BUNN, Justice:

The petitioner, T.S.^[1] (“Mother”), appeals to this Court from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County’s June 26, 2023 dispositional order terminating her parental rights to her children D.H., M.H., and J.S. Mother’s assignments of error are without merit because the circuit court was authorized to order the West Virginia Department of Human Services

(“DHS”)2 to join the prosecution of the underlying abuse and neglect case; and further, it did not err in denying Mother’s motion to hire an expert, finding the allegations of abuse and neglect were proven by clear and convincing evidence, and ultimately terminating

Mother’s parental rights.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Prior to the abuse and neglect proceeding at issue, the DHS received multiple referrals over a period of years regarding allegations of abuse and neglect against Mother. Child Protective Services (“CPS”) investigated those referrals, but the DHS did not file a petition at that time because it failed to substantiate the allegations. D.H. and M.H.’s father (“Father”) subsequently instituted an action in family court for a protective order after M.H. disclosed sexual abuse that purportedly occurred in Mother’s home. The family court then

referred the matter to circuit court pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Courts.^[3] The circuit court initiated an administrative action to investigate the claims and appointed the children a guardian ad litem (“GAL”).

In August 2022, before the administrative action concluded, Father, with the assistance of counsel, filed an abuse and neglect petition in the same circuit court alleging that Mother physically abused the children, allowed others to abuse the children, engaged in domestic violence with a boyfriend in the presence of the children, and engaged in substance abuse affecting her parenting ability.^[4] The children’s GAL joined the petition. According to the petition, the family court set a custody schedule giving Father primary custody, while Mother had visitation of D.H. and M.H. every other weekend. Father contended that D.H. and M.H. returned to his home with bruises after spending time with

Mother. The children explained that Mother and her boyfriend, W.C., repeatedly hit them with belts. In a forensic interview with the Child Advocacy Center, M.H., then seven years old, disclosed that Mother threatened to physically harm her, allowed inappropriate people in the home, failed to care for J.S., and allowed W.C. to physically harm her. D.H., then

eleven years old, reported in a forensic interview that Mother engaged in substance abuse, harmed him physically, threatened to harm him physically, failed to keep sufficient food in the home, and failed to care for J.S. D.H. revealed a time when Mother took him with her to a “sketchy alley” to “buy weed” and he also indicated that marijuana and drug paraphernalia were in her home.

On August 16, 2022, the court held a preliminary hearing. In the following order, the court stated that it had “previously ordered [the DHS] to join in the petition and [had] noted [the DHS’s] objection on the record.”5 The court further found that “[i]t was appropriate for [Father and GAL] to . . . file the petition based upon the allegations of [Mother’s] abuse and neglect of the children.”

Throughout the proceedings, Mother questioned the veracity of the children, contending they were coached to make their disclosures. She particularly questioned the veracity of D.H.’s complaints, stating he had a propensity to exaggerate and lie. On

September 21, 2022, Mother filed a motion requesting public funding for an expert witness

to review the children’s forensic interviews for signs of coaching or other indicia of unreliability. Following additional briefing and a hearing in December 2022, the court issued an order denying Mother’s motion for public funding and further denied her permission to hire an expert to independently review the forensic interviews. The court explained that Mother’s suggested expert was not trained in the Child First Protocol used

by forensic interviewers and found that the suggested expert “would not be helpful to the [c]ourt and goes outside of the purpose of forensic interviews of children.”

The GAL submitted a Birth to Three referral for J.S. “due to significant delays and concerns reported by his caregivers.”6 On October 27, 2022, the GAL filed Birth to Three evaluations with the court demonstrating that J.S. had twenty-five to forty percent delays in every category of development and that he suffered partial hearing loss. Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court conducted in camera interviews with D.H. and M.H.

The court conducted several evidentiary hearings related to Mother’s adjudication and a final adjudicatory hearing in March 2023. At the start of the adjudicatory hearings, the court informed the parties that it had conducted in camera interviews with

D.H. and M.H. and concluded that their in camera disclosures were consistent with their previous forensic interviews.^[7] The DHS informed the court that it was a co-petitioner but

deferred the lead questioning to Father and the GAL. The DHS took part in questioning the witnesses and submitted exhibits for admission into evidence.

During the adjudicatory hearings, Father testified and recounted the events that led to his filing of the petition, including disclosures from D.H. that Mother physically harmed D.H., failed to provide sufficient food, engaged in substance abuse, and allowed inappropriate people into the home. Mother also testified and denied many of the allegations in the petition. Mother did admit during her testimony that she previously pled guilty to reckless driving after law enforcement stopped her for driving more than 100 miles per hour with J.S. in the vehicle and that she allowed W.C., a known drug addict, around her children. However, she repeatedly testified that she did not abuse or neglect her children. Mother insisted that D.H. and M.H. lied or were coached regarding the disclosures made to the court and in their forensic interviews. The maternal grandmother testified that Mother took excellent care of J.S. and that Mother and D.H. had a good relationship.

The court heard testimony from D.H.’s therapist who opined that since the court removed D.H. from Mother’s care, D.H. had been happier and less stressed, and his behavioral issues had decreased. The children’s forensic interviewer stated that D.H. and M.H. disclosed allegations of Mother threatening physical abuse, engaging in physical abuse, abusing substances, failing to care for J.S., and allowing others in the home to physically abuse the children. The DHS caseworker who removed J.S. from Mother’s home testified that when she removed J.S. he was “not . . . the cleanest” and was hungry. The DHS caseworker who conducted the initial investigation and that worker’s supervisor also provided testimony. The DHS supervisor essentially conceded that the initial investigation was not conducted fully. Another DHS supervisor testified that the DHS no longer resisted pursing the case based on what it had learned. At the conclusion of the case-in-chief, Mother moved to dismiss the abuse and neglect petition arguing that the circuit court’s order directing the DHS to join the petition violated Supreme Court cases and that the DHS did not choose to prosecute this case and had given over prosecution of the case to Father and the GAL. In response, the DHS argued that it “participated in each and every phase of this proceeding[,]” including multidisciplinary team meetings and hearings. The DHS further asserted that it believed it “technically prosecuted the case.” The GAL also contended that the DHS was involved

throughout the prosecution of this case and that the GAL, Father’s counsel, and the prosecutor consulted via email and in person prior to every hearing to strategize.

The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss the petition in an order explaining that the law relied on by Mother was inapplicable under the circumstances of this case. The court further found that D.H. and M.H.’s forensic interviews were credible and there was no evidence of coaching. Ultimately, the court found that Mother abused and neglected the children due to her substance use and its effect on her parenting ability, failure to protect the children from inappropriate individuals in the home, excessive corporal punishment, and failure to provide for the children’s basic needs. Therefore, the court adjudicated Mother as an abusing and neglecting parent and found the children to be abused and neglected. Mother filed a motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The circuit court proceeded to disposition and held a hearing on June 16, 2023, where it also considered Mother’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period.^[8] Both DHS and the GAL supported termination of Mother’s parental rights. The court found that Mother was not likely to participate in an improvement period because Mother continued to deny that she abused and neglected her children and maintained that no aspect of her parenting needed to be corrected. The court terminated Mother’s parental

rights, explaining that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and that reunification would not be in the children’s best interests. Mother now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a circuit court’s factual determinations and legal conclusions in an abuse and neglect case pursuant to the following well-established standard: Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. Syl. pt. ^[1], In Int. of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). Furthermore, “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. ^[1], Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Finally, we have held that

“The West Virginia Rules of Evidence and the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making evidentiary and procedural rulings. Thus, rulings on the admissibility of evidence . . . are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review evidentiary and procedural rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. ^[1], in part, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W. Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995).

Syl. pt. ^[3], In re J.S., 233 W. Va. 394, 758 S.E.2d 747 (2014).

III. DISCUSSION Mother asserts that the circuit court committed reversible error by (1) ordering the DHS, after its objection, to prosecute the abuse and neglect case; (2) refusing to allow Mother to hire an expert to review the forensic interviews of the children for signs of coaching or other indicia of unreliability; (3) finding the allegations of abuse and neglect had been proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (4) terminating Mother’s parental rights. We address each of these assignments of error in turn and conclude that the circuit court did not err.

A. DHS Ordered to Join in the Abuse and Neglect Petition

Mother contends that the DHS investigated the allegations, elected not to file

an abuse and neglect petition, and objected to joining in Father’s petition. Therefore, Mother argues that the circuit court violated the separation of powers doctrine of the West

Virginia Constitution by stepping into the role of the executive branch when it ordered the DHS to join the petition. We disagree.

Pursuant to the West Virginia Constitution, “[t]he legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others[.]” W. Va. Const. art. V, § 1, in part. In other words, “[w]here there is a direct and fundamental encroachment by one branch of government into the traditional powers of another branch of government, this violates the separation of powers doctrine contained in Section 1 of Article V of the West Virginia Constitution.” Syl. pt. ^[2], Appalachian Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 170 W. Va. 757, 296 S.E.2d 887 (1982). This Court has never “hesitated to utilize the doctrine” to curtail government actions which violate it. Id. at 759, 296 S.E.2d at 889. On the other hand, this Court “has long recognized that it is not possible that division of power among the three branches of government be so precise and exact that there is no overlapping whatsoever.” State ex rel. Sahley v. Thompson, 151 W. Va. 336, 341, 151 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1966), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Hill v. Smith, 172 W. Va. 413, 305 S.E.2d 771 (1983); see also Appalachian Power Co., 170 W. Va. at

759, 296 S.E.2d at 889 (“[W]e have recognized the need for some flexibility in interpreting the separation of powers doctrine in order to meet the realities of modern day government.”). Accordingly, “the doctrine of separation of powers does not seek to achieve

a complete divorce between the branches of government[.]” In re D.S., 763 N.E.2d 251, 262 (Ill. 2001), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. ^[4], 2002). “Inevitably, there are areas in which separate spheres of governmental authority overlap and certain functions are

thereby shared. Such an overlap of governmental authority does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine.” Id. This overlap is often necessary in abuse and neglect

proceedings, where there are concurrent obligations to protect the best interest of the children involved. See, e.g., id. at 262-63 (“[D]ue to the unique nature of abuse, neglect[,] and dependency proceedings . . . both the State’s Attorney and the circuit court have concurrent obligations to protect the best interests of the minor.”).

While this Court has not considered whether a circuit court may order the DHS to join in an abuse and neglect petition filed by someone other than the DHS, at least one other jurisdiction has examined a similar question. In In re J.J., the Illinois Supreme Court held that the separation of powers doctrine does not preclude a court from hearing and deciding the merits of the State’s motion to dismiss a petition filed pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act alleging abuse of a minor. 566 N.E.2d 1345, 1348-49 (Ill. 1991). In other words, even when the State chooses to dismiss a petition alleging abuse and/or neglect of a minor, the circuit court has a duty to examine the merits and determine whether the best interests of the children involved are served by the dismissal. Id. In reaching this

conclusion, the court explained that under the applicable statutory provisions, both the court and the prosecuting attorney “are charged with acting in the best interests of the minor.”9 Id. at 1349.

Similarly, the West Virginia abuse and neglect statutory scheme provides for intersecting obligations of the executive and the judiciary branches. This Court has explained that the doctrine of parens patriae affords the State certain rights and obligations in the abuse and neglect context, “[t]he doctrine of [p]arens patriae, subsisting since feudal times and well documented in the common law of England, Virginia, and this State, accords the State rights just below that The court further indicated that because the State’s prosecuting attorney has “exclusive executive discretion in the initiation and management of criminal litigation does not require a different result.” In re J.J., 566 N.E.2d 1345, 1348 (Ill. 1991). It reasoned that “neglect proceedings brought pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act are civil, not criminal, actions.” Id. at 1348. Accordingly, the court found that the

overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to ensure that the best interests of the minor, the minor’s family, and the community are served. . . . [N]ot only the court but the State’s Attorney is bound to act in furtherance of this purpose. . . . [I]n dependency and neglect proceedings, . . . both the State’s Attorney and the court are charged with the duty of ensuring that, at each step of the wardship adjudication process, the best interests of the minor, the minor’s family[,] and the community are served.

Id. at 1349.

of the natural parent in the health and welfare of minor children. For the protection of the child, the State has always moved expeditiously and decisively when a natural parent has been proved to be unfit to continue the trust of raising his child, when a child has been abandoned by his natural parent or when the parent, by agreement or otherwise, has permanently transferred, relinquished[,] or surrendered the custody of such natural child.”

In re A.G., 247 W. Va. 249, 253-54, 878 S.E.2d 744, 748-49 (2022) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 238, 207 S.E.2d 129, 137 (1973)). This parens

patriae interest rests with both the judicial and the executive branches. For example, the judiciary has an “obligation to consider the ‘best interests of the child [as] paramount.’”

State ex rel. Paul B. v. Hill, 201 W. Va. 248, 257, 496 S.E.2d 198, 207 (1997) (quoting In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. ^[24], 32, 435 S.E.2d 162, 170 (1993)). Furthermore, “[t]his judicial duty has also been characterized as a parens patriae role: ‘[t]his Court cannot . . . ignore its parens patriae duty to protect the best interests of [the child].’” Paul

B., 201 W. Va. at 257, 496 S.E.2d at 207 (first alteration added) (citation omitted).

Regarding the executive branch’s similar interest, this Court has held that an abuse and neglect “action is pursued solely on behalf of the State of West Virginia in its role as parens patriae.” Syl. pt. ^[5], in part, In re B.C., 233 W. Va. 130, 755 S.E.2d 664 (2014).10 Therefore, both the judiciary and the executive branch have an obligation to act in the best interests of children.

Moreover, the specific abuse and neglect statutes at issue indicate that overlapping obligations exist between the judicial and executive branches. West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(a) makes it clear that either the DHS or a reputable person may file an abuse and neglect petition.^[11] See also In re Willis, 157 W. Va. at 238, 207 S.E.2d at 137 (“Our statutes providing for the welfare of children establish a mechanism whereby the courts may adjudicate questions arising when the State or a citizen thereof believes there is necessity to change the custodial relationship of natural parent and child because of some dereliction on the part of the parent or the child.”).12 Once the petition is filed by either 130, 755 S.E.2d 664. In re B.C. merely clarified that the DHS is a distinct and separate party from any reputable person who files an abuse and neglect petition and that a reputable person is not represented by the prosecuting attorney.

DHS or “a reputable person,” West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(c) requires the court to “set a time and place for a hearing” and “appoint counsel for the child.” Subsection (d) of this same provision provides that “[a]t the time of the institution of any proceeding under this article, the department shall provide supportive services in an effort to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child.” The Legislature has, therefore, determined that an

abuse and neglect petition may be initiated by an individual who is not a part of the DHS, the DHS must be a part of the proceedings, and the courts must hold an initial hearing on

the petition and take further action and make certain decisions as warranted by the facts of the case.^[13] See In re George Glen B., Jr., 207 W. Va. 346, 355, 532 S.E.2d 64, 73 (2000)

(“[C]ircuit courts are statutorily charged with promptly ruling upon the merits of an abuse and neglect petition, W. Va. Code, 49-6-2 [1996] [now W. Va. § 49-4-601], and if abuse or neglect is found, crafting a disposition to achieve an appropriate placement of an abused and/or neglected child. W. Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1998] [now W. Va. § 49-4-604].).14

Considering our prior recognition of the role of the State and the court as parens patriae as well as the statutory framework laying out mutual obligations on behalf of both to move expeditiously towards the same goal of the best interest of the children, we find that our abuse and neglect statutory scheme provides for corollary obligations of the judiciary and the executive branch to protect the best interest of the children involved in an abuse and neglect proceeding. For these reasons, the circuit court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by ordering the DHS to join in the abuse and neglect petition filed by Father and joined by the GAL in this case, and therefore, did not err.^[15] B. Mother’s Motion to Hire an Expert

Mother next asserts that the circuit court erred by refusing to allow her to

hire an expert to review the forensic interviews of the children for signs of coaching or other indicia of unreliability. Mother contends that her due process rights to meaningfully

participate in the abuse and neglect proceeding, including the right to present witnesses, were violated by the court’s ruling.^[16] We find that the circuit court did not err.

Generally, West Virginia Rule of Evidence 702 “provides for the admission of expert testimony . . . when the expert’s ‘knowledge will assist the trier of fact . . . to determine a fact in issue.’ It does not require the admission of all proffered expert testimony.” Rozas v. Rozas, 176 W. Va. 235, 240, 342 S.E.2d 201, 206 (1986) (quoting W. Va. R. Evid. 702).17 Accordingly, we have held that “[u]nder [West Virginia Rule of Code § 49-6-1 [now W. Va. Code § 49-4-601] have been complied with, particularly the statutory directives requiring participation by the [DHS.]” In re Emily G., 224 W. Va. at 396, 686 S.E.2d at 47.

Evidence] 702, a trial judge has broad discretion to decide whether expert testimony should be admitted, and where the evidence is unnecessary, cumulative, confusing[,] or misleading the trial judge may properly refuse to admit it.” Syl. pt. ^[4], Rozas, 176 W. Va. 235, 342

S.E.2d 201.

Similarly, in the context of an abuse and neglect proceeding, because the matter is tried without a jury, “the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or neglected.” Syl. pt. ^[1], in part, In Int. Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470

S.E.2d 177. In other words, “in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings, the circuit court is the entity charged with weighing the credibility of witnesses and rendering findings

of fact.” In re Emily B., 208 W. Va. 325, 339, 540 S.E.2d 542, 556 (2000). Because the circuit court is the fact finder in abuse and neglect proceedings, an expert witness is not permitted to render credibility determinations in such cases.^[19] was to attack the credibility of the children’s testimony.^[20] Throughout the proceedings

below, Mother repeatedly indicated that her children had a history of lying and that the children were being coached.^[21] As we acknowledged above, an expert witness is not permitted to render credibility determinations in abuse and neglect cases. Accordingly, to

the extent that Mother sought to hire an expert witness for the purpose of opining as to the credibility of the children’s disclosures during the forensic interviews, the expert witness testimony was improper as it would have invaded the province of the court as the trier of fact.^[22] To the extent that Mother’s proposed expert witness would have testified regarding the techniques and form of the forensic interview itself, we similarly find no error under the circumstances of this case. As noted above, the Rules of Evidence allow expert testimony when it will “assist the trier of fact . . . to determine a fact in issue[.]”

W. Va. R. Evid. 702. The circuit court, as the trier of fact, exercised its broad discretion to determine that Mother’s proffered expert’s testimony was not necessary to inform its findings of fact. During the hearing on the motion for Mother’s expert witness, the circuit court explained that it was the trier of fact and that the proffered expert witness was not going to be helpful in its decision-making:

The judge is the finder of fact. We don’t have issues where you have to educate me about how to read the demeanor of the child. I watch hundreds of child interviews, hundreds, so I don’t see that [this] is going to be helpful to the [c]ourt . . . . It goes outside the reason that we have [forensic] interviews of children to protect them in these proceedings from cross- examination.

The court memorialized this finding in its subsequent order.^[23] Significantly, aside from receiving the testimony of the forensic interviewer at the adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court reviewed the forensic interviews itself and conducted its own in camera interviews of D.H. and M.H. In its adjudicatory order, the court noted that it had not only reviewed the forensic interviews at the start of the matter, but also again during the adjudication

phase due to Mother’s concern that the children were coached. The court found the children’s interviews to be credible and that there was “not . . . any evidence of coaching but rather [the] children relay[ed] their first-hand experiences and [were] able to describe

with detail what they saw, heard, and felt.” Because the court, as the trier of fact, found the proffered expert testimony would not aid its decision, and because the circuit court, as the trier of fact, independently reviewed and conducted its own interviews, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying Mother the opportunity to present the testimony of an expert witness regarding the forensic interviews.^[24]

C. Clear and Convincing Evidence Turning to Mother’s third assignment of error, we must examine whether the circuit court erred by finding the respondents proved the allegations of abuse and neglect by clear and convincing evidence. We conclude that the DHS, Father, and the GAL, presented sufficient evidence to support Mother’s adjudication.^[25]

In any abuse and neglect proceeding, the allegations set forth in the petition must be proven by clear and convincing evidence: (i) Findings of the court. — Where relevant, the court shall consider the efforts of the department to remedy the alleged circumstances. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the respondent is abusing, neglecting, or, if applicable, a battered parent, all of which shall be incorporated into the order of the court. The findings must be based upon conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition and proven by clear and convincing evidence. W. Va. Code § 49-4-601 (emphasis added). See also In re C.L., 249 W. Va. 95, 102, 894 S.E.2d 877, 884 (2023) (“At the adjudicatory hearing, to have jurisdiction over an abuse and neglect case, the circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the children named in the petition are abused or neglected based upon conditions that existed at the time of filing.”). “Clear and convincing evidence means that more than a mere scintilla of evidence has been presented to establish the veracity of the allegations of abuse and/or neglect, but it does not impose as exacting an evidentiary burden as criminal proceedings which generally require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re A.M., 243

W. Va. 593, 598, 849 S.E.2d 371, 376 (2020). See also In re F.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 546, 759 S.E.2d 769, 777 (2014) (per curiam) (“It is imperative to note that the evidence in an abuse and neglect case does not have to satisfy the stringent standard of beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence must establish abuse by clear and convincing evidence.”).

Mother asserts that the evidence presented “was riddled with inconsistencies, discrepancies, and acknowledged falsehoods” and that the circuit court disregarded each such discrepancy. Yet, as noted above, credibility determinations belong to the trier of fact, the circuit court, which must “weigh[]the credibility of witnesses and render[] findings of fact.” In re Emily B., 208 W. Va. at 339, 540 S.E.2d at 556. We are reluctant to disturb such findings, as “[a] reviewing court cannot assess witness credibility through a record. The trier of fact is uniquely situated to make such determinations and this Court is not in a position to, and will not, second guess such determinations.” Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997). Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court reviewed the children’s forensic interviews from November 2021 and July 2022 and held in camera interviews with D.H. and M.H. During the adjudicatory hearing, the court informed the parties of its actions

and noted the similarities and consistencies between the forensic interviews and the in camera interviews.^[26] Then, the circuit court proceeded to hold several evidentiary hearings and heard testimony from numerous individuals including Mother, D.H.’s therapist, several

CPS employees, a forensic interviewer, Father, and D.H and M.H’s stepmother. The record contains extensive witness testimony and documentary evidence submitted for the court’s consideration, including the forensic interviews and the in camera interviews detailing

Mother’s threats of physical abuse, actual physical abuse, abuse of substances, failure to care for J.S., and failure to protect the children from abuse by other adults in the home.

Therefore, based on the record, we find that the circuit court did not err in finding that the allegations of abuse and neglect had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

D. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Finally, Mother asserts that the circuit court erred in denying her a post- adjudicatory improvement period and terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Mother argues that the circuit court erroneously found that she refused to acknowledge the existence of a problem when she admitted to failing to protect the children, even though she claimed to be innocent of the other allegations. We disagree.

This Court has consistently explained that the “[f]ailure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth of the basic allegation pertaining to . . . abuse and neglect . . ., results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.” In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quotations and citation omitted). In this matter, the record demonstrates that Mother failed to admit to the full scope of abuse and neglect for which she was adjudicated, and which was established by clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, Mother argued below that her children were liars and unreliable and she maintains the same contentions on appeal. As such, the circuit court did not err by denying Mother’s request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminating her parental rights based on Mother’s failure to fully acknowledge the extent of her abuse and neglect, which rendered it untreatable. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s June 26, 2023 dispositional order terminating Mother’s parental rights to D.H., M.H., and J.S. Affirmed.