by 5 cases
Reversed by Chelan County v. Nykreim (2002): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“Additionally, the BLA may not meet the definition of a “permit” under RCW 64.40.010(2). Under this provision, a “permit” is defined as “any governmental approval required by law before an owner of a property interest may improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise put real property to…”
20
NEUTRALIsla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 64.40.010 2×subsections: (6) 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.010
“or relief from a failure to act within time limits established by law: PROVIDED, That the action is unlawful or in excess of lawful authority only if the final decision of the agency was made with knowledge of its unlawfulness or that it was in excess of lawful authority or it…”
The case’s holding
A subdivision condition requiring open space set-asides must be roughly proportional to the development's impact and supported by evidence or an individualized determination.
Later courts cite it for
“retain a minimum of thirty (30) percent of the site as open space” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198620052025

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2013. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.20Wash.6W.D. Wash.39th Cir.1
By subsection
(1)7 cases
Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cnty., 829 P.2d 746 (Wash. 1992).“Agency is defined in RCW 64.40.010(1) as "the state of Washington, any of its political subdivisions, including any city, town, or county, and any other public body exercising regulatory authority or control over the use of real property in the state.”
Mission Springs Inc. v. City of Spokane, 954 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1998).“Therefore we have rather a straightforward situation where clear legal rights of the *257 citizen were violated by city council members acting in excess of their lawful authority and by a City Manager acting in excess of his own lawful authority but at the urging of the City…”
Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947 (1998).“Therefore we have rather a straightforward situation where clear legal rights of the citizen were violated by city council members acting in excess of their lawful authority and by a City Manager acting in excess of his own lawful authority but at the urging of the City Council.…”
Wilson v. City of Seattle, 863 P.2d 1336 (Wash. 1993).“RCW 64.40.010(1). "Damages" mean reasonable expenses and losses incurred between the time a cause of action arises and relief is granted, but does not include speculative damages, diminution in value or damage to real property.”
Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., 295 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).“) ¶13 The definitions section in RCW 64.40.010 includes the following: (2) “Permit” means any governmental approval required by law before an owner of a property interest may improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise put real property to use.”
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(2)4 cases
Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., 295 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 105 Wash. App. 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).“Additionally, the BLA may not meet the definition of a “permit” under RCW 64.40.010(2). Under this provision, a “permit” is defined as “any governmental approval required by law before an owner of a property interest may improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise put real property to…”
Chelan Cnty. v. Nykreim, 20 P.3d 416 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).“Additionally, the BLA may not meet the definition of a "permit" under RCW 64.40.010(2). Under this provision, a "permit" is defined as "any governmental approval required by law before an owner of a property interest may improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise put real property to…”
Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., No. 30539-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2013).
(3)4 cases
Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706 (1997).“” Thus, a claimant under the Washington statute does not have to establish either a vested right or "legitimate claim of entitlement” (Roth) to the action he or she desires the agency to take, as in a § 1983 claim; he or she need only establish an ownership interest in the…”
Hayes v. City of Seattle, 934 P.2d 1179 (Wash. 1997).“RCW 64.40.010(3) defines property interest as "any interest or right in real property in the state.”
Westway Constr., Inc. v. Benton Cnty., 151 P.3d 1005 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).“RCW 64.40.010(3) defines “property interest” as “any interest or right in real property in the state.”
Westway Const., Inc. v. Benton Cnty., 151 P.3d 1005 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
(4)10 cases
Birnbaum v. Pierce Cnty., 274 P.3d 1070 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).“RCW 64.40.010(4). ¶9 Birnbaum makes claims under each statutory prong.”
Cobb v. Snohomish Cnty., 935 P.2d 1384 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).“" See RCW 64.40.010(4); see also Fleming v. County of Kane, 898 F.”
Wilson v. City of Seattle, 863 P.2d 1336 (Wash. 1993).
Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706 (1997).
Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., 295 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(5)1 case
Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cnty., 829 P.2d 746 (Wash. 1992).
(6)16 cases
Callfas v. Dep't of Constr. & Land Use, 120 P.3d 110 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).“The court also addressed the argument that the Callfases had failed to meet the statutory limit for filing their suit: In the end, I found myself in agreement with the City Attorney’s analysis of the language, structure and policy of the statutes in question: RCW 64.40.010(6),…”
Birnbaum v. Pierce Cnty., 274 P.3d 1070 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
Hayes v. City of Seattle, 888 P.2d 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).“4 Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary to address the City’s argument that the Council’s action was not an "act” for purposes of RCW 64.40.010(6). " 'Act’ shall not include lawful decisions of an agency which are designed to prevent a condition which would…”
Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., 295 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
Pleas v. City of Seattle, 746 P.2d 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).“RCW 64.40.010(6). Third, the act does not apply unless the government agency knew or reasonably should have known its acts were unlawful or exceeded lawful authority.”
Showing the top 5 of 16. More in the list view →

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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