Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 815.20 (2026)
Homestead exemption definition
✓ current as of July 2026
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815.20(1)(1) An exempt homestead as defined in s. 990.01 (14) selected by a resident owner and occupied by him or her shall be exempt from execution, from the lien of every judgment, and from liability for the debts of the owner to the amount of $75,000, except mortgages, laborers’, mechanics’, and purchase money liens and taxes and except as otherwise provided. The exemption shall not be impaired by temporary removal with the intention to reoccupy the premises as a homestead nor by the sale of the homestead, but shall extend to the proceeds derived from the sale to an amount not exceeding $75,000, while held, with the intention to procure another homestead with the proceeds, for 2 years. The exemption extends to land owned by husband and wife jointly or in common or as marital property, and each spouse may claim a homestead exemption of not more than $75,000. The exemption extends to the interest therein of tenants in common, having a homestead thereon with the consent of the cotenants, and to any estate less than a fee.
815.20(2)(2) Any owner of an exempt homestead against whom a judgment has been rendered and entered in the judgment and lien docket, and any heir, devisee, or grantee of the owner, or any mortgagee of the homestead, may proceed under s. 806.04 for declaratory relief if the homestead is less than $75,000 in value and the owner of the judgment shall fail, for 10 days after demand, to execute a recordable release of the homestead from the judgment owner’s judgment lien.
815.20 HistoryHistory: 1973 c. 168; Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 761, 781 (1975); Stats. 1975 s. 815.20; 1983 a. 186; 1985 a. 153; 1993 a. 486; 1995 a. 224; 2009 a. 80.
815.20 AnnotationA defendant who has moved to Michigan intending to stay there loses the defendant’s Wisconsin homestead exemption. A defendant cannot have an exemption in two states. Plan Credit Corp. v. Swinging Singles, Inc., 54 Wis. 2d 146, 194 N.W.2d 822 (1972).
815.20 AnnotationA vendee in a land contract has an interest sufficient to sustain a homestead exemption. The holder of a judgment lien is subject to a mortgage dated after the judgment. A homestead exemption does not depend on a formal claim to it. Occupancy at the time a lien attaches is sufficient. Lueptow v. Guptill, 56 Wis. 2d 396, 202 N.W.2d 255 (1972).
815.20 AnnotationRental income from a rented portion of a homestead is exempt under the homestead exemption. Schwanz v. Teper, 66 Wis. 2d 157, 223 N.W.2d 896 (1974).
815.20 AnnotationProperty purchased by a debtor subsequent to the docketing of a judgment and immediately occupied as a homestead becomes exempt to the extent of the statutory protection. Northern State Bank v. Toal, 69 Wis. 2d 50, 230 N.W.2d 153 (1975).
815.20 AnnotationThe homestead exemption may arise in a partition action. Reckner v. Reckner, 105 Wis. 2d 425, 314 N.W.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1981).
815.20 AnnotationThis section is a statutory expression of a public policy embodied in article I, section 17, of the Wisconsin Constitution that creditors should not be permitted to deprive a debtor of the necessary comforts of life. The homestead exemption is interpreted broadly to protect the homeowner. Reckner v. Reckner, 105 Wis. 2d 425, 314 N.W.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1981).
815.20 AnnotationHomestead rights are no greater than the underlying property rights when those property rights have been limited by the owners themselves. Master Lock Credit Union v. Rayford, 119 Wis. 2d 301, 349 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1984).
815.20 AnnotationOwners who permanently remove themselves from a home that is for sale with the intent of using the proceeds to procure another home are entitled to a homestead exemption in the sale proceeds. Moore v. Krueger, 179 Wis. 2d 449, 507 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1993).
815.20 AnnotationBecause a judgment lien was subject to the homestead exemption while a federal tax lien was not, the operation of the homestead exemption effectively subordinated the otherwise superior judgment lien to the status of a junior lien, which was discharged by operation of federal law by the execution of the Internal Revenue Service’s quitclaim deed after judicial sale. CVW, Ltd. v. Stress, 230 Wis. 2d 450, 602 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0252.
815.20 AnnotationWhen equity in a homestead exceeds $40,000 [now $75,000], the homestead is partially exempt, and a docketed judgment is a lien upon the debtor’s equity in excess of the $40,000 [now $75,000]. If a debtor has less than $40,000 [now $75,000] in equity, the homestead is fully exempt, and the debtor has no interest to which a judgment lien may attach. Accordingly a debtor-seller can give clear title to the purchaser of fully exempt property. Rumage v. Gullberg, 2000 WI 53, 235 Wis. 2d 279, 611 N.W.2d 458, 98-1276.
815.20 AnnotationAn in-court oral stipulation could create a mortgage interest in property, but under s. 706.02 (1) (f), a homestead conveyance must bear the conveyors’ signatures. Because the stipulation lacked signatures, it was not a mortgage that could defeat the homestead exemption under sub. (1). Equitable Bank, S.S.B. v. Chabron, 2000 WI App 210, 238 Wis. 2d 708, 618 N.W.2d 262, 99-2639.
815.20 AnnotationA homestead created and maintained with stolen or embezzled property, or by the wrongful appropriation of property rightly belonging to others, is not protected by the homestead exemption. Paulman v. Pemberton, 2001 WI App 164, 246 Wis. 2d 909, 633 N.W.2d 715, 98-3021.
815.20 AnnotationTo qualify for the homestead exemption in sub. (1), a debtor generally needs to own or lease property that the debtor in fact occupies as the debtor’s homestead. However, sub. (1) carves out two distinct circumstances in which the homestead exemption is not impaired despite a lack of occupancy by the owner for some identified period of time: 1) a temporary removal exception, which involves an owner’s intentionally transient absence from the homestead; and 2) the owner’s sale of the homestead with intent to use the proceeds to obtain a new homestead. The combined result of these two exceptions to the general occupancy requirement is that the exemption on a homestead is lost—in statutory terms, it is “impaired”—when the debtor removes herself or himself from a homestead with no intent either to reoccupy or to sell the house and use the proceeds to procure another homestead. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39, 398 Wis. 2d 595, 961 N.W.2d 911, 20-0898.
815.20 AnnotationTo preserve the homestead exemption under sub. (1), a debtor is not required to intend to “permanently” reoccupy the homestead. In this case, the judgment debtors’ temporary absences while actively looking for a potential homestead in Iowa to replace their Wisconsin homestead did not impair the exemption, even if they planned that their serial absences and reoccupancies of the Wisconsin property as their homestead would eventually end with the establishment of a new homestead, perhaps even in the near future. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39, 398 Wis. 2d 595, 961 N.W.2d 911, 20-0898.
815.20 AnnotationMerely having a property right to what could become a new homestead if it were occupied as a homestead does not, on its own, lead to the establishment of a new homestead and the abandonment of an old one. Actual occupancy as a homestead is required. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39, 398 Wis. 2d 595, 961 N.W.2d 911, 20-0898.
815.20 AnnotationA judgment debtor’s assertion of a homestead exemption generally establishes a presumption that the property is homestead property. A judgment creditor may rebut that presumption by showing that the debtor claiming the exemption does not occupy the claimed homestead, including for the reason that the debtor has established a new homestead before having sold the homestead on which the debtor claims the exemption. When a debtor ceases to occupy the premises of the claimed homestead, it is the debtor’s burden to show that the circumstances qualify for one of the two exceptions to impairment based on the debtor’s absence from the homestead. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39, 398 Wis. 2d 595, 961 N.W.2d 911, 20-0898.
815.20 AnnotationThe homestead exemption is void under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution to the extent that it impedes a federal court restitution order. United States v. Lampien, 89 F.3d 1316 (1996).
815.20 AnnotationEstablishment and Abandonment of a Wisconsin Homestead. Kreitler. 1973 WLR 876.
815.20 AnnotationJudgment Lien Claimants’ Rights Against Homestead Exemption Interests: An Equitable Distribution of Mortgage Foreclosure Sale Proceeds. Steinmetz. 1981 WLR 697.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 73
cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: Rumage v. Gullberg, 2000 WI 53 (Wis. 2000).
Rumage v. Gullberg, 2000 WI 53 (Wis. 2000). “On his bankruptcy schedules, Kemeling listed the Brook Road property as his homestead and claimed the property as exempt under Wis. Stat. §§ 815.20 (1) and 990.01(14) (1989-90), the homestead exemption statutes set forth below.”
Jeffery D. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “§ 815.20 provides: (1) An exempt homestead as defined in s.”
Reckner v. Reckner, 314 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981). “6 Second, the *429 sec. 815.20, Stats., homestead exemption is a statutory right that a debtor may assert against some creditors.”
In re Carter, 550 B.R. 433 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2016). “Although Carter maintained legal residence in Madison at the time of filing, she claimed the Laona residence as her exempt homestead under Wis. Stat. § 815.20 . The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the claimed exemption.”
In re Coenen, 487 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012). “Wis. Stat. Ann. § 815.20 (1) (West 2012).”
Moore v. Krueger, 507 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “Alternatively, the Moores argue that even if the trial court was correct by finding that the Moores moved from the house with no intent to return and reoccupy it as a homestead, it erred in its interpretation of sec. 815.20(1), Stats., 1 by concluding that because the *453…”
In Re Laube, 152 B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993). “This case presents an issue of first impression: whether a semi truck cab qualifies as an exempt homestead under Wis. Stat. § 815.20 (1). The debtor, Shirl John Laube, Jr.”
Paulman v. Pemberton, 2001 WI App 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). “Contrary to what the trial court determined, Carole argues that Charles' residence is not protected from a *911 forced sale under Wis. Stat. § 815.20 (1995-96), 1 the statute exempting homesteads from execution.”
United States v. Carol J. Lampien, 89 F.3d 1316 (7th Cir. 1996). “1 Carol Lampien appeals the district court’s restitution order on the grounds that (1) her interest in her home is protected by the Wisconsin homestead exemption, Wis. Stat. § 815.20 (1994), which prevents the court from ordering her to relinquish that interest in favor of any…”
In Re Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999). “15(1), the judgment created a cloud on title to the debtor’s homestead, which could have been remedied by the protections of Wis.Stat. § 815.20 and 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f), but the complexities of the interplay between community property rules, state judgment lien statutes and…”
In Re Fink, 417 B.R. 786 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009). “Wis. Stat. § 815.20 . The statute itself expressly provides: An exempt homestead .”
In Re Arnhoelter, 431 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010). “The Debtor filed this Chapter 12 case on January 26, 2010, and claimed the real estate exempt under Wis. Stat. § 815.20 . The Debtor listed Kiel as an unsecured creditor in his bankruptcy schedules.”
— Wis. Stat. § 815.20(1) — 27 cases
Jeffery D. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “§ 815.20 provides: (1) An exempt homestead as defined in s.”
Moore v. Krueger, 507 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “Alternatively, the Moores argue that even if the trial court was correct by finding that the Moores moved from the house with no intent to return and reoccupy it as a homestead, it erred in its interpretation of sec. 815.20(1), Stats., 1 by concluding that because the *453…”
In re Carter, 550 B.R. 433 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2016). “Although Carter maintained legal residence in Madison at the time of filing, she claimed the Laona residence as her exempt homestead under Wis. Stat. § 815.20 . The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the claimed exemption.”
In Re Laube, 152 B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993). “This case presents an issue of first impression: whether a semi truck cab qualifies as an exempt homestead under Wis. Stat. § 815.20 (1). The debtor, Shirl John Laube, Jr.”
Mogilka v. Jeka, 389 N.W.2d 359 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
— Wis. Stat. § 815.20(2) — 2 cases
In Re Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999). “15(1), the judgment created a cloud on title to the debtor’s homestead, which could have been remedied by the protections of Wis.Stat. § 815.20 and 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f), but the complexities of the interplay between community property rules, state judgment lien statutes and…”
Jeffery D. Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 2021 WI App 39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “§ 815.20 provides: (1) An exempt homestead as defined in s.”
— Wis. Stat. § 815.20(l)(a) — 1 case
Rumage v. Gullberg, 2000 WI 53 (Wis. 2000). “On his bankruptcy schedules, Kemeling listed the Brook Road property as his homestead and claimed the property as exempt under Wis. Stat. §§ 815.20 (1) and 990.01(14) (1989-90), the homestead exemption statutes set forth below.”
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