Florida Case Law Digest | Syfert Law

Florida Case Law Digest

Opinions released November 13, 2026

Thomas M. Overton v. State of Florida & Thomas M. Overton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Fla. Supreme Court Tanenbaum, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Criminal Affirmed summary denial; denied habeas relief and stay of execution.

Panel: Couriel, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Labarga

Thomas Overton, a death row inmate, appealed the summary denial of his third successive motion for postconviction relief and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution. Overton challenged the circuit court's decision to sustain state objections to his demands for public records from the Executive Office of the Governor, the Florida Commission on Offender Review, and the Department of Legal Affairs under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852. He also argued that the Governor's policy of opposing clemency for certain offenders constituted a bill of attainder. In his habeas petition, Overton asserted that Florida's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional due to a lack of safeguards. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the summary denial of his motion, finding that his records requests were not relevant to cognizable claims and that the Governor cannot pass a bill of attainder. The Court also rejected his habeas claim, maintaining that Florida's capital punishment process is constitutional, and denied his request for a stay of execution.

The case addresses the scope of public records demands in capital postconviction proceedings and the constitutionality of the state's capital sentencing scheme.

Statutes construed: § 27.7081, § 119.19

K. K. v. Department of Children and Families, Statewide

Fla. 2d DCA LaRose, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Juvenile/Dependency Reversed and remanded

Panel: Rothstein-Youakim, Labrit

The Mother appealed an order from the Hillsborough County Circuit Court that dismissed her dependency petition. The Mother argued that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition without providing an opportunity to amend it. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, a court cannot dismiss a petition due to a defect in its form. The court further noted that a dependency petition should not be dismissed for being vague, indistinct, or misleading, but should instead be subject to a motion for a more definite statement.

The court clarified that defects in the form of a dependency petition are not grounds for dismissal and that such petitions should be addressed through motions for more definite statements rather than outright dismissal.

Karac v. Fidelity National Information, Inc.

Fla. 2d DCA LaRose, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: Khouzam, Black

Mladenko Karac appealed a final order from the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) that dismissed his employment discrimination petition against Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. (FIS). The FCHR dismissed the petition because it lacked the authority to transfer the petition to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as requested by Karac. Karac argued that the FCHR erred by dismissing the petition based on a legal memorandum without an evidentiary hearing and that the FCHR failed to provide notice that his failure to attend a prehearing conference would result in dismissal. The court found that Karac received notice and an opportunity to be heard at the prehearing conference but chose not to attend. The court also determined it could not review Karac's remaining arguments because he failed to provide a complete record, including the FCHR legal memorandum and his own exhibits. Although the court previously notified Karac that he could supplement the record, he failed to do so. Because Karac failed to provide an adequate record and failed to show reversible error, the court affirmed the dismissal.

The court held that an appellant waives the argument regarding an incomplete record when the appellee points out the deficiency in its brief and the appellant fails to move to supplement the record.

Koppert v. Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Inc.

Fla. 2d DCA Silberman, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Civil Reversed and remanded

Panel: Northcutt, Labrit

The personal representative of the Estate of Eldon Koppert appealed final judgments entered in favor of Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company following nonbinding arbitration. The trial court had ruled that Koppert's request for a trial de novo was untimely because it was filed after the twenty-day deadline following the arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator had emailed the decision as an attachment to an invoice from a QuickBooks notification address. The subject line of the email did not begin with the phrase 'SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT' as required by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.516. Because the email did not comply with the specific formatting requirements for electronic service, the arbitration decision was not properly served under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080. Koppert became aware of the decision only when the insurer filed a motion for judgment in conformance with the arbitration decision and attached the decision to that motion. Koppert filed his demand for trial on the same day he received the decision from opposing counsel. The appellate court held that the demand was timely and reversed the trial court's judgments.

The case addresses the specific notice requirements for an arbitration decision following nonbinding arbitration, specifically whether an email attachment sent as an invoice satisfies the service requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration.

Statutes construed: § 44.103

Koppert v. Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company. Inc.

Fla. 2d DCA Silberman, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Insurance Reversed and remanded

Panel: Northcutt, Labrit

The Second District Court of Appeal reversed final judgments entered in favor of Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company after determining that the appellant's request for a trial de novo was timely. The underlying cases involved breach of contract and negligence claims regarding hurricane damage and roof repairs. Following nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator emailed the decision to the parties as an attachment to a billing invoice. The email subject line indicated it was a new invoice from a mediation firm and did not begin with the phrase 'SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT' as required by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.516. Because the email failed to comply with the specific formatting requirements for electronic service, the arbitration decision was not properly served under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080. The appellant only became aware of the decision when the appellee filed a motion for judgment in conformance with the arbitration decision. The appellant filed a demand for trial on the same day he received the decision from opposing counsel. The court held that the demand was timely because proper service had not occurred.

Addresses the specific notice requirements for an arbitration decision following nonbinding arbitration and whether an email attachment sent as an invoice satisfies service requirements.

Statutes construed: § 44.103

Koppert v. Homeowners Choice Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Inc.

Fla. 2d DCA Silberman, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Civil Reversed and remanded

Panel: Northcutt, Labrit

The personal representative of the Estate of Eldon Koppert appealed final judgments entered in favor of Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company following nonbinding arbitration. The trial court had ruled that Koppert's request for a trial de novo was untimely because it was filed after the twenty-day deadline following the arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator had sent an email containing the decision as an attachment to a billing invoice, but the email subject line did not begin with 'SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT' as required by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.516. Because the email did not comply with the specific formatting requirements for electronic service, the arbitration decision was not properly served under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080. Koppert became aware of the decision only when the insurer filed a motion for judgment in conformance with the arbitration decision and attached the decision to that motion. Koppert filed his demand for trial on the same day he received the decision from opposing counsel. The appellate court held that the demand was timely because the arbitrator's email failed to meet the mandatory service requirements. The court reversed the final judgments and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

The case addresses the specific notice requirements for an arbitration decision following nonbinding arbitration, specifically whether an email attachment sent as part of an invoice satisfies the service requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration.

Statutes construed: § 44.103

Crocker v. Rein

Fla. 2d DCA Khouzam, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Personal Injury/Tort Reversed and remanded for a new trial

Panel: Northcutt, LaRose

In a motorcycle accident case, the trial court erroneously gave a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction. The doctrine requires that the instrumentality causing the injury be under the exclusive control of the defendant and that the accident would not ordinarily occur without negligence. Here, the defendant was not in exclusive control because the plaintiff's own expert admitted a passenger can exert control over a motorcycle. Additionally, the evidence showed the crash could have occurred without negligence due to environmental hazards or mechanical behavior without rider error. Because the instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof or significantly reduced the plaintiff's burden to establish negligence, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The court clarified that the res ipsa loquitur instruction was improper because the elements of exclusive control and the necessity of negligence were not met, particularly noting that a passenger's ability to influence a motorcycle's stability precludes a finding of exclusive control by the driver.

Unsworth v. Barsoumian

Fla. 2d DCA Guard, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Personal Injury/Tort Affirmed in part; reversed in part

Panel: Labrit, Khouzam

In a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle crash, the trial court erroneously applied section 768.0427, Florida Statutes, to a cause of action filed before the statute's effective date. The trial court had ruled that the statute applied because it was procedural, and further imposed a burden on the plaintiff to prove the extent of his health insurance coverage. Based on this ruling, the court admitted collateral source evidence and granted a directed verdict on future medical expenses when the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding what his insurer would pay. The appellate court held that section 768.0427 applies only to causes of action filed after its effective date of March 24, 2023. The court determined that the admission of collateral source evidence was not harmless error and that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on future medical expenses. Finally, the appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the granted new trial to past and future medical expenses only. Because causation, permanency, and damages are inextricably intertwined, the court reversed the limitation and held that the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on causation, permanency, and all applicable categories of damages.

Addresses the retroactivity of section 768.0427 and the interrelatedness of causation, permanency, and damages in the context of a new trial.

Statutes construed: § 768.0427, § 768.76, § 95.11, § 631.70

Lamb v. City of Tampa

Fla. 2d DCA Atkinson, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Administrative Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Sleet, Guard

Robert Lamb, a wartime veteran and police officer for the City of Tampa, appealed a final order from the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) which had denied his complaint that the City violated section 295.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Lamb alleged that the City failed to afford him veterans' preference in promotions to the position of police corporal/detective, despite his high rankings on the 2021 and 2023 eligibility lists. The City utilized a hybrid promotion process where a written examination and preference points created a ranked eligibility list, but the final selection was made subjectively by the Chief of Police based on factors such as training, experience, and disciplinary history. The PERC concluded that because the final selection was not determined by numerical scores, the City was not required to follow the absolute preference mandate of the statute. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies whenever an examination for promotion is used. The court determined that the eligibility list functioned as a promotional register under the ordinary meaning of the term. Because Lamb successfully passed the examination and held a superior position on the register compared to those promoted, the City violated the statute by promoting individuals in lesser positions ahead of him. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to order the City to promote Lamb.

Veterans' Preference; Promotional Register; Hybrid Promotion Process

Statutes construed: § 295.09, § 504.10, § 1.01, § 295.07, § 295.08

Hector Medina v. Kassandra Timothe, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 13, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: Scales, Lindsey, Rebull

Hector Medina appealed a trial court's declaratory judgment which disqualified him as a candidate for the North Miami City Council. Medina had submitted qualifying papers including a check drawn on his campaign account to pay the qualifying fee. Although the check was drawn on the correct account and the City Clerk deposited it, the check was signed by Medina himself rather than his designated campaign treasurer. Medina argued that the Clerk's acceptance of the check and the bank's honoring of it meant the check was properly executed, and that any doubts regarding candidacy should be resolved in his favor. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the disqualification, holding that under section 99.061(7)(a)1, Florida Statutes, a candidate must submit a properly executed check. Following the methodology established in Amador, the court construed the undefined term properly executed by reference to section 106.11(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes, which requires a campaign account check to bear the signature of the campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer. The court concluded that because Medina was not the designated treasurer or deputy treasurer, the check was not properly executed. The court further noted that the Clerk's acceptance of the check did not substitute for the express statutory requirements and that the clear statutory command regarding the signature requirement takes precedence over general policies favoring ballot access.

Clarifies the application of the Amador methodology to determine the meaning of 'properly executed' regarding candidate qualifying fees under the Florida Election Code.

Statutes construed: § 99.061, § 99.0211, § 106.11, § 100.3605

George S. Broughton, IV v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Smith, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Traver, Wozniak

George S. Broughton, IV appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during an inventory search of his vehicle. After being arrested for reckless driving, Broughton's vehicle was impounded and searched, leading to the discovery of cocaine and ammunition. Broughton argued that the State failed to prove the search was conducted according to the Fort Myers Police Department's standardized operating procedures because the State did not introduce a written copy of the policy. The court held that the testimony provided by the officers was sufficient to establish the existence of the impoundment and inventory policies. The court further noted that a law enforcement policy does not need to be in writing and can be established through testimony regarding standard practices. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.

The case addresses the sufficiency of evidence required to establish the existence of a law enforcement inventory search policy, specifically whether testimony alone is sufficient to prove a policy exists without the introduction of a written document.

Oliver K. Bayouth v. Lillian Reguero-Bayouth

Fla. 6th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 13, 2026 Family Reversed and Remanded

Panel: White, Smith, Gannam

Appellant Oliver K. Bayouth appeals a five-year final injunction for protection against domestic violence. During the final hearing, the trial court considered incidents raised by Appellee Lillian Reguero-Bayouth that were not included in the original petition. Although Appellant timely objected, the transcript shows the lower court relied on these unpled incidents to issue the injunction. Because the reliance on unpled incidents violated Appellant's due process rights, the appellate court reversed the decision. The court remanded the case with instructions to vacate the final injunction, reissue the temporary injunction, and conduct a new final hearing based on the existing petition or a properly amended petition.

The trial court erred by relying on unpled incidents to issue a domestic violence injunction, violating the appellant's due process rights.

Heather Anne Bell v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Wozniak, J. Issued November 13, 2026 Criminal Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded with instructions

Panel: Stargel, Pratt

Heather Anne Bell appealed her judgment and sentence for reckless driving with damage to property or person. The court affirmed the judgment but reversed the imposition of certain costs. The trial court must strike the $33 Traffic Offense Court Cost and the $70 Reckless Driving Court Cost. Because the trial court did not orally impose a $50 monthly cost of supervision, the court must correct that amount to $40 per month. The court upheld the imposition of $65 costs under section 939.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes, because the statutory reference sufficiently notified the appellant of the basis for the cost.

Addresses the improper imposition of specific court costs and the limits of discretionary supervision costs when not orally imposed by the trial court.

Statutes construed: § 316.192, § 318.18, § 318.17, § 948.09, § 939.185

Shawn M. Nichols and Collin M. Nichols v. Burshan, LLC

Fla. 6th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 13, 2026 Civil Affirmed in part; Dismissed in part

Panel: Stargel, White, Kamoutsas

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as to Shawn M. Nichols because he failed to fully brief and argue the points on appeal, which constitutes a waiver of those claims. The court dismissed the appeal as to Collin M. Nichols because a timely notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of the order. Although Shawn M. Nichols filed a notice of appeal on behalf of both appellants, that notice was a nullity as to Collin M. Nichols because Shawn M. Nichols is not a member of The Florida Bar and cannot represent another person.

The court addressed the limitations of a non-lawyer attempting to represent another party in an appeal.

13 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released November 12, 2026

In Re: Amendments to Florida Probate Rules 5.670 and Part V

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Amendments adopted

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court adopted proposed amendments to Florida Probate Rule 5.670 and Part V of the Probate Rules. Rule 5.670(d) was amended to include a statutory reference to section 744.524, Florida Statutes, regarding the termination of guardianship when a resident ward changes domicile. In Part V, the phrase without prolixity was replaced with concisely to improve clarity. Additionally, a new subdivision (b) was added to Part V to reference Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 10-2.2 for instances where forms are completed by nonlawyers. These amendments become effective on January 1, 2027.

Rule amendment

Statutes construed: § 744.524

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Amended

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court amended Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820 regarding hearing procedures for non-binding arbitration. The amendment to subdivision (g)(3) removes the requirement that an arbitrator file an arbitration decision and original transcripts under seal with the clerk. Instead, the arbitrator must file a notice of service of the decision. The decision itself must be filed later by the party entitled to a judgment if no requests for trial de novo are filed, or by the party seeking to enforce section 44.103, Florida Statutes, after a trial de novo. Additionally, subdivision (h)(1) was amended to align with section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes, stating that a party needs only to file a timely request for trial de novo to reject an arbitration decision and proceed to trial. The Court declined to include language requiring that a timely request for trial de novo be construed to do substantial justice to avoid unnecessary litigation and uncertainty.

The amendments change the filing requirements for arbitration decisions and the procedure for rejecting such decisions via a request for trial de novo.

Statutes construed: § 44.103

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, Florida Small Claims Rule 7.180, and Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Amended

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court approved proposed amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, Florida Small Claims Rule 7.180, and Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530. The primary purpose of these amendments is to reorganize the rules to address motions for new trial and motions for rehearing in separate subdivisions to improve clarity. The amendments clarify that motions for rehearing may be directed only to final judgments or final orders. The Court also added a new subdivision to each rule regarding the necessity of a motion to preserve a challenge to the failure of a trial court to make required findings of fact in a final judgment. These amendments become effective January 1, 2027.

The amendments reorganize the rules to separate motions for new trial and motions for rehearing, making the rules easier to follow.

State of Florida v. Deangelo Robinson

Fla. Supreme Court Francis, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Criminal Quashed and remanded

Panel: Couriel, Muñiz, Grosshans, Barrios, Tanenbaum, Labarga

The Supreme Court of Florida addressed whether a defendant is entitled to an automatic discharge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 if the State fails to file charges before the speedy trial period expires. The Court receded from its previous decision in State v. Williams, which had held that such a failure resulted in automatic discharge without affording the State an opportunity for recapture. The Court determined that the text of Rule 3.191 does not establish a substantive right to automatic discharge based solely on the expiration of the speedy trial period. Instead, the rule provides a procedural mechanism where a defendant must file a notice of expiration, triggering a hearing and a mandatory recapture period. Because the defendant in this case failed to file a notice of expiration, he was not entitled to automatic discharge, even though the charges were filed after the speedy trial period had run. The Court quashed the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the convictions and sentences.

The Court receded from the precedent set in State v. Williams, clarifying that the State is entitled to the mandatory recapture period under Rule 3.191 even if charges are not filed within the prescribed speedy trial timeframe.

Statutes construed: § 915.01, § 918.015

BDG Fern Grove Phase Two, LP v. WHFT LL Workforce, LTD, WHFT LL Workforce Developer, LLC, et al

Fla. 1st DCA M.K. Thomas, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: Bilbrey, Kelsey

BDG Fern Grove Phase Two, LP appealed a Final Order from the Florida Housing Finance Corporation which determined that its application for state funding failed to meet mandatory mixed-use experience requirements. The appellant argued that the agency erroneously imposed an unwritten requirement that institutional services be provided in a physically dedicated space, that the agency acted arbitrarily by applying different levels of scrutiny to different applicants, and that the bifurcated review of eligibility and credit-underwriting was unfair. The court held that the agency erred by injecting a dedicated space requirement into the Request for Applications (RFA) text, as the RFA did not expressly require such a space for institutional services. However, the court affirmed the agency's decision because the factual findings regarding the appellant's lack of required experience were supported by competent, substantial evidence independent of the dedicated space error. Specifically, the record showed that the management and developer experience cited by the appellant did not demonstrate the required five-day-per-week presence of institutional services within the developments. The court also rejected the arguments regarding arbitrary treatment and fundamental unfairness, noting that the scrutiny arose from a specific protest and that the different treatment of historical experience versus anticipated financing was appropriate given their differing natures.

The case addresses the limits of agency interpretation regarding solicitation specifications, specifically holding that an agency cannot add unwritten requirements, such as a dedicated space requirement, to an RFA. It also applies the principle that an erroneous legal interpretation by an agency does not necessitate reversal if the decision is supported by independent, competent, and substantial evidence.

Statutes construed: § 420.5087, § 120.68, § 120.57

State of Florida v. C.H.R.,

Fla. 1st DCA Osterhaus, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Juvenile/Dependency Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Panel: M.K. Thomas, Treadwell

The State appealed a juvenile disposition in which the trial court imposed intensive probation and a suspended commitment to a secure Department of Juvenile Justice facility. The State argued the disposition was illegal because the trial court deviated from a plea agreement that had contemplated an actual commitment to a secure facility. The First District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the State's right to appeal a juvenile disposition is limited to instances where the disposition is illegal, meaning it is beyond the statutory authority of the court. Because a trial court is not a party to plea negotiations and is not bound by a plea agreement, even one it has accepted, a departure from the terms of that agreement does not constitute an illegal disposition. The court further determined that certiorari review was unavailable because the trial court's order was a final order and the State lacked a statutory right to appeal.

Clarifies that a trial court's departure from a plea agreement does not, by itself, constitute an illegal disposition under Florida juvenile law, thereby limiting the State's jurisdictional ability to appeal such deviations.

Statutes construed: § 985.534, § 985.318

Donald C. Freeman v. FJ Solutions Corp., et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Lindsey, Miller, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court noted that a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Because the record did not show that the appellant sought leave to amend the complaint prior to the dismissal or moved for rehearing to request leave to amend, the issue of leave to amend could not be considered for the first time on appeal.

The court applied the principle that failure to seek leave to amend before a dismissal with prejudice precludes the issue from being raised on appeal.

Kerrin Friedman v. In Re: Estate of Bonny L. Wax, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Scales, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Affirmed

Panel: Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed orders removing a personal representative of an estate and a trustee of three trusts. The probate court issued an order requiring the personal representative to retain counsel within thirty days, but she continued to proceed pro se in the estate case, in federal court, and in the appellate proceedings. Additionally, the court barred her from self-representation as a trustee in one trust case, yet she continued to file pro se documents in that case and in two other trust cases. The court held that the probate court had the authority to remove the personal representative for violating a court order to retain counsel and had the authority to remove the trustee for the unauthorized practice of law through self-representation. The court also found no due process violation because the appellant received notice of the hearing and had an opportunity to be heard.

Addresses the authority of a probate court to remove a personal representative and trustee for unauthorized self-representation and failure to comply with orders to retain counsel.

Statutes construed: § 733.504, § 736.0706

Urbana at the Residences Condominium No. 3 Association, Inc. v. White Course Lennar, LLC, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Gooden, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Panel: Logue, Lindsey

The Association filed a petition for writ of certiorari to quash trial court orders that stayed litigation against various defendants pending the outcome of arbitration between the Association and the developer. The trial court reasoned that a temporary stay was warranted because the claims were based on the same operative facts and were inseparable from the claims subject to arbitration. The trial court also ordered status conferences to monitor the arbitration and allowed the parties to return the case to active status upon the conclusion of the arbitration. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because the Association failed to establish irreparable harm, noting that the orders merely postponed the litigation rather than foreclosing its resumption.

The court held that a stay which simply postpones litigation pending a contingency does not constitute irreparable harm sufficient to support certiorari relief, as delay or inconvenience alone is insufficient.

Urbana at the Residences Condominium No. 3 Association, Inc. v. Accents Fence & Construction, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Gooden, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Panel: Logue, Lindsey

The Association filed a petition for writ of certiorari to quash trial court orders that stayed litigation involving various developers, contractors, and subcontractors pending the outcome of arbitration. The Association argued the stays were indefinite and denied it access to the courts. The court dismissed the petition because the Association failed to establish irreparable harm. The court reasoned that because the orders merely postponed the litigation rather than foreclosing its resumption, the resulting delay or inconvenience did not constitute the material injury required for certiorari relief.

The court held that a stay which simply postpones litigation pending a contingency does not cause irreparable harm sufficient to warrant certiorari review.

AvMed, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Gooden, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: Lindsey, Lobree

AvMed, Inc. appealed a trial court order dismissing its action seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus against Miami-Dade County and Aetna Life Insurance Company. The dispute arose after the County Board of County Commissioners approved a bid waiver to award a contract for professional administrative services for its self-insured healthcare program to Aetna, rather than the local vendor, AvMed. AvMed contended that because the County utilizes a self-insured plan, the contract for a professional administrator constitutes a 'contract for insurance' and must be competitively bid pursuant to section 112.08, Florida Statutes. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that section 112.08 requires competitive bidding when a local government is purchasing insurance, but does not require competitive bidding for a local government to contract with a professional administrator to manage a self-insured plan. The court reasoned that self-insured plans involve risk retention by the employer, whereas a contract of insurance involves the assumption of risk by another party to indemnify the insured. Because the County retains the risk of paying medical expenses and the administrator merely provides services for a fee, the contract is for administrative services rather than insurance.

Clarifies the distinction between a contract for insurance and a contract for professional administrative services within the context of a local government's self-insured healthcare plan under section 112.08, Florida Statutes.

Statutes construed: § 112.08, § 125.01, § 626.88, § 110.123, § 624.02

Justin Leon Bailey v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Lindsey, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Criminal Petition Denied

Panel: Miller, Bokor

Justin Leon Bailey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Bailey was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and sentenced to 40 years of imprisonment. He argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the lack of jury instructions on justifiable and excusable homicide as fundamental error and for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding an incorrect jury instruction. The court denied the petition, finding that because there was no contemporaneous objection to the jury instructions concerning justifiable and excusable homicide, the error could only be reversed if it constituted fundamental error. The court determined the error was not fundamental, noting that the trial court had provided both oral and written instructions regarding justifiable use of deadly force.

The court applied the standard for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and noted that a jury instruction error related to a lesser included offense does not automatically constitute fundamental error.

Statutes construed: § 775.087, § 776.032

Guerdy William Fabre v. Dolphin Towing and Recovery, Inc.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Lindsey, Gooden, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment granted in favor of Dolphin Towing and Recovery, Inc. Under Florida law, a person regularly engaged in the business of transporting vehicles or vessels by wrecker, tow truck, or car carrier has a lien for reasonable towing, administrative, and storage fees when recovering or storing a vehicle or vessel upon the instructions of a law enforcement agency. The court noted that a storage fee cannot be charged if the vehicle or vessel is stored for fewer than six hours. In opposing summary judgment, a party must provide more than mere metaphysical doubt regarding material facts, and a party may not use an affidavit to repudiate previous deposition testimony to create a jury issue without attempting to explain the discrepancy.

Clarifies the standards for summary judgment and the statutory lien rights of towing companies acting on instructions from law enforcement.

Statutes construed: § 713.78

Mohammed Alsaloussi, et al. v. Christopher Drummond

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Dismissed

Panel: Fernandez, Gordo, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the matter because the appellants disobeyed an order of the trial court. Dismissal is appropriate when a party demonstrates a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority or a willful disregard or gross indifference to a court order.

The court applied its discretionary power to dismiss an appeal based on a party's failure to comply with trial court orders.

Kerrin Friedman, etc. v. Adam Wax, etc.

Fla. 3d DCA Scales, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Affirmed

Panel: Lobree, Gooden

Appellant Kerrin Friedman appealed four orders from the probate court that removed her as the personal representative of her mother's estate and as the trustee of the Bobbi Ring Trust, the Adam Wax Trust, and the Credit Shelter Trust. The probate court entered the removal orders following a hearing where it announced its intent to remove Appellant due to her unauthorized self-representation. In the estate case, Appellant failed to comply with a court order requiring her to retain counsel within thirty days. In the trust cases, Appellant continued to file documents and litigate pro se despite a court order barring her from self-representation as a non-lawyer trustee. Appellant argued that the probate court lacked statutory authority to remove her and that she was deprived of due process. The court held that the probate court had sufficient authority to remove the personal representative for violating a court order to retain counsel and had statutory basis to remove the trustee for the unauthorized practice of law. Regarding due process, the court found that Appellant received notice of the hearing and had an opportunity to be heard. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the removal orders.

Addresses the authority of a probate court to remove a personal representative and trustee based on unauthorized self-representation and failure to comply with orders to retain counsel.

Statutes construed: § 733.504, § 736.0706

Kerrin Friedman, etc. v. Bobbi Ring, etc.

Fla. 3d DCA Scales, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Affirmed

Panel: Lobree, Gooden

Appellant challenged four orders from a probate court that removed her as the personal representative of her mother's estate and as the trustee of three separate trusts. The trial court entered these orders after Appellant failed to comply with an order to retain counsel for the estate and continued to represent the interests of the trusts pro se. Appellant argued the court lacked statutory authority to remove her and that she was denied due process. The court affirmed the removal orders, finding that the probate court had the authority to remove a personal representative for violating a court order to retain counsel and had the authority to remove a trustee for the unauthorized practice of law through self-representation. Regarding due process, the court held that Appellant received notice of the hearing and had an opportunity to be heard.

Addresses the authority of a probate court to remove a personal representative and trustee due to unauthorized self-representation.

Statutes construed: § 733.504, § 736.0706

Kerrin Friedman, etc. v. Adam Wax, etc., et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Scales, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Affirmed

Panel: Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed orders removing an individual as the personal representative of an estate and as the trustee of three separate trusts. In the estate case, the probate court ordered the personal representative to retain counsel pursuant to Florida Probate Rule 5.030(a), but the personal representative failed to comply and continued to proceed pro se. In the trust cases, the probate court barred the non-lawyer trustee from self-representation to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. The court held that the probate court possessed the statutory authority to remove the personal representative for violating a court order and the authority to remove the trustee for unauthorized self-representation. The court also rejected the argument that the personal representative was deprived of due process, noting she received notice of the hearing and had an opportunity to be heard.

Addresses the authority of a probate court to remove a personal representative and trustee due to unauthorized self-representation and failure to comply with orders requiring legal counsel.

Statutes construed: § 733.504, § 736.0706

Susie Fitzpatrick v. Joshua Fitzpatrick o/b/o V.F., a minor and V.F., a minor

Fla. 4th DCA Gerber, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Family Affirmed

Panel: Shaw, Lott

After a circuit court dismissed a husband's petition for a domestic violence injunction, the wife moved for attorney's fees as a sanction under both section 57.105(1) and section 57.105(8) of the Florida Statutes. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that because the proceeding involved a domestic violence injunction, the court was legally limited to considering the motion under section 57.105(8) rather than section 57.105(1). The circuit court further determined that the wife failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required by section 57.105(8) to prove the husband knowingly made false statements or allegations. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that in a domestic violence injunction proceeding, a circuit court is legally limited to considering a motion for attorney's fees under the higher evidentiary burden of section 57.105(8) and cannot consider the motion under the lower evidentiary burden of section 57.105(1).

Clarifies that section 57.105(8) acts as a stand-alone provision in domestic violence injunction proceedings, precluding the application of the lower evidentiary standard found in section 57.105(1).

Statutes construed: § 57.105, § 741.30, § 784.046, § 784.0485, § 837.011

Maschelle Pugh v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Klingensmith, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Criminal Reversed and remanded without prejudice

Panel: Gerber, Shepherd

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a conviction for indirect criminal contempt because the trial court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840(a). The appellant was convicted for violating timesharing orders on specific dates in April. While the order to show cause incorporated both a sworn motion for contempt and an unsworn emergency motion for child pickup, the specific acts for which the appellant was convicted were only alleged in the unsworn motion. The court held that an unnotarized acknowledgment in a pleading does not constitute a sworn affidavit. Because the sworn motion did not provide factual support for the later acts identified in the unsworn motion, the order to show cause was procedurally defective.

The case clarifies that an order to show cause cannot satisfy Rule 3.840(a) by incorporating an unsworn motion to provide the essential facts for a criminal contempt charge, even if a separate sworn motion is also attached.

Johnnie Jones v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Criminal Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Panel: Ciklin, Lott, Carbuccia, Elaine A

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions of the appellant but reversed in part regarding the sentencing documentation. The amended sentencing documents improperly imposed a single general disposition for Counts 2 and 3 and failed to enter separate probation dispositions for those counts. The court remanded the case for the trial court to enter separate written sentencing and probation orders for Counts 2 and 3, effective as of April 11, 2025. The defendant is not required to be present for these ministerial actions.

Requires separate written sentencing and probation orders for each offense.

Adrian Edward Demond Connor v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Criminal Reversed and remanded

Panel: Ciklin, Klingensmith, Lott

The appellant appealed the reinstatement and modification of his probation after a trial court found he violated several terms of his probation. The violations included committing the offense of trafficking in fentanyl, failing to report to his probation officer, and failing to pay supervision costs. The appellant argued that the state presented insufficient evidence regarding the drug trafficking and failure to pay costs violations. While the state conceded those points, it argued that the failure to report to the probation officer was a valid ground and that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based on that single violation. Because the record did not allow the appellate court to determine whether the trial court would have revoked probation based solely on the failure to report, the court reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration.

The court reversed because it could not determine from the record whether the trial court would have revoked probation based solely on the single valid ground of failing to report to a probation officer.

Patrick Edward Beauzier v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Gerber, C.J. Issued November 12, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Klingensmith, Shepherd

The defendant appealed his convictions and sentences for possession of marijuana exceeding twenty grams and resisting an officer without violence. On the issue of sentencing, the defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to correct his sentence because his combined jail and probationary sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a nonstate prison sanction. The court affirmed, holding that while a nonstate prison sanction of county jail incarceration is limited to one year, the statute does not restrict the aggregate duration of all nonstate prison sanctions to one year. The defendant also argued that the circuit court erred by not providing him with a twelve person jury, which the court affirmed.

Clarifies that the one year limit for nonstate prison sanctions applies to county jail incarceration specifically and does not restrict the aggregate duration of all nonstate prison sanctions.

Statutes construed: § 775.082

Fla. 4th DCA Shaw, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions

Panel: May, Shepherd

The mother appealed a circuit court judgment terminating her parental rights regarding her son. The circuit court had found two grounds for termination. On the first issue, the court determined that termination under section 39.806(1)(e)1. was improper because the mother was not subject to a reunification case plan for the required twelve month period. Although the circuit court found the mother had consented to a reunification plan in November 2024, the record showed the case plan approved in December 2024 had a maintain and strengthen goal because the child remained in the home. Reunification only became the goal between March 2025 and November 2025. Because the statutory period for termination under this ground only runs while a reunification goal is operative, the circuit court erred. On the second issue, the court affirmed the termination under section 39.806(1)(l), which allows for termination when a parent's actions caused the removal of three or more children on three or more occasions. The court found competent, substantial evidence established that the mother's actions caused the removal of four children on three or more occasions. The court held that a best interests determination is not required for termination under this specific ground. The judgment was reversed as to the first ground and affirmed as to the second ground.

The court clarified that the statutory period for termination under section 39.806(1)(e)1. is only met while a reunification goal is operative and noted that a best interests determination is not required for termination under section 39.806(1)(l).

Statutes construed: § 39.806

Christian Boberg v. Ox of South Florida, Inc.

Fla. 4th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 12, 2026 Civil Reversed and remanded in part

Panel: Ciklin, Conner, Klingensmith

Plaintiff Christian Boberg appealed a nonfinal order granting defendant Ox of South Florida, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration regarding his negligence and implied warranty claims. Boberg only challenged the order as to his negligence claim. The contract between the parties for pool flooring installation contained a broad arbitration provision covering any controversy arising out of or relating to the agreement. Boberg alleged that Ox owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the preparation and installation of the product for the safety of invitees and visitors and failed to warn of latent hazards. The court held that while the arbitration provision was broad, a claim must have a significant relationship or contractual nexus to the contract to be arbitrable. A contractual nexus exists when the resolution of a claim requires construction of the contract or arises from a duty created by the unique contractual relationship, whereas a claim lacks a nexus if it concerns a duty imposed by law and generally owed to the public. The court determined that Boberg's negligence claim lacked a contractual nexus because the alleged duties to exercise reasonable care and to warn of hazards were intended to protect invitees and visitors generally rather than arising from the specific contractual relationship. The court reversed the order as to the negligence claim and remanded for further proceedings, while the arbitration of the implied warranty claims remained undisturbed.

Determines whether a negligence claim alleging duties owed to invitees and visitors generally possesses a sufficient contractual nexus to be subject to a broad arbitration provision.

First Care Therapy, LLC and Loodhinssy Lafaille-Paul v. Congress Ave Boynton, LLC

Fla. 4th DCA Forst, J. Issued November 12, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Panel: Shepherd, Shaw

In a breach of commercial lease and guaranty action, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's findings regarding standing, subject matter jurisdiction, and liability, but reversed the award of unliquidated damages. The Landlord sued the Tenant and Guarantor for nonpayment of rent after purchasing the property and receiving an assignment of the lease and guaranty. The Tenant and Guarantor failed to respond to the complaint, resulting in a clerk's default. The Landlord subsequently moved for final summary judgment, providing an affidavit of indebtedness that included rent, legal fees for negotiating a new lease, reletting commissions, and tenant improvement costs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Landlord in the amount of $85,782.80. The appellate court held that the damages were unliquidated because the amount could not be determined with exactness from the pleadings and required the court to weigh evidence. Because the trial court awarded these unliquidated damages during a non-evidentiary summary judgment hearing rather than through a damages trial noticed in compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440, the damages award was reversed and remanded for a properly noticed trial.

The court clarified that summary judgment proceedings are not a substitute for a properly noticed damages trial when a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages against a defaulted defendant.

Statutes construed: § 26.012

16 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released November 6, 2026

Saxon v. Bay Ranch Mobile Village, LLP, Bay Ranch Mobile Home Park

Fla. 2d DCA Morris, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed and remanded

Panel: Khouzam, Guard

In a mobile home lot eviction action, the trial court entered a judicial default and default final judgment for possession after the mobile home owner failed to deposit rent into the court registry as ordered. Under section 723.063(2), Florida Statutes, such failure constitutes an absolute waiver of all defenses except payment, entitling the park owner to an immediate default. While the judgment correctly entered a judicial default against the defendant, it erroneously cited section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes, instead of the correct statute. The appellate court affirmed the judgment but remanded the case for the trial court to correct this scrivener's error by entering an amended judgment that cites the proper statute.

Corrects a scrivener's error regarding statutory citation in a default judgment for possession in a mobile home lot eviction.

Statutes construed: § 723.063, § 83.60

Person v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA Silberman, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: LaRose, Guard

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a pat down of a bicyclist. Officers stopped the appellant for a traffic violation involving a bicycle without lights. During the encounter, an officer observed a cylindrical bulge inside the appellant's sock. Based on his training and experience in identifying drug paraphernalia, the officer determined the shape was inconsistent with money, a pen, or a tobacco pipe and instead believed it was a crack pipe. The officer performed a pat down of the appellant's leg, which confirmed the presence of a crack pipe containing cocaine. The trial court found that the officer had probable cause under the plain view doctrine. The appellate court held that the officer's training and experience allowed him to form a reasonable belief that the object was contraband, and that the trial court's factual findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.

The case addresses the application of the plain view doctrine and the use of an officer's training and experience to establish probable cause when an object's shape is visible through clothing.

Williams v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Kelly, Morris, Atkinson

After a jury trial, Jamichael Williams was convicted of attempted kidnapping with intent to commit sexual battery and/or with intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim. He was designated as a sexual offender and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment followed by five years of probation. Williams argued that his trial and conviction by a six-person jury constituted fundamental error because he was constitutionally entitled to a twelve-person jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because this argument was unpreserved, the court addressed it and found it unavailing, noting that the United States Supreme Court has held that Florida's use of a six-person jury does not violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.

The court addressed an unpreserved argument regarding the constitutionality of a six-person jury.

Statutes construed: § 913.10

State of Florida v. Muhammad

Fla. 2d DCA Atkinson, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Reversed and remanded

Panel: Black, Smith

The State of Florida appeals an order discharging Bobby Rocell Muhammad from a charge of trafficking in hydrocodone for a violation of the speedy trial rule. On April 16, 2024, a detective stopped Muhammad's vehicle for traffic violations and observed a bottle and cup containing a purple liquid in plain view. During a subsequent search, officers found fentanyl and cocaine concealed in a sock under the hood. Muhammad was arrested for the concealed drugs. After FDLE testing confirmed the purple liquid was codeine, the State charged Muhammad with trafficking in hydrocodone on January 8, 2025. Muhammad moved for discharge, arguing the hydrocodone charge was part of the same criminal episode as the initial arrest. The trial court granted the motion, finding the charges arose from the same factual nexus. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the hydrocodone possession and the concealed drugs constituted separate criminal episodes. The court reasoned that the crimes were based on different conduct: the hydrocodone was in an accessible container for personal consumption, while the other drugs were hidden for transport or sale. The court noted that the discovery of different contraband during a single traffic stop does not automatically merge them into one criminal episode, as the determination depends on the defendant's actions rather than the police investigation.

Clarifies that different types of contraband discovered during a single traffic stop may constitute separate criminal episodes for speedy trial purposes if the conduct and purposes of possession differ.

Statutes construed: § 893.135

James Lynch v. Michelle Lynch

Fla. 5th DCA Harris, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Family Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded

Panel: Makar, Soud

In a dissolution of marriage action, the trial court entered a final judgment that failed to identify or classify marital liabilities. The judgment merely stated that each party was solely responsible for any liability in their own name. Because the trial court did not make specific written findings of fact to identify, classify, and distribute the liabilities listed in the husband's financial affidavit, the appellate court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for the trial court to make the required findings regarding the allocation of marital debts, including credit card balances and vehicle loans.

The court held that a failure to make sufficient findings regarding the identification and classification of marital assets and debts constitutes reversible error.

Statutes construed: § 61.075

Hollie Joanne Nobles v. State of Florida

Fla. 5th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Makar, Wallis, Eisnaugle

An appellant challenging a sentence following an evidentiary hearing on a violation of probation successfully established that the sentence was vindictive. During a change of plea hearing, the trial judge participated in negotiations by offering a 36 month prison sentence. After the appellant declined the offer and requested a hearing, the trial judge stated that the maximum possible punishment was five years in prison. At the final hearing, the trial judge adjudicated the appellant guilty and imposed the maximum sentence of 60 months. The court determined that the totality of the circumstances, including the judge's active participation in plea discussions, the implication that a hearing would result in harsher punishment, the significant disparity between the offered sentence and the imposed sentence, and the lack of any facts explaining the increase other than the appellant's exercise of her right to a hearing, established vindictive sentencing. The case was reversed and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

The case applies the four factor test to determine if a sentence is vindictive when a trial court imposes a harsher sentence after participating in plea negotiations.

Lawrence Alan Neu v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Gannam, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Reversed and Remanded; Question Certified

Panel: Nardella, Mize

Lawrence Alan Neu appealed his convictions and sentences for computer solicitation of a minor for sex and travel for sex with a minor after computer solicitation. The State charged Neu under section 847.0135, Florida Statutes, for both offenses, with both counts occurring during the same timeframe. Neu argued that punishing him for both offenses violated the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Under the different elements test, if a defendant commits a single act of computer solicitation, punishment is prohibited for both solicitation and travel after solicitation. To determine if distinct acts of solicitation support separate punishments, the court must look to the charging document. Because the amended information did not specify that the counts were based on separate solicitation conduct, the court held that the double jeopardy clause was violated. The court reversed the conviction and sentence for the lesser crime of solicitation and remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts. The court also certified a question of great public importance regarding whether a reviewing court is limited to the charging document or may consider the entire record to determine if multiple acts supported multiple convictions in a double jeopardy claim.

The court addressed the application of the double jeopardy clause to multiple punishments for offenses arising from the same criminal episode, specifically regarding the necessity of specifying distinct acts in the charging document to avoid double jeopardy when charging both solicitation and travel after solicitation.

Statutes construed: § 847.0135, § 847.0138, § 775.021

Halifax Hospital Medical Center d/b/a Halifax Health and Medical Center of Deltona, Inc. v. Unitedhealthcare of Florida, Inc.

Fla. 6th DCA Nardella, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Civil Dismissed

Panel: Stargel, Brownlee

Halifax Hospital Medical Center petitioned for a writ quashing a trial court order that sealed an arbitration award. The dispute arose after the trial court ruled in favor of UnitedHealthcare of Florida, Inc. regarding whether the award should be filed under seal. Because Halifax is a party to the action and maintains complete access to the award, it failed to demonstrate that the interlocutory order would cause a material injury that cannot be remedied on direct appeal. The petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The court applied the certiorari standard to the petition filed under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(d), requiring the petitioner to show material injury for the remainder of the case.

Richard Vaughan v. Usmi Properties Five, LLC

Fla. 6th DCA Mize, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Civil Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Pratt, Beamer, D.K

Richard Vaughan appealed a final judgment granted in favor of USMI Properties Five, LLC following a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Vaughan alleged that a large, rotten oak tree on USMI's property fell onto his house, causing significant damage. Vaughan claimed USMI knew the tree was rotten for years and that a tenant had complained about falling limbs. USMI argued that under existing Florida case law, a landowner owes no legal duty to prevent a tree on their land from causing harm to adjacent property, even if the tree is diseased and the owner has knowledge of the condition. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under the McCain standard, a defendant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care when their conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk. The court determined that the cases cited by USMI, Gallo and Scott, merely adopted the Massachusetts rule regarding healthy tree limbs and vegetation encroaching on neighbor property, which did not apply to a diseased tree. Because the complaint alleged USMI knew the tree was rotten, it established a foreseeable zone of risk and a corresponding duty to prevent harm to adjacent properties.

Clarifies that the Massachusetts rule regarding healthy tree limbs does not create a categorical exception to the duty of care owed by a landowner regarding diseased trees that pose a foreseeable risk to adjacent property.

Statutes construed: § 2.01

Desta Mateen v. Michael A. Ariyo

Fla. 6th DCA Nardella, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Family Reversed

Panel: White, Brownlee

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that compelled a former wife to execute a quitclaim deed to a former husband for the purpose of refinancing a marital home. The parties' marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, provided that the former husband was solely responsible for the mortgage and must use his best efforts to refinance the mortgage to remove the former wife's name within 180 days of the agreement's execution. The agreement further specified that if the former husband failed to refinance within that 180 day period, the property must be immediately listed for sale and the proceeds placed in a trust for the minor children. Because the former husband failed to refinance the property within the 180 day deadline, the court held that the former wife was no longer obligated to execute a quitclaim deed to facilitate a belated refinancing attempt. The trial court erred by granting relief that contravened the plain language of the incorporated agreement.

The case addresses the enforcement of a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a final judgment, specifically regarding a deadline for refinancing a marital home and the subsequent obligation of a spouse to execute a quitclaim deed.

Alvaro Martin Perez v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Mize, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded

Panel: Nardella, Smith

After Alvaro Martin Perez violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamines, THC, and amphetamines, the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in the Department of Corrections. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court orally pronounced a $50 Public Defender application fee, a $100 cost of prosecution, and a $100 defense counsel fee. However, the written judgment and sentence imposed a $190 Public Defender application fee, a $328 cost of prosecution, and a $300 defense counsel fee. The appellate court held that the written order must be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement. The court affirmed the prison sentence but reversed the portion of the judgment regarding the costs and fees and remanded the case to correct the Public Defender application fee, the cost of prosecution, and the defense counsel fee to match the trial court's oral pronouncement.

The case addresses the requirement that a written sentencing document must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement regarding costs and fees.

Statutes construed: § 27.52, § 938.27, § 938.29

Gerald Buchheit v. Cara Siciliano

Fla. 6th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 6, 2026 Family Affirmed

Panel: Stargel, Kamoutsas, Traver

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed a final injunction for protection against domestic violence issued in favor of Cara Siciliano. The injunction was based on Siciliano's testimony regarding multiple past incidents of domestic violence committed by Gerald Buchheit between 2016 and 2023, including punching, choking, and slamming her into a door. Although Buchheit argued that the December 2024 incident involving an unannounced visit to Siciliano's home did not constitute domestic violence and that the prior incidents were too remote in time to support an injunction, the court found competent, substantial evidence supported both the history of domestic violence and Siciliano's reasonable fear of imminent danger. The court noted that the domestic violence statute does not impose time limitations on considering past incidents. Because Buchheit did not raise the argument regarding the remoteness of the past incidents until his motion for rehearing, the argument was unpreserved. The court recertified conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal regarding the application of judicial standards that limit injunctions based on remote incidents.

Recertification of conflict with the Fifth District regarding whether remote incidents of domestic violence can support an injunction under the statute.

Statutes construed: § 741.28, § 741.30, § 784.03

Julio Velazquez v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Pratt, J. Issued November 6, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Nardella, Kamoutsas

Appellant appeals his judgment and sentence for two non-capital felonies, arguing that the use of a six-person jury violated his right to a twelve-person jury under the United States Constitution. Because the argument was unpreserved at trial, Appellant sought relief on the basis of fundamental error. The court held that no fundamental error occurred because the United States Supreme Court decision in Williams remains binding precedent, which established that Florida's use of six-person juries in non-capital cases does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The court declined to consider the implications of a recent petition for certiorari granted by the United States Supreme Court in Kian, noting that such speculation is premature while Williams remains the controlling law.

Addresses the constitutionality of six-person juries in non-capital felony cases in light of binding Supreme Court precedent.

Little Brownie Properties, Inc. v. Rop Holding Group, Inc.

Fla. 6th DCA Traver, C.J. Issued November 6, 2026 Civil Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded

Panel: Wozniak, White

Little Brownie Properties, Inc. (LBP) appealed a trial court order in proceedings supplementary involving the ownership of LBP shares and the characterization of management fees. The dispute arose after LBP purchased a judgment from Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC (BALC), which included 135 LBP shares previously held by John Paul Brown and Peter Wood. Brown and Wood argued they had not legally transferred the shares to BALC, but rather delivered them to avoid estate garnishment. The trial court originally ruled that Brown and Wood had not waived their right to contest the transfer. However, the appellate court reversed this finding, holding that Brown and Wood waived their right to claim they had not transferred the 135 shares due to their prolonged silence and failure to object throughout the transfer process, which included specific notices and a court order. Consequently, the court determined that ROP Holding Group, Inc., a subsequent judgment creditor, cannot collect on its judgment using those 135 shares. Regarding the remaining shares, the court found that Wood owned no shares and was therefore not entitled to unpaid management fees. The court also affirmed that the management fees paid to Brown were actually disguised dividends and remanded the case for the trial court to recalculate the amount owed to Brown based on his actual share ownership.

The case addresses the application of the doctrine of waiver in the context of proceedings supplementary and the transfer of corporate shares following a judgment.

Statutes construed: § 56.29

9 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released November 5, 2026

James Guzman v. State of Florida

Fla. Supreme Court Grosshans, J. Issued November 5, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Couriel, Muñiz, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum, Labarga

James Guzman appeals his death sentence for the murder of David Colvin. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, rejecting Guzman's arguments regarding judicial disqualification, victim impact testimony, and the constitutionality of the death penalty.

The case addresses the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify a judge based on a brief overlap between the judge's employment at a law firm and the firm's representation of the defendant in a prior appeal.

Statutes construed: § 38.10, § 921.141

Cesar Ortega v. Grisell Verania Sotolongo

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 5, 2026 Family Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Gooden, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County regarding the validity of an antenuptial agreement. The court noted that while a trial court's interpretation of a prenuptial agreement is reviewed de novo, a decision to uphold such an agreement must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. Challenges to these agreements generally fall into two categories: claims involving fraud, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching, and claims involving unfairness.

The opinion reinforces the standard of review for antenuptial agreements, distinguishing between the de novo review of contract interpretation and the competent substantial evidence standard required to uphold the agreement itself.

Modern Pharmacy, LLC v. J&J 111 Associates, Inc.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 5, 2026 Contract/Business Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Gordo, Bokor

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment. The court held that when parties select language for a contract that is clear and unambiguous, the court lacks the authority to rewrite the terms to provide a different meaning. Because the contractual provision was unambiguous, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the meaning of the language or the intent of the parties, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.

Reaffirms the standard for summary judgment in the context of unambiguous contractual provisions.

2 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released November 4, 2026

Heritage Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Rapkin, Rapkin, et al

Fla. 1st DCA Per Curiam Issued November 4, 2026 Administrative Petitions GRANTED; order on review QUASHED

Panel: Lewis, Winokur, Neff

The First District Court of Appeal granted petitions for writ of certiorari and quashed a trial court order that compelled insurers to disclose sealed records to public-records requestors before the court determined whether the records were exempt from disclosure. The court held that the order caused irreparable harm because the premature dissemination of claimed trade secrets or sensitive personal information cannot be remedied on appeal. The court further determined that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering production and full participation in discovery before adjudicating the trade-secret status of the documents. Under section 624.4213(2), Florida Statutes, the court noted that the release of records containing claimed trade secrets is barred until a circuit court rules on their exempt status. The court remanded the case with instructions to determine the exemption and trade-secret status through a confidentiality-preserving in camera inspection or evidentiary hearing that does not disclose the records to the requestors prior to the determination.

The decision clarifies that a trial court cannot order the production of sealed records to requestors before making a formal determination regarding trade-secret or statutory exemptions, as such premature disclosure constitutes irreparable harm.

Statutes construed: § 768.72, § 624.4213

Florida Peninsula Insurance Company and Edison Insurance Company v. Department of Financial Services, Heritage Property & Casualty Insurance Company, et al

Fla. 1st DCA Per Curiam Issued November 4, 2026 Administrative Petitions GRANTED; order on review QUASHED.

Panel: Lewis, Winokur, Neff

Heritage Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Florida Peninsula Insurance Company, and Edison Insurance Company filed petitions for writ of certiorari to challenge a trial court order requiring the disclosure of sealed records to public-records requestors before the court determined if the records were exempt. The underlying dispute involved public-records requests related to a Florida Department of Financial Services investigation into insurer claim-handling practices. The trial court had conducted an initial review of the records to identify claimed exemptions but subsequently ordered that the sealed records be provided to requestor-intervenors, who were permitted to participate in an evidentiary hearing and engage in discovery subject to a confidentiality order. The First District Court of Appeal granted the petitions and quashed the order, holding that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering production before adjudicating the exemption status. The court noted that section 624.4213(2), Florida Statutes, bars the release of records containing claimed trade secrets until a circuit court rules on their status. The court further reasoned that once information is disseminated, its confidentiality is lost, and a mere confidentiality order may not prevent irreparable harm. The court concluded that the trial court must determine the exemption and trade-secret status of the disputed records through a confidentiality-preserving in camera inspection or evidentiary hearing before ordering any production or access.

The court held that ordering the production of records to requestors before a trade-secret determination is made violates statutory safeguards and causes irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on appeal.

Statutes construed: § 768.72, § 624.4213

Shakeel Charles v. State of Florida

Fla. 1st DCA Per Curiam Issued November 4, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Nordby, Long, Winokur

The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the order of the Circuit Court for Bay County. The court applied the holding in Daise v. State to reach this result.

The concurring opinion notes that the application of Daise v. State interprets Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850(g) and (h)(2) in a way that may prematurely cut off a defendant's right to file a timely amended rule 3.850 motion.

Durden v. St.Johns County Fire Rescue, Preferred Governmental Claims Solutions

Fla. 1st DCA Ray, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Workers' Compensation Set aside in part and remanded

Panel: Roberts, Treadwell

A firefighter seeking workers' compensation benefits for atrial fibrillation (AFib) prevailed when the First District Court of Appeal held that AFib constitutes heart disease under section 112.18, Florida Statutes. The judge of compensation claims had previously denied the statutory presumption of occupational causation, reasoning that heart disease is limited to conditions that weaken the heart through the degradation of vessels or valves. However, the appellate court determined that the term heart disease must be interpreted according to its original meaning at the time of the statute's enactment in 1965. Drawing on historical medical dictionaries and reports, the court found that heart disease includes functional conditions that affect the heart's operation without necessarily damaging its structure. Because AFib is an electrical disorder that disrupts the heart's normal function, it falls within the statutory definition. The court clarified that prior decisions describing heart disease as involving vascular or valvular degradation provided a limited-purpose definition specific to those cases and did not exclude cardiac arrhythmias. The court set aside the denial of compensability and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Determines whether atrial fibrillation qualifies as heart disease under the firefighter statutory presumption.

Statutes construed: § 112.18

Meta Platforms, Inc., Instagram, LLC v. Office Of The Attorney General, State of Florida, et al

Fla. 2d DCA Smith, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Civil Petition dismissed for lack of certiorari jurisdiction.

Panel: Morris, Labrit

Meta Platforms, Inc. and Instagram, LLC petitioned for a writ of certiorari to quash a trial court order denying their motion to dismiss a complaint filed by the Florida Attorney General. The Attorney General alleged that Meta violated the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by using addictive design features and algorithms to target young users. Meta argued that the action was barred by the statutory immunity provided under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and by its First Amendment rights. The appellate court dismissed the petition because Meta failed to establish the threshold jurisdictional requirement of irreparable harm. The court determined that section 230 confers a nonabsolute immunity that does not protect a party from being involved in a lawsuit itself, meaning the immunity is not lost by waiting for a final judgment. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's denial of the motion did not limit Meta's speech, compel any action, or alter its First Amendment rights, thus precluding a finding of irreparable harm.

The court addressed whether the immunity provided by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act constitutes an absolute immunity from suit, which is a prerequisite for establishing irreparable harm in a certiorari petition regarding a nonfinal order.

Statutes construed: § 768.28, § 776.032, § 768.72, § 768.295

Anderson v. Anderson

Fla. 2d DCA Kelly, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Panel: Black, Guard

In a dissolution of marriage action, the court held that funds deposited into a joint account by one spouse and subsequently used to make a downpayment on a marital home are marital property rather than nonmarital property. The former husband had placed proceeds from the sale of his Georgia home and employment earnings into a joint account used for general expenses. The parties then used those funds for the downpayment on a house titled jointly. Because the former husband failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that he did not intend to make a gift of the funds upon depositing them into the joint account, the trial court erred in awarding him credit for those nonmarital funds. However, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding the former husband credit for mortgage payments and house-related expenses he paid alone for two years following the divorce filing, as the former wife had sufficient income to contribute and did not demonstrate a need for temporary support.

Addresses the commingling of nonmarital funds in a joint account and the presumption of gift when depositing funds into such an account.

Statutes construed: § 61.075

The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York v. Fernandez, Fernandez

Fla. 2d DCA Guard, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Silberman, Atkinson

The Bank of New York Mellon appealed a final judgment denying its foreclosure action, in which the trial court found the Bank failed to prove a default. The dispute arose after the Bank's servicer, Bank of America, reversed four payments made in 2015 without providing an explanation. Following these reversals, the Fernandezes continued making monthly payments until April 2017. In May 2017, the servicer returned the Fernandezes' payment and refused subsequent attempts to pay. The Bank subsequently filed for foreclosure, alleging a default began on January 1, 2017. The trial court ruled in favor of the Fernandezes, finding the Bank failed to explain the 2015 payment reversals and that the servicer's refusal to accept payments after May 2017 was relevant. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Bank presented legally sufficient evidence that the Fernandezes defaulted on the note and mortgage from June 2017 onward. The court determined that a dispute over the accounting of previous payments does not excuse a borrower's obligation to make subsequent timely payments. Furthermore, the court held that the Bank's failure to accept the May 2017 payment did not excuse the Fernandezes from their ongoing obligations, and the evidence did not support the equitable defenses of tender of payment or unclean hands.

Addresses whether a servicer's refusal to accept payments and a dispute over prior payment reversals excuse a borrower's subsequent failure to make monthly mortgage payments.

Statutes construed: § 45.0315, § 697.07

Monroe County v. Roy's Trailer Park, Inc., etc., et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Bokor, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Administrative Reversed and remanded

Panel: Lindsey, Gooden

Monroe County appealed a trial court order dismissing its counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The underlying dispute arose after a fire at Roy's Trailer Park led to the discovery of safety violations. Roy's Trailer Park sought a declaratory judgment regarding whether mobile home park owners are responsible for fire code violations under section 723.024, Florida Statutes. The County countersued for declaratory relief, injunctive relief to enforce the fire code, and the appointment of a receiver. The trial court dismissed the County's counterclaims, holding that the County failed to exhaust administrative remedies established by local ordinance. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the doctrine of administrative exhaustion is a prudential rule rather than a jurisdictional requirement. The court reasoned that section 162.13, Florida Statutes, establishes that local code enforcement procedures are supplemental and do not prohibit a local government from enforcing codes by other lawful means. Furthermore, the court noted that circuit courts maintain jurisdiction to issue injunctions to enforce ordinances and to render declaratory judgments. The court concluded that the existence of local administrative processes does not require the government to surrender its right to pursue alternative judicial remedies.

Clarifies that the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not strip a local government of its ability to seek judicial remedies such as injunctions or declaratory judgments, as local enforcement procedures are supplemental to other lawful means of enforcement.

Statutes construed: § 723.024, § 723.004, § 125.01, § 162.13, § 86.011

David Tejera v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 4, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Scales, Fernandez, Lindsey

Appellant David Tejera appealed an order denying his ninth and tenth motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. On April 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order precluding Tejera from making further pro se filings regarding his conviction and sentence, requiring that any subsequent filings be reviewed and signed by a licensed attorney. Although the State confessed error by conceding that the ninth and tenth motions raised different grounds than previous motions, the court declined to accept the confession. Because the trial court had previously precluded Tejera from filing pro se motions, his ninth and tenth pro se motions were not cognizable. The court noted that while the trial court should have stricken the motions instead of denying them, the result remained the same.

The court affirmed the denial of successive postconviction motions because a prior order had precluded the defendant from filing pro se motions, even though the trial court used the wrong procedural mechanism by denying rather than striking the motions.

Sydney Smith v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued November 4, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Miller, Gooden, Rebull

Appellant Sydney Smith appealed the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied the motion, and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court determined that the claims presented by Smith were either procedurally barred, facially insufficient, or conclusively refuted by the record.

This case involves the standard for affirming a summary denial of a Rule 3.850 motion.

John L. Criswell v. Heaven Bound Construction, LLC, etc., et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Gordo, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Bokor

John L. Criswell appeals a non-final order from the Monroe County Circuit Court granting a motion by Heaven Bound Construction, LLC to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The dispute arose following the termination of a contract between the parties. The contract contained a provision stating that any dispute arising from the agreement would be determined by arbitration after mediation, but specifically noted that seeking injunctive or equitable relief in court would not waive the right to arbitrate. After the contract was terminated, Heaven Bound filed suit to protect its construction lien claim and subsequently moved to stay the proceedings after service was perfected, while simultaneously demanding arbitration through the American Arbitration Association. The trial court found that Heaven Bound did not act inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Because competent, substantial evidence supported the finding that Heaven Bound did not voluntarily or intentionally relinquish its arbitration right, the appellate court affirmed.

Arbitration; Waiver; Construction Lien Law

Rafael Lopes Brasileiro Martim, et al. v. Cattleya PTC

Fla. 3d DCA Logue, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Civil Dismissed in part; affirmed in part

Panel: Scales, Lobree

Cattleya PTC sued R. Martim and Martim, LLC for conversion, unjust enrichment, and imposition of a constructive trust, alleging they failed to return $10,000,000 intended for investment. The defendants moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration, citing a contract between the owner of Cattleya PTC and Martim, LLC that mandated arbitration in London. The defendants supported their motion by asking the court to take judicial notice of unsworn pleadings from a previously dismissed federal lawsuit rather than providing affidavits or testimony. The appellate court dismissed the portion of the appeal regarding the denial of motions to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to join an indispensable party due to lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens because the defendants failed to provide sworn evidence to support the motion and the complaint alleged the defendants reside in Miami-Dade County. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause and arbitration agreement because the plaintiff and defendant were not parties to the contract and the record lacked sufficient evidence to support piercing the corporate veil.

Addresses the necessity of sworn evidence in forum non conveniens motions and the jurisdictional limits of interlocutory appeals regarding motions to dismiss.

JB Green Estate, LLC, et al. v. Fredric N. Karlton, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Scales, C.J. Issued November 4, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed

Panel: Bokor, Gooden

JB Green Estate, LLC, William Holly, and KLIP Associates, Inc. appeal a final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Fredric N. Karlton and Beneficial Loan Corp. The appellants argued that the trial court's factual findings, specifically the finding that William Holly executed the loan documents, were not supported by competent, substantial evidence. They further contended the trial court erred by disregarding the testimony of their handwriting expert who claimed the signatures were forged. The court held that the trial judge acted within his discretion by rejecting the expert testimony because the testimony was contradicted by a notary who witnessed the signatures and because the expert reviewed photocopies instead of original documents. The court also rejected the argument that the cumulative weight of challenged factual findings required reversal, noting that the trial court's findings were supported by record evidence and that the appellate court's role is to determine the existence of competent, substantial evidence rather than reweighing competing evidence.

Addresses the standard for a trial court to disregard expert testimony and the scope of appellate review regarding factual findings supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Robert Holton v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Lindsey, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Scales, Lobree

Robert Holton appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree arson, arguing that the State's closing arguments constituted fundamental error. Holton contended the State made improper comments stating he was no longer presumed innocent, used highly inflammatory language to describe the crimes and his character, and denigrated his theory of defense. Because Holton did not object at trial, he argued the cumulative effect of these comments rose to the level of fundamental error. The court held that the comments were not improper when read in context. The State's remark regarding the presumption of innocence was tied to the strength of the evidence presented. The descriptions of the crimes as savage, brutal, and heinous, and the characterization of Holton's hands as the hands of a killer, were supported by the evidence of the victim's injuries and the defendant's DNA. Additionally, the State was permitted to argue that the defense theory lacked evidentiary support. Because the individual comments were not improper, there was no cumulative fundamental error. The judgment was affirmed.

Addresses the standard for fundamental error regarding unobjected-to prosecutorial comments during closing arguments, specifically concerning the presumption of innocence, inflammatory language, and the denigration of a defense theory.

Rebecca Zalkin v. Jeffrey Zalkin

Fla. 4th DCA Issued November 4, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Panel: Gerber, Klingensmith

The wife appeals a final judgment dissolving her marriage and an order amending that judgment. The appellate court reversed the trial court's alimony denial because the court failed to make specific factual findings regarding the parties' net incomes and the respective need and ability to pay before applying statutory factors. The court also found the trial court erred in imputing salary income to the wife because the husband failed to prove a job was available, and erred in imputing investment income because there was no finding that such income would not invade the principal of the retirement accounts. Additionally, the court reversed the child support award and the determination of parental responsibility because the trial court failed to find that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children. The court vacated the order amending the final judgment, ruling that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to make substantive amendments after the wife filed her notice of appeal. The court affirmed the denial of the wife's request for attorney's fees because the trial court properly found the wife had a need but the husband lacked the ability to pay.

This case addresses the jurisdictional limits of a trial court to amend a final judgment while an appeal is pending, the requirement to make specific findings on net income before assessing alimony, and the necessity of finding detriment to award sole parental responsibility.

Statutes construed: § 61.13, § 61.08, § 61.14, § 61.16

Alton Dontabutts Johnson v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Forst, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Conner, Ciklin

Appellant Alton Dontabutts Johnson appealed his convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and resisting an officer without violence, challenging the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The incident occurred in a high-crime area of Belle Glade where deputies were responding to reports of harassment. Deputy A observed Appellant riding a bicycle without a required light and stopped him for this noncriminal infraction. During the encounter, Appellant leaned his body against the hood of a police car in an exaggerated and awkward manner. Deputy B observed a bulge under Appellant's shirt and identified it as the imprint of a gun with an extended magazine. When deputies attempted a pat-down for weapons, Appellant resisted, leading to a struggle and his subsequent arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the deputies' testimony regarding the observed bulge credible. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, holding that the initial detention was lawful due to the bicycle light infraction and that the totality of the circumstances, including the suspicious positioning of the Appellant and the visible bulge, provided the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry frisk for officer safety.

Addresses the distinction between a lawful detention and the specific requirements for a Terry frisk, specifically whether the observation of a firearm bulge during a lawful stop justifies a protective pat-down based on the totality of the circumstances.

Statutes construed: § 316.2065, § 790.01, § 790.06

Coastal Building Contractors, LLC v. Abraham A. Calixte,

Fla. 4th DCA Lott, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Reversed and remanded

Panel: Levine, Klingensmith

A subcontractor, Coastal Building Contractors, LLC, recorded a claim of lien for masonry, carpentry, and slab work performed on a residence. The recorded notice erroneously listed the completion date as October 21, 2022, although the work was actually completed around December 1, 2022. The notice was recorded on February 16, 2023. The homeowners, the Calixtes, sought to invalidate the lien, and the trial court granted summary judgment in their favor, finding the lien was facially untimely and that the subsequent amendments to the lien were invalid. The trial court also found the homeowners were prejudiced by the lien encumbering their property. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its analysis. The court noted that while the amendments were likely untimely, the original lien was not actually untimely because it was recorded within 90 days of the actual completion of work. The court held that under Florida Statutes section 713.08, the trial court must determine whether the erroneous date in the notice prejudiced the homeowners or otherwise adversely affected them. The court clarified that the mere existence of a lien does not constitute legal prejudice, as that is the purpose of a lien. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine if the error fell within the statutory safe harbor provisions.

Addresses the application of statutory safe harbor provisions regarding erroneous information in a claim of lien and defines the scope of prejudice in this context.

Statutes construed: § 713.08, § 84.041, § 84.081

Coastal Building Contractors, LLC v. Abraham A. Calixte and Dorothy Drouillard a/k/a Dorothy Calixte

Fla. 4th DCA Lott, J. Issued November 4, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Reversed and remanded

Panel: Levine, Klingensmith

A subcontractor, Coastal Building Contractors, LLC, recorded a claim of lien for masonry, carpentry, and slab work performed on a residence. The recorded notice erroneously listed a completion date of October 21, 2022, whereas the work was actually completed on or about December 1, 2022. The notice was recorded on February 16, 2023. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners, finding the lien was facially untimely due to the erroneous date and that subsequent amendments were invalid. The trial court also held that the lien prejudiced the homeowners by encumbering their property. The appellate court reversed, holding that because the lien was recorded within 90 days of the actual completion of work, it was timely. The court clarified that under Florida Statutes section 713.08, the trial court must determine whether the erroneous date prejudiced the owners or adversely affected them, rather than simply finding the lien invalid because it was not timely amended. The case was remanded to assess whether the error fell within the statutory safe harbor provisions.

Clarifies the application of statutory safe harbor provisions regarding erroneous information in a claim of lien, specifically noting that a facially untimely notice that is actually timely must be evaluated for owner prejudice rather than being dismissed solely due to a failure to amend.

Statutes construed: § 713.08, § 84.041, § 84.081

Ibraheem S. Jackson v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Per Curiam Issued November 4, 2026 Criminal Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions

Panel: Gross, Levine, Shaw

The Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed the denial of a postconviction motion filed by Ibraheem Jackson. Jackson argued that his convictions for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property were improper under section 812.025, Florida Statutes, because the offenses occurred within a single scheme or course of conduct. The trial court had denied this claim by concluding that the dual convictions were permissible because the property involved in each count was different. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by focusing only on whether the property was different. The court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the convictions were based on the same scheme or course of conduct.

The court clarified that the statutory prohibition against dual convictions for theft and dealing in stolen property depends on whether the offenses are part of the same scheme or course of conduct, rather than whether the specific items of property involved are different.

Statutes construed: § 812.025

Rebecca Zalkin v. Jeffrey Zalkin

Fla. 4th DCA Issued November 4, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions

Panel: Gerber, Klingensmith

The wife appeals a final judgment dissolving her marriage. The appellate court reversed the trial court's alimony denial because the court failed to make specific factual findings regarding the parties' net incomes and the parties' need and ability to pay before applying statutory factors. The court also found the trial court erred in imputing salary and investment income to the wife because there was no evidence a qualifying job was available and no finding that the imputed investment income would not invade the principal. Regarding parental responsibility, the court reversed because the trial court failed to find that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children before awarding sole parental responsibility or shared responsibility with ultimate decision-making authority to the husband. Additionally, the court vacated the trial court's order amending the final judgment, ruling that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to make substantive amendments after the wife filed her notice of appeal. The court affirmed the denial of the wife's request for attorney's fees because the trial court properly found the wife had a need and the husband lacked the ability to pay.

This case addresses the jurisdictional limits of a trial court to amend a final judgment after a notice of appeal has been filed, the requirement to make specific findings on net income and ability to pay before evaluating alimony factors, and the necessity of making detriment findings when awarding sole parental responsibility.

Statutes construed: § 61.13, § 61.08, § 61.14, § 61.16

6 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released November 3, 2026

2 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 30, 2026

Diamond Edge Construction, LLC v. The Moorings of Pinellas County Condominium Association, Inc., Jackson, et al

Fla. 2d DCA Guard, J. Issued October 30, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Northcutt, Khouzam

Diamond Edge Construction, LLC appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration in a dispute with The Moorings of Pinellas County Condominium Association, Inc. The dispute arose after Hurricane Helene caused damage to condominium units. Diamond Edge presented a Construction Services Agreement that included an arbitration provision but was unsigned by the Association. The Agreement lacked a construction price and a defined scope of work, instead providing that the parties would mutually develop these terms through change orders. Although the Association remitted $818,266.02 to Diamond Edge, the record failed to connect these payments to the Agreement or establish them as an act of acquiescence to the contract terms. Because the Agreement lacked essential terms regarding price and scope, it constituted merely an agreement to agree. Consequently, Diamond Edge failed to prove the existence of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and the trial court's denial of the motion was affirmed.

The case addresses the enforceability of an arbitration provision in an unsigned agreement that lacks essential terms such as price and scope of work, and clarifies that payments made without a clear connection to the contract terms do not constitute acquiescence to an agreement.

Cleveland v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA LaRose, J. Issued October 30, 2026 Criminal Reversed and remanded

Panel: Northcutt, Black

After a jury convicted Bo Williams Cleveland of battery on a corrections officer, the trial court sentenced him as a habitual felony offender to ten years in prison. On first appeal, the court reversed because the State failed to admit the paperwork supporting the enhanced sentence into evidence. Following remand, the trial court again sentenced Cleveland as a habitual felony offender without receiving his prior convictions into evidence, relying on a mistaken representation that the convictions had been entered into evidence at the original hearing. Because there is no record evidence showing that Cleveland qualifies as a habitual felony offender, the court reversed the sentence and remanded for a third sentencing hearing to allow the State to introduce evidence establishing the enhanced sentence.

The State failed to establish the defendant's status as a habitual felony offender because the prior convictions were not admitted into evidence during the sentencing proceedings.

Johnson v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA Sleet, J. Issued October 30, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Northcutt, LaRose

Darrell Johnson appealed his conviction and sentence for battery on a person sixty-five years of age or older. Johnson challenged the adequacy of his Nelson hearing, the denial of his requests to disqualify the trial judge, and the failure of the trial court to order a competency hearing. He further argued that the trial court committed fundamental error by using a six-person jury for a noncapital offense and contended that the statute requiring six-person juries for noncapital cases is unconstitutional. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence, finding no error in the jury composition or the statutory requirement for a six-person jury in noncapital cases.

The court rejected the argument that using a six-person jury for a noncapital offense constitutes fundamental error or that the statute governing jury size is unconstitutional.

Statutes construed: § 913.10

State of Florida v. Dunlop

Fla. 2d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 30, 2026 Criminal Affirmed; conflict certified

Panel: Northcutt, Morris, Lucas

A sheriff's deputy observed a truck swerving within its lane and onto the shoulder of State Road 64 several times at midnight. Based on this observation, the deputy initiated a traffic stop to investigate potential intoxication. The trial court granted a motion to suppress evidence, finding that the driver's movements did not constitute erratic or aggressive driving and did not present a danger to the motoring public. The court held that these movements did not provide sufficient objective basis or reasonable suspicion for the stop. The appellate court affirmed the order, holding that a violation of the statute governing lane maintenance does not occur in isolation and requires evidence that the driver's conduct created a reasonable safety concern.

The court certified a conflict regarding whether a violation of section 316.089(1), Florida Statutes, requires evidence of a safety concern to justify a traffic stop.

Statutes construed: § 316.089, § 316.155, § 316.193, § 322.16

Melissa Lynn Malone v. Ronald Louis Malone, Jr.

Fla. 5th DCA Harris, J. Issued October 30, 2026 Family Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded with instructions

Panel: Eisnaugle, Kilbane

The Former Wife appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and an order denying her motion for rehearing. She argued that the trial court erred by failing to properly calculate certain business liabilities in the equitable distribution scheme, resulting in an unjust distribution. The Former Husband conceded that the trial court made a mathematical error regarding the business debt. The trial court had assigned 100% of the business debt to the Former Husband, even though the parties owned 51% of the business and the Former Husband testified that his business partner was responsible for 49% of the liabilities. The court reversed the judgment regarding the business debt and remanded the case for the trial court to correct the error and reconsider the equitable distribution based on the corrected debt assignment. All other issues raised by the Former Wife were affirmed.

The court reversed because the trial court assigned 100% of a business debt to the Former Husband despite the parties owning 51% of the business and testimony indicating a partner held responsibility for 49% of the liabilities.

Adolfo Posadas San Martin v. Ana Posadas

Fla. 5th DCA Per Curiam Issued October 30, 2026 Civil Dismissed

Panel: Lambert, Edwards, Kilbane

Appellant appealed a trial court order discharging a mechanic's lien filed to secure payment for labor and materials provided for structures owned by Appellee. Because a petition for certiorari is the proper vehicle to review an order discharging a lien and must be filed within thirty days, and because a motion for rehearing does not toll the time to seek review of a non-final order, the appeal is untimely and dismissed. Appellant also appealed an order finding Appellee entitled to attorney's fees, but because the order did not set an amount and no such order was in the record, this aspect of the appeal is dismissed as premature. Finally, Appellant appeared to attempt an appeal of an order granting summary judgment, but because an order simply granting a motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable order, this aspect of the appeal is also dismissed as premature.

Procedural requirements for challenging a lien discharge and the finality of summary judgment orders.

Kristen Cox v. A New Hope Psychiatric Services, LLC and Matthew Murphy and Jessica Murphy

Fla. 6th DCA Gannam, J. Issued October 30, 2026 Civil Petition Dismissed

Panel: Stargel, Kamoutsas

The petitioner sought certiorari review of a trial court order imposing monetary and other sanctions for contempt. The contempt was based on a violation of a Spencer order that prohibited the petitioner from filing pro se pleadings and motions. The petitioner's filings did not include any complaints, petitions, answers, replies, or applications for orders by motion. Although the trial court may have intended to bar all pro se filings, a court cannot base contempt on noncompliance with terms not explicitly stated in an order. Even if the contempt order departed from the essential requirements of the law, the court lacked certiorari jurisdiction because the error is correctable on post-judgment appeal. The trial court retains the inherent authority to reconsider or retract its nonfinal rulings prior to the entry of a final judgment.

The court held that contempt cannot be based on noncompliance with an order that does not explicitly prohibit the specific filings made, and noted that such errors are generally subject to post-judgment appeal rather than certiorari review.

Brad Hatcher and Audrey Hatcher v. Restorical, LLC d/b/a Sydonie Mansion

Fla. 6th DCA Gannam, J. Issued October 30, 2026 Civil Reversed

Panel: Stargel, Mize

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order granting a temporary injunction against the Hatchers, who were accused of disrupting wedding events at the Sydonie Mansion owned by Restorical, LLC. The trial court had found that the Hatchers' conduct, including gunfire and engine noise, threatened the viability of the venue and caused irreparable harm. However, the appellate court held that there was no competent, substantial evidence that Restorical would suffer irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law. The court noted that while the total destruction of a business may constitute irreparable harm, the loss of some business is insufficient. Because there was no evidence presented that Restorical's business would be destroyed in the absence of the injunction, the injunction was improper.

The case addresses the distinction between the loss of business and the total destruction of a business regarding the irreparable harm requirement for a temporary injunction.

Statutes construed: § 823.16, § 90.102, § 90.103, § 2.01

3 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 29, 2026

The Florida Bar v. Omar Medina, Jr.

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 29, 2026 Administrative Approved referee's report; found not guilty of violating rules 3-4.3, 4-3.3(a)(1), and 4-8.4(a).

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Bar filed a formal complaint against Omar Medina, Jr. alleging that he knowingly made false statements in a motion to vacate and an accompanying affidavit. The motion and affidavit claimed that Medina did not receive notice of a case management conference because the clerk of court sent notices to non-existent email addresses that had not been part of his firm for over ten years. The Bar argued this violated rules regarding misconduct and candor toward the tribunal. A referee found that while Medina's statements regarding the email addresses were inaccurate, the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Medina knowingly made false statements. The referee found that Medina had mismanaged his PACER account and misunderstood how federal court electronic filing worked, mistakenly believing his state court email designations would carry over to the federal system. The referee also found that Medina sincerely believed he had properly notified the court of his email addresses. The Supreme Court of Florida approved the referee's report, finding that the Bar failed to prove the "knowingly" element of the charged rule violations and that the referee's findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Clarifies that to prove the knowingly element in a disciplinary proceeding, the Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer knew the statements were false at the time they were made.

Jesse Guardado v. State of Florida

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 29, 2026 Criminal Affirmed denial of postconviction relief; denied stay of execution.

Panel: Couriel, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum, Labarga

Jesse Guardado, a death row inmate, appealed the summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief and sought a stay of his execution. Guardado argued that Florida's clemency process is unconstitutional because it denies death-sentenced individuals minimal due process, specifically noting that no clemency has been granted to death-sentenced defendants since 1983 and the Governor has expressed a policy against granting clemency to murderers. He further contended that his death sentence was unreliable due to ineffective assistance of counsel and that the state's warrant process violates due process by failing to provide a full and fair postconviction proceeding. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied the request for a stay of execution. The Court held that the Governor possesses unfettered discretion regarding clemency and that Guardado failed to demonstrate a violation of due process, as he had received clemency review and failed to identify specific procedures that were violated or matters on which he was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The case addresses the constitutionality of the Florida clemency process and the warrant process in death penalty cases.

Statutes construed: § 922.052

RJ’s International Trading, LLC v. Crown Castle South, LLC, et al.

Fla. Supreme Court Grosshans, J. Issued October 29, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Question Answered: No

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Supreme Court of Florida addressed a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding whether a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision in an easement agreement constitutes a real covenant that runs with the land. The dispute arose after Crown Castle South, LLC excavated land owned by RJ’s International Trading, LLC beyond the boundaries of an existing easement. Following a jury verdict for trespass and breach of the easement, RJ’s sought attorney’s fees based on a provision in the original easement agreement. The Court held that a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision does not run with the land. To run with the land, a covenant must satisfy three requirements: intent of the original parties, notice to successors, and the requirement that the covenant touches and concerns the land. The Court determined that the fee provision failed the touch and concern requirement because it is merely collateral to the land. Such a provision does not directly affect the use, occupation, or enjoyment of the property, nor does it obligate a party to act or refrain from acting in a way that benefits the land itself. Consequently, the fee provision is a personal obligation rather than a real covenant that binds successors in interest.

Clarifies the application of the 'touch and concern' doctrine to attorney's fee provisions in easement agreements.

Statutes construed: § 9.13, § 57.105

Svyatoslav Mangushev v. Alpha Team, LLC

Fla. Supreme Court Issued October 29, 2026 Civil Dismissed

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Supreme Court of Florida dismissed a petition for writ of certiorari because the petitioner failed to cite an independent basis for the court to exercise its all writs authority. The court found no such basis was apparent on the face of the petition.

The court treated the petition as an attempt to invoke all writs jurisdiction but determined it lacked the necessary underlying authority to exercise jurisdiction.

Heather S. Maloney v. A Better Blind, Inc.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 29, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Lindsey, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County. The court applied de novo review to the legal rulings regarding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper service. The court noted that a forum clause alone is insufficient to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident and requires an independent basis, such as a breach of contract occurring in Florida. Furthermore, the court held that if a defendant's affidavits fail to controvert the factual allegations in a complaint or merely assert legal conclusions, the burden of proof regarding the existence of jurisdiction does not shift to the plaintiff. Where a trial court decision is based on live testimony, the appellate court reviews the factual determinations for competent substantial evidence.

The opinion clarifies the standard of review for non-final orders involving personal jurisdiction and the evidentiary requirements for shifting the burden of proof via affidavit.

Cedric Coleman v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 29, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Scales, Bokor, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County. The court applied the standard of review for the legal sufficiency of evidence, noting that a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. The court also addressed the scope of closing arguments, noting that attorneys are allowed wide latitude to summarize evidence, discuss admitted testimony, and advance logical inferences. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court maintains discretion regarding the use of demonstrative exhibits provided they are relevant and provide a reasonably accurate reproduction of the objects or incident involved.

The opinion reinforces the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence and the broad latitude granted to counsel during closing arguments.

People's Trust Insurance Company v. Yamirka Castro Almora, et al.,

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 29, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Logue, Miller

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order denying a motion for directed verdict. In reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, the appellate court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw every reasonable inference in their favor. If the evidence is conflicting or allows for different reasonable inferences, the issue is factual and must be submitted to the jury for resolution.

The opinion reinforces the standard of review for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that factual disputes must be resolved by a jury when reasonable inferences conflict.

Statutes construed: § 627.7011

5 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 28, 2026

Johnson v. Comerford

Fla. 1st DCA Osterhaus, C.J. Issued October 28, 2026 Administrative Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Rowe, Bilbrey

Shaquon Johnson appealed the dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus, which the trial court had ruled was moot. Johnson alleged that law library personnel refused to provide him with a complete copy of a rehearing notice he filed in federal court. The Department of Corrections claimed it had provided the requested documents, but Johnson denied receiving a complete copy and alleged the Department provided false information. Because a factual dispute remained regarding whether the Department actually delivered the requested documents, the petition was not moot. The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for the trial court to resolve the competing factual claims.

The court held that a petition for writ of mandamus is not moot when there is an unresolved factual dispute regarding whether the requested relief was provided.

Harlin Richard Crowley v. State of Florida

Fla. 1st DCA Neff, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Criminal Reversed as to counts XXI and XXIV; affirmed as to count XXII and remaining grounds; certified conflict.

Panel: Osterhaus, Bilbrey

Harlin Richard Crowley appealed convictions for sexual battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, and promoting a sexual performance by a child. The court reversed the convictions on two counts of promoting a sexual performance by a child because the evidence required a stacked chain of inferences rather than direct evidence. Specifically, for one count, the State failed to prove who operated a shared cellphone or created a cached image, requiring the jury to infer the defendant's use, viewing, and creation of the image. For another count, the State failed to prove the defendant was a party to a video call depicted in a screenshot. The court affirmed a conviction on a third count of promoting a sexual performance by a child because the evidence, including GPS data and personal email credentials, allowed for a single inference from converging facts. Regarding double jeopardy, the court held that when a defendant is convicted under the same statute, the legal-sameness inquiry is unnecessary and the dispute is confined to whether the counts rest on the same act or distinct ones. The court determined that the charging-document-only rule established in Lee v. State does not govern cases involving multiple acts of the same statutory charge, as the court must be able to look to the evidentiary record to determine factual sameness. The court certified conflict with Dominguez v. State regarding whether the charging-document rule applies to same-statute prosecutions.

The court addressed whether the charging-document-only rule from Lee v. State applies to double jeopardy claims involving multiple convictions under the same statute, concluding that the rule does not govern such cases and that the evidentiary record may be used to determine factual sameness.

Isaac Mitchell Williams v. State of Florida

Fla. 1st DCA Osterhaus, C.J. Issued October 28, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Lewis, Bilbrey

Isaac Williams appeals his first degree murder conviction and life sentence. He challenges the trial court's refusal to hold a Richardson hearing regarding two discovery issues. First, Williams argued that the State failed to timely disclose a video of a driver-accomplice's interview. The video was located by the defense via a public records request to the sheriff's office after the trial had begun because of a mix-up between the sheriff and the prosecutor. The trial court found no discovery violation because the State had disclosed the existence of the recording and a summary of its contents prior to trial. The appellate court affirmed, noting that a full Richardson hearing is only required if a discovery violation is first established. Second, Williams argued the State failed to disclose an oral statement by a defense witness that contradicted her recorded statement. The witness had initially told police she saw three men in a vehicle ten minutes before a shooting, but later claimed she saw the three men earlier in the day and only saw the driver ten minutes before the shooting. The appellate court held this was not a material change to her recorded statement because her testimony still tied all three men to the vehicle on the day of the crime, and the defense's ability to use the witness for its theory of the case remained unchanged.

Addresses the threshold requirement of a discovery violation before a Richardson hearing is required and defines material changes in witness statements for discovery purposes.

Debra Sowell Short v. Darryl Gene Short

Fla. 1st DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Panel: Rowe, Winokur, Neff

Debra Sowell Short appealed an amended final judgment dissolving her marriage to Darryl Gene Short. The appellate court addressed only the findings supporting the durational alimony award. Under Florida Statutes, a trial court must make specific factual findings of actual need and ability to pay before awarding alimony. While the amended judgment stated the wife had need and the husband had the ability to pay and calculated the statutory ceiling, it failed to identify the reasonable expenses of either party, quantify the wife's actual need, or determine the husband's available net income after reasonable expenses. The court held that the award and the wife's imputed income do not allow the court to infer a finding of need. Because the parties disputed expenses, the appellate court could not select specific expenses or supply the required findings. The court reversed the durational alimony award and remanded the case for the trial court to make the findings required by statute. All other issues were affirmed and the motion for appellate sanctions was denied.

The court clarified that a trial court's determination of the statutory alimony ceiling and general findings of need and ability do not satisfy the requirement to identify reasonable expenses and quantify actual need.

Statutes construed: § 61.08

Matthews v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Morris, Rothstein-Youakim, Guard

Diana Louise Matthews appealed her conviction for attempted first degree murder with a firearm and her thirty year prison sentence. She argued that her trial and conviction by a six person jury constituted harmful fundamental error because she was constitutionally entitled to a twelve person jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because this argument was unpreserved and raised for the first time in a supplemental brief, the court found it unavailing. The court held that under existing binding precedent, a twelve person panel is not a necessary ingredient of trial by jury and a six person jury is constitutionally permissible for non-capital criminal cases.

Addresses the constitutionality of six person juries in non-capital cases despite pending Supreme Court review of conflicting precedent.

Statutes construed: § 913.10

Tracz v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA Labrit, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Criminal Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded

Panel: Villanti, Atkinson

Amy Beth Tracz appealed the summary denial of her motion for postconviction relief following a no contest plea to a third DUI charge. The postconviction court had denied her claims regarding her lack of understanding of the plea terms, counsel's failure to challenge prior convictions, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with her in person and affirmed the denial of the claim that she was unaware of the ten-year driver's license revocation or the third DUI classification, as the plea transcript and her own statements during the colloquy conclusively refuted those allegations. However, the court reversed the summary denial of her broader claims regarding counsel's failure to provide meaningful advice on case strategy, negotiations, and plea alternatives, as well as claims regarding counsel's failure to review the plea form and investigate prior convictions. Because these allegations identified specific omissions and connected them to recognizable ineffective assistance theories, and because the record did not conclusively refute them, the court held that Ms. Tracz was entitled to an opportunity to amend her motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(h).

The court applied a framework for determining when an inartfully drafted pro se postconviction motion fairly presents a claim or subclaim requiring adjudication or an opportunity to amend, distinguishing between mere stray sentences and recognizable, curable allegations.

Advanced Wound Care, LLC v. Contact Medical Supply, LLC

Fla. 2d DCA Khouzam, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Civil Reversed and remanded

Panel: Morris, Guard

Advanced Wound Care appealed a nonfinal order that quashed its substituted service on Contact Medical Supply and transferred venue to Miami-Dade County. The trial court originally ruled that Advanced Wound Care failed to strictly comply with the mailing requirements of section 48.161(3), Florida Statutes, because the defendant had previously filed a related action in Miami-Dade County where it had perfected service on the plaintiff. However, the record indicated that Advanced Wound Care lacked an address for Contact Medical Supply due to the defendant's own evasiveness and gamesmanship. Contact Medical Supply filed a confession of error admitting the trial court erred. The appellate court accepted the confession of error and reversed the order, holding that equitable estoppel prevents the defendant from benefiting from its own deceptive actions. The case was remanded to proceed in Hillsborough County.

Application of equitable estoppel to prevent a defendant from benefiting from gamesmanship regarding service of process requirements.

Statutes construed: § 48.161

Dr.-Ing. H.C.F. Porsche v. The Collection LLC

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Lindsey, Miller, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order denying Porsche AG's motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rebull noted that Porsche AG had effectively waived its right to an evidentiary hearing regarding jurisdictional facts by stating in a footnote of its reply that such a hearing would be unnecessary. The concurrence further noted that the necessity of an evidentiary hearing was not raised in the transcript of the hearing on the motion and that an argument made only in a footnote is legally insufficient for preservation on appeal.

The case addresses the waiver of the right to an evidentiary hearing on jurisdictional issues when a party argues in a footnote that such a hearing is unnecessary.

Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Sandra Moise

Fla. 3d DCA Bokor, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Insurance Affirmed

Panel: Scales, Miller

Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company appealed a trial court's denial of summary judgment and a subsequent jury verdict in favor of the insured, Sandra Moise. The dispute arose from property damage, including cracks in floors, walls, and ceilings, which the insured claimed were caused by vibrations from heavy construction equipment at an adjacent property. The insurer argued the damages were excluded under the policy's earth movement and settlement provisions. The insured's expert testified that the damage resulted from vibrations without displacement of the earth. The trial court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the vibration exclusion did not apply to the earth movement and settlement provisions. The court also granted partial summary judgment for the insured regarding the insurer's affirmative defenses concerning post-loss obligations, finding that the insurer's denial of coverage based on the cause of loss waived those defenses. The insurer challenged the trial court's ruling on motions in limine and the award of monetary damages. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a factual dispute existed regarding whether the damage was caused by vibrations without earth movement, and that the insurer's declination of coverage based on a substantive determination of excluded causes waived its right to assert post-loss compliance defenses. The court also found that the award of money damages was proper because the operative complaint sought damages attributable to the loss.

The case clarifies that when an insured's expert attributes damage to vibrations without displacement of the earth, a factual dispute exists as to whether earth movement exclusions apply, and that an insurer's denial of coverage based on the cause of loss can waive its affirmative defenses regarding the insured's failure to comply with post-loss obligations.

Statutes construed: § 86.061

Maria Gimenez v. Bargain Properties Inc.

Fla. 3d DCA Miller, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed

Panel: Lobree, Gooden

In an eviction dispute, the tenant appealed a final judgment of removal after she failed to vacate the premises by the date established in a negotiated partial settlement. The landlord had filed an eviction lawsuit alleging nonpayment of rent. The parties entered into a court-ratified stipulation where the tenant would reside in the premises rent free until July 12, 2025, at which point she would voluntarily vacate and the landlord would file a voluntary dismissal. The tenant subsequently filed an amended answer and counterclaim alleging retaliatory conduct and seeking to remain in possession until December 2025. The landlord moved for final judgment of removal after the tenant refused to relinquish possession. The tenant argued she had filed a viable counterclaim and that the settlement was the product of duress. The court held that by entering into the settlement agreement to relinquish possession, the tenant waived her defenses to possession. The tenant's failure to abide by the agreement did not revive her affirmative defenses but instead entitled the landlord to immediate relief. The court declined to review the tenant's claim of duress because she failed to provide transcripts or establish error on the face of the orders.

The case addresses the effect of a negotiated settlement agreement on a tenant's affirmative defenses in an expedited eviction proceeding.

Statutes construed: § 51.011, § 83.232, § 83.64

Reybel Hernandez v. Barclays Mortgage Trust 2022-RPL1, Mortgage-Backed

Fla. 3d DCA Lindsey, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Lobree

Appellant Reybel Hernandez appealed a trial court order denying his motion to vacate a foreclosure sale and stay proceedings, and overruling his objection to the foreclosure sale. Hernandez argued that the trial court erred because Barclays Mortgage Trust 2022-RPL1 failed to file the original note, thereby failing to establish standing; he provided evidence of a broken chain of title and a fraudulent certification of the note; the trial court erroneously applied section 702.036, Florida Statutes; and the trial court failed to grant a stay pending appeal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Hernandez failed to preserve his specific arguments for review because his motions in the trial court focused on pending federal proceedings rather than the specific legal grounds raised on appeal. Furthermore, the court held that even if the arguments were preserved, they did not establish a gross abuse of discretion. The court noted that Barclays established standing by possessing the original note with a blank indorsement and filing it before the entry of judgment. The court also found that a broken chain of title is immaterial if standing is established by status as the note holder, and that Hernandez failed to show the trial court applied section 702.036. Finally, because Hernandez lacked a likelihood of success on the merits, the denial of a stay was affirmed.

The case addresses the preservation of arguments in foreclosure proceedings and the standard of review for motions to vacate a foreclosure sale.

Statutes construed: § 702.036

Bloktech Wynwood Atrium LLC, etc., et al v. BD FL Notes, LLC, etc., et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Gooden, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed

Panel: Logue, Gordo

Appellants, who were contract purchasers of pre-construction condominium units, appealed a non-final order regarding their motion to intervene in a foreclosure action. The Appellants sought to intervene to vacate the foreclosure so they could close on their units, arguing they should have been added to the post-foreclosure judgment as junior lienholders. The purchase agreements executed by the Appellants contained a subordination clause stating that the agreements were subject to any mortgage liens and that the purchasers expressly waived and relinquished any lien or lien rights, legal or equitable, that might otherwise accrue. Because the Appellants expressly waived the lien rights necessary to establish their status as junior lienholders, they failed to demonstrate the sufficient property interest required for post-judgment intervention. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling.

The case addresses the impact of express waiver clauses in purchase agreements on a party's ability to intervene as a junior lienholder in a foreclosure proceeding.

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Mirna Rodriguez

Fla. 3d DCA Miller, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Insurance Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded

Panel: Fernandez, Lobree

In a first-party homeowners insurance dispute, the Third District Court of Appeal held that a prevailing party cannot recover both current market billing rates and prejudgment interest for attorney's fees. The court reasoned that both remedies are designed to compensate for the same harm, which is the delay in payment. Because the use of current market rates serves as a proxy for the time value of money, awarding both constitutes a double recovery for the same loss. While both remedies are lawful when applied individually, they function as substitutes rather than supplements. The court affirmed the trial court's order in part but reversed the award of prejudgment interest specifically applied to the lead counsel's fees, as those fees had already been calculated using current market rates.

Addresses the prohibition of double recovery when calculating attorney's fees using both current market rates and prejudgment interest.

Statutes construed: § 627.428

Yaimi Alvarez v. Raiza Cueto, etc.

Fla. 3d DCA Lindsey, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Family Affirmed in part; dismissed in part

Panel: Gordo, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order compelling the sale of marital property and a business to prevent foreclosure. Following a dissolution of marriage, the trial court entered a final judgment requiring the sale of certain real property and an assisted living facility business. After the former husband died, the personal representative of his estate moved to compel the sale of these assets. During the pendency of a prospective sale, the wife allowed mortgage payments on the property to become delinquent, leading to foreclosure proceedings. The trial court granted the motion to compel the sale to preserve the value of the marital estate and prevent foreclosure. The court dismissed the appellant's challenge to the award of attorney's fees as premature because the trial court had only addressed entitlement and had not yet set a specific amount.

The court dismissed an appeal of an attorney's fees award as premature because the trial court had only ruled on entitlement and had not yet determined the specific amount of fees and costs.

Amanda Miguel Collado Laguna v. The Berry Farm, LLC

Fla. 3d DCA Lobree, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Personal Injury/Tort Reversed and remanded

Panel: Miller, Gooden

Amanda Miguel Collado Laguna sued The Berry Farm, LLC for negligence after fracturing her ankle while using a slide at the defendant's agritourism facility. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of The Berry Farm, LLC, finding the defendant was immune from liability under section 570.88(1), Florida Statutes, because it had posted required notice signs pursuant to section 570.89, Florida Statutes. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant complied with the posting and notice requirements on the date of the incident. The court noted that the defendant's affidavit relied on photographs dated months after the injury and that the plaintiff's deposition testimony, stating no signs were present on the day of the incident, created a triable issue of fact that a jury must resolve.

Addresses the evidentiary requirements for an agritourism operator to invoke statutory immunity, specifically regarding the timing and presence of required warning signs.

Statutes construed: § 570.88, § 570.89, § 570.86

Victoria Friend LLC v. Tamiami Airport Service Center, Inc., et al.,

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Civil Reversed and remanded

Panel: Fernandez, Logue, Miller

Victoria Friend LLC appealed a non-final order denying its renewed motion for leave to amend its complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages. The trial court denied the motion because the proffered conduct did not meet a standard of being shocking, outrageous, or immoral. The Florida punitive damages statute requires a claimant to provide a reasonable basis for recovery by showing evidence of intentional misconduct or gross negligence. Because the trial court applied a standard not prescribed by the statute, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration of the motion.

The court addressed the improper application of a judicial standard for punitive damages that exceeds the statutory requirements of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.

Statutes construed: § 768.72

Dimo Veselinov Panov v. Irina Panova

Fla. 3d DCA Miller, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Family Petition dismissed

Panel: Fernandez, Lobree

Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to disqualify the trial judge from presiding over post-decretal dissolution proceedings after the trial court denied his verified motion for disqualification on its merits. Although the trial court exceeded the proper scope of its inquiry by ruling on the merits of the motion rather than its legal sufficiency, the trial judge was reassigned to a different division seven days after the denial. Because the reassignment of the judge to a different division renders the issue of disqualification moot, the petition is dismissed.

The court addressed the procedural error of a judge ruling on the merits of a disqualification motion, but ultimately found the issue moot due to the judge's reassignment to a different division.

L.C., the Mother v. Department of Children and Families, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Family Affirmed and remanded

Panel: Scales, Logue, Bokor

The Mother failed to appear at an adjudicatory hearing regarding a petition to terminate her parental rights, which resulted in a consent default. The trial court entered a final judgment terminating her parental rights. The trial court denied the Mother's motion to vacate the consent default. The court affirmed the denial of the motion and the final judgment, but remanded the case for the trial court to correct inadvertent scrivener's errors in the introduction section of the final judgment. These errors incorrectly stated that the Department was not seeking to terminate the Mother's rights and that the court had the opportunity to weigh evidence on each ground alleged in the petition. Because the errors had no substantive effect on the trial court's decision, they did not constitute reversible error.

Corrects scrivener's errors in a final judgment involving a consent default.

Statutes construed: § 39.801

Kristen Martinez v. Omar Guardia

Fla. 3d DCA Miller, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Family Affirmed

Panel: Gooden, Rebull

In a high-conflict dissolution proceeding, Kristen Martinez sought to disqualify the appellee's counsel, Perez-Abreu, alleging that the attorneys improperly obtained a financial interest in disputed properties by securing mortgages to cover unpaid legal fees. Martinez argued this conduct violated Rule 4-1.8 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. The trial court denied the motion, finding it was untimely and legally insufficient. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Martinez waived the right to seek disqualification by failing to act with reasonable promptness. The court noted that Martinez had constructive notice of the mortgages when they were recorded in June 2025 and actual notice by December 2025 when she filed a quiet title action. Despite this knowledge, Martinez continued to litigate multiple cases, including an ejectment action, and only moved for disqualification after losing that trial. Furthermore, the court found that substantial work had been performed in the dissolution case between the recording of the mortgages and the motion, suggesting the motion was a strategic attempt to gain an advantage and would prejudice the appellee.

Addresses the timeliness requirement for motions to disqualify counsel and the impact of constructive notice via recording statutes on the waiver of such motions.

Statutes construed: § 695.11

Morey Wright, Jr. v. Mike Gelin, et al

Fla. 4th DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: May, Shepherd, Shaw

Morey Wright, Jr. appealed a final judgment disqualifying him as a candidate for City of Tamarac Commissioner, District 2. Wright had filed a Form DS-DE 9 on the last day of the qualifying period to designate a campaign treasurer and depository. However, the form was incomplete: it failed to specify if the bank was a primary or secondary depository, failed to name a bank, and failed to specify whether Wright was appointing a treasurer or deputy treasurer. Additionally, while Wright checked a box to accept the appointment of deputy treasurer, he did not sign the form in the required section for the appointee's signature. Wright argued he had substantially complied with the statutory requirements and that the check used to pay his qualifying fee was drawn from a campaign account. The court held that the payment of the fee with a properly executed check drawn upon the primary campaign depository is a basic qualification requirement that must be strictly followed and is not subject to the doctrine of substantial compliance. Because Wright failed to designate a primary depository and failed to properly appoint himself as deputy treasurer, the fee was not paid from a primary campaign account. The court also noted that the City Clerk's acceptance of the papers did not excuse the incomplete filing, as the clerk performs a ministerial function and had no duty to notify the candidate of omissions filed on the last day of qualifying. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Strict compliance with basic election qualification requirements, specifically the proper designation of a primary campaign depository and the correct execution of forms, is mandatory and cannot be cured by substantial compliance.

Statutes construed: § 99.061, § 99.092, § 99.095, § 99.021, § 92.525, § 106.021, § 106.11

Taplin Falls, Ltd. and Taplin Meadows Development Corporation v. Jason Brown and Genelle Gordon

Fla. 4th DCA Klingensmith, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Civil Reversed and remanded

Panel: Gerber, White, Rebecca

In an uncontested landlord-tenant action, the trial court entered a final judgment that included a provision granting the landlord forty-five days to pursue attorney's fees and costs. The landlord filed a motion for attorney's fees on the forty-fifth day. Three months after the entry of the final judgment, the trial court sua sponte entered an order striking the provision, concluding the provision was legally erroneous. Based on this strike, the trial court denied the motion for attorney's fees as untimely. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked the authority to substantively modify the final judgment after the time for rehearing had expired. The court noted that while a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce a judgment, it cannot alter or modify a judgment except under the specific provisions of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.530 or 1.540. The court found that the trial court's action did not constitute a correction of a clerical mistake under Rule 1.540(a), nor did Rule 1.540(b)(1) allow for the correction of a judicial error regarding a mistaken view of the law. The court remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the provision and consider the motion for attorney's fees on its merits.

The case addresses the limits of a trial court's authority to sua sponte modify a final judgment to correct perceived legal errors after the expiration of the time for rehearing.

Jamaine Wayne Warren v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Klingensmith, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Gerber, White, Rebecca

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search incident to arrest. The appellant was arrested for driving with a suspended license after detectives, conducting surveillance, identified him as the registered owner of a vehicle and confirmed through databases that his license had been suspended eight months prior for failure to pay child support. The appellant argued the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe he knew of the suspension. The court held that the totality of the circumstances supported probable cause. The detective's experience regarding the notification process for child support-related suspensions, combined with the duration of the suspension, provided an objective basis to infer the appellant had notice of the suspension. The court noted that probable cause does not require direct confirmation of knowledge or trial-level proof of a defendant's state of mind.

Clarifies that probable cause for a 'knowing' driving offense can be established through reasonable inferences regarding the notification process and the duration of a suspension, even without direct evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge or receipt of notice.

Statutes construed: § 322.34, § 322.264, § 322.01, § 322.251

Gail Allen, et al v. Beth Israel Outpatient Surgical Center, LLC, et al.

Fla. 4th DCA May, J. Issued October 28, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Gross, Ciklin

Forty-one plaintiffs appealed the dismissal with prejudice of their Fourth Amended Complaint, which alleged medical malpractice, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil RICO violations, and civil conspiracy against twenty-two defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to perform unnecessary surgeries to collect money from the plaintiffs' personal injury settlements. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the complaint failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110. The court noted the pleading was overly convoluted, lacked specificity regarding which defendants committed which acts, and failed to identify the specific false statements, reliance, or damages required for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Furthermore, the complaint failed to allege an agreement for the conspiracy claim, failed to define a timeframe for the RICO claims, and failed to articulate a causal link between the alleged misrepresentations and any actual injury or damage suffered by the plaintiffs.

The case highlights the necessity of pleading specific facts, including who, what, when, and where, particularly in complex multi-plaintiff litigation involving allegations of widespread medical fraud and conspiracy.

John William Carroll v. Gloria Jo Gyland Weger

Fla. 4th DCA Per Curiam Issued October 28, 2026 Family Reversed and remanded

Panel: Gross, May, Ciklin

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment of protection against stalking because the trial court relied on an incident that was legally insufficient to support the injunction. The trial court had identified two incidents of harassment: one occurring on April 18, 2025, and an online review posted on May 15, 2025. In the May 15 incident, the appellant posted an online review of the appellee's employer accusing her of cheating on him while he was in the hospital. Although the court found the post had no legitimate purpose, the appellate court held that an online post containing accusations or embarrassing information does not meet the objective standard for causing substantial emotional distress. The court noted that such speech, even if false or offensive, is more appropriate for a defamation action rather than a stalking injunction. Because the May 15 incident did not qualify as harassment, the trial court's findings supported only a single episode of harassment, which is insufficient to meet the statutory requirement of repeated harassment.

The case clarifies that online reviews containing personal accusations or embarrassing information, even when lacking a legitimate purpose, do not inherently cause the level of substantial emotional distress required to support a stalking injunction under Florida law.

Statutes construed: § 784.0485, § 784.048

7 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 26, 2026

1 routine disposition (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 23, 2026

Real Estate Services Group, Inc. v. Mills, Hickory Lake Estates Owners' Association, Inc.

Fla. 2d DCA Villanti, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Reversed and remanded

Panel: Kelly, Atkinson

Real Estate Services Group, Inc. (RESG) appealed an agreed order that vacated a judicial foreclosure sale and directed the return of funds to the homeowner, Joseph Mills. RESG was the highest bidder at the sale and had been issued a certificate of sale. The trial court entered the agreed order ex parte after Mills filed an objection to the sale and proof of payment to the Association, but RESG was never served with the emergency motions or the proposed order. Because a third-party purchaser holds a protectable legal interest in property purchased at a foreclosure sale, the trial court violated RESG's due process rights by vacating the sale without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. The appellate court reversed the order and remanded the case for a noticed hearing on the homeowner's motion to vacate the sale.

Establishes that a third-party purchaser's interest in a foreclosure sale is a protectable legal interest requiring due process notice and a hearing before a sale is vacated.

Wilson v. State of Florida

Fla. 2d DCA Silberman, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Lucas, Smith

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and sentence of Brian John Wilson, who was convicted of battery following a jury trial involving charges of attempted sexual battery and sexual battery on a mentally defective person. Wilson challenged the trial court's decision to allow the developmentally disabled victim to testify while holding a teddy bear. The court held that under Florida Statutes, a trial court has the discretion to set just and appropriate conditions when taking the testimony of a person with an intellectual disability in sexual offense proceedings, and allowing the victim to hold a comfort item did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Wilson also raised a facial constitutional challenge to Florida Statutes, arguing that the use of a six-person jury instead of a twelve-person jury violated his constitutional rights. The court rejected this argument, noting that existing United States Supreme Court and Florida precedent establishes the constitutionality of six-person juries in noncapital cases and that no fundamental error occurred.

Addresses the use of comfort items by intellectually disabled victims during testimony and the constitutionality of six-person juries in noncapital criminal cases.

Statutes construed: § 92.55, § 913.10

Kalifa v. Department of Children and Families

Fla. 2d DCA LaRose, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: Khouzam, Black

A pro se detainee at the Florida Civil Commitment Center filed a mandamus petition seeking to be relocated to a specific dormitory due to alleged threats and physical altercations with other detainees. The trial court denied the petition, finding the petitioner lacked a legal right to a dormitory of his choice and failed to establish atypical and significant hardship. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief. The court noted that while correctional facilities have a duty to protect inmates from serious harm, the petitioner's allegations constituted mere possibilities of harm rather than a particularized threat establishing a strong likelihood of serious injury. The court further determined that the petitioner did not have an enforceable right to a specific dormitory, as institutional security and order must take precedence over individual preferences.

The case clarifies that mandamus is not the proper vehicle to establish a new enforceable right, such as a right to a specific dormitory, but is instead used to enforce existing legal rights. It also highlights the high evidentiary threshold required to prove a substantial risk of harm in a mandamus context involving inmate threats.

Statutes construed: § 394.910

Ryan Justin Wilder v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 23, 2026 Criminal Petition dismissed

Panel: Lindsey, Miller, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of an order denying a motion for continuance. Because a denial of a motion for continuance is a discretionary decision that can be reviewed through a plenary appeal, the court determined that certiorari was not the appropriate vehicle for relief.

The court noted that certiorari is an extraordinary writ requiring a departure from the essential requirements of law, which is a higher standard than the standard used for an appeal of right.

Luis Garcia v. Ruth Garcia

Fla. 5th DCA Soud, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Panel: Makar, Maciver

In a dissolution of marriage action, the trial court awarded the appellee $50,000 in attorney's fees due to the appellant's bad faith conduct. The trial court found that the appellant acted in bad faith by failing to timely provide or withholding discovery, specifically a notebook containing rental income and expense information, until the middle of trial. While the trial court determined the appellee did not have a need for fees, it found the appellant was entitled to an award based on his egregious actions. The appellate court affirmed the appellee's entitlement to attorney's fees and the court's equitable distribution of property. However, the court reversed the specific award of $50,000 because the trial judge made no findings to support the calculation of that amount. The case was remanded for the trial court to provide findings regarding the amount of attorney's fees it deems appropriate.

The court held that while a trial court may award attorney's fees based on a spouse's bad faith conduct regardless of need, the court must provide specific findings and reasoning to support the specific amount of the fee award.

Statutes construed: § 61.16

Angel E. Gaston v. Lifestream Behavioral Center, Inc.

Fla. 5th DCA Soud, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Makar, Eisnaugle

An indigent prisoner's civil complaint alleging false arrest and improper involuntary commitment was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint within the time required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j). The appellant argued that his status as an indigent prisoner required the clerk of court to assist him in issuing and effectuating service of the summons. The court held that while indigent prisoners may defer certain costs, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prepare the summons for issuance by the clerk. Because the appellant failed to present a completed summons to the clerk, the clerk had nothing to issue and the sheriff had nothing to serve. The trial court's dismissal was affirmed.

Clarifies the division of responsibility between an indigent prisoner plaintiff and the clerk of court regarding the preparation and issuance of summons.

Statutes construed: § 57.085, § 57.081, § 27.52, § 48.011, § 48.021, § 48.183, § 48.184

Giselle Guzman v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Per Curiam Issued October 23, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Traver, Stargel, Brownlee

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Collier County Circuit Court. The court addressed several legal issues including the admissibility of recordings containing partial inaudibility, the trial court's discretion regarding discovery violation sanctions, the hearsay rule as applied to out of court statements offered to show the effect on the listener, the trial court's discretion in controlling opening and closing statements, and the standard for granting a motion for a mistrial.

The opinion affirms a lower court ruling involving multiple discretionary determinations, including discovery sanctions and the granting of a mistrial.

Jennifer M. Rivera-Wagner, as Trustee of the Adiella Faith Living Estate Trust v. Samuel Wayne Wagner

Fla. 6th DCA Gannam, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Petition Dismissed

Panel: Nardella, Pratt

The petitioner, acting as trustee of the Adiella Faith Living Estate Trust, sought certiorari review of orders from the circuit court for Polk County. The lower tribunal required the petitioner to retain legal counsel to represent the trust and struck her pro se filings because she failed to comply with the retention order. The petitioner argued that the trust instrument prohibited attorney representation of the trust. The court held that because the petitioner is not an attorney, she cannot represent the trust in court proceedings without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The court further noted that the terms of a trust instrument cannot legally authorize a non-attorney to practice law.

Addresses the limitation of a non-attorney trustee representing a trust in court proceedings regardless of trust instrument provisions.

Gulf South Reo, LLC v. Wilson Andrew Garrett, Gulf South Reo Holdings, LLC, Sean Couch, Eric Matthew Couch, Phil Couch, Sheila Couch, and Benjamin Cromer

Fla. 6th DCA Wozniak, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Civil Reversed and Remanded

Panel: White, Brownlee

Gulf South REO, LLC appealed an order dismissing its complaint with prejudice against several appellees on the grounds that the claims were time-barred. The trial court determined that the most recent conduct alleged in the complaint occurred in 2018, making the 2025 filing subject to the applicable statutes of limitations. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that the trial court erred by failing to allow the appellant to amend its complaint. Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a), a party has an absolute right to amend its pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. Because no responsive pleading had been filed, the appellant was entitled to amend the complaint regardless of whether the amendment would be futile.

The case clarifies the absolute right to amend a complaint under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a) prior to the service of a responsive pleading, even when a dismissal for failure to state a claim or statute of limitations issues is being considered.

Robert Dwayne Harris v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC

Fla. 6th DCA Brownlee, J. Issued October 23, 2026 Civil Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded

Panel: Traver, Nardella

Appellant Robert Dwayne Harris appealed a final judgment of foreclosure, the denial of his motion for rehearing, and the denial of his motion to enjoin a foreclosure sale. Appellee Nationstar Mortgage, LLC conceded that the foreclosure judgment was entered without adequate notice to the Appellant, as he did not receive notice of the trial until after it had occurred. Because the lack of notice deprived the Appellant of the opportunity to be heard on his defenses, the appellate court accepted the concession of error, reversed the foreclosure judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Regarding the motion to enjoin the foreclosure sale, the court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief because the motion became moot when the sale took place. However, the reversal of the foreclosure judgment provides grounds for the parties to seek an order vacating the sale under the rules of civil procedure.

The case involves a concession of error by the appellee regarding a lack of notice for a foreclosure trial, leading to the reversal of the judgment.

4 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 22, 2026

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Traffic Court 6.100, 6.160, and 6.325

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Administrative Amended

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court amended Rule 6.160 of the Florida Rules of Traffic Court to align with recent changes to the criminal speedy trial rule. Under the amended rule, a defendant is considered formally charged for the purposes of Rule 3.191 when a traffic citation, notice to appear, summons, information, or indictment is served in lieu of arrest, or when the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. This change ensures that the speedy trial clock begins at the time of formal charge rather than at the time of arrest. The amendments are effective January 1, 2027.

The amendment modifies the trigger for speedy trial requirements in traffic infraction matters to match criminal procedure standards.

Statutes construed: § 318.30, § 318.13, § 775.15

In Re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar - Rule 20-6.1

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Administrative Amendments adopted

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court adopted proposed amendments to Rule 20-6.1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar regarding continuing education requirements for Florida Registered Paralegals. The amendments create a new subdivision allowing Florida Registered Paralegals to receive lecture credit for approved seminars, specifically up to 3 credit hours for every 50 minutes of lecture at basic seminars and up to 5 credit hours for every 50 minutes of lecture at intermediate seminars. The amendments also establish a new subdivision allowing the Executive Director or Board of Governors to grant extensions for completion of continuing education requirements in certain circumstances, such as emergencies, natural disasters, or government mandates, though extensions for individual members will not be considered. Additionally, the amendments clarify that any continuing education credits completed in excess of 30 hours during a reporting cycle cannot be carried over to the next cycle. The amendments become effective on December 21, 2026.

The amendments modify the continuing education rules specifically for Florida Registered Paralegals regarding lecture credits, extensions for good cause, and credit carryover limits.

In Re: Petition to Amend the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Administrative Granted with minor revisions

Panel: Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court granted a petition from the Florida Board of Bar Examiners to amend several rules relating to bar admissions. The amendments include a clarification in Rule 3-14.6 that the application of an applicant who has not passed all portions of the Florida Bar Examination may be inactivated rather than terminated if the applicant fails to comply with board requests. Such applications may be reactivated upon payment of a fee. Rule 4-46 was amended to extend the deadline for early notice of a bar examination postponement from 7 days to 14 days before the commencement of the examination. Additionally, the Court approved increases to various fees for applications, document copies, investigative and formal hearings, and postponements due to inflation and rising costs.

The decision modifies the procedural handling of incomplete bar applications and adjusts the fee schedule for the admissions process.

S.H., in the Interest of A.H. and K.W., the children v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem

Fla. Supreme Court Couriel, C.J. Issued October 22, 2026 Family Approved Sixth District; Disapproved First District

Panel: Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Supreme Court of Florida addressed whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) preempts the clear and convincing evidence standard required by Florida law for the termination of parental rights. S.H. challenged the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, K.W., an Indian child. Under section 1912(f) of the ICWA, a court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody will likely result in the child's serious harm. Conversely, Florida law requires the Department of Children and Families to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists, that termination is in the child's manifest best interest, and that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child. S.H. argued that the ICWA's beyond a reasonable doubt standard should apply to all findings necessary to terminate parental rights. The Court held that the ICWA does not preempt the distinct findings required under Florida law. The Court reasoned that the ICWA establishes minimum federal standards and allows states to provide higher standards of protection. Because the findings required by the ICWA and the findings required by Florida law are distinct, the state's clear and convincing evidence standard does not conflict with the federal beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The Court approved the decision of the Sixth District Court of Appeal and disapproved the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in J.P.H. v. Florida Department of Children & Families.

Resolves conflict regarding evidentiary burdens under ICWA versus Florida law.

Statutes construed: § 39.809, § 39.806

Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Rebecca Hughes

Fla. Supreme Court Couriel, C.J. Issued October 22, 2026 Insurance Affirmed Sixth District Court of Appeal decision.

Panel: Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court held that the presuit notice requirement established by section 627.70152, Florida Statutes, applies only prospectively and does not apply retroactively to insurance policies issued before the statute's effective date. The Court applied a two-step test to determine retroactivity, first seeking a clear legislative command for retroactive application within the statutory text. Finding no express command in the text, the Court concluded that the statute applies only to policies issued after July 1, 2021. Additionally, the Court determined that the provision is substantive rather than procedural, noting its similarity to the pre-suit notice requirements in section 768.57, Florida Statutes.

Resolves a conflict among Florida District Courts of Appeal regarding whether the statutory presuit notice requirement for property insurance claims applies to existing policies.

Statutes construed: § 627.70152, § 627.70131, § 627.736, § 624.21, § 768.57

In Re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar - Miscellaneous Petition

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Administrative Amended

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Supreme Court of Florida approved several amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Under amended Bylaw 2-3.11, The Florida Bar and its various committees and divisions are authorized to conduct votes via email or electronic polling in exigent circumstances, such as emergencies or impending deadlines. Amended Rule 4-7.20 exempts sponsored search engine results from filing requirements if they do not include images, audio, or video other than the permissible content allowed in advertisements. Amended Rule 6-12.7 clarifies that files and proceedings of the board of legal specialization and education regarding a member's failure to meet basic skills course requirements remain confidential until proceedings conclude, unless disclosed for board duties, by written request of the member, or as evidence in proceedings. Amended Rule 20-5.2 requires Florida registered paralegals to notify their employing or supervising lawyer of any changes to their registration status. Additionally, Rule 1-3.7 was amended regarding reinstatement eligibility, specifying that members retired or delinquent for less than five years but more than three years must complete ten hours of continuing legal education for each year of retirement or delinquency, while those retired or delinquent for five years or more must apply for readmission through the Florida Board of Bar Examiners. The Court declined to amend Rule 1-12.1 at this time.

The amendments update rules regarding electronic voting, advertisement exemptions, confidentiality of legal specialization proceedings, paralegal notification duties, and reinstatement procedures for retired or delinquent members.

Daniel Jacob Craven, Jr. v. State of Florida & Daniel Jacob Craven, Jr. v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Criminal Affirmed; Habeas Corpus Denied

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios

Daniel Jacob Craven, Jr., a prisoner sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of his cellmate, appealed the denial of his initial and successive motions for postconviction relief, his request for additional public records from the Florida Department of Corrections, and his motion to transport for imaging and testing. He also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court denied his postconviction motions, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a court reporter read back statements made by a juror during selection. Craven also challenged the admission of testimony regarding the victim's character and religious background, arguing it constituted improper victim impact evidence. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court's orders and denied the habeas corpus petition. The Court held that the testimony regarding the victim's nickname and religious status was not victim impact evidence intended to demonstrate uniqueness or community loss, but was instead used to identify the victim and establish motive. Because Craven did not object to this testimony at trial, the issue was unpreserved, and its admission did not constitute fundamental error.

The case addresses the distinction between improper victim impact evidence and testimony used for identification or motive, as well as the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding unpreserved trial issues.

Statutes construed: § 921.141, § 922.10, § 922.105, § 119.071, § 945.10, § 119.07

Rigoberto Dorticos v. Infinity Auto Insurance Company, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Insurance Affirmed

Panel: Miller, Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding an insurance coverage dispute. The court held that a single policy provision must be construed in light of the entire contract, including applications, endorsements, and riders. Under Florida statutes, if a named insured signs the required form, there is a conclusive presumption of an informed and knowing rejection of coverage or an election of lower limits for all insureds. Where an insured selects specific coverage options on a form and remits the corresponding premium, the selection is binding and does not create ambiguity regarding the coverage provided.

The decision reinforces the conclusive presumption of an informed rejection of coverage when a named insured signs the appropriate statutory forms.

Statutes construed: § 627.727

Manuel v. Feijoo, M.D., P.A., etc. v. Progressive Select Insurance Company

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Insurance Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Gordo, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a summary final judgment in favor of Progressive Select Insurance Company. The court held that an affirmative defense is properly pled if it includes ultimate facts sufficient to provide notice of the proof the defendant intends to rely upon to defeat a claim, even if the defense was not previously asserted in an answer. In the context of personal injury protection benefits, submitting to an examination under oath is a condition precedent to receiving benefits under the applicable statute and policy. Because this requirement is a condition precedent, prejudice is not an element of the insurer's affirmative defense.

Clarifies that an affirmative defense is properly pled when it provides sufficient notice of the intended proof and confirms that failure to submit to an examination under oath is a condition precedent to PIP benefits where prejudice is not required to be proven.

Statutes construed: § 627.736

Manuel Garcia, et al. v. The Bank of New York Mellon, etc., et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Miller, Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order granting final summary judgment in a foreclosure action. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the order and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding standing. The court noted that to defeat summary judgment, a non-movant must produce evidence showing a genuine and material factual dispute, as summary judgment may be granted if the evidence provided by the non-movant is merely colorable or not significantly probative.

The opinion affirms a summary judgment order, applying the de novo standard of review for both the order and the evidentiary sufficiency regarding standing.

Joshua Fonollosa, et al. v. American Integrity Insurance Company of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Insurance Affirmed

Panel: Miller, Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision regarding a statutory bad faith claim. Under section 624.155, Florida Statutes, a civil remedy notice must specify the statutory provision allegedly violated, the facts and circumstances of the violation, and any relevant policy language. In this matter, the insured's bad faith claim failed because the civil remedy notice did not comply with these specificity requirements. Additionally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when denying a motion for reconsideration or rehearing that raises issues not presented in the initial motion or hearing.

The decision reinforces the strict specificity requirements for a civil remedy notice in statutory bad faith claims under section 624.155, Florida Statutes.

Statutes construed: § 624.155, § 768.72

Herbert Jean v. Bayview Asset Management LLC, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Miller, Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. The court relied on the law of the case doctrine, which requires a trial court to follow prior appellate rulings when the underlying facts remain unchanged. The court also noted that under Florida statutes, a court must issue an order confirming an arbitration award unless the award is modified, corrected, or vacated. Finally, the court noted that relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence is rarely granted and requires the party seeking relief to demonstrate due diligence.

The opinion reinforces the mandatory nature of confirming arbitration awards and the high standard for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence.

Statutes construed: § 682.12, § 682.10, § 682.14, § 682.13

Jean Paul Bernal, et al. v. Rigoberto Dorticos, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Civil Affirmed

Panel: Miller, Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court decision regarding the application of statutory limits on liability. The court applied the principle that unambiguous statutory language must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Specifically, the court referenced Florida Statutes regarding the lifting of liability limits for commercial motor vehicles, noting that such limits are lifted if the vehicle is being used in the transportation of hazardous materials at the time of the incident. The court also noted that a statutory damage cap does not constitute an affirmative defense because it does not bar or void the cause of action.

The case reinforces the rule of statutory construction that clear and unambiguous language precludes the use of extrinsic materials or judicial construction to alter the plain meaning of a statute.

Statutes construed: § 324.021

Lazaro Santana v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Gordo, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that counsel is permitted to review evidence and discuss logical inferences drawn from properly admitted testimony during closing arguments. Attorneys are afforded great latitude in closing arguments provided they confine their arguments to the facts, evidence presented to the jury, and logical deductions from that evidence. Prosecutors may argue and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, including arguing that one witness should be believed over another based on the record. Additionally, testimony from an officer regarding a witness's initial identification of a perpetrator by name is not hearsay if the identifying witness testifies to that effect at trial.

The opinion clarifies the scope of permissible closing arguments and the non-hearsay nature of certain identification testimony.

Christon Moore v. State of Florida

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 22, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Gordo, Lobree, Gooden

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County. The court addressed issues regarding the invocation of rights and the denial of a continuance. The court held that law enforcement officers are not required to cease questioning immediately upon an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. Furthermore, the court noted that a request for a continuance made on the day of trial by a defendant electing to proceed pro se is within the trial court's discretion to deny, especially when such a request is untimely or serves as a ploy to avoid trial.

Clarifies the standard for equivocal assertions of rights and the discretion of trial courts regarding untimely requests for continuances by pro se defendants.

4 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 21, 2026

Estrada v. State of Florida

Fla. 1st DCA Ray, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Lewis, M.K. Thomas

Alexander Estrada appealed his sentence for unlawful sexual activity with a minor, challenging his designation as a habitual felony offender and the requirement to pay for electronic monitoring during sex offender probation. The court affirmed both aspects of the sentence. Regarding the habitual felony offender designation, the court held that Estrada failed to preserve the issue because he did not make a contemporaneous objection during sentencing, and the claim could not be raised for the first time via a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. Even if preserved, the error was harmless because the record contained sufficient evidence, including certified judgments and fingerprint evidence, that a rational jury would have found the facts necessary for the designation beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding the electronic monitoring costs, the court held that because the payment obligation is mandated by statute, the trial court was not required to orally pronounce the requirement at sentencing. Once the court imposed electronic monitoring, the obligation to pay followed by operation of law.

Addresses preservation of sentencing challenges and the necessity of oral pronouncement for statutory probation conditions.

Statutes construed: § 775.084, § 948.11, § 948.09

Clinical Specialty Infusions of Dallas, LLC v. Florida Office of Insurance Regulation

Fla. 1st DCA Per Curiam Issued October 21, 2026 Administrative Affirmed

Panel: Bilbrey, Treadwell, Neff

Clinical Specialty Infusions of Dallas, LLC appealed the denial of its petition for a declaratory statement by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. The petitioner sought an opinion on whether a specific statute required an unnamed pharmacy benefit manager to include the petitioner in its pharmacy benefit plan or program specialty network. The Florida Office of Insurance Regulation denied the petition because it sought a declaratory statement concerning the conduct of another person rather than the petitioner's own conduct. The court affirmed the denial, holding that a petition for declaratory statement must apply to the petitioner's particular circumstances to allow the petitioner to select a proper course of action. Because the statute in question applies to contracts between pharmacy benefit managers and pharmacy benefit plans rather than the conduct of pharmacies, the petition improperly sought an opinion regarding the actions of a third party.

Clarifies the scope of a petition for declaratory statement, noting it must address the petitioner's own circumstances and cannot be used solely to determine the application of a statute to the conduct of a third party.

Statutes construed: § 120.565, § 120.68, § 626.8825, § 465.003

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Rosanna Weber, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 21, 2026 Insurance Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions

Panel: Gordo, Lobree, Bokor

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation appealed a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees and costs to its insureds, Rosanna and Randy Weber. The appellant challenged the trial court's application of a contingency fee multiplier to the appellees' trial co-counsel and the calculation of post-judgment interest at a fixed rate. The court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and the contingency fee multiplier because the trial court's decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence. However, the court reversed the portion of the judgment regarding post-judgment interest. Because the judgment erroneously provided for a constant interest rate, the court remanded the case with instructions to amend the judgment to provide for a variable interest rate that is adjusted annually in accordance with section 55.03(3), Florida Statutes.

The court addressed the proper calculation of post-judgment interest, noting that interest rates must be adjusted annually rather than remaining at a constant rate.

Statutes construed: § 55.03

Boris Jean-Philippe Vulac v. Cvar International LLC

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 21, 2026 Real Property/Foreclosure Affirmed

Panel: Fernandez, Logue, Bokor

In an eviction action, the tenant waived his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service by filing a permissive counterclaim seeking $50,000 for emotional distress and reputational damage. Because the tenant interposed defenses other than the defense of payment and failed to pay the accrued rent into the registry of the court, the trial court was required to enter a default judgment for removal and a writ of possession. Under Florida statutes, failure to pay the rent into the registry or file a motion to determine the amount of rent to be paid constitutes an absolute waiver of all defenses except the defense of payment.

The filing of a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief waives a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction resulting from defective service.

Statutes construed: § 83.60

Melissa Azrack, etc. v. John M. McDonald, etc.

Fla. 3d DCA Bokor, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Affirmed in part, dismissed in part

Panel: Gordo, Lobree

In two related appeals, Melissa Azrack challenged a final judgment in a probate proceeding regarding the homestead status of property owned by the decedent, Malcolm Dorman. The trial court found that Dorman was neither the legal nor biological parent of Azrack's child, E.M.A., because a sperm donor agreement established Azrack as the sole intended parent and precluded Dorman from retaining parental rights. The court alternatively found that the property in question was not Dorman's protected homestead. Azrack appealed the paternity findings and moved to vacate or reconsider the judgment. The appellate court dismissed the appeal of the post-judgment motions because Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is not available in a non-adversary probate proceeding. The court affirmed the judgment regarding the paternity findings because Azrack failed to challenge the independent ground of the homestead determination. Finally, the court found no error in the judgment's recitation of Azrack's individual capacity and dismissed the portion of the appeal regarding her individual status as moot and premature.

The court clarified that motions to vacate under Rule 1.540 are unauthorized in non-adversary probate proceedings and that failure to challenge an independent ground for a judgment results in affirmance.

Stanley Conway v. Nina Lee Wallin

Fla. 3d DCA Per Curiam Issued October 21, 2026 Family Reversed and remanded

Panel: Scales, Gordo, Rebull

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a non-final order in which the trial court conditioned the appellant's temporary timesharing with three minor children on the willingness of the eldest child to participate. The court held that under section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, the determination of timesharing is a non-delegable judicial duty that must be based on the best interests of each individual child. By making the eldest child the decision maker, the trial court improperly abdicated its authority, particularly because the eldest child's refusal to participate functioned as a veto for the timesharing of the younger siblings as well. The case was remanded for the trial court to enter a timesharing schedule based on its own determination of the best interests of each minor child.

The court clarified that conditioning timesharing on the consent of a child is an error because it delegates judicial authority to a third party.

Statutes construed: § 61.13

E.M.A., et al. v. In Re: Estate of Malcolm Joel Dorman, et al.

Fla. 3d DCA Bokor, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Affirmed in part, dismissed in part

Panel: Gordo, Lobree

In two related appeals, Melissa Azrack challenged a final judgment in a probate proceeding regarding the homestead status of property belonging to the estate of Malcolm Dorman. The trial court had determined that Dorman was not the legal or biological father of Azrack's child, E.M.A., because a sperm donor agreement provided that Azrack would be the sole intended parent and Dorman would surrender his parental rights. The court also found that even if paternity were established, the property in question was not Dorman's protected homestead. Azrack appealed the paternity findings and subsequently moved to vacate or reconsider the judgment. The appellate court dismissed the appeal of the post-judgment motions because Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is not available in a non-adversary probate proceeding. The court affirmed the judgment regarding the paternity findings because Azrack failed to challenge the independent ground of the homestead determination, which rendered the paternity issue harmless error. Finally, the court dismissed Azrack's challenge to the judgment's application to her in her individual capacity as being moot and premature.

The court held that Rule 1.540 is unavailable in non-adversary probate proceedings and that failure to challenge an independent ground of a judgment on appeal is fatal to the appeal.

Herman Lindsey v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Shaw, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Criminal Reversed and remanded

Panel: Forst, Shepherd

Herman Lindsey appeals the denial of his petition to determine wrongful incarceration and eligibility for compensation under section 961.03, Florida Statutes. Lindsey was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery in 2006, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed his convictions in 2009 and directed a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence. Following legislative amendments on July 1, 2025, which created a grace period for previously ineligible persons to seek compensation, Lindsey filed a petition. The circuit court denied the petition based on arguments regarding the petition being unsworn and untimely, despite Lindsey filing an amended sworn petition. The State conceded that the circuit court failed to follow the procedures required by section 961.03. The appellate court accepted the State's confession of error and reversed the denial, remanding the case for the circuit court to follow the statutory procedures.

The case involves the application of newly amended statutes regarding compensation for wrongfully incarcerated persons and a confession of error by the State regarding procedural compliance.

Statutes construed: § 961.03, § 961.04

Chelsea Henry v. David Rice

Fla. 4th DCA May, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Family Reversed and remanded

Panel: Gerber, Klingensmith

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed an interim temporary timesharing order that modified a parenting plan during a pending petition for modification. The trial court had held a hearing on a motion for contempt but declined to hear the contempt arguments, stating they must be heard alongside the pending petition for modification. Despite this, the trial court issued an interim order that changed the child's primary residence to the father, required exchanges to occur at the Indian River County Sheriff's Office, and restricted the mother's timesharing to Indian River County. The appellate court held that because the only motion noticed for the hearing was for contempt, the court violated due process by adjudicating issues not presented in the pleadings and by modifying timesharing while a petition for modification was pending without a finding of an emergency or an evidentiary hearing.

The case clarifies that a trial court cannot modify timesharing or primary residence at a contempt hearing when a petition for modification is pending, unless there is a demonstrated emergency or an evidentiary hearing is conducted.

Statutes construed: § 61.13

Jose Marcial Torres v. State of Florida

Fla. 4th DCA Levine, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Klingensmith, Lott

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the admission of recorded interview videos in which an uncertified community service officer acted as an interpreter. The appellant argued that the lack of a certified interpreter violated his due process rights under the United States and Florida Constitutions. The court held that due process does not constitutionally require the use of a certified interpreter, noting that while certification may be a best practice, it is not a constitutional mandate. The court further determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videos because sufficient safeguards were in place to ensure the reliability of the translation. These safeguards included the officer's testimony regarding her fluency and the appropriateness of the appellant's responses during the recorded interaction, the fact that the officer had no investigative role, and the availability of the recording for defense review prior to trial.

Addresses whether the due process clause requires the use of a certified interpreter for recorded law enforcement interviews.

Statutes construed: § 90.606

Bianca Rampartap v. Darryl Rampartap

Fla. 4th DCA Shepherd, J. Issued October 21, 2026 Family Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Panel: Gerber, Lott

In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the former wife appealed a final judgment adopting a hearing officer's recommended order regarding child support. The hearing officer had calculated the former wife's monthly income by adding her actual gross income to $8,600 per month, which represented the contributions made by her new husband toward mortgage and household expenses. The trial court adopted these findings and entered a final judgment. The appellate court reversed the portion of the judgment that imputed the new spouse's household expense contributions as income to the former wife. The court held that under section 61.30(2)(a)13. and section 61.046(8) of the Florida Statutes, income must consist of payments made to an individual. Because the new spouse's payments for the mortgage and household expenses were made for the household and were not direct payments to the former wife, they did not meet the statutory definition of income. The court affirmed the remaining issues and remanded the case for the trial court to recalculate child support based on the former wife's actual income.

The court clarified that a new spouse's contributions to household expenses do not constitute 'income' for child support purposes unless those contributions are actual payments made to the former spouse.

Statutes construed: § 61.30, § 61.046

8 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 16, 2026

Syed Imran Ali v. Saba Shoukat

Fla. 5th DCA Soud, J. Issued October 16, 2026 Family Reversed in part and affirmed in part

Panel: Boatwright, Kilbane

In a dissolution of marriage proceeding involving a marriage of 249 days, the trial court awarded the former wife bridge-the-gap alimony for a period of nine months. The trial court noted that the former wife did not introduce evidence regarding the specific time period necessary to bridge the gap to self-support, other than her request for lump sum alimony based on her inability to support herself for several months. Instead, the trial court relied on case law to determine the duration of the award. The appellate court reversed this award, holding that the requesting party bears the burden of proving need and that the statute requires the identification of legitimate identifiable short-term needs. The court determined that the former wife's testimony regarding a need for assistance for a few months was insufficient to inform the court of the proper duration of alimony and that case law cannot substitute for admitted evidence regarding specific short-term needs and the time such needs will exist.

The court held that a trial court cannot use case law to determine the duration of bridge-the-gap alimony when the requesting party fails to provide specific evidence regarding the duration and nature of their identifiable short-term needs.

Statutes construed: § 61.08

State of Florida v. Steven Ray Gunter

Fla. 5th DCA Per Curiam Issued October 16, 2026 Criminal REVERSED and REMANDED

Panel: Makar, Harris, Maciver

The State appealed from a trial court order granting a motion to dismiss a charge of possessing a driver license with an altered sexual predator designation. The trial court granted the motion based on a divided panel decision which held that the designation constituted impermissibly compelled speech. While the appeal was pending, the court issued an en banc decision rejecting the First Amendment challenge and holding that the designation does not compel speech. The Florida Supreme Court declined jurisdiction and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Because this is a pipeline case, the trial court order is reversed in light of the en banc decision and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The case involves the application of a subsequent en banc decision to a pending appeal where the initial dismissal was based on a previously controlling divided panel opinion.

Rogelio Jose Dacosta v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Brownlee, J. Issued October 16, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Wozniak, Mize

Appellant Rogelio Jose Dacosta appealed an order of restitution for $11,911 following a no contest plea to unlawful contracting. He argued the amount was based on inadmissible hearsay because the trial court relied on a victim's check stubs to determine costs for repairing deficient work. He also argued the restitution amount included sums from check stubs unrelated to the offense. The court affirmed the order. Regarding the hearsay argument, the court noted that although the State conceded error, section 775.089(7), Florida Statutes, allows trial courts to consider hearsay at restitution hearings if the evidence has a minimal indicia of reliability. Because the trial court expressly found the check stubs had the requisite reliability and the appellant did not challenge that finding on appeal, the issue was waived. Regarding the argument that the award included unrelated sums, the court held that the appellant failed to provide sufficient information to show that the specific check stubs he identified were included in the total amount awarded.

The court rejected the State's concession of error regarding hearsay, noting that statutory amendments allow for the use of hearsay in restitution hearings if the court finds a minimal indicia of reliability.

Statutes construed: § 489.127, § 775.089

Elijah Johnson v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Wozniak, J. Issued October 16, 2026 Criminal Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Stargel, Nardella

Elijah Johnson appealed an order revoking his community control and sentencing him to twelve years of incarceration. During proceedings, Johnson stated, 'I’m ready to be pro se, sir' and 'Defend myself. Yeah, defend myself.' The trial court denied his request to defend himself without conducting a Faretta hearing. Because Johnson made an unequivocal request to represent himself, the trial court's failure to conduct a Faretta hearing constituted fundamental error. The appellate court reversed the revocation order and the sentence, remanding the case for a Faretta hearing.

The court held that a trial court's failure to hold a hearing after a defendant makes an unequivocal request for self-representation during a violation of community control proceeding is per se reversible error.

James Gainvors v. State of Florida

Fla. 6th DCA Brownlee, J. Issued October 16, 2026 Criminal Affirmed

Panel: Wozniak, Smith

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction of James Gainvors for manslaughter. Gainvors was charged with second-degree murder after shooting Matthew Hanson, who had aggressively approached Gainvors's home while shouting threats and carrying a concealed knife. During a pretrial immunity hearing, the trial court denied Gainvors's claim of immunity under Florida's Stand Your Ground law, finding that the evidence showed Hanson had stopped his advance and placed his hands on his hips before the shot was fired. Although the dissenting opinion noted that the trial court likely erred by not requiring the State to rebut the immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence, the dissent concluded that this error was rendered harmless because the State met the higher burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

The case addresses the harmless error doctrine regarding a trial court's incorrect application of the burden of proof during a pretrial immunity hearing when the State subsequently meets the higher burden of proof at trial.

Statutes construed: § 776.012, § 776.032, § 784.021

Susan Reed and Kent Lonngren v. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation

Fla. 6th DCA Stargel, J. Issued October 16, 2026 Insurance Affirmed

Panel: Mize, Gannam

Appellants Susan Reed and Kent Lonngren appealed a final summary judgment granted in favor of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. Following Hurricane Ian, Appellants filed a breach of contract lawsuit alleging Citizens failed to complete the appraisal process within ninety days as required by statute. During the litigation, the parties engaged in the appraisal process, and an umpire issued an award in favor of Appellants. Citizens paid the award within sixty days as required by the policy. Appellants argued that Citizens' payment of the appraisal award constituted a confession of judgment, entitling them to prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Citizens, finding that Citizens complied with the policy and timely paid the award. The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the confession of judgment doctrine does not apply when the claims process has not broken down, the insured did not need to file suit to obtain recovery, and the insured instead engages in a race to the courthouse. The court noted that Citizens accepted coverage, conducted investigations, and promptly invoked appraisal and paid the resulting award, meaning the lawsuit was not a necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute.

Clarifies the application of the confession of judgment doctrine in the context of an insured filing suit while the appraisal process is ongoing.

Statutes construed: § 627.70152

9 routine dispositions (per curiam, citation, and similar)

Opinions released October 15, 2026

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 15, 2026 Civil Amended

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

The Florida Supreme Court amended Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(h) regarding the setting of new trial periods. The Court declined the Civil Procedure Rules Committee's proposal to amend subsection (h) but instead modified the rule to require that when a case does not reach trial during a period set by court order, the court must enter an order setting a new trial period as soon as practicable. In determining this new period, the court must consider the availability of the parties, the needs of the case, and the resources of the court. The order resetting the trial period must also specify what further activity will or will not be permitted. These amendments become effective on January 1, 2027.

Rule Amendment

In Re: Amendments to Florida Probate Rules - 2026 Legislation

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 15, 2026 Probate/Guardianship Amendments adopted

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

Following recent legislative changes, the Florida Supreme Court amended Probate Rules 5.122 and 5.905. Under the amended Rule 5.122, the court must determine the amount of any bond required of a curator. Additionally, notice of a curator's appointment must be provided to other interested persons, unless such notice would cause a delay that creates a significant danger of the decedent's property being wasted, destroyed, or removed beyond the court's jurisdiction. Regarding Rule 5.905, the amendment adds Tatton-Brown-Rahman syndrome to the list of disorders and syndromes that constitute a developmental disability for the purposes of a petition for the appointment of a guardian advocate of the person.

The amendments implement statutory changes from the 2026 legislative session regarding curator bond requirements, notice procedures, and the definition of developmental disabilities.

Statutes construed: § 733.501, § 393.063, § 393.12, § 709.2209

Henry Lee Jones v. State of Florida

Fla. Supreme Court Couriel, C.J. Issued October 15, 2026 Criminal Reversed and remanded for a new trial

Panel: Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Barrios, Tanenbaum

Henry Lee Jones, convicted of and sentenced to death for the 2003 murder of Carlos Perez, sought postconviction relief following the denial of his initial rule 3.851 motion. The State had possessed Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) conversation logs prior to trial that contained analyst opinions stating it was highly unlikely that DNA from Deborah Williams Bello found on the victim's penis resulted from secondary transfer via an unwashed comforter, suggesting instead that direct contact was more likely. The State did not disclose these logs during discovery, and the lead detective did not disclose the existence of these conversations during a deposition. At trial, the State relied on a secondary transfer theory to explain the presence of Bello's DNA on the victim. The postconviction court found that the State had withheld the logs either willfully or inadvertently and that the evidence was favorable to the defense, but it concluded the evidence was not exculpatory. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the withheld evidence was material impeachment evidence that could have been used to impeach State witnesses and attack the thoroughness of the investigation. The Court ordered Jones's conviction to be set aside and remanded the case for a new trial.

The case addresses the Brady obligation regarding impeachment evidence, specifically how withheld forensic analyst opinions regarding DNA transfer theories can be used to impeach witnesses and challenge the quality of a criminal investigation.

The Florida Bar v. Clayton Bowers Studstill

Fla. Supreme Court Per Curiam Issued October 15, 2026 Administrative Reversed and Remanded

Panel: Couriel, Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, Tanenbaum, Barrios

The Supreme Court of Florida disapproved a referee's recommendation that Clayton Bowers Studstill be found not guilty of professional misconduct. The Court found that Studstill violated Rules 4-3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) and 4-3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel). During a paternity trial, Studstill spoke with a sequestered expert witness in the hallway regarding the authentication of text messages. When questioned by the trial judge about this contact, Studstill initially claimed he was merely releasing the witness, but later changed his story to state he was checking to see if she was still present. The witness later testified that Studstill had discussed the status of specific exhibits with her. Although the referee found that Studstill's illogical and untruthful behavior was likely caused by delirium resulting from COVID-19, the Court held him guilty of the violations. The case was remanded to a new referee to determine appropriate discipline.

The case involves the intersection of medical impairment (COVID-induced delirium) and the duty of candor and fairness when a lawyer violates a sequestration order and provides inconsistent accounts to the court.

Statutes construed: § 90.616

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