Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662 (2026)

Prison-based drug offender sentencing alternative

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The court may only order a prison-based special drug offender sentencing alternative if the high end of the standard sentence range for the current offense is greater than one year.
(2) A sentence for a prison-based special drug offender sentencing alternative shall include:
(a) A period of total confinement in a state facility for one-half the midpoint of the standard sentence range or 12 months, whichever is greater;
(b) One-half the midpoint of the standard sentence range as a term of community custody, which must include appropriate substance use disorder treatment in a program that has been approved by the department of health, and for co-occurring drug and domestic violence cases, must also include an appropriate domestic violence treatment program by a state-certified domestic violence treatment provider pursuant to RCW 43.20A.735;
(c) Crime-related prohibitions, including a condition not to use illegal controlled substances;
(d) A requirement to submit to urinalysis or other testing to monitor that status; and
(e) A term of community custody pursuant to RCW 9.94A.701 to be imposed upon the failure to complete or administrative termination from the special drug offender sentencing alternative program.
(3)(a) During incarceration in the state facility, individuals sentenced under this section shall undergo a comprehensive substance use disorder assessment and receive, within available resources, treatment services appropriate for the individual. The substance use disorder treatment services shall be provided by individuals licensed by the state of Washington.
(b) When applicable for cases involving domestic violence, domestic violence treatment must be provided by a state-certified domestic violence treatment provider pursuant to RCW 43.20A.735 during the term of community custody.
(4) If the department finds that conditions of community custody have been willfully violated, the individual may be reclassified to serve the remaining balance of the original sentence. An individual who fails to complete the program or who is administratively terminated from the program shall be reclassified to serve the unexpired term of his or her sentence as ordered by the sentencing court.
(5) If an individual sentenced to the prison-based alternative under this section is found by the United States attorney general to be subject to a deportation order, a hearing shall be held by the department unless waived by the individual, and, if the department finds that the individual is subject to a valid deportation order, the department may administratively terminate the individual from the program and reclassify the individual to serve the remaining balance of the original sentence.
[ 2025 c 382 s 2; 2021 c 215 s 103; 2020 c 252 s 2; 2019 c 263 s 503; 2009 c 389 s 4.]

Notes:

FindingsIntent2025 c 382: "The legislature finds that in 2020, the governor signed Second Substitute Senate Bill No. 6211 into law, which made various changes to the drug offender sentencing alternative statutes. As part of that legislation, revisions were made to RCW 9.94A.662 to state that substance use disorder treatment services provided in prisons be licensed by the department of health.
As a result, under RCW 71.24.037, the department of health is also required to license mental health services provided in prisons.
The legislature finds that prior to the passing of Second Substitute Senate Bill No. 6211 in 2020, the department of social and health services created the department of corrections substance use disorder treatment services in collaboration with the department of corrections.
It is the intent of the legislature to require the department of health to monitor the provision of behavioral health services to individuals in correctional facilities based on standards jointly established by the department of health and the department of corrections. Monitoring shall be done in lieu of licensure by the department of health." [ 2025 c 382 s 1.]
Effective date2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.
Effective date2020 c 252: See note following RCW 9.94A.660.
FindingsIntent2019 c 263 ss 202-803: See note following RCW 10.01.240.
Effective date2019 c 263 ss 501-504, 601, 602, and 701-708: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.
Effective date2009 c 389 ss 1 and 3-5: See note following RCW 9.94A.505.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 37 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 2013–2025 · leading case: Henry Grisby Iii, Resp. v. Robert Herzog, Apps., 362 P.3d 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
Henry Grisby Iii, Resp. v. Robert Herzog, Apps., 362 P.3d 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 3× “RCW 9.94A.662. 4 ¶34 In short, we disagree with McNeal’s categorical determination that due process never requires the appointment of counsel.”
In re Pers. Restraint of Schley, 421 P.3d 951 (Wash. 2018). · cites it 13× “RCW 9.94A.662(1). Accordingly, Schley was sentenced to 29.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Matthew Ray Douglas Schley, 392 P.3d 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 3× “RCW 9.94A.662(3). The Department may revoke a DOSA for administrative termination from a substance abuse treatment program.”
State v. Yancey, 434 P.3d 518 (Wash. 2019). · cites it 4× “he following statute, specifically the emphasized portions: If the sentencing court determines that the offender is eligible for an alternative sentence under this section and that the alternative sentence is appropriate, the court shall waive imposition of a sentence within the…”
State v. Hender, 324 P.3d 780 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). “(3) If the sentencing court determines that the offender is eligible for an alternative sentence under this section and that the alternative sentence is appropriate, the court shall waive imposition of a sentence within the standard sentence range and impose a sentence…”
In re Bufalini, 423 P.3d 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 10× “He argues that (1) DOC violated his due process rights by failing to inform him that he had the right to have a request to be represented by counsel considered on a case-by-case basis at his urinalysis (UA) violation hearing, (2) DOC improperly applied RCW 9.94A.662(3), (3) his…”
State v. Mohamed, 350 P.3d 671 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “660(3), the DOSA statute: If the sentencing court determines that the offender is eligible for an alternative sentence under this section and that the alternative sentence is appropriate, the court shall waive imposition of a sentence within the standard sentence range and…”
State of Washington v. Eduardo Miranda Salazar, 468 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “RCW 9.94A.662. In that instance, DOC is empowered to reclassify the offender and order him to serve the remaining balance of the original sentence.”
State v. Blair, 421 P.3d 937 (Wash. 2018). “Because we affirm the Court of Appeals on procedural grounds, we do not reach the second issue presented. While it is unclear from the briefing he filed with this court, Blair's argument appears to be that half the midpoint of a standard range that Blair sought to be used to…”
State v. Anderson, 498 P.3d 903 (Wash. 2021). “98973-7 moved for an alternative, more rehabilitative, drug offender sentencing alternative sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.662. Id. at 83. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Anderson to 54 months of confinement on count 1, including 24 months for the “school bus…”
Prp Of Paul Bufalini (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 10× “He argues that (1) DOC violated his due process rights by failing to inform him that he had the right to have a request to be represented by counsel considered on a case-by-case basis at his urinalysis (UA) violation hearing, (2) DOC improperly applied RCW 9.94A.662(3), (3) his…”
State Of Washington v. Taylor Alexandra Church, 428 P.3d 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). “"4 Legislative intent is derived, when possible, "solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(1) — 2 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Schley, 421 P.3d 951 (Wash. 2018). “RCW 9.94A.662(1). Accordingly, Schley was sentenced to 29.”
State v. Yancey, 434 P.3d 518 (Wash. 2019). “he following statute, specifically the emphasized portions: If the sentencing court determines that the offender is eligible for an alternative sentence under this section and that the alternative sentence is appropriate, the court shall waive imposition of a sentence within the…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(1)(a) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(1)(e) — 2 cases
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(2) — 5 cases
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(2)(a) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(2)(b) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(2)(e) — 2 cases
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(3) — 9 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Schley, 421 P.3d 951 (Wash. 2018). “RCW 9.94A.662(1). Accordingly, Schley was sentenced to 29.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Matthew Ray Douglas Schley, 392 P.3d 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). “RCW 9.94A.662(3). The Department may revoke a DOSA for administrative termination from a substance abuse treatment program.”
Henry Grisby Iii, Resp. v. Robert Herzog, Apps., 362 P.3d 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “RCW 9.94A.662. 4 ¶34 In short, we disagree with McNeal’s categorical determination that due process never requires the appointment of counsel.”
In re Bufalini, 423 P.3d 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). “He argues that (1) DOC violated his due process rights by failing to inform him that he had the right to have a request to be represented by counsel considered on a case-by-case basis at his urinalysis (UA) violation hearing, (2) DOC improperly applied RCW 9.94A.662(3), (3) his…”
State of Washington v. Eduardo Miranda Salazar, 468 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “RCW 9.94A.662. In that instance, DOC is empowered to reclassify the offender and order him to serve the remaining balance of the original sentence.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(4) — 4 cases
Moody v. McCullough (W.D. Wash. 2021).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(5)(e) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.662(l)(c) — 1 case
Henry Grisby Iii, Resp. v. Robert Herzog, Apps., 362 P.3d 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “RCW 9.94A.662. 4 ¶34 In short, we disagree with McNeal’s categorical determination that due process never requires the appointment of counsel.”
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