Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.345 (2026)

Timing

✓ current as of May 2026
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Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.
[ 2021 c 286 s 2; 2021 c 141 s 2; 2000 c 26 s 2.]

Notes:

Effective date2021 c 286: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [May 12, 2021]." [ 2021 c 286 s 3.]
Intent2000 c 26: "RCW 9.94A.345 is intended to cure any ambiguity that might have led to the Washington supreme court's decision in State v. Cruz, Cause No. 67147-8 (October 7, 1999). A decision as to whether a prior conviction shall be included in an individual's offender score should be determined by the law in effect on the day the current offense was committed. RCW 9.94A.345 is also intended to clarify the applicability of statutes creating new sentencing alternatives or modifying the availability of existing alternatives." [ 2000 c 26 s 1.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 134 cases (40 in the last 5 years), 2001–2026 · leading case: State v. Jenks, 487 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2021).
State v. Jenks, 487 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2021). · cites it 43× “The State argues that it cannot apply due to RCW 9.94A.345 and RCW 10.01.040. State v.”
State Of Washington v. Alan D. Jenks, 459 P.3d 389 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 19× “EFFECT OF 2019 AMENDMENT TO RCW 9.94A.030(33) The question here is whether we must review Jenks’s sentence under the law in effect at the time Jenks committed his current offense or under the law in effect at the time we decide his appeal.”
State v. Pillatos, 150 P.3d 1130 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 4× “[6] ¶ 21 Analogously, we agree with the State that RCW 9.94A.345 does not bar application of LAWS of 2005, chapter 68.”
State v. Pillatos, 159 Wash. 2d 459 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 4× “6 ¶21 Analogously, we agree with the State that RCW 9.94A.345 does not bar application of Laws of 2005, chapter 68.”
State v. Varga, 86 P.3d 139 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 3× “In a statutory note, the legislature also stated, RCW 9.94A.345 is intended to cure any ambiguity that might have led to the Washington supreme court's decision in State v.”
State v. Varga, 151 Wash. 2d 179 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 3× “In a statutory note, the legislature also stated, “RCW 9.94A.345 is intended to cure any ambiguity that might have led to the Washington supreme court’s decision in State v.”
State v. Smith, 118 Wash. App. 288 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 7× “Effective June 8, 2000, the legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.345, in response to our Supreme Court’s decision in Cruz, 139 Wn.”
State v. Smith, 75 P.3d 986 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 7× “Effective June 8, 2000, the Legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.345, in response to our Supreme Court's decision in Cruz, 139 Wash.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 272 P.3d 209 (Wash. 2012). · cites it 4× “240 applies retroactively and, if so, whether Carrier has a vested right in the vacated status of his conviction that would prevent retroactive application in his case.”
State v. Thompson, 223 P.3d 1165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “¶ 37 The Thompsons also rely on a statute that was not addressed in Brewster, RCW 9.94A.345. That statute states: "Any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.”
State v. Dean, 54 P.3d 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 5× “The Legislature Responds to Cruz In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Cruz, in June 2000, the Legislature enacted RCW 9.94A.345 (the Timing Statute). Laws of 2000, ch.”
State v. McNeal, 175 P.3d 1139 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “¶ 22 McNeal replies [19] that on remand the trial court is required to impose standard range sentences for each offense and cannot empanel a jury to consider the aggravating factors because: (1) under RCW 9.94A.345, he is entitled to resentencing under the laws in effect at the…”
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