Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026

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In this title unless a different meaning plainly is required:

(1) "Acted" includes, where relevant, omitted to act;

(2) "Actor" includes, where relevant, a person failing to act;

(3) "Benefit" is any gain or advantage to the beneficiary, including any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary;

(4)(a) "Bodily injury," "physical injury," or "bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition;

(b) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part;

(c) "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ;

(5) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale, or deposit of goods; each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate building;

(6) "Deadly weapon" means any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm, and shall include any other weapon, device, instrument, article, or substance, including a "vehicle" as defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm;

(7) "Dwelling" means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging;

(8) "Government" includes any branch, subdivision, or agency of the government of this state and any county, city, district, or other local governmental unit;

(9) "Governmental function" includes any activity which a public servant is legally authorized or permitted to undertake on behalf of a government;

(10) "Indicted" and "indictment" include "informed against" and "information", and "informed against" and "information" include "indicted" and "indictment";

(11) "Judge" includes every judicial officer authorized alone or with others, to hold or preside over a court;

(12) "Malice" and "maliciously" shall import an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person. Malice may be inferred from an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a willful disregard of social duty;

(13) "Officer" and "public officer" means a person holding office under a city, county, or state government, or the federal government who performs a public function and in so doing is vested with the exercise of some sovereign power of government, and includes all assistants, deputies, clerks, and employees of any public officer and all persons lawfully exercising or assuming to exercise any of the powers or functions of a public officer;

(14) "Omission" means a failure to act;

(15) "Peace officer" means a duly appointed city, county, or state law enforcement officer;

(16) "Pecuniary benefit" means any gain or advantage in the form of money, property, commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic gain;

(17) "Person," "he or she," and "actor" include any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation, joint stock association, or an unincorporated association;

(18) "Place of work" includes but is not limited to all the lands and other real property of a farm or ranch in the case of an actor who owns, operates, or is employed to work on such a farm or ranch;

(19) "Prison" means any place designated by law for the keeping of persons held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest, including but not limited to any state correctional institution or any county or city jail;

(20) "Prisoner" includes any person held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest;

(21) "Projectile stun gun" means an electronic device that projects wired probes attached to the device that emit an electrical charge and that is designed and primarily employed to incapacitate a person or animal;

(22) "Property" means anything of value, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal;

(23) "Public servant" means any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of or has been elected, appointed, or designated to become any officer or employee of government, including a legislator, judge, judicial officer, juror, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, or otherwise in performing a governmental function;

(24) "Signature" includes any memorandum, mark, or sign made with intent to authenticate any instrument or writing, or the subscription of any person thereto;

(25) "Statute" means the Constitution or an act of the legislature or initiative or referendum of this state;

(26) "Strangulation" means to compress a person's neck, thereby obstructing the person's blood flow or ability to breathe, or doing so with the intent to obstruct the person's blood flow or ability to breathe;

(27) "Suffocation" means to block or impair a person's intake of air at the nose and mouth, whether by smothering or other means, with the intent to obstruct the person's ability to breathe;

(28) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:

(a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or

(b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or

(d) To accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person; or

(e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or

(f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; or

(g) To testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

(h) To take wrongful action as an official against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or

(i) To bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other similar collective action to obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group which the actor purports to represent; or

(j) To do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another with respect to his or her health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationships;

(29) "Vehicle" means a "motor vehicle" as defined in the vehicle and traffic laws, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail;

(30) Words in the present tense shall include the future tense; and in the masculine shall include the feminine and neuter genders; and in the singular shall include the plural; and in the plural shall include the singular.

[ 2011 c 336 s 350; 2011 c 166 s 2; 2007 c 79 s 3; 2005 c 458 s 3; 1988 c 158 s 1; 1987 c 324 s 1; 1986 c 257 s 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.04.110.]

Notes:

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2011 c 166 s 2 and by 2011 c 336 s 350, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).

Finding—2007 c 79: See note following RCW 9A.36.021.

Effective date—1988 c 158: "This act shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1988 c 158 s 4.]

Effective date—1987 c 324: "Section 3 of this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect immediately. The remainder of this act shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1987 c 324 s 4.]

Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: "Sections 3 through 10 of this act shall take effect on July 1, 1988." [ 1987 c 324 s 3; 1986 c 257 s 12.]

Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 669 cases (107 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: State v. Wentz, 149 Wash. 2d 342 (Wash. 2003).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

State v. Wentz, 149 Wash. 2d 342 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 21× “110(7), and “vehicle” in RCW 9A.04.110(26).”

State v. Wentz, 68 P.3d 282 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 20× “For example, as in virtually all other jurisdictions, the crime intended no longer need be a felony, rather, any intended crime suffices.”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 18× “8 motion for relief from judgment in which he argued that “[t]he Trial Court’s failure to properly define deadly weapon in 1st degree burglary violated RCW 9A.04.110(6), and XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution.”

State v. K.L.B., 328 P.3d 886 (Wash. 2014). · cites it 28× “Conclusion ¶19 Because we hold that FEOs are not “public servants” as defined by RCW 9A.04.110, we need not reach the other issues raised by K.”

State v. Knowles, 957 P.2d 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 15× “(2) “Threat” as used in this section means: (a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or (b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25). The State proceeded under subsection (2)(b), charging…”

State v. Evans, 298 P.3d 724 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 5× “005(4) (citing RCW 9A.04.110); RCW 9A.04.110(17) (defining “person” to include “any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation”).”

State v. Engel, 166 Wash. 2d 572 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 4× “” RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming the yard was not a “fenced area” in the sense intended by the legislature.”

State v. Engel, 210 P.3d 1007 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 4× “" RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming the yard was not a "fenced area" in the sense intended by the legislature.”

State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1993). · cites it 10× “(2) "Threat" as used in this section means: (a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or (b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25). (3) Intimidating a judge is a class B felony.”

State v. O'Hara, 167 Wash. 2d 91 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 3× “” He contended the trial court failed to include the rest of the definition of “ ‘[m]alice’ ” in RCW 9A.04.110(12) that provides “[mjalice may be inferred from an act done in wilful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an…”

State v. Pauling, 69 P.3d 331 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 11× “The word "wrongful" occurs only in subsection (25)(h), which makes it a crime for an official "[t]o take wrongful action" in his or her official capacity "against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding;.”

State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 11× “110(4)(b) defines “substantial bodily harm” as bodily injury which involves [(1)] a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or [(2)] which causes temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or [(3)] which causes a fracture of any…”

Show all 669 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(1) — 2 cases

United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2021).

State Of Washington, V Justin Moses & Aimee Moses, 193 Wash. App. 341 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(1)(c) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Marlon Iupati Lemafa (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(12) — 56 cases

State v. O'Hara, 167 Wash. 2d 91 (Wash. 2009). “” He contended the trial court failed to include the rest of the definition of “ ‘[m]alice’ ” in RCW 9A.04.110(12) that provides “[mjalice may be inferred from an act done in wilful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an…”

State v. O'HARA, 217 P.3d 756 (Wash. 2009).

State v. Wooten, 312 P.3d 41 (Wash. 2013).

State v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890 (Wash. 2001).

State v. Williams, 144 Wash. 2d 197 (Wash. 2001).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(13) — 11 cases

Lee v. Jasman, 332 P.3d 1106 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

State v. K.L.B., 328 P.3d 886 (Wash. 2014). “Conclusion ¶19 Because we hold that FEOs are not “public servants” as defined by RCW 9A.04.110, we need not reach the other issues raised by K.”

Grant Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney v. Jasman, 354 P.3d 846 (Wash. 2015).

Hickey v. City of Bellingham, 953 P.2d 822 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

State v. Korba, 832 P.2d 1346 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(14) — 1 case

State Of Washington, V Justin Moses & Aimee Moses, 193 Wash. App. 341 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(15) — 4 cases

State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996).

State v. Williams, 627 P.2d 581 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).

State Of Washington, V Matthew Delano Gipson, 364 P.3d 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(17) — 15 cases

State v. Evans, 298 P.3d 724 (Wash. 2013). “005(4) (citing RCW 9A.04.110); RCW 9A.04.110(17) (defining “person” to include “any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation”).”

State v. Evans, 265 P.3d 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).

State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).

State v. Snedden, 112 Wash. App. 122 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).

State v. Sanchez, 869 P.2d 1133 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(2) — 1 case

State v. Nelson, 561 P.2d 1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(20) — 1 case

State v. Pinkowsky, 623 P.2d 735 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(21) — 5 cases

State v. Stockton, 647 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1982).

State v. Taylor, 632 P.2d 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).

State v. Jacobson, 876 P.2d 916 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Douglas, 751 P.2d 311 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).

State v. Gans, 886 P.2d 578 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(22) — 13 cases

State v. White, 640 P.2d 1061 (Wash. 1982).

State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996).

State v. Lalonde, 665 P.2d 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).

State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996).

State v. Burke, 132 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(23) — 5 cases

State v. K.L.B., 328 P.3d 886 (Wash. 2014). “Conclusion ¶19 Because we hold that FEOs are not “public servants” as defined by RCW 9A.04.110, we need not reach the other issues raised by K.”

State v. K.L.B. (Wash. 2014).

State v. Hendrickson, 311 P.3d 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

State of Washington v. Kathy Ann Hendrickson (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

State Of Washington v. Joel Christopher Holmes (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25) — 32 cases

State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1993). “(2) "Threat" as used in this section means: (a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or (b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25). (3) Intimidating a judge is a class B felony.”

State v. Knowles, 957 P.2d 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “(2) “Threat” as used in this section means: (a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or (b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25). The State proceeded under subsection (2)(b), charging…”

State v. Marko, 27 P.3d 228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).

State v. Marko, 107 Wash. App. 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).

State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25)(a) — 24 cases

State v. Bright, 916 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1996).

State v. Kepiro, 810 P.2d 19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).

State v. Bright, 129 Wash. 2d 257 (Wash. 1996).

State v. J.M., 28 P.3d 720 (Wash. 2001).

State v. Kilburn, 84 P.3d 1215 (Wash. 2004).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25)(b) — 3 cases

State v. Johnston, 127 P.3d 707 (Wash. 2006).

State v. Johnston, 156 Wash. 2d 355 (Wash. 2006).

State v. Edwards, 924 P.2d 397 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25)(d) — 14 cases

State v. Pauling, 69 P.3d 331 (Wash. 2003). “The word "wrongful" occurs only in subsection (25)(h), which makes it a crime for an official "[t]o take wrongful action" in his or her official capacity "against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding;.”

State v. Pauling, 149 Wash. 2d 381 (Wash. 2003).

Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1995).

United States v. Brian R. Anderson, 989 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1993).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25)(g) — 4 cases

Nelson v. McGoldrick, 871 P.2d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).

Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1995).

State v. Pauling, 149 Wash. 2d 381 (Wash. 2003).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25)(h) — 2 cases

State v. Pauling, 149 Wash. 2d 381 (Wash. 2003).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(25)(j) — 6 cases

State v. Stephenson, 950 P.2d 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

State v. Sanchez, 448 P.3d 991 (Idaho 2019).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(26) — 36 cases

State v. Reed, 168 Wash. App. 553 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

State v. Rodriquez, 352 P.3d 200 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).

State v. Tyson, 658 P.2d 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).

State v. Wentz, 149 Wash. 2d 342 (Wash. 2003). “110(7), and “vehicle” in RCW 9A.04.110(26).”

State v. Wentz, 68 P.3d 282 (Wash. 2003). “For example, as in virtually all other jurisdictions, the crime intended no longer need be a felony, rather, any intended crime suffices.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(26)(a) — 2 cases

State v. Brown, 137 Wash. App. 587 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

State v. Brown, 154 P.3d 302 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(27) — 24 cases

State v. Harvill, 234 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2010).

State v. France, 329 P.3d 864 (Wash. 2014).

State Of Washington, V. Charles Freeman Christian, 489 P.3d 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

State v. Montano, 239 P.3d 360 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Montano, 169 Wash. 2d 872 (Wash. 2010).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(27)(a) — 11 cases

State v. Schaler, 169 Wash. 2d 274 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Harvill, 169 Wash. 2d 254 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Allen, 294 P.3d 679 (Wash. 2013).

State v. Morales, 298 P.3d 791 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

State v. Schaler, 236 P.3d 858 (Wash. 2010).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(27)(b) — 1 case

State v. Toscano, 271 P.3d 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(27)(d) — 1 case

State v. Strong, 272 P.3d 281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(27)(j) — 2 cases

State v. Toscano, 271 P.3d 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

State v. Strong, 272 P.3d 281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(28) — 30 cases

State v. Farnsworth, 374 P.3d 1152 (Wash. 2016).

State v. Acevedo, 248 P.3d 526 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

State Of Washington, V Gary Pinkney, 411 P.3d 406 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).

United States v. Castillo, 811 F.3d 342 (10th Cir. 2015).

State v. France, 329 P.3d 864 (Wash. 2014).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(28)(a) — 14 cases

State v. Trey M., 383 P.3d 474 (Wash. 2016).

State Of Washington v. Jessica Linda Kohonen, 370 P.3d 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State v. Farnsworth, 348 P.3d 759 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

State v. Trey M. (Wash. 2016).

State of Washington v. Joel Matthew Groves (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(28)(c) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Mario Lamont Harris (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(28)(d) — 2 cases

State Of Washington, V. Dean Ervin Phillips (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).

State of Washington v. Henry F. Ward, Jr (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(28)(g) — 1 case

State of Washington v. Henry F. Ward, Jr (Wash. Ct. App. 2025).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(28)(j) — 2 cases

State v. France, 329 P.3d 864 (Wash. 2014).

State Of Washington v. Jeremy William Dawley, 455 P.3d 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(29) — 6 cases

State v. Van Wolvelaere, 461 P.3d 1173 (Wash. 2020).

State of Washington v. Jacob Daniel Level, 493 P.3d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

State of Washington v. Joshua Michael Barnes, 382 P.3d 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State v. Barnes (Wash. 2017).

State of Washington v. Michael Patrick Cargill (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(30) — 1 case

State Of Washington v. Todd Richard Marjama, Jr., 473 P.3d 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(4) — 4 cases

State v. Stubbs, 240 P.3d 143 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Stubbs, 170 Wash. 2d 117 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Duncalf, 267 P.3d 414 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).

State v. Alcantar-Maldonado, 340 P.3d 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(4)(a) — 29 cases

State v. Rich, 365 P.3d 746 (Wash. 2016).

Elmer J. Bailey v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2012).

State Of Washington v. Katrina R. Loos, 473 P.3d 1229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

State v. Taitt, 970 P.2d 785 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).

State Of Washington, V Treven A. Perry, 431 P.3d 543 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(4)(b) — 91 cases

State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “110(4)(b) defines “substantial bodily harm” as bodily injury which involves [(1)] a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or [(2)] which causes temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or [(3)] which causes a fracture of any…”

State v. McKAGUE, 262 P.3d 1225 (Wash. 2011).

State v. Hovig, 202 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).

State v. McCreven, 284 P.3d 793 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

State v. Hovig, 202 P.3d 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(4)(c) — 58 cases

State v. Stubbs, 240 P.3d 143 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Stubbs, 170 Wash. 2d 117 (Wash. 2010).

State v. Stubbs, 184 P.3d 660 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

State v. Laico, 987 P.2d 638 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).

State v. Marko, 27 P.3d 228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(5) — 63 cases

State v. Wentz, 149 Wash. 2d 342 (Wash. 2003). “110(7), and “vehicle” in RCW 9A.04.110(26).”

State v. Wentz, 68 P.3d 282 (Wash. 2003). “For example, as in virtually all other jurisdictions, the crime intended no longer need be a felony, rather, any intended crime suffices.”

State v. Engel, 166 Wash. 2d 572 (Wash. 2009). “” RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming the yard was not a “fenced area” in the sense intended by the legislature.”

State v. Engel, 210 P.3d 1007 (Wash. 2009). “" RCW 9A.04.110(5). Engel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming the yard was not a "fenced area" in the sense intended by the legislature.”

State v. Thomson, 861 P.2d 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(6) — 131 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354 (Wash. 2011). “8 motion for relief from judgment in which he argued that “[t]he Trial Court’s failure to properly define deadly weapon in 1st degree burglary violated RCW 9A.04.110(6), and XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution.”

State v. Hentz, 663 P.2d 476 (Wash. 1983).

In Re Martinez, 256 P.3d 277 (Wash. 2011).

State v. Winings, 126 Wash. App. 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

State v. Winings, 107 P.3d 141 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(7) — 37 cases

State v. McDonald, 123 Wash. App. 85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

State v. Wentz, 149 Wash. 2d 342 (Wash. 2003). “110(7), and “vehicle” in RCW 9A.04.110(26).”

State v. Wentz, 68 P.3d 282 (Wash. 2003). “For example, as in virtually all other jurisdictions, the crime intended no longer need be a felony, rather, any intended crime suffices.”

United States v. Timothy Allen Wenner, 351 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003).

State v. Murbach, 843 P.2d 551 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(c) — 1 case

Melvin Amaya v. Merrick Garland, 15 F.4th 976 (9th Cir. 2021).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(l3) — 1 case

D. Angus Lee v. Jerry Jasman (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.