Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.94A
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) At any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range. The notice shall state aggravating circumstances upon which the requested sentence will be based.
(2) In any case where an exceptional sentence above the standard range was imposed and where a new sentencing hearing is required, the superior court may impanel a jury to consider any alleged aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3), that were relied upon by the superior court in imposing the previous sentence, at the new sentencing hearing.
(3) The facts supporting aggravating circumstances shall be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's verdict on the aggravating factor must be unanimous, and by special interrogatory. If a jury is waived, proof shall be to the court beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to the aggravating facts.
(4) Evidence regarding any facts supporting aggravating circumstances under RCW 9.94A.535(3) (a) through (y) shall be presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime, unless the jury has been impaneled solely for resentencing, or unless the state alleges the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3) (e)(iv), (h)(i), (o), or (t). If one of these aggravating circumstances is alleged, the trial court may conduct a separate proceeding if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact is not part of the res geste of the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise admissible in trial of the charged crime, and if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence to the aggravated fact is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury's ability to determine guilt or innocence for the underlying crime.
(5) If the superior court conducts a separate proceeding to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3) (e)(iv), (h)(i), (o), or (t), the proceeding shall immediately follow the trial on the underlying conviction, if possible. If any person who served on the jury is unable to continue, the court shall substitute an alternate juror.
(6) If the jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the facts alleged by the state in support of an aggravated sentence, the court may sentence the offender pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535 to a term of confinement up to the maximum allowed under RCW 9A.20.021 for the underlying conviction if it finds, considering the purposes of this chapter, that the facts found are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.
[ 2007 c 205 s 2; 2005 c 68 s 4.]

Notes:

Intent—2007 c 205: "In State v. Pillatos, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007), the Washington supreme court held that the changes made to the sentencing reform act concerning exceptional sentences in chapter 68, Laws of 2005 do not apply to cases where the trials had already begun or guilty pleas had already been entered prior to the effective date of the act on April 15, 2005. The legislature intends that the superior courts shall have the authority to impanel juries to find aggravating circumstances in all cases that come before the courts for trial or sentencing, regardless of the date of the original trial or sentencing." [ 2007 c 205 s 1.]
Effective date—2007 c 205: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [April 27, 2007]." [ 2007 c 205 s 3.]
Intent—2005 c 68: "The legislature intends to conform the sentencing reform act, chapter 9.94A RCW, to comply with the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ... (2004). In that case, the United States supreme court held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt any aggravating fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that is used to impose greater punishment than the standard range or standard conditions. The legislature intends that aggravating facts, other than the fact of a prior conviction, will be placed before the jury. The legislature intends that the sentencing court will then decide whether or not the aggravating fact is a substantial and compelling reason to impose greater punishment. The legislature intends to create a new criminal procedure for imposing greater punishment than the standard range or conditions and to codify existing common law aggravating factors, without expanding or restricting existing statutory or common law aggravating circumstances. The legislature does not intend the codification of common law aggravating factors to expand or restrict currently available statutory or common law aggravating circumstances. The legislature does not intend to alter how mitigating facts are to be determined under the sentencing reform act, and thus intends that mitigating facts will be found by the sentencing court by a preponderance of the evidence.
While the legislature intends to bring the sentencing reform act into compliance as previously indicated, the legislature recognizes the need to restore the judicial discretion that has been limited as a result of the Blakely decision." [ 2005 c 68 s 1.]
Severability—2005 c 68: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 2005 c 68 s 6.]
Effective date—2005 c 68: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [April 15, 2005]." [ 2005 c 68 s 7.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 244 cases (54 in the last 5 years), 2005–2026 · leading case: State v. Powell, 223 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2009).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Powell, 223 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 30× “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence, and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537…”
State v. Powell, 167 Wash. 2d 672 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 26× “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537 could…”
State v. Mutch, 254 P.3d 803 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 6× “Facts supporting aggravated sentences, other than the fact of a prior conviction, shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of RCW 9.94A.537. . . . . *810 (2) . . . The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the…”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 301 P.3d 450 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 7× “589 and RCW 9.94A.537. He asked this court to order the sentences be served concur *504 rently.”
State v. Siers, 274 P.3d 358 (Wash. 2012). · cites it 6× “See RCW 9.94A.537. Statutory interpretation is a legal question, which we also review de novo on appeal.”
State v. Edvalds, 157 Wash. App. 517 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 10× “Facts supporting aggravated sentences, other than the fact of a prior conviction, shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of RCW 9.94A.537. RCW 9.94A.537(1) requires: At any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not…”
State v. McNeal, 175 P.3d 1139 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 10× “408; and (2) the Legislature's 2007 amendments to RCW 9.94A.537, effective April 27, 2007, authorized the trial court to empanel a sentencing jury to determine if any aggravating factors exist.”
State v. McNeal, 142 Wash. App. 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 10× “408 and (2) the legislature’s 2007 amendments to RCW 9.94A.537, effective April 27, 2007, authorized the trial court to empanel a sentencing jury to determine if any aggravating factors exist.”
State v. McNeal, 231 P.3d 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 19× “537(2) authorized the trial court to impanel a jury on resentencing to determine any aggravating factors under the 2007 version of RCW 9.94A.537. [11] McNeal II, 142 Wash.App.”
State v. Elmore, 228 P.3d 760 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 7× “Supreme Court decided Blakely, holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt any aggravating fact that is used to impose a greater punishment than the standard range.”
State v. Eggleston, 164 Wash. 2d 61 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 5× “Eggleston sought review on a number of issues, including whether double jeopardy precludes his second conviction and whether the State can impanel a new sentencing jury under former RCW 9.94A.537 (2005). We hold that the double jeopardy clause did not prevent Eggleston’s retrial…”
State v. Eggleston, 187 P.3d 233 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 5× “Eggleston sought review on a number of issues, including whether double jeopardy precludes his second conviction and whether the State can impanel a new sentencing jury under former RCW 9.94A.537 (2005). We hold that the double jeopardy clause did not prevent Eggleston's retrial…”
Show all 244 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(1) — 38 cases
State v. Siers, 274 P.3d 358 (Wash. 2012). “See RCW 9.94A.537. Statutory interpretation is a legal question, which we also review de novo on appeal.”
State v. Powell, 223 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2009). “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence, and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537…”
State v. Edvalds, 157 Wash. App. 517 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “Facts supporting aggravated sentences, other than the fact of a prior conviction, shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of RCW 9.94A.537. RCW 9.94A.537(1) requires: At any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not…”
State v. Powell, 167 Wash. 2d 672 (Wash. 2009). “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537 could…”
State v. Mutch, 254 P.3d 803 (Wash. 2011). “Facts supporting aggravated sentences, other than the fact of a prior conviction, shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of RCW 9.94A.537. . . . . *810 (2) . . . The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(2) — 50 cases
State v. Powell, 223 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2009). “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence, and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537…”
State v. Powell, 167 Wash. 2d 672 (Wash. 2009). “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537 could…”
State v. McNeal, 231 P.3d 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “537(2) authorized the trial court to impanel a jury on resentencing to determine any aggravating factors under the 2007 version of RCW 9.94A.537. [11] McNeal II, 142 Wash.App.”
State v. McNeal, 156 Wash. App. 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(3) — 65 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 301 P.3d 450 (Wash. 2013). “589 and RCW 9.94A.537. He asked this court to order the sentences be served concur *504 rently.”
State v. Guzman Nuñez, 174 Wash. 2d 707 (Wash. 2012).
State v. Stubbs, 170 Wash. 2d 117 (Wash. 2010).
State v. Bluehorse, 159 Wash. App. 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Williams, 159 Wash. App. 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(4) — 12 cases
State Of Washington, V. Nicholas Windsor Anderson, 552 P.3d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Reyes-Brooks, 267 P.3d 465 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State of Washington v. Salvador Garcia Sanchez (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State Of Washington, Resp. v. Arthur Buzzelle, App. (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
State Of Washington v. Randall William Macheta (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(5) — 5 cases
State v. Powell, 167 Wash. 2d 672 (Wash. 2009). “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537 could…”
State v. Powell, 223 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2009). “Powell moved for the imposition of a standard range sentence, arguing that (1) the State had not provided notice to Powell that it would seek an exceptional sentence, and (2) the trial court did not have authority to impanel a jury because the recently amended RCW 9.94A.537…”
State v. Chanthabouly, 164 Wash. App. 104 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Hale, 146 Wash. App. 299 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Hale, 189 P.3d 829 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(6) — 43 cases
State v. Williams, 159 Wash. App. 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Gordon, 153 Wash. App. 516 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Gordon, 223 P.3d 519 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
State Of Washington, V. Brennaris Marquis Johnson, 540 P.3d 831 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Smith, 433 P.3d 821 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.537(l) — 4 cases
State v. McNeal, 156 Wash. App. 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Berrier, 143 Wash. App. 547 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Murawski, 142 Wash. App. 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
State of Washington v. Rigoberto G. Sanchez (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
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