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Wis. Stat.Chapter 968 — Commencement of Criminal Proceedings

Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2026)

Interception and disclosure of wire, electronic or oral communications prohibited

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1971–2026 33citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 33 opinions since 1971, 5 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (2)(b) (5 cases).

968.31968.31 Interception and disclosure of wire, electronic or oral communications prohibited.
968.31(1)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in ss. 196.63 or 968.28 to 968.30, whoever commits any of the acts enumerated in this section is guilty of a Class H felony:
968.31(1)(a)(a) Intentionally intercepts, attempts to intercept or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept, any wire, electronic or oral communication.
968.31(1)(b)(b) Intentionally uses, attempts to use or procures any other person to use or attempt to use any electronic, mechanical or other device to intercept any oral communication.
968.31(1)(c)(c) Discloses, or attempts to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication in violation of this section or under circumstances constituting violation of this section.
968.31(1)(d)(d) Uses, or attempts to use, the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication in violation of this section or under circumstances constituting violation of this section.
968.31(1)(e)(e) Intentionally discloses the contents of any oral, electronic or wire communication obtained by authority of ss. 968.28, 968.29 and 968.30, except as therein provided.
968.31(1)(f)(f) Intentionally alters any wire, electronic or oral communication intercepted on tape, wire or other device.
968.31(2)(2) It is not unlawful under ss. 968.28 to 968.37:
968.31(2)(a)(a) For an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee or agent of any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the normal course of his or her employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his or her service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of a wire or electronic communication service shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
968.31(2)(b)(b) For a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception.
968.31(2)(c)(c) For a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
968.31(2)(d)(d) For any person to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that the electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public.
968.31(2)(e)(e) For any person to intercept any radio communication that is transmitted:
968.31(2)(e)1.1. By any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles or persons in distress;
968.31(2)(e)2.2. By any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
968.31(2)(e)3.3. By a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band or general mobile radio services; or
968.31(2)(e)4.4. By any marine or aeronautical communications system.
968.31(2)(f)(f) For any person to engage in any conduct that:
968.31(2)(f)1.1. Is prohibited by section 633 of the communications act of 1934; or
968.31(2)(f)2.2. Is excepted from the application of section 705 (a) of the communications act of 1934 by section 705 (b) of that act.
968.31(2)(g)(g) For any person to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of the interference.
968.31(2)(h)(h) For users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of the system, if the communication is not scrambled or encrypted.
968.31(2)(i)(i) To use a pen register or a trap and trace device as authorized under ss. 968.34 to 968.37; or
968.31(2)(j)(j) For a provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect the provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of the service.
968.31(2m)(2m) Any person whose wire, electronic or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of ss. 968.28 to 968.37 shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use, the communication, and shall be entitled to recover from any such person:
968.31(2m)(a)(a) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
968.31(2m)(b)(b) Punitive damages; and
968.31(2m)(c)(c) A reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
968.31(3)(3) Good faith reliance on a court order or on s. 968.30 (7) shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under ss. 968.28 to 968.37.
968.31 AnnotationThe testimony of an undercover police officer who was carrying a concealed eavesdropping device under sub. (2) is not the product of the eavesdropping and is admissible even assuming the eavesdropping was unconstitutional. State v. Smith, 72 Wis. 2d 711, 242 N.W.2d 184 (1976).
968.31 AnnotationAn individual who volunteers to aid the authorities in a lawful, albeit surreptitious, investigation does not commit an injury against the investigated party under sub. (2) (c) simply by participation. Undercover informants must surely realize that evidence they receive may be potentially harmful to the target of the investigation, but this is not the type of injurious act contemplated by the statute. State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583, 03-2180.
968.31 AnnotationConsent under sub. (2) (b) may be express or implied in fact from surrounding circumstances indicating that the person knowingly agrees to the surveillance. In the prison setting, an inmate has given implied consent to electronic surveillance when the inmate has meaningful notice that a telephone call is subject to monitoring and recording and nonetheless proceeds with the call. State v. Riley, 2005 WI App 203, 287 Wis. 2d 244, 704 N.W.2d 635, 04-2321.
968.31 AnnotationIf a warrantless intercept complies with sub. (2) (b), commonly referred to as the one-party consent exception, the contents of the intercept may be disclosed in a felony proceeding. The phrase “person acting under color of law” does not exclude law enforcement officers. State v. Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, 317 Wis. 2d 445, 767 N.W.2d 336, 08-0135.
968.31 AnnotationWhen determining whether a minor has the capacity to consent to “color-of-law surveillance” under sub. (2) (b), courts should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent is voluntarily given. The court should consider the minor’s knowledge, intelligence, and maturity. It is also appropriate to consider the minor’s education and state of mind, the demeanor and tone of voice of the officers requesting consent, the location at which consent is given, and the duration of the encounter. The court should also consider the police tactics used to elicit consent and any other relevant circumstances. State v. Turner, 2014 WI App 93, 356 Wis. 2d 759, 854 N.W.2d 865, 13-2101.
968.31 AnnotationThe use of the “called party control device” by the communications common carrier to trace bomb scares and other harassing telephone calls would not violate any law if used with the consent of the receiving party. 60 Atty. Gen. 90.
The 20 cases that cite Wis. Stat. § 968.31 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, 698 N.W.2d 583.
cites § 968.31 10×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“His claim involves two sections of WESCL, Wis. Stat. §§ 968.31 (2)(b) and (c). Under these provisions, it is not unlawful: (b) For a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of…”
The case’s holding
An attorney does not render deficient performance by failing to bring a motion that would have been denied or by failing to argue an unsettled proposition of law.
Later courts cite it for
“judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance is highly deferential.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENState v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, 685 N.W.2d 620.
cites § 968.31 17×subsections: (2)(c)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“2 by special prosecutor Joseph Paulus; (2) counsel should have challenged the admissibility of the videotape evidence under Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(c) as "injurious;" and (3) at trial, counsel impermissibly invited the State's investigator, Kim Skorlinski, to comment on…”
The case’s holding
Trial counsel is not ineffective simply because an otherwise reasonable trial strategy was unsuccessful.
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court's determination of what counsel did or did not do, along with counsel's basis for the challenged conduct, are factual matters we will not disturb unless clearly erroneous.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENState v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 749 N.W.2d 611.
cites § 968.31 8×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“2d 354 (citing Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b)). However, in considering all the relevant portions of the Electronic Surveillance Control Law, we concluded that "[i]nterception is one thing; disclosure as evidence in court is another.”
The case’s holding
A motion to suppress documents and derivative statements obtained in violation of the statute is a valid motion under the statute's expansive language.
Later courts cite it for
“statutes are interpreted to give effect to each word and to avoid surplusage....” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENTerry v. Journal Broadcast Corp., 2013 WI App 130, 840 N.W.2d 255.
cites § 968.31 10×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“Terry argues that her image was misappropriated, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (1), because the news station used an image of Terry making a "throat cutting" gesture when it "was taken in *508 her home without her consent.”
The case’s holding
A media defendant's broadcast is not actionable defamation if the statements are substantially true or are opinion based on disclosed facts that do not imply undisclosed defamatory facts.
5
GREENBartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
cites § 968.31 2×cited by 370 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“Code § 62 -1D-3 (2000); Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (1) (1994); Wyo. Stat.”
The case’s holding
First Amendment protections for publishing matters of public importance outweigh privacy rights when the media outlet played no part in the illegal interception of the information.
Later courts cite it for
“the normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.” · 18 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Bobby L. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 849 N.W.2d 798.
cites § 968.31 4×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“87 See Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (prohibiting the interception of wire, electronic, or oral communication, except as provided and authorized by judicial order) 88 See Wis.”
The case’s holding
A court order satisfies the particularity requirement if it identifies a target phone by its electronic serial number to permit a particularized collection of cell site information.
Later courts cite it for
“the identification of the physical location of a target cellular phone.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Gilmore, 549 N.W.2d 401 (Wis. 1996).
cites § 968.31 7×subsections: (2m)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“In addition, Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (l)(e), which has no federal counterpart, 16 imposes a criminal penalty on anyone who "[i]ntentionally discloses the contents of any oral, electronic or wire communication obtained by authority of ss 968.”
Later courts cite it for
“in enacting title iii congress displayed an overriding concern with protecting privacy.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENState v. Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, 767 N.W.2d 336.
cites § 968.31 19×subsections: (2)(b)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 968.31
“For now, it is sufficient to say that he contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b), commonly referred to as the one-party consent exception, does not apply when the intercepting person is a law enforcement officer and the party to the communication who consents to the intercept…”
9
GREENState v. Smith, 438 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1989).
cites § 968.31 2×subsections: (1)(a) 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“Sec. 968.31(1)(a), Stats. Under the facts of this case, the initial interception of Prettic Smith's conversation apparently was inadvertent, not intentional.”
The case’s holding
Conversations transmitted via cordless telephone signals are not protected wire communications under the state electronic surveillance statute.
10
GREENBanargent v. State, 228 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007).
cites § 968.31 1×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“at 638; see Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b) (2005-06) (stating that it is not unlawful under the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law for “a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where .”
The case’s holding
An inmate impliedly consents to recorded jail telephone calls when on notice that such calls may be recorded.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the size, shape, and sharpness of the knife; (2) the manner in which the appellant used the weapon; (3) the nature of any inflicted wounds; (4) testimony concerning the knife's life-threatening capabilities; and (5) the words appellant spoke.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENFischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
cites § 968.31 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“§§ 2510-21 ; Wisconsin Communications Privacy Act, Wis. Stat. § 968.31 ; Electronic Communications Storage Act, 18 U.”
12
GREENState v. Riley, 2005 WI App 203, 704 N.W.2d 635.
cites § 968.31 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“31 (2) (b), an individual acting under the color of law may lawfully intercept oral and wire communications where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”
Later courts cite it for
“so long as an inmate is given meaningful notice that his or her telephone calls over institutional phones are subject to surveillance, his or her decision to engage in conversations over those phones constitutes implied consent to such surveillance.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 2007).
cites § 968.31 1×cited by 33 cases
The case’s holding
The state constitution prohibits law enforcement from using an informant equipped with an electronic surveillance device to secretly record communications inside a person's home without a warrant.
Later courts cite it for
“our decision to depart from stare decisis is based upon a 'serious judicial error' in the thompson opinion.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENState ex rel. Arnold v. Cnty. Court of Rock Cnty., 187 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1971).
cites § 968.31 2×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“In sec. 968.31, Stats., the act deals with the prohibited interceptions and disclosures of wire and oral communications.”
The case’s holding
Electronic surveillance recordings are admissible in evidence only if they are intercepted in accordance with the specific procedures and authorizations set forth in the state statute.
Later courts cite it for
“in considering a statute, the court must seek the legislative intent as disclosed from the language of the statute in relation to its scope, history, context, subject matter, and object intended to be remedied or accomplished. case cited.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Christensen, 2007 WI App 170, 737 N.W.2d 38.
cites § 968.31 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“If one were to illegally intercept Christensen's communication with his attorney, one would be liable under the penalties set forth in Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (1). That section provides in part: [W]hoever commits any of the acts enumerated in this section is guilty of a Class H…”
16
GREENState v. Maloney, 467 N.W.2d 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 968.31 2×subsections: (2)(b) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“Section 968.31(2)(b), Stats., provides that it is not unlawful " [fjor a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication .”
17
GREENBoehner, John A. v. McDermott, James A., 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
cites § 968.31 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“Code §§ 62-1D-3, 62-1D-12 (1990); Wis.Stat. Ann. § 968.31 (West 1985 & Supp.”
The case’s holding
The government may constitutionally prohibit the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications even if the discloser obtained the information through a lawful transaction.
Later courts cite it for
“where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?” · 4 citing courts
18
GREENPhillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 996 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 968.31 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“Code § 62-1D-12 (1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.31 (West 1998). 7 .”
19
NEUTRALState v. Turner, 2014 WI App 93, 854 N.W.2d 865.
cites § 968.31 19×subsections: (2)(b)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 968.31
“It first observed that no court had yet addressed whether a minor could consent to police interception of a communication under the WESCL's one-party consent exception, Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b). However, drawing on consent cases in other contexts, the court concluded the…”
Later courts cite it for
“it is also appropriate to consider the minor's education and state of mind, the demeanor and tone of voice of the officers requesting consent, the location at which consent was given, and the duration of the encounter.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENState v. Gil, 561 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 968.31 2×subsections: (2)(b) 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 968.31
“, 1993-94; see also § 968.31(2)(b), Stats. The trial court then turned to specific circumstances relating to how the drug agents inadvertently captured the evidence of Gil's other criminal activity.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197119982026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1999. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wis. Ct. App.9Wis.7W.D. Wis.4E.D. Wis.3N.D. Ill.23rd Cir.17th Cir.1D.C. Cir.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 13 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)(a)1 case
State v. Smith, 438 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1989).“Sec. 968.31(1)(a), Stats. Under the facts of this case, the initial interception of Prettic Smith's conversation apparently was inadvertent, not intentional.”
(2)(b)5 cases
State v. Maloney, 467 N.W.2d 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).“Section 968.31(2)(b), Stats., provides that it is not unlawful " [fjor a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication .”
State v. Gil, 561 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).“, 1993-94; see also § 968.31(2)(b), Stats. The trial court then turned to specific circumstances relating to how the drug agents inadvertently captured the evidence of Gil's other criminal activity.”
State v. Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, 767 N.W.2d 336.“For now, it is sufficient to say that he contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b), commonly referred to as the one-party consent exception, does not apply when the intercepting person is a law enforcement officer and the party to the communication who consents to the intercept…”
State v. Hand, 2019 WI App 8, 926 N.W.2d 500.
State v. Turner, 2014 WI App 93, 854 N.W.2d 865.“It first observed that no court had yet addressed whether a minor could consent to police interception of a communication under the WESCL's one-party consent exception, Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b). However, drawing on consent cases in other contexts, the court concluded the…”
(2)(c)1 case
State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, 685 N.W.2d 620.“2 by special prosecutor Joseph Paulus; (2) counsel should have challenged the admissibility of the videotape evidence under Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(c) as "injurious;" and (3) at trial, counsel impermissibly invited the State's investigator, Kim Skorlinski, to comment on…”
(2)(m)1 case
Brahm, Natalie v. Hosp. Sisters Health Sys., No. 3:23-cv-00444 (W.D. Wis. June 28, 2024).
(2m)2 cases
State v. Gilmore, 549 N.W.2d 401 (Wis. 1996).“In addition, Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (l)(e), which has no federal counterpart, 16 imposes a criminal penalty on anyone who "[i]ntentionally discloses the contents of any oral, electronic or wire communication obtained by authority of ss 968.”
Bartholomew v. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 717 N.W.2d 216.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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