Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9A · Chapter 9A.42
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abandons" means leaving a child or other dependent person without the means or ability to obtain one or more of the basic necessities of life.
(2) "Basic necessities of life" means food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care, including but not limited to health-related treatment or activities, hygiene, oxygen, and medication.
(3)(a) "Bodily injury" means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition;
(b) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part;
(c) "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ.
(4) "Child" means a person under eighteen years of age.
(5) "Dependent person" means a person who, because of physical or mental disability, or because of extreme advanced age, is dependent upon another person to provide the basic necessities of life. A resident of a nursing home, as defined in RCW 18.51.010, a resident of an adult family home, as defined in RCW 70.128.010, and a frail elder or vulnerable adult, as defined in *RCW 74.34.020(22), is presumed to be a dependent person for purposes of this chapter.
(6) "Employed" means hired by a dependent person, another person acting on behalf of a dependent person, or by an organization or governmental entity, to provide to a dependent person any of the basic necessities of life. A person may be "employed" regardless of whether the person is paid for the services or, if paid, regardless of who pays for the person's services.
(7) "Good samaritan" means any individual or group of individuals who: (a) Is not related to the dependent person; (b) voluntarily provides assistance or services of any type to the dependent person; (c) is not paid, given gifts, or made a beneficiary of any assets valued at five hundred dollars or more, for any reason, by the dependent person, the dependent person's family, or the dependent person's estate; and (d) does not commit or attempt to commit any other crime against the dependent person or the dependent person's estate.
(8) "Parent" has its ordinary meaning and also includes a guardian and the authorized agent of a parent or guardian.
[ 2020 c 18 s 7; 2006 c 228 s 1; 1997 c 392 s 508; 1996 c 302 s 1; 1986 c 250 s 1.]

Notes:

Reviser's note: *(1) RCW 74.34.020 was amended by 2020 c 312 s 735, changing subsection (22) to subsection (21).
(2) The definitions in this section have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(k).
Explanatory statement—2020 c 18: See note following RCW 43.79A.040.
Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.
Severability—1996 c 302: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1996 c 302 s 7.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1996–2026 · leading case: State v. Jackson, 976 P.2d 1229 (Wash. 1999).
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State v. Jackson, 976 P.2d 1229 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 4× “LAURINDA’S CONTENTION Laurinda asserts that there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to support her conviction as either a principal or an accomplice to the second degree assault, the predicate felony of second degree felony murder.”
State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 5× “” RCW 9A.42.010 (2)(c). “ ‘Substantial *119 bodily harm’ means [an impairment of physical condition] .”
State v. Mitchell, 169 Wash. 2d 437 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 4× “There is no doubt the statute establishes that the terms “dependent person” and “child” have different meanings — in fact, they are specifically defined differently in RCW 9A.42.010. This should not, however, be confused with establishing two separate and distinct groups of…”
State v. Chenoweth, 354 P.3d 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.42.010. These offenses refer to a “child” or “dependent person” under the care of the defendant.”
State v. Roggenkamp, 106 P.3d 196 (Wash. 2005). “In Jackson , we applied this principle and held that the word "shelter" in the phrase "food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care," as used in RCW 9A.42.010(1), should not be isolated and analyzed apart from the words surrounding it.”
State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash. 2d 614 (Wash. 2005). “In Jackson , we applied this principle and held that the word “shelter” in the phrase “food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care,” as used in RCW 9A.42.010(1), should not be isolated and analyzed apart from the words surrounding it.”
State v. Evans, 298 P.3d 724 (Wash. 2013). “” RCW 9A.42.010(1). This definition of life’s necessities contemplates that only natural beings are alive and clearly excludes corporations.”
State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 3× “” RCW 9A.42.010(1). To defeat the Knapstad order of dismissal on appeal, the State must show that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond reasonable doubt each of these essential elements of the crime.”
State v. Mitchell, 237 P.3d 282 (Wash. 2010). · cites it 5× “There is no doubt the statute establishes that the terms "dependent person" and "child" have different meanings—in fact, they are specifically defined differently in RCW 9A.42.010. This should not, however, be confused with establishing two separate and distinct groups of…”
State v. Thompson, 92 P.3d 228 (Wash. 2004). “037 (crime to withhold the "basic necessities of life"); see also RCW 9A.42.010(1) (including "shelter" among "basic necessities of life"); see also State v.”
State v. Daniels, 124 Wash. App. 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “RCW 9A.42.010(1), (2)(c), .020(1). But to commit a homicide, it may not be necessary to withhold the basic necessities of life.”
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005). “The court further stated th "[c]onsidering the Legislature's broad, almost plenary, authority to define crimes, the fact that it did not specifically define `child' in RCW 9A.42.010(3) to include a fetus indicates it did not intend to depart from the typical definition of a…”
Show all 32 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(1) — 13 cases
State v. Jackson, 976 P.2d 1229 (Wash. 1999). “LAURINDA’S CONTENTION Laurinda asserts that there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to support her conviction as either a principal or an accomplice to the second degree assault, the predicate felony of second degree felony murder.”
State v. Roggenkamp, 106 P.3d 196 (Wash. 2005). “In Jackson , we applied this principle and held that the word "shelter" in the phrase "food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care," as used in RCW 9A.42.010(1), should not be isolated and analyzed apart from the words surrounding it.”
State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash. 2d 614 (Wash. 2005). “In Jackson , we applied this principle and held that the word “shelter” in the phrase “food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care,” as used in RCW 9A.42.010(1), should not be isolated and analyzed apart from the words surrounding it.”
State v. Evans, 298 P.3d 724 (Wash. 2013). “” RCW 9A.42.010(1). This definition of life’s necessities contemplates that only natural beings are alive and clearly excludes corporations.”
State v. Thompson, 92 P.3d 228 (Wash. 2004). “037 (crime to withhold the "basic necessities of life"); see also RCW 9A.42.010(1) (including "shelter" among "basic necessities of life"); see also State v.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(2) — 1 case
State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “” RCW 9A.42.010 (2)(c). “ ‘Substantial *119 bodily harm’ means [an impairment of physical condition] .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(2)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “” RCW 9A.42.010 (2)(c). “ ‘Substantial *119 bodily harm’ means [an impairment of physical condition] .”
State v. Carter, 157 P.3d 420 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(2)(c) — 3 cases
State v. Daniels, 124 Wash. App. 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “RCW 9A.42.010(1), (2)(c), .020(1). But to commit a homicide, it may not be necessary to withhold the basic necessities of life.”
State v. Daniels, 103 P.3d 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State Of Washington v. Beonka Patrice Doty (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(3) — 14 cases
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005). “The court further stated th "[c]onsidering the Legislature's broad, almost plenary, authority to define crimes, the fact that it did not specifically define `child' in RCW 9A.42.010(3) to include a fetus indicates it did not intend to depart from the typical definition of a…”
State v. Chenoweth, 354 P.3d 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “RCW 9A.42.010. These offenses refer to a “child” or “dependent person” under the care of the defendant.”
State v. Cooper, 128 P.3d 1234 (Wash. 2006).
State v. Cooper, 156 Wash. 2d 475 (Wash. 2006).
State v. Mitchell, 169 Wash. 2d 437 (Wash. 2010). “There is no doubt the statute establishes that the terms “dependent person” and “child” have different meanings — in fact, they are specifically defined differently in RCW 9A.42.010. This should not, however, be confused with establishing two separate and distinct groups of…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(4) — 6 cases
State v. Mitchell, 169 Wash. 2d 437 (Wash. 2010). “There is no doubt the statute establishes that the terms “dependent person” and “child” have different meanings — in fact, they are specifically defined differently in RCW 9A.42.010. This should not, however, be confused with establishing two separate and distinct groups of…”
Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wash. 2d 556 (Wash. 2001).
Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001).
State v. Mitchell, 237 P.3d 282 (Wash. 2010). “There is no doubt the statute establishes that the terms "dependent person" and "child" have different meanings—in fact, they are specifically defined differently in RCW 9A.42.010. This should not, however, be confused with establishing two separate and distinct groups of…”
State v. Mitchell, 149 Wash. App. 716 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(5) — 3 cases
State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). “” RCW 9A.42.010(1). To defeat the Knapstad order of dismissal on appeal, the State must show that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond reasonable doubt each of these essential elements of the crime.”
State v. Koch, 157 Wash. App. 20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Koch, 237 P.3d 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.42.010(b) — 1 case
State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “” RCW 9A.42.010 (2)(c). “ ‘Substantial *119 bodily harm’ means [an impairment of physical condition] .”
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