For the purpose of this chapter, the following words have the following meanings:
(1) CONTRACTOR. Any person, individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity who contracts with an owner to improve real property or perform construction services for an owner.
(2) IMPROVE. To build, effect, alter, repair, or demolish any improvements upon, connected with, or on, or beneath the surface of any real property; to excavate, clear, grade, fill, landscape any real property; to construct driveways and roadways; to furnish materials, including trees and shrubbery, for any of these purposes; or to perform any labor upon these improvements.
(3) IMPROVEMENT. All or any part of any building, structure, erection, alteration, demolition, excavation, clearing, grading, filling, or landscaping, including trees and shrubbery, driveways, and roadways on real property.
(4) OWNER. Any person, individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity who has an interest in the real property improved and for whom an improvement is made, who either directly or by agent ordered the improvement to be made.
(5) REAL PROPERTY. The real estate that is improved, including lands, leaseholds, tenements, and improvements placed on the real property.
(6) SUBCONTRACTOR. Any person, individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity who has contracted to furnish labor or materials to, or has performed labor or supplied materials for a contractor in connection with a contract to improve real property.
(7) SUB-SUBCONTRACTOR. Any person, individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity who has contracted to furnish labor or materials to, or has performed labor or supplied materials for a subcontractor in connection with a contract to improve real property.
(Acts 1995, No. 95-380, p. 775, §1.)
Notes of Decisions
Lemoine Co. of Alabama v. HLH Constructors, Inc., 62 So. 3d 1020 (Ala. 2010).
· cites it 2× “Issues On appeal, Lemoine raises three issues: (1) whether Vista Bella’s payment to Lem-oine of the balance owed under the general contract was a condition precedent to Lemoine’s obligation to pay HLH the balance owed under the subcontract; (2) whether the trial court erred in…”
Diamond Conc. Slabs v. Andalusia-Opp, 2100114 (ala.civ.app. 8-12-2011), 103 So. 3d 73 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
· cites it 7× ““The Motions are granted insofar as they are directed to Diamond Concrete’s claims under Ala.Code § 8-29-1 et seq. (including § 8-29-6) in that the evidence produced during the trial of this matter does not create a question for resolution by the jury on those issues.”
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 59 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2010).
· cites it 2× “2006), did not involve the little Miller Act, but instead involved the Prompt Payment Act (§ 8-29-1, Ala.Code 1975), also known as the Deborah K.”
Lighting Fair, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 63 So. 3d 1256 (Ala. 2010).
“Lighting Fair also asserted claims of breach of contract and account stated against Taylor and Taylor Homes; a civil-conspiracy claim against Taylor, Taylor Homes, and Regions; and, against all the defendants, claims alleging unjust enrichment and violations of § 8-29-1 et seq.,…”
Consol. CONSTR. CO. v. Metal Bldg. Components, LP, 961 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 2007).
· cites it 3× “Sorrells and Consolidated were liable under the Alabama Prompt Payment Act, § 8-29-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975; (3) that Consolidated was liable to pay the amounts owed MBCI from its payment bond pursuant to § 39-1-1; and (4) that Hartford was also liable to pay MBCI on the payment…”
Boyington v. Bryan, 174 So. 3d 347 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).
· cites it 3× “Bryan’s original complaint also stated a claim under the Prompt Pay Act, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 8-29-1 et seq., 1 alleging that the defendants had failed to promptly pay him as required and seeking penalty interest and an attorney fee, as provided for in § 8-29-6.”
Herring-malbis I, LLC v. Temco, Inc., 37 So. 3d 158 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “(“TEMCO”), pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 8-29-1 et seq., usually referred to as the Prompt Payment Act.”
Rolin Constr., Inc. v. Wind Clan Constr. Co., Inc. (S.D. Ala. 2020).
· cites it 12× “Wind Clan’s counterclaim against Rolin and its surety Hartford Fire Insurance Company, sets out the following six counts: (1) Rolin’s failure to make timely payments to Wind Clan under Alabama’s Prompt Pay Act, Ala.Code § 8-29-1, et seq.; (2) breach of the subcontract by Rolin…”
Otis Elevator Co. v. WG Yates & Sons Constr. Co., 589 F. App'x 953 (11th Cir. 2014).
“It brought claims for: (1) breach of the Subcontract, (2) fraud, and (3) violation of the Alabama Prompt Pay Act, see Ala. Code § 8-29-1 et seq. Otis sought monetary damages for: (1) the $260,013.”
— Ala. Code § 8-29-1(1) — 3 cases
Diamond Conc. Slabs v. Andalusia-Opp, 2100114 (ala.civ.app. 8-12-2011), 103 So. 3d 73 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
““The Motions are granted insofar as they are directed to Diamond Concrete’s claims under Ala.Code § 8-29-1 et seq. (including § 8-29-6) in that the evidence produced during the trial of this matter does not create a question for resolution by the jury on those issues.”
Boyington v. Bryan, 174 So. 3d 347 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).
“Bryan’s original complaint also stated a claim under the Prompt Pay Act, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 8-29-1 et seq., 1 alleging that the defendants had failed to promptly pay him as required and seeking penalty interest and an attorney fee, as provided for in § 8-29-6.”
Rolin Constr., Inc. v. Wind Clan Constr. Co., Inc. (S.D. Ala. 2020).
“Wind Clan’s counterclaim against Rolin and its surety Hartford Fire Insurance Company, sets out the following six counts: (1) Rolin’s failure to make timely payments to Wind Clan under Alabama’s Prompt Pay Act, Ala.Code § 8-29-1, et seq.; (2) breach of the subcontract by Rolin…”
— Ala. Code § 8-29-1(2) — 1 case
Rolin Constr., Inc. v. Wind Clan Constr. Co., Inc. (S.D. Ala. 2020).
“Wind Clan’s counterclaim against Rolin and its surety Hartford Fire Insurance Company, sets out the following six counts: (1) Rolin’s failure to make timely payments to Wind Clan under Alabama’s Prompt Pay Act, Ala.Code § 8-29-1, et seq.; (2) breach of the subcontract by Rolin…”
— Ala. Code § 8-29-1(4) — 2 cases
Diamond Conc. Slabs v. Andalusia-Opp, 2100114 (ala.civ.app. 8-12-2011), 103 So. 3d 73 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
““The Motions are granted insofar as they are directed to Diamond Concrete’s claims under Ala.Code § 8-29-1 et seq. (including § 8-29-6) in that the evidence produced during the trial of this matter does not create a question for resolution by the jury on those issues.”
Rolin Constr., Inc. v. Wind Clan Constr. Co., Inc. (S.D. Ala. 2020).
“Wind Clan’s counterclaim against Rolin and its surety Hartford Fire Insurance Company, sets out the following six counts: (1) Rolin’s failure to make timely payments to Wind Clan under Alabama’s Prompt Pay Act, Ala.Code § 8-29-1, et seq.; (2) breach of the subcontract by Rolin…”
— Ala. Code § 8-29-1(6) — 2 cases
Diamond Conc. Slabs v. Andalusia-Opp, 2100114 (ala.civ.app. 8-12-2011), 103 So. 3d 73 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
““The Motions are granted insofar as they are directed to Diamond Concrete’s claims under Ala.Code § 8-29-1 et seq. (including § 8-29-6) in that the evidence produced during the trial of this matter does not create a question for resolution by the jury on those issues.”
Rolin Constr., Inc. v. Wind Clan Constr. Co., Inc. (S.D. Ala. 2020).
“Wind Clan’s counterclaim against Rolin and its surety Hartford Fire Insurance Company, sets out the following six counts: (1) Rolin’s failure to make timely payments to Wind Clan under Alabama’s Prompt Pay Act, Ala.Code § 8-29-1, et seq.; (2) breach of the subcontract by Rolin…”
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