Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.95
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.120 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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Whenever the board or a community corrections officer of this state has reason to believe a person convicted of a crime committed before July 1, 1984, has breached a condition of his or her parole or violated the law of any state where he or she may then be or the rules and regulations of the board, any community corrections officer of this state may arrest or cause the arrest and detention and suspension of parole of such convicted person pending a determination by the board whether the parole of such convicted person shall be revoked. All facts and circumstances surrounding the violation by such convicted person shall be reported to the board by the community corrections officer, with recommendations. The board, after consultation with the secretary of corrections, shall make all rules and regulations concerning procedural matters, which shall include the time when state community corrections officers shall file with the board reports required by this section, procedures pertaining thereto and the filing of such information as may be necessary to enable the board to perform its functions under this section. On the basis of the report by the community corrections officer, or at any time upon its own discretion, the board may revise or modify the conditions of parole or order the suspension of parole by the issuance of a written order bearing its seal, which order shall be sufficient warrant for all peace officers to take into custody any convicted person who may be on parole and retain such person in their custody until arrangements can be made by the board for his or her return to a state correctional institution for convicted felons. Any such revision or modification of the conditions of parole or the order suspending parole shall be personally served upon the parolee.
Any parolee arrested and detained in physical custody by the authority of a state community corrections officer, or upon the written order of the board, shall not be released from custody on bail or personal recognizance, except upon approval of the board and the issuance by the board of an order of reinstatement on parole on the same or modified conditions of parole.
All chiefs of police, marshals of cities and towns, sheriffs of counties, and all police, prison, and peace officers and constables shall execute any such order in the same manner as any ordinary criminal process.
Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a violation of his or her parole, other than the commission of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of this state or the laws of any state where he or she may then be, he or she shall be entitled to a fair and impartial hearing of such charges within thirty days from the time that he or she is served with charges of the violation of conditions of parole after his or her arrest and detention. The hearing shall be held before one or more members of the board at a place or places, within this state, reasonably near the site of the alleged violation or violations of parole.
In the event that the board suspends a parole by reason of an alleged parole violation or in the event that a parole is suspended pending the disposition of a new criminal charge, the board shall have the power to nullify the order of suspension and reinstate the individual to parole under previous conditions or any new conditions that the board may determine advisable. Before the board shall nullify an order of suspension and reinstate a parole they shall have determined that the best interests of society and the individual shall best be served by such reinstatement rather than a return to a correctional institution.
[ 2003 c 218 s 5; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 333; 1999 c 143 s 22; 1981 c 136 s 37; 1979 c 141 s 2; 1969 c 98 s 2; 1961 c 106 s 2; 1955 c 133 s 13. Prior: 1939 c 142 s 1, part; 1935 c 114 s 4, part; RRS s 10249-4, part.]

Notes:

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Effective date—1981 c 136: See RCW 72.09.900.
Severability—1969 c 98: "If any provision of this act, or its application to any person or circumstance is invalid, the remainder of the act, or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1969 c 98 s 10.]
Effective date—1969 c 98: "This act shall take effect on July 1, 1969." [ 1969 c 98 s 11.]
Violations of parole or probation—Revision of parole conditions—Rearrest—Detention: RCW 72.04A.090.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35 cases, 1966–2018 · leading case: In Re the Pers. Restraint of Haverty, 618 P.2d 1011 (Wash. 1980).
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In Re the Pers. Restraint of Haverty, 618 P.2d 1011 (Wash. 1980). · cites it 23× “On January 25, 1978, Haverty's parole was administratively revoked pursuant to RCW 9.95.120. *623 RCW 9.95.120, the relevant portion of which was enacted in 1961, provided for revocation of parole without a hearing when the basis for revocation was commission and conviction of a…”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). · cites it 2× “28, § 1081 (b) (1970); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.95.120 through 9.95.”
State v. Dupard, 609 P.2d 961 (Wash. 1980). · cites it 3× “See RCW 9.95.120. December 15, 1976, 1 day prior to Dupard's arraignment in King County Superior Court on criminal charges, the parole board held a parole revocation hearing.”
State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720 (Wash. 1980). · cites it 2× “090; RCW 9.95.120, .125. Finally, our cases and the foregoing statutory scheme reveal that Fain's chances of receiving parole have little to do with the crimes for which he was sentenced.”
Christensen v. Grant Cnty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 96 P.3d 957 (Wash. 2004). “The court specifically noted that RCW 9.95.120 provided a parole hearing within 30 days for violations other than felonies or misdemeanors.”
Kellogg v. State, 621 P.2d 133 (Wash. 1980). · cites it 4× “RCW 9.95.120; see also RCW 72.04A.090. 3 As with the Everett police officers, parole officer Doty had a "reason to believe" there had been a breach of parole conditions or a violation of law, thus her subsequent actions were privileged.”
January v. Porter, 453 P.2d 876 (Wash. 1969). · cites it 3× “120, which provides, inter alia: Whenever the board of prison terms and paroles or a probation and parole officer of this state has reason to believe a convicted person has breached a condition of his parole or violated the law of any state where he may then be or the rules and…”
Robinson v. Peterson, 555 P.2d 1348 (Wash. 1976). · cites it 2× “We noted, however, that a parolee is entitled to a hearing, under RCW 9.95.120, 30 days after he is returned to custody.”
Couch v. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “” See RCW 9.95.120 (implying that parole may be revoked without hearing if parolee is convicted of committing new criminal offense).”
Bailey v. Gallagher, 450 P.2d 802 (Wash. 1969). · cites it 6× “Gallagher, Sheriff of Grays Harbor County, Washington, pursuant to a detainer issued by his parole officer under the authority of RCW 9.95.120 and 72.04A.090. 1 The procedure leading to a revocation of a parole is set forth in RCW 9.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Sinka, 599 P.2d 1275 (Wash. 1979). “RCW 9.95.120. See Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wn.”
Couch v. Wa. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “" See RCW 9.95.120 (implying that parole may be revoked without hearing if parolee is convicted of committing new criminal offense).”
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