ARMSTEAD, Chief Justice:

Petitioner Michael Shane Rexrode was found guilty of one count of domestic battery of his wife in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-28(a) (2014) following a jury trial in the Magistrate Court of Grant County, West Virginia. By order entered May 24, 2018, the Circuit Court of Grant County affirmed this conviction and ordered that Petitioner serve the previously imposed sentence of ten days in jail.

On appeal to this Court, Petitioner raises numerous assignments of error. The primary issue presented is whether law enforcement officers’ entry into Petitioner’s home was reasonable under the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement. U.S. Const., amend. IV; W.Va. Const., art. III, sec. 6. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that it was. As such, this Court finds no error and affirms the circuit court’s order. I. BACKGROUND On April 19, 2017, at approximately 8:00 p.m., law enforcement officers responded to a 911 call from a third party who advised that that there was a domestic dispute underway at Petitioner’s home.^[1] The caller reported that Petitioner’s wife, Suzette Rexrode, stated she was struck by her husband, Petitioner, and suffered an injury to her eye.

Corporal S.A. Nazelrod of the West Virginia State Police arrived at Petitioner’s home in Maysville, West Virginia, at 8:26 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Deputies Rohrbaugh and Crites of the Grant County Sheriff’s Department, arrived at the scene. As they approached the home, officers did not hear the couple arguing or shouting inside. Corporal Nazelrod knocked on the door and when Mrs. Rexrode greeted them, the officers immediately noticed that her right eye was bloody; specifically, blood was forming on the sclera.^[2] She also had bloody injuries to her right arm. Mrs. Rexrode appeared “very visibly upset” but claimed that she injured herself on farm equipment earlier that day. Officers entered the home in order to locate Petitioner, secure the scene, separate the couple, and investigate the matter.

It is undisputed that officers did not have permission to enter the home, nor did they have either an arrest or search warrant. Corporal Nazelrod located Petitioner in the bedroom, lying on the bed under the covers. The officer told Petitioner to show his hands, to ensure Petitioner was not holding a weapon. When he complied, Cpl. Nazelrod noticed blood on Petitioner’s hands. Petitioner was handcuffed and taken into the kitchen for questioning. Meanwhile, Dep. Rohrbaugh stepped outside of the home with Mrs. Rexrode and asked her what happened. Mrs. Rexrode gave a statement to the officers at approximately 8:40 p.m., wherein she stated that Petitioner “jabbed me in the face with his fingers and fist.” When asked what happened to her arm, Mrs. Rexrode replied: “He had me on the living room floor, holding me down and hitting me in the head.”

Nazelrod testified that he entered Petitioner’s home “[f]or officer safety, also for – just to protect her and the other officers that were on scene.” Ultimately, the magistrate court denied all of Petitioner’s motions, finding that officers “not only acted lawfully, but appropriately, under the circumstances.”

her eye when she fell over a step and landed on the figurine. After the magistrate court denied Petitioner’ motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and denied the allegations against him. He explained that he had blood on his hand that evening because of an injury sustained while working earlier that day. Petitioner also stated that while his wife was intoxicated during the evening in question, he had consumed only one beer. Ultimately, the jury found Petitioner guilty of domestic battery and he was sentenced to ten days in jail.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the circuit court, which held a hearing in January 2018 and thereafter entered an order denying Petitioner’s appeal on May 24, 2018.4 The circuit court found that the officers’ entry into Petitioner’s home fell under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the officers acted reasonably.5 The circuit court found no merit to Petitioner’s other assignments of error.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, Petitioner argues that (1) the lower courts erred in finding the officers’ entry into his home, and his subsequent arrest, fell within the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement; (2) the magistrate court erred in consulting ex parte with the circuit court about an evidentiary issue during trial; (3) the magistrate court erred in forcing the victim to testify; (4) the State made prejudicial comments during closing argument; (5) the magistrate court erred in failing to record voir dire; (6) a State witness testified to inadmissible hearsay regarding the 911 call; (7) the circuit court failed to render a decision within the applicable timeframe; and (8) cumulative error. These assignments of error involve various legal principles and differing standards of review. Thus, we will address the applicable standard of review within the discussion regarding the assigned error.6

III. DISCUSSION

A. Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement

“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).7 This Court has held:

To provide more appropriate context to Petitioner’s arguments, we address them 6 in different order.

“Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution8 —subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Moore, 165 W. Va. 837, 272 S.E.2d 804 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Julius, 185 W. Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991). Syl. Pt. ^[20], State v. Ladd, 210 W. Va. 413, 557 S.E.2d 820 (2001) (footnote added).

needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).9

“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. This exception to the warrant requirement, commonly referred to as the emergency doctrine, takes into account the fact that “police owe duties to the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and other preventative measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.” Merid v. Virginia, No. 1145-19-4, 2020 WL 2374232, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. May 12, 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).10 A warrantless search or seizure undertaken on this basis passes constitutional muster, however, only if the officer had an objectively reasonable ground to believe that an emergency existed, and the manner of the entry and scope of the search were reasonable. United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir.

2006). The notion of what is reasonable must “be fleshed out,” on a case by case basis. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35-36 (2003).

In State v. Cecil, 173 W. Va. 27, 311 S.E.2d 144 (1983), we stated that, generally, the emergency doctrine may be said to permit a limited, warrantless search or entry of an area by police officers where (1) there is an immediate need for their assistance in the protection of human life, (2) the search or entry by the officers is motivated by an emergency, rather than by an intent to arrest or secure evidence, and (3) there is a reasonable connection between the emergency and the area in question. Id. at 32, 311 S.E.2d at 149. In syllabus point two of Cecil, this Court applied those factors to the specific facts of that case, concluding that the warrantless entry into the home was reasonable when police officers were attempting to locate an injured or deceased child based on information received immediately prior to the entry.^[11] Considering the highly fact-driven inquiry in determining reasonableness, we recognized that the doctrine “has been defined in various ways and must be considered upon a case by case basis.” Id. at 32, 311 S.E.2d at 149. 12 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that reasonableness must be examined by “the totality of circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating marginal ones.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 36. Therefore, we cannot place hard parameters around the reasonableness inquiry; rather, each situation must be considered on its particular facts.

Although we believe that Cecil is a valid recognition of the emergency doctrine, we are compelled to modify its holding based upon subsequent precedent from the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brigham City calls into question the requirement expressed in Cecil that both the subjective motivation of a police officer and his or her action, viewed objectively, must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Syl. Pt. ^[2], Cecil, 173 W. Va. at 28, 311 S.E.2d at 146. Under the standard established by the United States Supreme Court in Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404-05, we are not concerned with the subjective reasons for the officer’s entry. Instead, we are to determine whether the police officer’s “action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978) (emphasis added).” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404-05.13

We hereby hold that, under the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement officers may enter a home and conduct a limited search without a warrant when, considering the totality of the circumstances, they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.^[14] U.S. Const., amend. IV; W.Va. Const. art. III, § 6. To the extent that our prior holding in syllabus point two of State v. Cecil, 173 W. Va. 27, 311 S.E.2d 144 (1983), is inconsistent, it is expressly modified.

With this background to guide our analysis, we turn to the issue here: whether the warrantless entry into Petitioner’s home fell within the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement.

B. Warrantless Entry into Petitioner’s Home Petitioner argues that the lower courts erred in finding that the warrantless entry into his home, and his subsequent arrest, fell within the emergency doctrine, because there was no showing that officers entered the home because they believed someone was inside who needed assistance.^[15] Conversely, the State maintains that the officers entered the home without a warrant due to exigent circumstances, as they were concerned for their own safety as well as the victim’s. Therefore, the State argues that the admissibility of the particular evidence was properly decided by the circuit court.^[16] We have previously set forth the following standard of review: “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” Syllabus point 1, State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996). Syl. Pt. ^[1], State v. Bookheimer, 221 W. Va. 720, 656 S.E.2d 471 (2007). Additionally,

“[i]n contrast to a review of the circuit court’s factual findings, the ultimate determination as to whether a search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 6 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. . . . Thus, a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake has been made.” Syllabus point 2, State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996). 221 W. Va. at 722, 656 S.E.2d at 473, syl. pt. ^[2], in part.

Specifically, Petitioner argues that the emergency doctrine does not apply because Cpl. Nazelrod’s expressed intent in entering the home was to make an arrest. Petitioner focuses on Cpl. Nazelrod’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he entered the home to “detain” Petitioner. But Cpl. Nazelrod never testified that he entered the home to make an arrest. A review of the testimony at the suppression hearing makes it clear that officers entered the home to secure the scene to assure the safety of Mrs. Rexrode and themselves. Q. [Pros. Atty. Ours] All right. When you arrived, how, did you locate her? A. [Cpl. Nazelrod] She came to the door.

Q. All right. So, what did you see when she came to the door?

A. A pretty bad injury to her eye. She also had blood injuries to her arms, things of that nature.

Q. All right. When you saw that, what did you do next and why?

A. Instantly had went to locate and detain Mr. Rexrode who she said was inside.

Q. What was the purpose?

A. For officer safety, also for – just to protect her and the other officers that were on scene.

Q. All right. When you went in the house, did you find him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you see when you found him?

A. He was laying in the bed. I told him to show me his hands. He put his hands out for me. We got him out of bed, detained him. He had blood on his hands.

Petitioner argues that Cpl. Nazelrod did not testify that he perceived an immediate need for assistance in the protection of human life inside the home, and further argues that no one inside the home was in need of assistance because Mrs. Rexrode was standing at the door or on the porch when the officers entered. We disagree. Corporal Nazelrod stated emphatically at the suppression hearing that: “I was trying to stop people from hurting people. I was securing people at that point when I went into the residence.” See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (recognizing that officers do not need “ironclad proof” of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency doctrine).

Because officers responded to a 911 call reporting domestic violence with injuries, we must consider the relevant law enforcement actions in this context. Domestic violence often, if not usually, occurs within the privacy of a home; these situations can be volatile and quickly escalate into significant injury to the victim and the officers called to the scene. “The volatility of situations involving domestic violence make them particularly well-suited for an application of the emergency doctrine.” United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). When police officers respond to a domestic dispute call, they understand that “violence may be lurking and explode with little warning.” Fletcher v. Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999). “Indeed, more officers are killed or injured on domestic violence calls than on any other type of call.” Martinez, 406 F.3d at 1164 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As was the case here, “[o]fficers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.” Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004). Corporal Nazelrod testified at the suppression hearing that officers treat 911 calls of domestic violence as emergency situations and “typically respond in a hasty manner, try to locate the parties, get them separated, figure out what’s going on.” Even though Cpl. Nazelrod did not hear obvious signs of an ongoing domestic dispute when approaching Petitioner’s home, he recognized that: “It could’ve been occurring two seconds before I got there . . . . I don’t know what was occurring when my car pulled in the driveway.” In this regard, courts have recognized the combustible nature of domestic disputes as a compelling factor in determining whether a warrantless entry was justified, when, as in the case at bar, there is reasonable cause to believe that one of the parties to the dispute was in danger. Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1998).

At the same time, officers must respect basic freedoms guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and article III, section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, even when responding to reports of domestic violence. For instance, in Brookheimer, this Court found that the officers acted unreasonably when responding to an anonymous call of a domestic disturbance involving gunshots and yelling. 221 W. Va. at 724, 656 S.E.2d at 475. After officers arrived, the owner of the residence denied any domestic disturbance and there were no signs of dispute or injury. Id. Once officers learned that Mr. Brookheimer was inside, they entered the residence and found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing in plain view. Id. On appeal, we held that the emergency doctrine did not permit officers to enter the residence because “neither resident . . . indicated a need for protection from the police.” Id. at 727-28, 656 S.E.2d at 478-79.17 However, the majority did indicate that “had facts been presented to suggest a possible domestic dispute, including injury or the presence of firearms, the resulting decision . . . may have been different.” Id. at n.9 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable. They were confronted with circumstances demonstrating that Mrs. Rexrode, an occupant in the home, was seriously injured and imminently threatened. Thus, it was reasonable for officers to enter without a warrant, to assure the safety of Mrs. Rexrode and secure the scene for their own safety; indeed, the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they failed to take these actions. It would be patently unreasonable, and contrary to public safety, for officers to unquestioningly accept Mrs. Rexrode’s initial denials and leave the scene with her wholly unprotected in the home from a potential abuser. “The role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties[.]” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.

about her statement to law enforcement on the evening in question, which Mrs. Rexrode claimed had been “a lie.”

Petitioner argues that the magistrate court erred in forcing Mrs. Rexrode to testify by threatening her with contempt after she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Petitioner misrepresents the ruling below; at no point did the magistrate court threaten Mrs. Rexrode with contempt. While Mrs. Rexrode’s attorney indicated that she would testify “under fear of being held in contempt,” there is nothing in the record to indicate that the magistrate court judge ever said Mrs. Rexrode would be held in contempt if she refused to testify. More importantly, Petitioner cannot establish that the magistrate court erred in requiring Mrs. Rexrode to testify. After being sworn in and providing her name, Mrs. Rexrode was asked if she was married to Petitioner, at which point she asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege. Given that the answer to this question would not have incriminated her in any way, the assertion of the privilege against self- incrimination was inappropriate. See Syl. Pt. ^[2], in part, State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014) (“The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may only be invoked when a witness is asked a potentially incriminating question.”). In addition, the prosecuting attorney clearly stated that he informed Mrs. Rexrode’s counsel that she would not be charged criminally as a result of any testimony she provided at Petitioner’s trial. As the United States Supreme Court has held, a “witness may ‘refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant.’” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973)); see also Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. ^[17], 21 (2001) (stating Fifth Amendment privilege’s protection extends only to witnesses who have reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer; “[t]hat inquiry is for the court; the witness’ assertion does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination.”).

Given Mrs. Rexrode’s inappropriate attempt to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege to a question that was not incriminating, and the State’s express waiver of any potential criminal charges that could arise from her testimony, it is clear that the magistrate court did not err in directing her to testify.^[19] Moreover, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice from the magistrate court’s decision. Petitioner claims that the jury failed to believe Mrs. Rexrode’s testimony after she was forced to testify, and that the magistrate’s actions showed his partiality towards the State and bias against Petitioner. Both of these allegations are conclusory and purely speculative. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on appeal for an alleged violation of Mrs. Rexrode’s rights.

D. Magistrate’s Consultation with Judge

Petitioner also contends that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the magistrate left the courtroom to consult with Circuit Court Judge James W. Courrier Jr., while an evidentiary dispute was ongoing concerning Mrs. Rexrode’s attempt to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Petitioner relies on Rule 2.9(A)(3) of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct to argue that this communication was inappropriate. However, this reliance is clearly misplaced, as the rule plainly provides that “[a] judge may consult with . . . other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.”

Petitioner cites to comment five of Rule 2.9, which provides that “[a] judge may consult with other judges on pending matters, but must avoid ex parte discussions of a case . . . with judges who have appellate jurisdiction over the matter.” Petitioner argues that because the magistrate conferred with Judge Courrier—a circuit court judge from the circuit that had appellate jurisdiction over his case—he is entitled to relief. However, Petitioner ignores the fact that the circuit court specifically found, on appeal, that Judge Courrier “is not, under the 21st Circuit’s case load rotation, the appellate judge for criminal appeals.” Simply put, the rule upon which Petitioner relies prohibits discussions with a specific judge, one who has appellate jurisdiction over the matter in question, and the record shows that Judge Courrier had no such jurisdiction. ^[20] Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to no relief on this ground.

E. Prosecutor’s Remarks During Closing Argument Petitioner next argues that the State made improper remarks during closing argument. During rebuttal closing, the State said of Mrs. Rexrode “[d]o any of you doubt that she is afraid about going home? . . . What do you reckon might happen to her if she goes home now after [Petitioner’s] had to go through all this?” A timely objection for a mistrial was made and denied, and the court did not give a curative instruction. According to Petitioner, a prosecutor cannot argue for a conviction based upon the threat of a criminal defendant committing another crime in the future. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) (“Arguments relating to a defendant’s future dangerousness ordinarily would be inappropriate at the guilt phase of a trial, as the jury is not free to convict a defendant simply because he poses a future danger; nor is a defendant’s future dangerousness likely relevant to the question whether each element of an alleged offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). While we acknowledge this authority, we find that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the prosecutor’s remarks do not constitute reversible error.

Petitioner’s guilt as the jury found. Finally, there is no evidence to indicate that these isolated comments were deliberately made to divert the jury’s attention to an extraneous matter. We therefore find no reversible error.

several potential jurors were from Petitioner’s hometown and, with regard to at least one of these potential jurors, he did not know if it would affect the juror’s ability to “sit and fairly judge” Petitioner’s case. These remarks do not evidence bias on the magistrate’s part; rather, they are very much in keeping with the court’s duty to ensure an impartial jury. See Syl. Pt. ^[4], in part, State v. Derr, 192 W. Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994) (citations omitted) (“The right to a trial by an impartial, objective jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.”).

S.E.2d at 553.21 Based upon this Court’s review of the issues raised concerning voir dire, we find no abuse of discretion by the lower courts.

that “[d]ispatch advised it was reported that there ha[d] been a physical altercation at the Rexrode --,” at which point Petitioner again objected. The objection was overruled.

“‘A trial court’s evidentiary rulings, as well as its application of the Rules of Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.’ Syl. Pt. ^[4], State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998).” Syl. Pt. ^[1], State v. Timothy C., 237 W. Va. 435, 787 S.E.2d 888 (2016). Further, “[t]he hearsay rule excludes such testimony only when offered ‘as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted’; and does not operate against such testimony offered for the mere purpose of explaining previous conduct.” State v. Maynard, 183 W. Va. ^[1], 4, 393 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1990). Petitioner argues that the officer’s testimony constituted hearsay and was admitted solely for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that there was, in fact, a physical altercation at Petitioner’s home. We disagree. A review of the record shows that this testimony was provided during Cpl. Nazelrod’s explanation of how he came to be at Petitioner’s home that evening. See State v. Randolph, 219 So.3d 425, 434 (La. Ct. App. ^[4] Cir. 2017) (stating police officer’s testimony may include information provided by another individual without constituting hearsay when it is offered to explain the course of the investigation or the officer’s actions). We therefore find that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when admitting this evidence.^[22]

IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, we affirm the order of the Circuit Court of Grant County upholding Petitioner’s conviction of domestic battery. Affirmed.