Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.94A
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540 (2026)

Mandatory minimum terms

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.94A.535:
(a) An offender convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement not less than twenty years.
(b) An offender convicted of the crime of assault in the first degree or assault of a child in the first degree where the offender used force or means likely to result in death or intended to kill the victim shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement not less than five years.
(c) An offender convicted of the crime of rape in the first degree shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement not less than five years.
(d) An offender convicted of the crime of sexually violent predator escape shall be sentenced to a minimum term of total confinement not less than sixty months.
(e) An offender convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder for a murder that was committed prior to the offender's eighteenth birthday shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement not less than twenty-five years.
(2) During such minimum terms of total confinement, no offender subject to the provisions of this section is eligible for community custody, earned release time, furlough, home detention, partial confinement, work crew, work release, or any other form of early release authorized under RCW 9.94A.728, or any other form of authorized leave of absence from the correctional facility while not in the direct custody of a corrections officer. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply: (a) In the case of an offender in need of emergency medical treatment; (b) for the purpose of commitment to an inpatient treatment facility in the case of an offender convicted of the crime of rape in the first degree; or (c) for an extraordinary medical placement when authorized under *RCW 9.94A.728(3).
(3)(a) Subsection (1)(a) through (d) of this section shall not be applied in sentencing of juveniles tried as adults pursuant to RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(i).
(b) This subsection (3) applies only to crimes committed on or after July 24, 2005.
[ 2014 c 130 s 2; 2005 c 437 s 2; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 315; 2000 c 28 s 7. Formerly RCW 9.94A.590.]

Notes:

*Reviser's note: RCW 9.94A.728 was amended by 2015 c 156 s 1, changing subsection (3) to subsection (1)(c).
Application—Effective date—2014 c 130: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.
Findings—Intent—2005 c 437: "(1) The legislature finds that emerging research on brain development indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabilities, differ significantly from those of mature adults. It is appropriate to take these differences into consideration when sentencing juveniles tried as adults. The legislature further finds that applying mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles tried as adults prevents trial court judges from taking these differences into consideration in appropriate circumstances.
(2) The legislature intends to eliminate the application of mandatory minimum sentences under RCW 9.94A.540 to juveniles tried as adults, and to continue to apply all other adult sentencing provisions to juveniles tried as adults." [ 2005 c 437 s 1.]
Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Technical correction bill—2000 c 28: See note following RCW 9.94A.015.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 50 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 2004–2026 · leading case: State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017).
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State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017). · cites it 4× “RCW 9.94A.540. The legislature explicitly stated that such mandatory minimums "shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
State v. McChristian, 241 P.3d 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 15× “¶ 17 RCW 9.94A.540(1) provides in part, Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Hegney, 138 Wash. App. 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 8× “540 ¶67 Hegney argues that the 2005 amendments to RCW 9.94A.540 should retroactively apply to the 2002 calculation of his offender score.”
In Re Hegney, 158 P.3d 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 7× “540, stating: (1) The legislature finds that emerging research on brain development indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabilities, differ significantly from those of mature adults.”
State v. Dyson, 360 P.3d 25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 7× “¶2 At sentencing, the trial court found Donald Dyson’s conduct qualified for imposition of the statutorily mandated five-year minimum term under RCW 9.94A.540 because the force employed by Dyson in committing the assaults could likely have resulted in death.”
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017). “, RCW 9.94A.540(3) (eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders tried as adults), .”
State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018). “After Miller , the legislature did away with life without parole sentences for children age 15 and under. RCW 10.”
State of Iowa v. Denem Anthony Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013). “at 71 (calling for legislation requiring periodic reviews of juvenile sentences even where they are sentenced to a generally applicable mandatory minimum).”
State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014). “620 (2003) (providing a juvenile tried as an adult shall not receive a mandatory minimum sentence except for aggravated murder or felonies committed with a firearm); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9.94A.540(3)(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders…”
State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888 (Wash. 2014). “RCW 9.94A.540(1)(b)-(d). A person convicted of first degree murder faces a 20-year mandatory minimum, while a person convicted of first degree rape, first degree assault, or sexually violent predator escape faces a mandatory minimum of 5 years.”
State of Washington v. Joel R. Ramos, 357 P.3d 680 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 3× “Ramos cannot claim the benefit of the prospective change to RCW 9.94A.540, he can at least ask that the court consider his request for an exceptional sentence based on the underlying science that developed pending finality of his sentence — something anticipated in Ha’mim.”
State v. McChristian, 158 Wash. App. 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 13× “¶17 RCW 9.94A.540(1) provides in part, Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
Show all 50 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(1) — 12 cases
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017). “RCW 9.94A.540. The legislature explicitly stated that such mandatory minimums "shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Hegney, 138 Wash. App. 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “540 ¶67 Hegney argues that the 2005 amendments to RCW 9.94A.540 should retroactively apply to the 2002 calculation of his offender score.”
In Re Hegney, 158 P.3d 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “540, stating: (1) The legislature finds that emerging research on brain development indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabilities, differ significantly from those of mature adults.”
State v. McChristian, 241 P.3d 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶ 17 RCW 9.94A.540(1) provides in part, Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
State v. McChristian, 158 Wash. App. 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶17 RCW 9.94A.540(1) provides in part, Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(1)(a) — 10 cases
State Of Washington, V. Tsegazeab Amine Zerahaimanot (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
State of Washington v. Richard John Richardson (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Jarrell Maurice Marshall (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
State Of Washington, V. George Donald Hatt, Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Matthew Andreas Durham (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(1)(b) — 12 cases
State v. McChristian, 241 P.3d 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶ 17 RCW 9.94A.540(1) provides in part, Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888 (Wash. 2014). “RCW 9.94A.540(1)(b)-(d). A person convicted of first degree murder faces a 20-year mandatory minimum, while a person convicted of first degree rape, first degree assault, or sexually violent predator escape faces a mandatory minimum of 5 years.”
In Re Pers. Restraint Petition of Tran, 111 P.3d 1168 (Wash. 2005).
State Of Washington, V. Nga Ngoeung (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Wingate, 98 P.3d 111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(1)(e) — 1 case
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Jeremiah Bourgeois (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(2) — 5 cases
State v. Dyson, 360 P.3d 25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “¶2 At sentencing, the trial court found Donald Dyson’s conduct qualified for imposition of the statutorily mandated five-year minimum term under RCW 9.94A.540 because the force employed by Dyson in committing the assaults could likely have resulted in death.”
Pers. Restraint Petition of Damian T. Johnson (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State of Washington v. Donald Lee Dyson, Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Jeremiah Bourgeois (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State Of Washington v. Marlon Roberto Aldridge (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(3) — 2 cases
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017). “, RCW 9.94A.540(3) (eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders tried as adults), .”
State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018). “After Miller , the legislature did away with life without parole sentences for children age 15 and under. RCW 10.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(3)(a) — 1 case
State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014). “620 (2003) (providing a juvenile tried as an adult shall not receive a mandatory minimum sentence except for aggravated murder or felonies committed with a firearm); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9.94A.540(3)(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(3)(b) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Joel Rodriguez Ramos (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(b) — 1 case
State Of Washington, V James R. Reinholdt (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Hahn, 256 P.3d 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.540(l)(b) — 5 cases
State v. McChristian, 158 Wash. App. 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). “¶17 RCW 9.94A.540(1) provides in part, Except to the extent provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following minimum terms of total confinement are mandatory and shall not be varied or modified under RCW 9.”
State v. Dyson, 360 P.3d 25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “¶2 At sentencing, the trial court found Donald Dyson’s conduct qualified for imposition of the statutorily mandated five-year minimum term under RCW 9.94A.540 because the force employed by Dyson in committing the assaults could likely have resulted in death.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Huy Khac Tran, 154 Wash. 2d 323 (Wash. 2005).
Pers. Restraint Petition of Damian T. Johnson (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
State of Washington v. Donald Lee Dyson, Jr. (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
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