Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (2026)

Sentence of life imprisonment; parole eligibility determination; extended supervision eligibility determination

✓ current as of July 2026
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973.014973.014Sentence of life imprisonment; parole eligibility determination; extended supervision eligibility determination.
973.014(1)(1)Except as provided in sub. (2), when a court sentences a person to life imprisonment for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1988, but before December 31, 1999, the court shall make a parole eligibility determination regarding the person and choose one of the following options:
973.014(1)(a)(a) The person is eligible for parole under s. 304.06 (1).
973.014(1)(b)(b) The person is eligible for parole on a date set by the court. Under this paragraph, the court may set any later date than that provided in s. 304.06 (1), but may not set a date that occurs before the earliest possible parole eligibility date as calculated under s. 304.06 (1).
973.014(1)(c)(c) The person is not eligible for parole. This paragraph applies only if the court sentences a person for a crime committed on or after August 31, 1995, but before December 31, 1999.
973.014(1g)(a)(a) Except as provided in sub. (2), when a court sentences a person to life imprisonment for a crime committed on or after December 31, 1999, the court shall make an extended supervision eligibility date determination regarding the person and choose one of the following options:
973.014(1g)(a)1.1. The person is eligible for release to extended supervision after serving 20 years.
973.014(1g)(a)2.2. The person is eligible for release to extended supervision on a date set by the court. Under this subdivision, the court may set any later date than that provided in subd. 1., but may not set a date that occurs before the earliest possible date under subd. 1.
973.014(1g)(a)3.3. The person is not eligible for release to extended supervision.
973.014(1g)(b)(b) When sentencing a person to life imprisonment under par. (a), the court shall inform the person of the provisions of s. 302.114 (3) and the procedure for petitioning under s. 302.114 (5) for release to extended supervision.
973.014(1g)(c)(c) A person sentenced to life imprisonment under par. (a) is not eligible for release on parole.
973.014(2)(2)When a court sentences a person to life imprisonment under s. 939.62 (2m) (c), the court shall provide that the sentence is without the possibility of parole or extended supervision. When a court sentences a person to life imprisonment under s. 948.051 (1) (b) or (2) (b), the court shall provide that the sentence is without the possibility of extended supervision.
973.014 AnnotationThe constitutionality of this section is upheld. State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992).
973.014 AnnotationThe denial of presentence confinement credit when parole was established under sub. (2) [now sub. (1) (b)] was constitutional. State v. Chapman, 175 Wis. 2d 231, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1993).
973.014 AnnotationSub. (1) (b) allows a circuit court to impose a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant’s expected lifetime. State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997), 95-0207.
973.014 AnnotationA trial court sentencing a defendant under sub. (1) (b), exercising its discretion, may or may not give credit for presentence incarceration. State v. Seeley, 212 Wis. 2d 75, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1939.
973.014 AnnotationParole eligibility is not a statutorily or constitutionally necessary component of a valid plea colloquy in a case in which a life sentence is imposed. State v. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d 702, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3217.
973.014 AnnotationThe U.S. Supreme Court in Miller, 576 U.S. 460 (2012), did not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole in homicide cases, but required sentencing courts to take into account how children are different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. Thus, it is not unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of supervised release for intentional homicide under sub. (1g) (a) 3. if the circumstances warrant it. State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, 14-2876.
973.014 AnnotationThe mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment provided by sub. (1g) (a) 1. as applied to children does not violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the U.S. and Wisconsin constitutions. State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, 14-2876.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 52 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: State v. Setagord, 565 N.W.2d 506 (Wis. 1997).
State v. Setagord, 565 N.W.2d 506 (Wis. 1997). · cites it 210× “Both defendants argue that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1)(b) does not authorize the circuit court to effectively deny parole by setting a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's anticipated lifetime.”
State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101 (Wis. 2000). · cites it 46× “As it applied to Byrge, Wis. Stat. § 973.014 required the sentencing court to exercise one of two options by: 1) determining that the defendant is eligible for parole under Wis.”
State v. Borrell, 482 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1992). · cites it 26× “This case involves the constitutionality of sec. 973.014, Stats. 1987-88, 1 as it affects the parole eligibility date of persons sentenced to life imprisonment.”
State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 22× “The court then proceeded to warn Barbeau in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (lg)(b) that the DOC may extend the date when he would become eligible for extended supervision if he committed infractions while incarcerated or was placed in an adjustment program or controlled…”
State v. Seeley, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 23× “In regard to Seeley's equal protection argument, it is true that Chapman analyzed the equal protection challenge to § 973.014, STATS., by comparing those who had been convicted of a crime that carried a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment with those convicted of a crime…”
State v. Wills, 523 N.W.2d 569 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 15× “That the prosecutor attempted to undercut the State's plea agreement is apparent when the prosecutor's *533 statement of the plea agreement at the time of the plea hearing, April 3, 1991, is contrasted with the prosecutor's subsequent communication to the trial court relative to…”
State v. Byrge, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 12× “Here, the trial court selected the second option and fixed Byrge's parole eligibility date at July 2, 2095, a date obviously beyond Byrge's life expectancy. The court's plea colloquy with Byrge, while *715 extensive and otherwise complete, did not advise Byrge of the court's…”
State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33 (Wis. 2011). · cites it 5× “Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1) (1997-98). If the crime was committed on or after August 31, 1995, but before December 31, 1999, the court may choose the option of no parole eligibility.”
State v. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 5× “The Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1) ¶ 50. Leighton contends that WlS.”
State v. Wills, 533 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1995). · cites it 6× “1 *276 Prior to sentencing the court sent both parties a letter inviting arguments with respect to the court's exercise of its sentencing discretion under sec. 973.014, Stats. (1991-92). The State responded with a letter which is the gravamen of this case.”
State v. Bentley, 548 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1996). · cites it 2× “Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State also amended one count of first-degree intentional homicide to felony murder, abandoned the penalty enhancers, and dismissed the two armed robbery counts.”
State v. Chapman, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 10× “His proposition is that after the trial court sets the parole eligibility date, the amount of time served in presentence confinement must be subtracted from the specific parole eligibility date to arrive at his actual parole eligibility date.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1) — 9 cases
State v. Byrge, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). “Here, the trial court selected the second option and fixed Byrge's parole eligibility date at July 2, 2095, a date obviously beyond Byrge's life expectancy. The court's plea colloquy with Byrge, while *715 extensive and otherwise complete, did not advise Byrge of the court's…”
State v. Borrell, 482 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1992). “This case involves the constitutionality of sec. 973.014, Stats. 1987-88, 1 as it affects the parole eligibility date of persons sentenced to life imprisonment.”
State v. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). “The Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1) ¶ 50. Leighton contends that WlS.”
State v. Seeley, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “In regard to Seeley's equal protection argument, it is true that Chapman analyzed the equal protection challenge to § 973.014, STATS., by comparing those who had been convicted of a crime that carried a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment with those convicted of a crime…”
State v. Chapman, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “His proposition is that after the trial court sets the parole eligibility date, the amount of time served in presentence confinement must be subtracted from the specific parole eligibility date to arrive at his actual parole eligibility date.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(a) — 1 case
State v. Levelt Dewarren Musgraves (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) — 4 cases
State v. Setagord, 565 N.W.2d 506 (Wis. 1997). “Both defendants argue that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1)(b) does not authorize the circuit court to effectively deny parole by setting a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's anticipated lifetime.”
State v. Seeley, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “In regard to Seeley's equal protection argument, it is true that Chapman analyzed the equal protection challenge to § 973.014, STATS., by comparing those who had been convicted of a crime that carried a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment with those convicted of a crime…”
Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 585 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Levelt Dewarren Musgraves (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c) — 1 case
State v. Linda Sue La Roche (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g) — 2 cases
State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 924 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 2019).
State v. Latonio D. Simpson (Wis. Ct. App. 2021).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g)(a) — 5 cases
State v. Martice T. Fuller (Wis. Ct. App. 2026).
State v. Jackson, 921 N.W.2d 4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Arnell Deron Gilmer (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. C. T. P.-B. (Wis. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Lacey, 685 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g)(c) — 1 case
State v. Lacey, 685 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) — 7 cases
State v. Setagord, 565 N.W.2d 506 (Wis. 1997). “Both defendants argue that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1)(b) does not authorize the circuit court to effectively deny parole by setting a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's anticipated lifetime.”
State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101 (Wis. 2000). “As it applied to Byrge, Wis. Stat. § 973.014 required the sentencing court to exercise one of two options by: 1) determining that the defendant is eligible for parole under Wis.”
State v. Wills, 523 N.W.2d 569 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). “That the prosecutor attempted to undercut the State's plea agreement is apparent when the prosecutor's *533 statement of the plea agreement at the time of the plea hearing, April 3, 1991, is contrasted with the prosecutor's subsequent communication to the trial court relative to…”
State v. Seeley, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “In regard to Seeley's equal protection argument, it is true that Chapman analyzed the equal protection challenge to § 973.014, STATS., by comparing those who had been convicted of a crime that carried a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment with those convicted of a crime…”
State v. Chapman, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “His proposition is that after the trial court sets the parole eligibility date, the amount of time served in presentence confinement must be subtracted from the specific parole eligibility date to arrive at his actual parole eligibility date.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Byrge, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). “Here, the trial court selected the second option and fixed Byrge's parole eligibility date at July 2, 2095, a date obviously beyond Byrge's life expectancy. The court's plea colloquy with Byrge, while *715 extensive and otherwise complete, did not advise Byrge of the court's…”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(l)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Seeley, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). “In regard to Seeley's equal protection argument, it is true that Chapman analyzed the equal protection challenge to § 973.014, STATS., by comparing those who had been convicted of a crime that carried a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment with those convicted of a crime…”
State v. Setagord, 565 N.W.2d 506 (Wis. 1997). “Both defendants argue that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1)(b) does not authorize the circuit court to effectively deny parole by setting a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's anticipated lifetime.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(l)(c) — 1 case
State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33 (Wis. 2011). “Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1) (1997-98). If the crime was committed on or after August 31, 1995, but before December 31, 1999, the court may choose the option of no parole eligibility.”
— Wis. Stat. § 973.014(lg)(a) — 1 case
State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). “The court then proceeded to warn Barbeau in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (lg)(b) that the DOC may extend the date when he would become eligible for extended supervision if he committed infractions while incarcerated or was placed in an adjustment program or controlled…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.