A word of caution, because somebody ought to say it: nothing below is finished business.
In Florida, the losing party gets fifteen days after an opinion comes down to ask for a rehearing — a chance for the court to reconsider, or fix something, or occasionally just change its mind. Until that window closes, or the motion gets resolved, the mandate hasn't issued and the opinion isn't final. It can still be amended. It can be withdrawn. It can vanish entirely and never happen, as far as the law is concerned.
So read these as first drafts of history, not as settled law. If one of these cases matters to your situation, check the docket before you build anything on top of it. The ink is still wet.
New opinions from the Florida Supreme Court and the six District Courts of Appeal, collected twice weekly, with summaries, practice areas, and the statutes each opinion construes. Most recent opinions: July 14, 2026.
Summaries are drafted by an AI model reading each opinion and are provided for scanning convenience only. They are not legal advice and may contain errors: always read the opinion itself before relying on it.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the termination of parental rights. The court noted that a meritorious defense must include arguments regarding the grounds for termination, the best interests of the child, and the least restrictive means for protecting the child. The court also noted that a motion to vacate is without merit when the moving party offers only a vague and underdeveloped suggestion of a potential defense to one statutory ground while failing to offer any defense to the other statutory grounds alleged by the Department of Children and Families.
The court clarified the requirements for a meritorious defense in a motion to vacate a termination of parental rights order.
The court reversed and remanded the trial court's order enforcing a pre-insolvency settlement agreement between the appellees and their former insurer. The trial court had originally ordered the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) to pay both the amount for covered claims and the amount for pre-insolvency attorney's fees. The appellate court held that the attorney's fees must be excluded because they accrued before FIGA was substituted as the post-insolvency insurer and therefore did not result from FIGA's denial of a covered claim. Furthermore, the court determined that these fees were not part of a covered claim because they arose from a post-loss settlement agreement rather than coverage within the insurance policy. The court also ordered the exclusion of pre-judgment interest because the statute prohibits FIGA from being liable for such interest on a covered claim.
The court clarified that FIGA is not liable for attorney's fees that accrue before its substitution as the post-insolvency insurer or for fees arising from a post-loss settlement agreement rather than policy coverage. Additionally, the court affirmed that FIGA is not liable for pre-judgment interest on covered claims.
The State of Florida appealed the dismissal of an Information charging the defendant with trafficking in substituted cathinones. The trial court dismissed the Information after finding that cyputylone was not a substituted cathinone under section 893.03(1)(c)191., Florida Statutes. The trial court based its decision on the rule of lenity, concluding that there were two reasonable interpretations of the term 'alkyl' and that cyputylone, which was modified with a cycloalkyl group, did not fall under the statutory definition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal. The court held that the plain language of the statute, specifically the phrases 'whether or not' and 'with or without,' indicates that the specific nature of the modification is irrelevant to the determination of whether a substance is a substituted cathinone. The court found that because cyputylone is a compound described in section 893.03(1)(c)191.a., it is a substituted cathinone regardless of whether the modification is an alkyl group or a cycloalkyl group. The court concluded that the statutory language is inclusive and that the specific identity of the modification does not exempt the substance from the definition.
The court clarified the interpretation of the phrases 'whether or not' and 'with or without' in the context of chemical substance definitions. The court held that these phrases signify that the specific nature of a modification is not a factor in determining if a substance meets the statutory definition of a substituted cathinone.
The Bank of New York appeals the trial court's order overruling its objection to a foreclosure sale and denying its motion to vacate the sale. The bank argued that the Osceola County Clerk of Court created irregularities by requiring a pre-sale affidavit to bid an amount exceeding the face value of the judgment. The bank claimed the clerk's actions prevented it from bidding the judgment amount plus statutory interest. The trial court found that the clerk did not prevent the bank from bidding but did advise the bank that an affidavit was required to bid over the judgment amount. The appellate court held that the bank failed to show any equitable grounds for setting aside the sale because it did not prove that the sale irregularities resulted in an injustice to the bank. The court found competent, substantial evidence that the clerk did not prevent the bank from bidding and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate.
The court clarifies the requirements for a motion to vacate a foreclosure sale, noting that a mere allegation of a single factor or a specific combination of factors is insufficient. A party must make a proper showing of adequate equitable factors, such as gross inadequacy of consideration, surprise, accident, mistake, or irregularity in the conduct of the sale, that result in an injustice to the party.
The petitioner, a resident of Lee County, filed a petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence in Collier County against a respondent who also resided in Lee County. The trial court dismissed the petition for improper venue, citing the special venue provision in Florida Statute 741.30(1)(j) and the fact that the parties' related family case was proceeding in Lee County. The appellate court held that the trial court erred. Because the special venue provision in section 741.30(1)(j) overrides the general provisions in chapter 47, a petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence may be filed in the circuit where the petitioner resides, where the respondent resides, or where the domestic violence occurred. The court found that the petition was filed in a proper venue because both Lee and Collier counties are within the same judicial circuit. The court further noted that the existence of other litigation between the parties in a different county does not affect the applicability of the special venue provision. The court reversed and remanded the case.
The court clarified that a specific venue statute for domestic violence injunctions overrides general venue provisions, and the existence of related litigation in a different county does not invalidate a proper venue under the specific statute.
The defendant appealed her conviction for driving under the influence, arguing that the trial court should have granted her motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to establish she was in actual physical control of her vehicle. The defendant contended that evidence showed her key was not in the ignition. The court determined that the defendant's argument actually challenged the weight of the evidence rather than its sufficiency. Because the appellate court cannot reweigh evidence to determine if one set of facts is better than another, the court affirmed the conviction. The court noted that the defendant did not raise any arguments regarding the legal interpretation of the term actual physical control.
The court clarified that a motion for judgment of acquittal is based on the sufficiency of the evidence. When a defendant argues that a different set of facts would have led to a different result, they are challenging the weight of the evidence, which is not grounds for appellate reversal.
Statutes construed: § 316.193
The appellant challenged the imposition of $250 in 'Additional SAO Costs of Prosecution Fees' on her Monetary Obligations Order. The State conceded that it failed to provide evidence of costs exceeding $100. The court agreed with the appellant and the State's concession, finding the $250 fee improper under Florida law. The court reversed the $250 fee and remanded the case for the trial court to enter a corrected order for $100 in state attorney costs of prosecution. The court noted that the appellant's presence is not required for this ministerial correction. The judgment and sentence were affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The court addressed the specific amount of attorney costs of prosecution allowed under Florida law, correcting an over-imposition of fees.
Statutes construed: § 938.27
The trial court erred by denying a motion for relief from a default judgment under Rule 1.540(b) without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The appellant, a pro se litigant, moved for relief after failing to appear at a hearing due to a calendaring error. She supported her motion with a sworn statement attesting to the mistake. Because the motion presented a colorable and legally sufficient claim for relief based on mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court noted that while pro se litigants are bound by the same rules as counsel, a court must hold an evidentiary hearing when a motion is supported by a sworn statement and a colorable claim. The court clarified that a hearing is not required in every instance of a pro se calendaring error, but in this case, there was no evidence that the motion was an abuse of process. The order is reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
The court clarifies that when a party files a Rule 1.540(b) motion supported by a sworn statement and a colorable claim for relief based on a calendaring error, the trial court abuses its discretion by denying the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
The appellate court reversed a trial court's judgment in favor of the Murrells and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for the Hitchens and order specific performance of the condominium sale. The trial court had originally ruled that the Hitchens failed to prove the Murrells received their notice of the right of first refusal and failed to pay a required deposit. The appellate court held that the Declaration of Condominium specifically stated that notice of a right of first refusal is effective upon the date of mailing. Therefore, the Hitchens did not need to prove actual receipt. Additionally, the court held that the Murrells waived the defense regarding the unpaid deposit because they failed to plead the specific condition precedent in their answer. The court further noted that the Murrells' conduct after the Hitchens exercised their right constituted an anticipatory repudiation, which would have excused the Hitchens from paying the deposit even if the defense had been properly pleaded.
The court clarified that a condominium association may specify in its declaration that a right of first refusal is effective upon mailing, overriding the general requirement for proof of receipt. The court also reinforced the requirement for specific pleading of conditions precedent under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(c).
The court affirmed the trial court's decision that a settlement agreement between a county and a private property owner did not constitute a "development order" under the Growth Management Act. The agreement was the result of a negotiation under the Bert Harris, Private Property Rights Protection Act, to resolve a dispute regarding height restrictions. Because the agreement did not authorize a specific project or permit at the time of signing, it did not meet the statutory definition of a development order. The court also addressed the scope of judicial review for Bert Harris Act settlements. While mandatory judicial review is required for settlements that contravene a state statute, the court held that judicial review for settlements involving local ordinances is permissible but not mandatory. The court noted that while the law does not explicitly prohibit such review, the separation of powers doctrine may limit the extent to which courts can substitute their judgment for legislative policy decisions regarding the public interest.
The court clarified the distinction between a "development order" and a settlement agreement under the Bert Harris Act, and addressed the availability of judicial review for settlement agreements involving local ordinances versus those involving state statutes.
Statutes construed: § 163.3215, § 163.3164, § 70.001, § 86.011, § 90.302
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentences of Samir Young for first-degree felony murder, robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon, and armed robbery of a conveyance. The court addressed the State's argument that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. State permitted the stacking of inferences to obtain a conviction. The court held that while Bush eliminated the special circumstantial evidence standard, it did not permit inference stacking. The court clarified that while a jury may draw reasonable inferences from evidence, it may not draw an inference from an inference. An inference is a permissible analytical move, but it is not evidence and must be rooted in admitted evidence. Each individual inference must be drawn from an evidentiary fact. A factfinder cannot draw an inference from an inference to substitute for missing direct evidence. Inference stacking results in insufficient evidence to support a conviction.
The court clarified that the elimination of the special circumstantial evidence standard in Bush v. State did not authorize the use of stacked inferences to establish guilt.
The appellate court reversed a trial court's order granting a directed verdict in favor of two defendants in a multivehicle negligence action. The trial court had granted the directed verdict after a jury deadlocked, reasoning that the plaintiff's expert testimony was physically impossible and that the defendant's version of events could not rebut the presumption of negligence for a rear-end driver. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by weighing the conflicting expert testimonies and deciding that one expert's testimony was impossible. Because the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and instead weighed the evidence, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
The court clarified that a trial court cannot grant a directed verdict based on the determination that a non-moving party's evidence is 'impossible' based on the testimony of one of two conflicting experts. The court emphasized that the weighing of evidence and the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses are functions of the jury.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a nurse practitioner and a medical group in a medical malpractice wrongful death action. The case involved a patient who committed suicide after being unable to obtain a specific fentanyl medication following the termination of his physician-patient relationship with the defendants. The court held that the defendants owed no legal duty to the patient after he terminated the relationship and was discharged from their care. The court analyzed the existence of a duty under several sources, including statutes, common law, and the specific facts of the case. The court determined that while the patient's comments regarding suicide during his treatment were noted, the defendants were not required to provide specific follow-up actions once the relationship was severed. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that a duty was created by providing a thirty-day prescription, noting that such a duty would not extend indefinitely or beyond the expiration of the prescription. The court concluded that the defendants were not the proximate cause of the patient's death and that no legal duty existed to sustain a claim for medical malpractice.
The court addressed the scope of a healthcare provider's duty of care following the termination of a patient's treatment and the specific limitations of liability regarding suicide prevention in an outpatient setting.
Statutes construed: § 766.102
The defendant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his pockets. The court held that the defendant's argument was not preserved for appeal. Although the trial court had issued a definitive ruling on the motion to suppress, the defendant's counsel stated "no objection" when the State moved to introduce the evidence at trial. Under established precedent, this affirmative statement of "no objection" constitutes an abandonment or waiver of the pretrial arguments. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for appeal. Even if the issue had been preserved, the court would not have reversed the conviction because the warrantless search was justified under both the community caretaking and emergency medical exceptions. The officer conducted a limited search of the defendant while he was being treated for an overdose to ensure the safety of the defendant and medical personnel. The search was deemed reasonable because the officer responded to an active medical emergency and the search was a minimally intrusive means to ensure safety.
The court addresses the interplay between section 90.104(1), Florida Statutes, and the requirement for a contemporaneous objection. It clarifies that even when a court has made a definitive ruling on a motion to suppress, a defendant's subsequent statement of "no objection" at trial waives the issue for appeal.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 1.540(b)(5). The court noted that relief under this rule is available when a judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged and the motion is filed within a reasonable time. The court observed that a motion must be filed within a reasonable amount of time once a litigant knows a final judgment is no longer equitable. The court also noted that the exhaustion of appellate remedies is not a prerequisite for relief under Rule 1.540(b)(5). The standard of review for a trial court's order on a Rule 1.540(b) motion is whether the court abused its discretion.
The court clarified the requirements for relief from judgment under Rule 1.540(b)(5), specifically regarding the reasonableness of the timing of the motion and the lack of a requirement to exhaust appellate remedies before seeking such relief.
The appellant challenged the constitutionality of his enhanced sentence, arguing that the trial court, rather than a jury, made the required factual findings for a habitual violent felony offender. The court determined that the state provided evidence of a prior conviction that established the appellant's status as a habitual violent felony offender. Because the appellant did not contest the existence, date, or status of the prior conviction, the court concluded that any error in failing to submit the habitual violent felony offender factors to a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment was affirmed.
The court held that an error in failing to submit habitual violent felony offender factors to a jury is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the underlying conviction is not disputed.
Statutes construed: § 775.084
The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether an employee's injuries are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law when the injury is caused by a third-party tortfeasor's assault. The court reviewed a case where a manager was shot while walking between two areas of his employer's business. The First District Court of Appeal had previously held the injuries non-compensable because the act of walking did not cause the shooting. The Supreme Court rejected this narrow focus on the physical mechanics of a specific task. The Court held that the 'arising out of' element is satisfied if the claimant can establish work-relatedness. One way to establish work-relatedness in cases involving third-party assaults is to prove that the employee's overall job duties and work environment exposed them to an increased risk of assault. The Court concluded that the presence of a third-party tortfeasor does not automatically preclude a finding of occupational causation. The Court quashed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a proper review of the evidence under the correct legal standard.
The Court clarified the standard for 'arising out of' in the context of third-party assaults, affirming that an employee can establish work-relatedness by showing that their work environment or duties increased their risk of becoming a victim of a crime.
Statutes construed: § 440.09, § 440.02, § 1.03, § 440.39, § 440.015, § 8.01, § 11.21
The Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court has statutory authority to award prejudgment interest to achieve an equitable distribution of marital property. While the court noted that such awards are not a matter of entitlement and are subject to the court's discretion based on the specific facts of a case, the court found that the broad grant of authority in section 61.075, Florida Statutes, to provide remedies to do equity between the parties includes the power to award prejudgment interest. The court's analysis of the statute as a whole revealed that equity is a central feature of the equitable-distribution process, and the statute contains no specific prohibition on prejudgment interest. The court further observed that prejudgment interest can be characterized as an equitable remedy designed to make an aggrieved individual whole. The court concluded that prejudgment interest is one of the other remedies available to a trial court to achieve an equitable outcome.
The court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding whether trial courts have the authority to award prejudgment interest in the context of equitable distribution of marital property.
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the standard of appellate review for a trial court's dismissal of an action for fraud on the court. The Court held that the correct framework for review is to apply traditional standards to each aspect of the trial court's ruling: factual findings are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; and the choice of sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court rejected the use of a specialized or 'more stringent' abuse of discretion standard for fraud on the court cases. The Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, which had applied a more stringent standard to the trial court's choice of sanction, and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the established standard of review.
The Court clarified the standard of appellate review for motions to dismiss for fraud on the court, rejecting a 'more stringent' abuse of discretion standard in favor of applying traditional standards of review to the trial court's findings, conclusions, and choice of sanction.
The appellant challenged his conviction for driving while license suspended with a prior conviction. The court declined to address the appellant's arguments because they were either meritless, not raised in the lower court, or waived. The court also noted that the appellant failed to provide sufficient legal analysis for several arguments. The court cautioned that a large number of citations does not replace the need for clear advocacy and that appellate courts are limited to reviewing arguments rather than developing them for a litigant. The conviction was affirmed.
The court issued a reminder to pro se litigants that the volume of citations in a brief does not substitute for legal analysis and that the burden is on the appellant to clearly present arguments for review.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, reversed a trial court order allowing a plaintiff to plead a claim for punitive damages in an automobile negligence case. The court held that the proffered evidence did not provide a reasonable basis for punitive damages because it failed to demonstrate intentional misconduct or gross negligence. While the trial court initially found the defendant's use of a cell phone while driving to be outrageous conduct, the appellate court clarified that a violation of a traffic law, such as the prohibition on texting while driving, is not sufficient on its own to support punitive damages. The court noted that while some instances of cell phone use may justify punitive damages, the evidence in this case did not include any additional facts to distinguish the defendant's conduct from cases where cell phone use was insufficient to meet the punitive threshold. The proffered evidence only showed a routine traffic accident and did not establish that the defendant's actions were so reckless or showed such a conscious disregard for safety that they would be considered outrageous to a member of the community.
The court clarifies the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial court in determining whether a plaintiff's proffered evidence provides a sufficient basis for punitive damages, specifically noting that a prima facie showing of ordinary negligence or a violation of a traffic statute is insufficient to meet the threshold for gross negligence.
The Department of Revenue appeals a final order granting a defendant's motion to vacate a 2005 judgment establishing paternity and child support and quashing service of process. The trial court found that substitute service upon the children's mother was defective. However, the court of appeals held that a judgment is only void if the defendant lacked notice of the proceedings. Because the defendant had actual notice and actively participated in litigation for years before raising any challenge to service, the judgment was voidable rather than void. The court held that the defendant waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief and participating in the case without timely raising the issue of service. Furthermore, because the judgment was voidable, the principles of finality applied, and the defendant's repeated attempts to challenge the same service-based issue constituted an impermissible successive attack on the judgment. The court reversed the order and remanded for further proceedings.
The court clarified the distinction between void and voidable judgments regarding service of process. It held that where a defendant has actual notice of proceedings, a service defect renders the judgment voidable and subject to waiver. The court also emphasized that a party waives objections to personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief and participating in litigation without timely raising the issue.
The appellant challenged the dismissal of her lawsuit alleging retaliation, national origin discrimination, and sex discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act. The trial court dismissed the suit because the appellant's Charge of Discrimination specifically cited federal law and did not explicitly mention the Florida Civil Rights Act. The trial court's dismissal was based on a prior appellate court opinion. However, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed that opinion and held that an aggrieved party is not required to identify the Florida Civil Rights Act in a dual-filed complaint that specifically references federal law to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the Florida Supreme Court's ruling overruled the previous interpretation, the appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The case addresses the requirements for exhausting administrative remedies under the Florida Civil Rights Act when a complaint is filed with both state and federal agencies.
Statutes construed: § 760.11
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part an order from the trial court that construed a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a motion to correct illegal sentence and denied relief. The trial court's order addressed several claims within the petition, including issues regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, a jury instruction, a habitual violent felony offender sentence, and a discovery violation. The court held that the trial court properly adjudicated the sentencing claims under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). However, the court found that the remaining claims, which included facial allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, were not properly addressed. The court reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to consider those remaining claims under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
The court clarified the distinction between a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for postconviction relief. It held that while sentencing claims were properly adjudicated under the appropriate rule, other claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed under the specific rules governing postconviction relief.
The appellant appealed an order granting in part and denying in part his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The court held that the appellant established no error in the trial court's order. The court noted that a sentence is illegal only if it imposes a punishment that no judge could inflict under any set of circumstances. The court also found no reversible error regarding the trial court's reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence in the absence of the defendant, noting that the statute provides the court discretion to choose a mandatory minimum between twenty-five years and life.
The court clarified the scope of what constitutes an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) and the trial court's discretion regarding mandatory minimum sentences.
Statutes construed: § 775.087
The District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court's order was a protective order rather than an injunction. The appellant sought to appeal a nonfinal order granting a motion for protection that prohibited him from contacting the appellee, making threats, or filing further documents without counsel. The court held that orders intended to regulate the conduct of litigants or manage court proceedings do not fall within the category of appealable injunctions under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(B). Because the order was designed to manage the conduct of litigation rather than grant or deny substantive relief, it was not an injunction and was not reviewable on appeal.
The court clarified that protective or case management orders are not injunctions and are therefore not reviewable as nonfinal orders under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(B).
The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion for remittitur because the jury's award of damages was not supported by the evidence. The court held that because the plaintiff's witness testified that the plaintiff never paid the amounts specified in two specific contracts, the plaintiff was not entitled to the full contract amounts as damages. The court determined that the only evidence supporting actual losses was the invoices for equipment and the small amount paid to one of the contractors. The court remanded the case with instructions to either accept a remittitur of the damages to the amount supported by the evidence or order a new trial on the issue of damages. If a remittitur is granted, the prejudgment interest must be recalculated based on the reduced amount.
The court clarified that a jury cannot award a greater amount of damages than what is reasonably supported by the evidence at trial. When a jury awards an amount based on contract figures that were not actually paid or incurred by the plaintiff, the court must grant a remittitur to the amount supported by the evidence.
Statutes construed: § 768.74
The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court declined to treat the petition as a motion to correct an illegal sentence because the defendant did not allege a sentencing error or miscalculation but instead challenged the legality of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held that the petition was time-barred because it was not filed within two years of the judgment and sentence becoming final. The court also held that the petition was procedurally improper because habeas corpus proceedings cannot be used to raise issues that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finally, the court determined the motion was successive because the issues raised had already been addressed in the defendant's initial appeal.
The court clarified that a petition for writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the two-year time limitation for post-conviction motions under Rule 3.850. The court also reaffirmed that habeas proceedings are not a vehicle for raising issues that were available on direct appeal or in a 3.850 motion.
The appellant challenged a trial court order that granted in part and denied in part his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The court held that the appellant failed to establish any error regarding the trial court's denial of relief. The court noted that a sentence is illegal only if it imposes a punishment that no judge could inflict under any set of circumstances. The court also found no reversible error regarding the trial court's reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence in the absence of the defendant, noting that the applicable statute provides the court with discretion to choose a mandatory minimum between twenty-five years and life.
The court clarified the scope of what constitutes an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) and addressed the judicial discretion involved in sentencing under the 10-20-life statute.
Statutes construed: § 775.087
The petitioner, Victor Manuel Rocha, sought a writ of certiorari to quash a trial court order compelling him to respond to discovery requests in a civil action. Rocha argued that responding to the discovery would require him to disclose confidential information and breach his plea agreement with the United States government. The trial court had previously denied Rocha's motion for a protective order and subsequently overruled his objections to the discovery, finding the requests relevant to the civil conspiracy claims. Rocha contended that the information was classified and that his plea agreement provided a shield against disclosure. The court held that Rocha is not the arbiter of whether information is classified; that determination belongs to the United States government. The court noted that Rocha's plea agreement included a specific pre-publication review procedure to determine if disclosure of confidential information is permissible. Because Rocha did not utilize that procedure before seeking certiorari, the court found the alleged harm to be speculative and too remote to support jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.
The court clarified that a party's assertion that information is classified is insufficient to obtain a writ of certiorari when the party's own agreement with the government provides a specific mechanism to address such concerns. The court held that the petitioner must utilize the provided procedure before the court can consider the claim of harm as non-speculative.
Statutes construed: § 772.13
The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that the court erred by not providing full read-backs of requested witness testimony and by misleading the jury by instructing them to narrow their requests. The jury had requested transcripts of three specific witnesses. The trial court informed the jury that transcripts were unavailable but that they could request to have testimony played back. The court then instructed the jury that if they could not resolve their questions using their collective memory, they could request a read-back, but that the request should be as specific as possible. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the trial court's instruction did not mislead the jury into believing read-backs were prohibited. Instead, the court informed the jury that read-backs were permitted and asked them to specify which portions of the testimony they wanted to hear. This instruction complied with established guidelines and was not an abuse of discretion. The judgment and sentence were affirmed.
The court clarified that a trial court's instruction requiring a jury to be specific about which portions of testimony it wants to hear during a read-back does not constitute an abuse of discretion or a misleading instruction, even when the jury has already identified specific witnesses.
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal granted in part a writ of certiorari to quash a trial court order denying a motion to abate a negligence lawsuit. The lawsuit involved a birth-related neurological injury and included claims against a hospital and its non-clinician executives. The trial court had denied the motion to abate in the case against the executives because the court reasoned that the executives were not participating providers under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA) and were not involved in the labor or delivery. The appellate court held that because the claim involved a birth-related injury and the hospital was a participating provider, a determination by an administrative law judge as to whether the claims are compensable under NICA is a prerequisite to the civil action. The court quashed the order to the extent it related to the threshold compensability issue.
The court clarified that a determination of compensability by an administrative law judge under the NICA Plan is a threshold issue and a prerequisite to any civil action, regardless of whether the specific defendants are participating providers or were directly involved in the labor or delivery.
Statutes construed: § 766.301, § 766.314, § 766.304, § 766.302, § 766.303, § 766.31, § 766.316, § 766.309
The court affirmed the orders on appeal and issued a warning to the pro se appellant regarding the use of generative artificial intelligence in legal filings. The court noted that the appellant's briefs contained numerous inaccuracies regarding legal propositions, case names, and reporter citations. The court cautioned that individuals using generative AI for legal research and brief writing must verify the accuracy of the results before filing. Failure to verify such content can result in sanctions for filing documents that contain inaccurate legal authorities.
The court issued a specific warning to a pro se litigant regarding the risks of using unverified generative AI content in court filings, noting that such use can lead to the inclusion of false legal statements and potential sanctions.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's order of summary judgment in a negligence action involving the transmission of tuberculosis (TB).
The court addressed the distinction between actual and constructive knowledge in premises liability cases involving the transmission of infectious diseases and the proper weighing of expert testimony at the summary judgment stage.
The District Court of Appeal referred the matter to the Florida Bar for investigation and potential disciplinary proceedings after an attorney failed to comply with multiple court orders regarding the payment of a filing fee and a motion to withdraw. The attorney filed a notice of appeal without the required fee and failed to respond to two subsequent orders to provide the fee or indigency documentation. The attorney also failed to comply with a show cause order. Although the attorney eventually paid the fee and filed a motion to withdraw, the court denied the motion as inadequate and the attorney failed to respond to the court's subsequent guidance. The court referred the case to the Florida Bar due to the attorney's failure to comply with court directives and the resulting delays.
The court issued a referral to the Florida Bar for investigation after an attorney repeatedly failed to comply with court orders regarding filing fees and motions to withdraw.
The district court reversed the circuit court's order transferring a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the county where the petitioner's sentence was imposed. The petitioner argued that his detention was unlawful because the charging instrument lacked the circuit court clerk's official seal and that the court where he was currently detained had jurisdiction to hear his petition. The circuit court correctly identified the petition as a collateral attack on his conviction and sentence, which should be treated as a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850. However, the circuit court erred by transferring the petition instead of dismissing it. Because the motion would have been untimely if considered as a Rule 3.850 motion, the circuit court was required to dismiss the habeas petition as unauthorized.
The court clarified that when a defendant seeks postconviction relief through a habeas petition, the circuit court must dismiss the petition as unauthorized if the underlying claim would be procedurally barred if treated as a Rule 3.850 motion.
Statutes construed: § 79.09
The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of claims against a medical group's answering service because the claims were based on ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice. The trial court had dismissed the claims because the plaintiff failed to comply with the presuit requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. However, the appellate court determined that the presuit requirements only apply to claims directly related to the improper application of medical services requiring professional judgment or skill. Because the allegations involved the management and operation of a telephone system by non-medical staff, the claims were for ordinary negligence and did not require presuit notice.
The court clarified that the mere fact that a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not automatically make it a medical malpractice claim. Because the issues involved the management of a business by non-medical staff, the medical malpractice presuit requirements did not apply.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment in favor of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP. The court held that the claims brought by the estate and trustees for aiding and abetting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy to commit fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty were barred by the statute of limitations. The court noted that the plaintiff had admitted his partnership was a sham and had agreed to pay the taxes in 2009. However, the plaintiff did not file the claims against the law firm until 2017. The court found that the finality accrual rule did not apply to the summary judgment record.
The court addressed the application of the finality accrual rule in a case involving claims for aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty where the plaintiff delayed filing suit for several years after the underlying tax issues were resolved.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy because the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiffs argued that the 'finality accrual rule' should apply, which would delay the start of the limitations period until a final judgment was obtained by the Internal Revenue Service. The court held that the finality accrual rule is a narrow exception reserved for cases where damages are speculative until a prior litigation concludes, such as in certain legal malpractice actions. The court determined that the rule did not apply here because the plaintiffs knew the legal status of their tax strategy as soon as the Arbitrage Trading entity stipulated that the transaction lacked economic substance following a specific federal court decision. Because the plaintiffs did not need to wait for a final IRS judgment to know their position was lost, the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.
The court clarified the scope of the 'finality accrual rule' in the context of tax-related litigation, distinguishing it from the standard rules for legal malpractice.
The appellate court reversed and remanded the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage because the trial court failed to follow remand instructions regarding the equitable distribution of a marital asset. Specifically, the trial court failed to include the full $355,674 reduction in the principal balance of a mortgage on nonmarital real property in the equitable distribution scheme. The court held that because marital funds were used to pay down the mortgage, the reduction is a marital asset. On remand, the trial court must consider the statutory factors and reconfigure the distribution to include the entire paydown amount. Additionally, the court held that after reconfiguring the distribution, the trial court may consider whether awarding statutory interest on an equalizing payment to the former wife from the date of the original judgment is appropriate under its broad discretion to do equity.
The case clarifies that when marital funds are used to pay down a mortgage on nonmarital property, the reduction in the principal balance is a marital asset that must be included in the equitable distribution scheme. It also addresses the trial court's discretion to award statutory interest on equalizing payments from the date of the original judgment after a distribution is reconfigured.
The District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the order of the circuit court because the court failed to make clear factual findings regarding the requirements for a downward departure. The circuit court's order contained contradictory statements regarding whether the defendant suffered from a mental disorder requiring specialized treatment. The court also included language suggesting that the appellate court should reweigh the evidence, which is not the role of the appellate court. The circuit court's statement that it likely would not have imposed the same guideline sentence if the first prong of the applicable law were satisfied further highlighted the failure to provide a clear answer on the underlying factual questions. The case was remanded with instructions for the circuit court to make clear findings using the two-part process required by law.
The court clarified that a trial court must make clear factual findings in the first instance rather than inviting the appellate court to reweigh evidence. The appellate court's role is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence.
The appellant challenged the trial court’s revocation of her probation and subsequent prison sentence. She argued that the trial court improperly designated her as a violent felony offender of special concern (VFOSC) without jury findings and failed to make the required written findings regarding whether she posed a danger to the community. The court held that her first argument was not preserved for appeal because it involved a sentencing process error rather than a sentencing order error. Furthermore, the court determined that the specific fact of her prior conviction did not require a jury finding for the VFOSC designation. Regarding the second argument, the court acknowledged the trial court failed to make the mandatory written findings on dangerousness but concluded the error was harmless. Because the trial court had the authority to revoke probation and impose a prison sentence regardless of the finding of dangerousness, the error did not contribute to the sentence. The court affirmed the sentence.
The court clarified that Apprendi/Erlinger claims are not cognizable under rule 3.800(b) because they involve errors in the sentencing process rather than the sentencing order. Additionally, the court established that a trial court's failure to make mandatory written findings under section 948.06(8)(e) is harmless if the resulting sentence would have been the same regardless of the finding.
The court affirmed a trial court order granting a motion to compel arbitration of an employment discrimination claim. The appellant, a port security worker, argued that he was exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act because he was a transportation worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. The trial court granted the motion to compel because the appellant's declaration did not show that his role as a port security officer involved a sufficiently direct, necessary, and active role in transporting goods in interstate commerce. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the appellant failed to show he qualified for the transportation worker exemption under the Federal Arbitration Act.
The court addressed the specific requirements for a transportation worker to qualify for the exemption under the Federal Arbitration Act, noting that the worker must play a direct, necessary, and active role in the free flow of goods across borders.
The trial court erred by proceeding to trial without first resolving the question of the defendant's competency. Although the defense submitted a report stating the defendant was not competent and the court subsequently received a report from a second expert stating he was competent, the record did not show that the trial court held a hearing or entered a written competency order before trial. Once the record contains reasonable grounds to question a defendant's competency, the trial court must hold a competency hearing and enter a determination before proceeding. The court reversed and remanded for a retroactive competency determination. If the court determines the defendant was competent at the time of trial, it must enter a nunc pro tunc order. If the court cannot make a retroactive determination or finds the defendant was incompetent at the time of trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial when he is competent to proceed.
The court held that a trial court must enter a written competency determination before proceeding to trial once the record contains reasonable grounds to question a defendant's competency, regardless of whether the defendant objects to the lack of a formal determination.
The appellant challenged his conviction and life sentence for first degree murder, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court found that evidence showed the appellant and the victim left the apartment, a loud pop was heard, and the appellant reentered the apartment alone. The victim was found outside with a fatal gunshot wound. The appellant fled the scene and discarded a handgun before being detained. This evidence was sufficient to submit the count to the jury. The appellant also argued that an officer's redirect testimony constituted improper expert testimony and hearsay. The court held that the appellant failed to preserve this issue because his counsel only objected to the testimony as speculative. Even if preserved, the court found the argument meritless because the testimony was part of a conversation involving hearsay elicited by the defense during cross examination.
The court clarified that the State does not need to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence to sustain a conviction. It also addressed the preservation of hearsay objections and the rule of completeness.
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court's summary denial of a postconviction motion and denied the petitioner's request for a stay of execution.
The court addressed the timeliness and merits of a facial challenge to Florida's three-drug lethal injection protocol involving etomidate.
Statutes construed: § 27.7081
The petitioner, who was sentenced to death for the 1987 murder and sexual battery of a minor, sought postconviction relief based on DNA testing and claims of actual innocence. The court reviewed the petitioner's appeal of the circuit court's summary denial of his fifth successive postconviction motion and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court addressed the constitutionality of the warrant process and the availability of actual innocence claims in Florida postconviction proceedings.
The court dismissed a petition for writ of prohibition as untimely. The petitioner filed the petition approximately two and a half months after the trial court rendered the order denying his stand-your-ground motion to dismiss. The petitioner's response to the court's order to show cause was filed approximately four and a half months after the trial court's order. The court found no reason for the delay in the record and determined the delay was unreasonable. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the petition because it was not filed within a reasonable time from the rendition of the challenged order.
The court exercised its discretion to dismiss a petition for writ of prohibition because the petitioner failed to file the petition within a reasonable time after the trial court's order.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting the plaintiffs' motions to vacate a court order extending jurisdiction. The court noted that the affirmance was without prejudice to the appellants' pending motion for rehearing regarding a separate final order concerning an attorney fee hearing. The court determined that the pending motion for rehearing did not impede the adjudication of the current appeal because it pertained to a different final order.
The court clarified that a pending motion for rehearing on one final order does not prevent the appellate court from ruling on a different final order.
The defendant appealed his judgment and sentence for attempted sexual battery without consent. He argued the trial court erred by admitting a recording of a custodial interview in which law enforcement officers expressed opinions regarding his guilt. Although the defendant moved to exclude these statements in a motion in limine, he did not object to their admission during the trial. The court held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he did not make a contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence was admitted. The court noted that while the applicable statute does not require a party to renew an objection after a definitive pre-trial ruling, the binding precedent requires a contemporaneous objection to preserve an error for direct appeal. The court affirmed the conviction and certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether a defendant must renew an objection at trial to preserve an issue for direct appeal when the trial court has already made a definitive pre-trial ruling on the record regarding the admission of that evidence.
The court certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the conflict between the plain language of the statute and binding precedent concerning the requirement to renew objections to evidence at trial to preserve the issue for direct appeal.
Statutes construed: § 90.104
The defendant appealed his conviction, alleging that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced his defense. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the defendant failed to meet the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced the defense by depriving the defendant of a fair trial. The court noted that it is not enough for a defendant to show that errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome; the defendant must show that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the deficient performance. The court found the trial court's findings on both the deficiency and prejudice prongs were supported by competent substantial evidence.
The court reaffirmed the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring both a showing of deficient performance and a showing of prejudice.
The court affirmed the lower court's order. The appellant raised due process concerns and challenged the trial court's failure to make required findings of fact. However, these issues were not raised before the trial court or in a motion for rehearing. Because the issues were not raised at the trial level or in a motion for rehearing, they were not preserved for appellate review and were considered waived.
The court affirmed the lower court's order because the appellant failed to preserve due process and factual finding issues for appeal by failing to raise them before the trial court or in a motion for rehearing.
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction of Tyrell Robinson. The court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to ensure the guilty verdict was supported by competent and substantial evidence regarding each element of the charged crime. The court found that the state presented evidence that functioned as pieces of a puzzle rather than an impermissible pyramiding of inferences. Additionally, the court noted that a videotape was properly admitted under the silent witness theory because testimony established the location and operation of the recording mechanism. The court also noted that a curative instruction was sufficient to rectify prejudice regarding a victim's statement about the defendant's prior criminal history.
The court addressed the sufficiency of evidence, the silent witness theory for admitting videotape, and the sufficiency of curative instructions regarding prior criminal history.
The Court approved the referee's report and plea agreement, finding respondent Elizabeth Hidalgo guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating prior court orders. The Court ordered the respondent to undergo five months of probation and GPS monitoring under the supervision of the Advocate Program or a similar program, with the respondent responsible for all associated costs. The Court also imposed a five-month jail sentence, which is suspended pending the successful completion of probation and GPS monitoring. The court affirmed existing orders prohibiting the respondent from the unlicensed practice of law in Florida. Judgment was entered in favor of The Florida Bar for costs in the amount of $1,692.71.
The court addressed the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court regarding the unlicensed practice of law. A dissenting justice argued that the court's administrative authority is limited to the regulation of admitted members of the bar and that the power to regulate the unlicensed practice of law belongs to the legislature.
Statutes construed: § 454.23
The defendant, Richard Wallace Rhodes, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. He sought postconviction relief based on claims that the State withheld exculpatory evidence, presented false testimony, and elicited statements through state agents. These claims were based on affidavits from two jailhouse witnesses, Cottrell and Duranseau, who alleged they were coerced or coached by the State and that they were promised rewards for their testimony. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing where the witnesses testified to these claims, while State witnesses denied them. The lower court denied relief, finding the jailhouse witnesses were not credible. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that competent, substantial evidence supported the finding that the witnesses were not credible. The court also determined that the evidence did not constitute newly discovered evidence that would likely result in an acquittal.
The case addresses the credibility of jailhouse witnesses and the requirements for a claim of newly discovered evidence in a capital case.
Statutes construed: § 90.802
The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a joint settlement proposal must apportion the amount and terms to each party when the parties are seeking to settle a unified, single claim. The court held that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) requires strict enforcement of the apportionment requirement for all joint proposals. The rule applies regardless of the relationship between the parties, the theories of liability, or the nature of the claims. The court quashed the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision, which had held that the apportionment rule did not apply to a joint proposal regarding a unified, single claim, and instead approved the Second District Court of Appeal's decision requiring apportionment.
The court clarified that the apportionment requirement in Rule 1.442(c)(3) is strictly enforced and does not provide exceptions for unified claims or common interests between parties.
Statutes construed: § 768.79, § 1.442
The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders dismissing supplemental complaints for fraudulent transfers under Chapter 726, Florida Statutes, as time-barred. The trial court had dismissed the complaints because it determined they did not relate back to any prior pleading. The appellate court held that the motion to commence proceedings supplementary filed in June 2021 constituted a pleading or the functional equivalent of a pleading because it was a formal document setting forth the claims and allegations in support of the proceeding and the implearing of transferees. Because the supplemental complaints were based on the same fraudulent transfers identified in the Statement of Particulars and the motion to commence, they related back to the original motion. The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints in their entirety. On remand, the trial court must treat the actions as having been brought on the date of the motion to commence proceedings supplementary to determine if the specific fraudulent transfer claims fall within the applicable statutory periods.
The court clarified that a motion to commence proceedings supplementary functions as a pleading for the purposes of the relation back doctrine, even though motions are generally not considered pleadings in other contexts.
Statutes construed: § 56.29, § 726.105, § 726.106, § 726.110
The trial court erred by summarily denying a motion for return of property without attaching portions of the record refuting the claim or holding an evidentiary hearing. The motion was timely filed and facially sufficient because it specifically described the property, alleged the property belonged to the defendant, and alleged the property was not the fruit of criminal activity or being held as evidence. Because the trial court failed to provide a basis for its summary denial, the order is reversed and remanded for the trial court to either attach portions of the record refuting the claim or hold an evidentiary hearing.
The court clarifies the procedural requirements for a trial court to summarily deny a motion for return of property, noting that the court must either attach portions of the record refuting the claim or hold an evidentiary hearing if the motion is facially sufficient.
Statutes construed: § 705.105
The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders dismissing supplemental complaints for fraudulent transfers under Chapter 726, Florida Statutes, as time-barred. The trial court had dismissed the complaints because it determined they did not relate back to any prior pleading. The appellate court held that the motion to commence proceedings supplementary filed in June 2021 constituted a pleading or the functional equivalent of a pleading because it was a formal document setting forth the claims and allegations in support of the proceeding and the impleader of transferees. Because the supplemental complaints were based on the same fraudulent transfers identified in the Statement of Particulars and the original motion, they related back to the motion to commence. The court clarified that while the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints in their entirety, the specific claims must still be evaluated against the various limitations periods under section 726.110. On remand, the trial court should treat the actions as having been brought on the date of the original motion to commence proceedings supplementary.
The court clarified that a motion to commence proceedings supplementary functions as a pleading for the purposes of the relation back doctrine. This distinction is significant because proceedings supplementary are special statutory proceedings initiated by motion rather than a standard complaint.
Statutes construed: § 56.29, § 726.105, § 726.106, § 726.110
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, reversed the expulsion of a student who was disciplined under a zero-tolerance policy for a statement made on a school computer. The court held that because the school's policy defined the offense by reference to section 836.10, Florida Statutes, the school was required to prove the specific elements of that statute, including the necessary mental state. The court determined that the school's policy incorporated the judicial construction of the statute, which requires proof that a communication was transmitted for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that it would be viewed as a threat. The hearing officer found that the school failed to establish this intent. Although the School Board accepted the hearing officer's factual findings, it incorrectly concluded that the lack of proven intent did not preclude a finding of a zero-tolerance offense. Because the school's interpretation of the policy was incorrect, the court vacated the expulsion.
The court clarified that when a school board incorporates a specific statute into its policy to define a prohibited act, it must adhere to the judicial constructions of that statute. The court held that the school could not bypass the requirement of a culpable mental state simply by claiming the policy was a limited reference to the statute.
Statutes construed: § 836.10, § 863.10, § 120.57, § 120.68, § 1006.13
The appellate court addressed whether a defective notice of commencement invalidated a construction lien and whether the failure to commence work within ninety days of recording the notice of commencement invalidated the lien. The court held that a defective notice of commencement does not invalidate a properly recorded and served claim of lien; rather, it only affects the lien's start date and potential priority. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court erred in ruling that the lien was void because work did not commence within ninety days of the notice of commencement. The court found that the appellant's actions of taking measurements and ordering windows within ninety days of the contract satisfied the requirement for commencement. The court affirmed the dismissal of the lien as to one owner due to lack of notice but reversed the trial court's ruling regarding the other owner, finding that the construction lien and quiet title claims should be enforced as to that owner.
The court clarified that a defective notice of commencement does not invalidate a construction lien but only affects the date of attachment and priority. The court also clarified that the commencement of work for the purposes of a construction lien can include the furnishing of materials.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders dismissing supplemental complaints for fraudulent transfers under Chapter 726, Florida Statutes, on the grounds that the complaints were time-barred. The trial court had ruled that the supplemental complaints did not relate back to any prior pleading. The appellate court held that the motion to commence proceedings supplementary, filed in June 2021, constituted a pleading or the functional equivalent of a pleading because it was a formal document setting forth the claims and allegations in support of the proceedings and the impleader of transferees. Because the supplemental complaints were premised on the same fraudulent transfers identified in the Statement of Particulars and the motion to commence, they related back to the original motion. The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints in their entirety as untimely. On remand, the trial court should treat the actions as having been brought on the date of the motion to commence proceedings supplementary for the purpose of determining if the claims fall within the applicable statutes of limitations.
The court clarified that a motion to commence proceedings supplementary functions as a pleading for the purposes of the relation back doctrine. This distinction is significant because proceedings supplementary are special statutory proceedings commenced by motion rather than by a standard complaint.
Statutes construed: § 56.29, § 726.105, § 726.106, § 726.110
The petitioner sought a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus to address concerns regarding judicial bias in a paternity case. The petitioner argued that because the respondent is the step-daughter of the circuit's Chief Judge and is represented by a law firm owned by the Chief Judge's husband, no judge in the circuit could adjudicate the case fairly. The petitioner's motions for disqualification were granted by the assigned judges, but those judges declined to grant additional relief regarding a change of venue or the assignment of a temporary judge from another circuit. The court dismissed the portion of the petition seeking a writ of prohibition because a party may appeal a judge's denial of a motion for blanket disqualification, meaning no other legal remedy is required. The court also denied the portion of the petition seeking a writ of mandamus. The court held that mandamus is only available to compel a ministerial duty where the court has no room for discretion. The court found no authority that a Chief Judge has a ministerial duty to adjudicate a request to change venue or to request the assignment of a temporary judge from another circuit under the circumstances described.
The court clarified the limitations of prohibition and mandamus in the context of judicial disqualification and the duties of a circuit's Chief Judge.
The Third District Court of Appeal granted a writ of certiorari and quashed a portion of a trial court order requiring judgment debtors to provide discovery in aid of execution. The trial court had entered an order requiring the petitioners to provide Rule 1.560 discovery despite the fact that the petitioners had paid the liquidated amounts of the judgment within the forty-five day period specified by Rule 1.560(c). The court held that Rule 1.560(c) provides a mechanism for a judgment creditor to identify assets to satisfy a judgment, but this requirement is waived if the judgment is satisfied. Because the petitioners paid the judgment amount and the subsequently liquidated attorney's fees within the prescribed timeframe, the judgment was satisfied. The court determined that the trial court's order to provide discovery was based on a non-executable fee entitlement order and that the order's entry caused irreparable harm because it required the disclosure of confidential financial information.
The court clarified that Rule 1.560(c) discovery requirements are waived once a judgment is satisfied. The court distinguished a case involving a mechanic's lien with unpaid fees from the present case where the judgment was fully paid, noting that an order merely granting entitlement to fees without a determined amount is not an executable judgment.
The court reversed and remanded a summary judgment order in a replevin action involving a watch. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the appellee, finding that the owner of the watch did not entrust the item to a third party. The appellant argued that the trial court incorrectly applied a specific statute instead of the Uniform Commercial Code entrustment doctrine. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the owner entrusted the watch to the third party. The court noted that the owner's knowledge that the third party was a merchant dealing in watches and the owner's voluntary delivery of the watch to that party created a situation where a reasonable jury could find that entrustment occurred regardless of the third party's conduct.
The court identified a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the entrustment of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, finding that the owner's knowledge of the third party's status as a merchant and the voluntary delivery of the item were sufficient to warrant a trial.
The appellant, a buyer of a condominium, appealed a final order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, the seller. The dispute involved an "as is" residential contract and the appellee's alleged failure to disclose that the condominium's travertine floors were installed without a permit. The appellant failed to file a timely response to the motion for summary judgment. The record did not contain evidence that the appellee had actual knowledge that the floors were installed without a permit. Because the appellant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the appellee's knowledge of the condition, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment.
The court affirmed summary judgment because the appellant failed to provide evidence of the seller's actual knowledge of the lack of a permit for the floor installation.
The appellant, a violent felony offender of special concern, was sentenced to imprisonment following a probation violation hearing. The trial court failed to make the written and oral findings regarding whether the appellant posed a danger to the community as required by section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes. Although the trial court and the State later agreed that the appellant did not pose a danger to the community, the trial court erroneously granted the appellant's motion to correct sentencing errors by merely entering a written order of finding rather than conducting a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court held that because the trial court failed to make the mandatory dangerousness findings required by statute, the sentencing order must be reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing with instructions to include the required written findings.
The court clarified that when a trial court fails to make the mandatory dangerousness determination for a violent felony offender of special concern, the proper remedy is a new sentencing hearing rather than a mere entry of a written order to correct the record.
Statutes construed: § 948.06
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial regarding whether ensuing damage was covered under the insurance policy.
The court held that the presence of conflicting evidence and the use of a jury verdict form proposed by the plaintiff precluded a finding of abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The defendant appealed a final judgment and sentence for attempted second-degree murder and grand theft of a vehicle. The trial court had not entered a written judgment of acquittal for an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon count despite a jury's not guilty verdict, and the probation order contained a scrivener's error regarding the nature of the defendant's plea. The State conceded these errors. Additionally, the defendant argued that the trial court violated his due process rights by considering a "no actioned" battery by detainee charge during sentencing. The court held that a trial court may not consider a subsequent arrest without conviction during sentencing for a primary offense. Because the trial court considered the "no actioned" charge and made specific references to the details of that charge during the sentencing hearing, the court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing before a different judge. The court also reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to correct the scrivener's error in the probation order and to enter a written judgment of acquittal for the aggravated assault count.
The court reaffirmed a bright-line rule that a trial court's consideration of a subsequent "no actioned" offense during sentencing constitutes a due process violation.
A petitioner seeking habeas relief for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed to establish the required prejudice to succeed on his claim. The petitioner argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a facial constitutional challenge to a sentencing enhancement for a habitual felony offender. He contended that a jury, rather than a judge, should have been the factfinder to determine the existence of prior felony offenses. The court determined that the claim was meritless because the result of the case would not have changed even if counsel had filed a motion to correct the sentence. The court noted that any error in failing to submit the habitual felony offender factors to a jury would constitute, at most, harmless error. Because the petitioner could not show that the outcome would have been different, the claim of ineffective assistance lacked the necessary prejudice.
The court clarified that appellate counsel cannot be deemed to have provided ineffective assistance for failing to raise non-meritorious claims. Furthermore, the court held that a claim of ineffective assistance fails when the petitioner cannot demonstrate that the result of the case would have been different if the counsel had performed differently.
Statutes construed: § 775.084
The defendant was convicted of resisting an officer without violence and criminal mischief. The trial court imposed a sentence of probation and orally stated that standard court costs and costs of prosecution were imposed. However, the written judgment for costs included two separate $50 cost of prosecution assessments for a total of $100. The defendant filed a motion to correct sentencing error arguing the cost of prosecution was improperly imposed twice. The trial court did not issue a written order on the motion, and the motion was deemed denied. The State conceded error on the issue. The court held that the statute requires a minimum of $50 for prosecution costs when a misdemeanor is charged and allows for a higher amount only upon a showing of sufficient proof of higher costs incurred. The record did not show that the State sought costs above the minimum, that the court made findings for a higher amount, or that the court orally announced a higher amount. The court affirmed the judgment and sentences but reversed the denial of the motion and remanded with instructions to strike one of the duplicative assessments.
The court clarified that prosecution costs must be reduced to the mandatory minimum amount if the trial court fails to make the appropriate factual findings regarding costs above the statutory minimum or fails to orally announce a higher amount at sentencing.
Statutes construed: § 938.27
The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to quash an administrative order issued by the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit. The petition was dismissed because the court determined that certiorari is not the appropriate vehicle to review an administrative order of this character.
The court clarified the scope of the writ of certiorari, holding that it is limited to the review of judicial or quasi-judicial determinations. Because the administrative order in question was a unilateral policy directive regarding the payment of expert witnesses and did not involve a dispute between parties or a determination of fact or law in a pending case, it did not qualify for certiorari review. The court further noted that if a chief judge exceeds their authority in performing administrative duties, the appropriate forum for such a challenge is the Supreme Court.
The court affirmed the order denying a motion to vacate a lien on an inmate's trust account. The court held that a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to challenge the requirement of conditional release supervision does not constitute a collateral criminal proceeding under section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes. A proceeding is a collateral criminal proceeding only if the challenged action directly affects the amount of time an inmate must actually spend in prison. Because an inmate's time in prison is not directly affected by the determination of eligibility for conditional release supervision, the proceeding was not exempt from the lien provisions of section 57.085. The court distinguished the present case from a case where a mandamus petition challenging the calculation of a Presumptive Parole Release Date was held to be a collateral criminal proceeding because it directly affected the date an inmate could be released from prison.
The court clarified the distinction between a proceeding that affects the length of an inmate's actual incarceration and one that only affects post-release supervision requirements to determine whether a proceeding qualifies as a collateral criminal proceeding under section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes.
Statutes construed: § 947.1405, § 57.085
The defendant, Charles Adelson, was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and solicitation to commit murder following a jury trial. Adelson appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a change of venue, denying his motion to strike the venire panel, and making errors regarding the admission of text messages and hearsay evidence. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the trial court's rulings.
The court addressed the impact of extensive pretrial publicity on the right to an impartial jury. It held that while pretrial publicity is a concern, the trial court's use of individual voir dire to identify and excuse biased jurors was sufficient. The court also determined that the motion to strike the venire panel was denied correctly because the specific statements made by prospective jurors were not sufficiently prejudicial to taint the panel. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant failed to preserve the change of venue argument for appeal after the jury was sworn.
The Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that Section 925.11, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 do not provide for an evidentiary hearing after the results of DNA testing have been provided to the court, the defendant, and the prosecuting authority. Because the parties agreed that the results had been provided, the request for an evidentiary hearing was not authorized. Consequently, the circuit court's order denying that request was not appealable.
The court clarified that an order denying an evidentiary hearing regarding DNA testing methods and procedures is not appealable once the results have been shared with all necessary parties.
Statutes construed: § 925.11
The court denied the appellant's motion for supplemental briefing regarding the constitutionality of Florida's six-person jury system. Although a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a statute may be raised for the first time on appeal, the appellant failed to raise the issue in the trial court or in his initial brief. Issues not raised in the initial brief are waived or abandoned. Furthermore, the court noted that supplemental briefing is the exception rather than the rule. The court found that the appellant's request was based on a speculative and premature development regarding a pending United States Supreme Court petition for writ of certiorari. Because the current binding precedent remains in effect and the appellant failed to raise the issue timely, the court declined to exercise its discretion to allow supplemental briefing.
The court clarified that while facial challenges to a statute can be raised on appeal, such a claim is waived if not included in the initial brief. The court also held that a petition for writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court does not provide a sufficient basis for supplemental briefing when the outcome is speculative and the current law remains binding.
The court issued an order to show cause because the pro se appellant filed an initial brief containing non-existent legal authorities or inaccurately cited legal authorities. The court held that it could apply the amended Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.515(d)(2) to the appellant's brief even though the brief was filed before the amendment became effective. The court reasoned that the amended rule merely clarified existing requirements and sanctions authorities. Specifically, the court noted that the rule's requirements regarding the accuracy of legal authorities were already in effect, the authority to sanction for noncompliance was already established by existing rules, and the courts possessed inherent authority to sanction litigants for abusing the legal system. Because the amended rule did not impose new legal consequences or burdens on prior filings, its application was not considered retroactive.
The court addresses the applicability of a recently amended rule to a document filed before the effective date, concluding that the rule is not being applied retroactively because it merely clarifies pre-existing requirements and inherent judicial powers.
The court addressed whether a written sentence that includes multiple recidivist enhancements is illegal under Rule 3.800(a) when the oral pronouncement of the sentence only reflects one enhancement. The court held that while the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written document, a written sentence that includes more than one recidivist category under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, is illegal. Because the trial court's oral pronouncement correctly sentenced the defendant as a habitual felony offender without a mandatory minimum, the oral portion of the sentence was not illegal. However, because the written judgment and sentence included designations as a habitual violent felony offender and a three-time violent felony offender, those specific designations and the associated mandatory minimums were illegal. The court affirmed the denial of the motion regarding the oral pronouncement but reversed and remanded the case for the limited purpose of striking the multiple recidivist designations from the written judgment.
The court clarified that while an oral pronouncement controls over a written sentence, a written sentence that includes multiple recidivist enhancements is illegal and can be corrected in a Rule 3.800(a) proceeding.
Statutes construed: § 775.084
The trial court erred by setting aside a jury's finding that a defendant was a prison releasee reoffender. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding because the defendant testified that he was released from a state correctional facility in June 2022, which was within the three-year timeframe required by the statute for a conviction of aggravated battery. The court reversed the order setting aside the verdict and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury's finding and sentence the defendant to the maximum fifteen-year term.
The court clarified that a jury's finding of a prison releasee reoffender status is upheld when the evidence shows the defendant committed a qualifying offense within three years of release from a state correctional facility.
Statutes construed: § 775.082
The trial court erred by setting aside a jury's finding that a defendant was a prison releasee reoffender. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding because the defendant testified that he was released from a state correctional facility in June 2022, which was within the three year timeframe required by the statute for the offense committed in January 2023. The court reversed the order and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict and sentence the defendant to the maximum fifteen year term.
The court clarified that a jury's finding of a prison releasee reoffender status is upheld when the evidence shows the defendant committed a qualifying offense within three years of release from a state correctional facility.
Statutes construed: § 775.082
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying an assignee's motion for attorney's fees under section 627.7152(10)(a), Florida Statutes. The statute allows for attorney's fees when the difference between the judgment obtained by the assignee and the presuit settlement offer is significant. The court interpreted the term 'judgment obtained' as the damages recovered, excluding attorney's fees, costs, or interest. The court held that the parties' settlement was not a 'judgment obtained' because the settlement was a contractual estimate of liability for the purpose of resolving a controversy and avoiding the burden of litigation. Because State Farm admitted no liability and the parties acknowledged the settlement as a compromise of doubtful and disputed claims, the settlement did not constitute a judgment. Therefore, the assignee was not entitled to attorney's fees.
The court clarified the distinction between a settlement and a 'judgment obtained' under section 627.7152(10)(a) for the purpose of determining eligibility for attorney's fees in residential property insurance claims.
Statutes construed: § 627.7152, § 627.428, § 57.105
The court struck an Anders brief because it was inadequate and failed to fulfill the requirements of the applicable rules. The brief provided no factual or procedural history and failed to mention the trial results or the sentences imposed. Furthermore, the brief did not explain why the identified issues were frivolous. The court noted that an Anders brief must assure the court that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated and requires a complete discussion of any possible points of merit. The court ordered counsel to file a compliant brief within thirty days that demonstrates a mastery of the trial record and thorough research of the law.
The court emphasizes that an Anders brief must be more than a mere statement that no issues of merit exist. It must provide a complete discussion of any possible points of merit to the appeal and demonstrate that counsel has mastered the trial record.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the sentencing of Charles Garvin. The court noted that a sentence is only illegal if it imposes a punishment that no judge could inflict under any set of circumstances under existing sentencing statutes. The court further observed that when a defendant commits multiple offenses in one transaction, the judge has the discretion to order sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. The court concluded that a sentence falling within the legislative minimum and maximum limits is a matter of judicial discretion and is not subject to inquiry on appeal.
The court reaffirms the principle that sentences within statutory limits are matters of judicial discretion and clarifies the conditions under which a sentence is considered illegal.
Statutes construed: § 775.021
The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the principle of priority. The principle of priority is applied to cases pending concurrently in different courts or different circuits within the state to avoid wasting judicial resources and the risk of inconsistent judgments. The court determined that the principle applies when a second filed action is sufficiently similar in parties and issues to be unnecessarily duplicative of the first filed proceeding. When two actions involve a single set of facts such that the resolution of the first case resolves the issues in the second case, the cases are substantially similar and comity principles apply. Trial courts may consider matters outside the pleadings to determine if a first filed action is anticipatory or constitutes an exceptional circumstance affecting the priority analysis.
The court reaffirms the application of the principle of priority to prevent duplicative litigation and inconsistent judgments when multiple cases involve the same parties and facts.
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction and sentence of death for William Roberts, who was charged with first-degree murder following the death of his girlfriend. The court addressed three primary issues: the admission of collateral crime evidence, the determination of statutory mitigators, and the nunc pro tunc determination of Roberts' competency at the time of trial.
The court addressed the scope of collateral crime evidence and the standard for determining a defendant's competency during a nunc pro tunc hearing.
The court reversed the circuit court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings were not closed at the time of the motion.
The court held that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is only permissible after the pleadings are closed. Because the pleadings were not closed in this case, the circuit court's order granting the motion was improper.
Statutes construed: § 56.29
The appellate court reversed the circuit court's order awarding supplemental damages and attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a specific performance action. The court held that the circuit court erred by applying a contingency fee multiplier because there was no pre-existing contingency fee agreement and no evidence was presented that a multiplier was necessary to secure competent counsel. The court also held that the circuit court erred in awarding mortgage interest because the prevailing party did not secure a mortgage and was not required to pay mortgage interest. Finally, the court found the award of interest from the date of a non-final order was unclear as to whether it was intended as pre-judgment or post-judgment interest. The case was remanded for the circuit court to clarify the nature of the interest award.
The court clarified that a contingency fee multiplier is only appropriate when a contingency fee agreement exists or when it is shown that a multiplier was necessary to obtain competent counsel. The court also clarified that damages incident to specific performance are limited to those that return the parties to the status quo at the time of the breach.
Statutes construed: § 57.104
The appellate court reversed a county court order denying a motion to vacate a default judgment because the underlying judgment was void for lack of valid service. The appellee sought substitute service under section 48.031(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which requires delivery of the complaint to a person residing at the defendant's usual place of abode. The return of service stated the complaint was delivered to the appellant's cousin at the appellant's residence. However, the cousin testified that she did not reside at that address and was only there to visit her grandmother. The appellee offered no evidence to contradict this testimony. Because the person who received the documents did not reside at the location, the requirements for substitute service were not met. A judgment entered without valid service is void and may be collaterally attacked at any time. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the default judgment.
The court clarified that substitute service under section 48.031(1)(a) must be strictly construed and requires that the person receiving the documents actually reside at the defendant's usual place of abode. Because the person who received the papers did not reside at the location, the service was invalid, rendering the resulting judgment void.
Statutes construed: § 48.031
The district court reversed a circuit court order regarding the distribution of sale proceeds following a partition of real property. The circuit court originally ordered that $181,635.88 be assessed against the portion of the sale belonging to Stephen Crooks. In an amended judgment, the court lowered that amount to $109,969.21 but then subtracted that amount from the total sale proceeds, which resulted in all parties being assessed equally for the amount intended only for Crooks. The appellate court found this to be an error. On remand, the circuit court must amend the judgment to distribute the $435,809.89 in proceeds by awarding $35,300.75 to Crooks and $200,254.57 each to Dejan Ciprovski and Amyee C. Crooks.
The court corrected a mathematical error in a partition action where a specific assessment against one party was incorrectly applied to the total proceeds, resulting in an equal distribution among all parties.
Statutes construed: § 64.071
The appellate court reversed a nonfinal order granting partial summary judgment to a buyer of a vehicle because the circuit court misapplied the statutory requirements for the passage of title and failed to resolve genuine disputes of material fact regarding physical delivery.
The court clarified that the plain language of section 672.401, Florida Statutes, requires physical delivery for the passage of title and cannot be interpreted to include constructive delivery. Additionally, the court held that evidence regarding the status of repairs and insurance requirements created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether physical delivery occurred, making summary judgment improper.
Statutes construed: § 672.403, § 672.401, § 671.401, § 672.102
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying the former wife's motion to hold the former husband in contempt for failing to pay the mortgage on the former marital home in full by a specified date. The court noted that the appellant failed to provide hearing transcripts for the record. The court held that because the mortgage payment was an obligation in the nature of a settlement of property rights rather than an obligation for support or alimony, the court's contempt power could not be invoked. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for contempt.
The court clarified that a court cannot use its contempt power to enforce a mortgage payment obligation that is categorized as a property settlement rather than a support obligation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the equitable defense of laches to bar the former wife's request for child support arrearages for a seven-year period during which the parties cohabitated and reconciled. The court's decision was based on credible testimony that the former wife told the former husband at the start of their cohabitation that she would not demand child support because they were living together. The court found that the former husband relied on this understanding and the wife's silence, and that his ability to defend against the enforcement action was now impaired by a lack of documentation and faded recollections. The court further determined that it would be inequitable to require the former husband to pay retroactive support for a child who resided primarily with him during the period in question. The court found that the trial court's determination was supported by competent, substantial evidence.
The court applied the equitable defense of laches to a child support arrearage claim, finding that the former wife's long delay in asserting her right, combined with the former husband's reliance on her stated intent not to seek support during their cohabitation, created a situation where enforcement would be inequitable.
The defendant was convicted of armed carjacking and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During the trial, a police officer testified that he had stopped many stolen vehicles in the past and that most of those vehicles still had their original license plates. The prosecution used this testimony in its closing argument to emphasize that the defendant's conduct was not an outlier. The defendant appealed, arguing that the testimony regarding the criminal behavior of others was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The court held that while testimony regarding general criminal behavior can be prejudicial, it is relevant because it tends to prove guilt. Furthermore, the court found that the defendant opened the door to this testimony by asserting a defense that a guilty person would not drive a stolen car with an unaltered license plate. Because the state provided substantial evidence of guilt, including a victim's identification of the defendant, the court found no fundamental error.
The court addressed the admissibility of testimony regarding the criminal behavior of others. While such testimony can be prejudicial, it is relevant and admissible when it is used to counter a specific theory of defense raised by the defendant.
Statutes construed: § 90.402
The appellate court addressed whether a trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on a subject matter jurisdiction challenge before opening an ancillary administration and appointing a curator. The court held that the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction constituted a denial of due process and was reversible error. The court reversed and remanded the orders with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss limited to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court affirmed that a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing when a party challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction before the court takes action on the underlying matter. Failure to do so constitutes a violation of due process.
Statutes construed: § 734.102
The court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to enforce settlement and the entry of final summary judgment against the subcontractor. The court held that a valid and enforceable settlement agreement existed because the parties provided objective manifestations of assent to the essential terms. Although the parties did not execute a formal mutual general release, the court found that the lack of a signed document did not prevent the formation of a contract or destroy the agreement. The parties' actions, including the exchange of emails, the issuance of a check for the negotiated amount, and the acknowledgment of the proposed settlement terms, constituted an objective agreement. The court determined that the formal release was a procedural formality rather than a condition precedent to the settlement.
The court clarified that the failure to execute a formal settlement document does not invalidate a settlement agreement if the parties have objectively agreed to the essential terms. The court emphasized that the formation of a contract depends on the objective manifestation of assent by both parties rather than their subjective intent.
The appellate court addressed the reasonableness of an attorney fee award and the taxation of expert costs following a settlement. The court affirmed the lodestar amount but reversed and remanded the award of a contingency risk multiplier and the costs for non-testifying experts.
The court clarified that a contingency risk multiplier requires specific evidence regarding the availability of competent counsel in the relevant market. It also reaffirmed that costs for experts who do not testify are generally not taxable unless they were reasonably necessary for trial preparation.
Statutes construed: § 92.231
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders striking the appellant's pleadings, dismissing his negligence complaint, and denying his motion to vacate the dismissal. The appellant argued that the trial court violated his due process rights by dismissing the action while discovery disputes and motions were pending. However, the appellant failed to provide transcripts of several hearings and case management conferences. Because the record was insufficient to determine if reversible error occurred, the court affirmed. The appellant also argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the judge due to judicial bias. The court found that the record did not establish facts that would cause a reasonable person to fear a lack of a fair trial. The court noted that a fear of bias resulting from adverse rulings is not a sufficient basis to disqualify a judge.
The court held that a lack of a sufficient record prevents an appellate court from determining if a trial court's decision was based on a misconception of the law. Additionally, the court clarified that an adverse ruling by a judge is not a sufficient basis for a motion to disqualify.
The petitioners sought second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court appellate division order affirming an enforcement order issued by the North Bay Village Code Enforcement Division. The court denied the petition. The court noted that second-tier certiorari is reserved for situations involving a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The court further observed that a circuit court order issued without a written opinion generally does not merit certiorari review because it lacks precedential value and is often fact-specific.
The court reaffirmed the narrow standard of review for second-tier certiorari, noting it is not a vehicle for a second appeal and is generally unavailable for orders lacking written opinions or those that are highly fact-specific.
In a residential eviction case, the tenant and landlord disputed the amount of rent and the conditions of the lease. The trial court heard a motion to determine rent and ordered the tenant to deposit a specific amount into the court registry. The tenant failed to comply with this order. The trial court subsequently granted the landlord's motion to strike the tenant's pleadings and entered a default final judgment of possession, finding the tenant's counterclaims were moot. The trial court also struck the tenant's requests for a jury trial. The tenant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting possession based on retaliatory conduct and in striking his counterclaims and jury trial demands.
The court clarified the application of section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes, regarding the mandatory deposit of rent into the court registry. While failure to deposit the required rent constitutes an absolute waiver of a tenant's defenses other than payment and justifies a default judgment of possession, it does not automatically render counterclaims for injunctive relief and damages moot. Furthermore, the court held that a jury trial demand cannot be struck as procedurally improper if the landlord has not filed a responsive pleading to the counterclaim within the timeframe required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of a condominium association in a premises liability action. The plaintiff, a condominium owner, sued the association after she slipped and fell on wastewater and sewage in her bathroom. The plaintiff argued the issue was recurring and that the association had notice of the problem. The association moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff could not prove that the specific blockage causing the backup was located in the common area pipes maintained by the association rather than in the pipes within the plaintiff's unit, which were the plaintiff's responsibility to maintain. The court held that because the fall occurred inside the plaintiff's unit, which was not exclusively controlled by the association, the plaintiff was required to provide evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the backup was more likely than not caused by a failure in the common area pipes. Because all witnesses, including the plaintiff and the association's representative, testified that they did not know the source of the blockage, the plaintiff failed to meet her evidentiary burden to establish a material issue of fact.
The court clarified that when a slip and fall occurs in a private unit where the defendant's responsibility is limited to common area infrastructure, the plaintiff must provide specific evidence linking the hazard to the defendant's area of responsibility to survive summary judgment.
The District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment in favor of a concert promoter who sued a record company and a rap artist for breach of contract and violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the contract claim because he was not a party to the agreement and was not an intended third-party beneficiary. The court noted that the plaintiff was an owner of a separate legal entity, and the contract was between the record company and a booking agency. Additionally, the court found the trial court erred by providing a substantial performance jury instruction regarding payment terms, as time is of the essence in commercial payment obligations. Finally, the court determined the FDUTPA claim was invalid because the plaintiff was not a Florida resident and the award was duplicative of the contract damages.
The court clarifies that a corporate officer or owner is not the same legal entity as the corporation and cannot claim standing for the entity's actions. It also reinforces that substantial performance does not apply to payment terms in commercial contracts where time is of the essence. Furthermore, it reaffirms that FDUTPA claims are limited to in-state consumers.
Statutes construed: § 501.201
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP appeals a final judgment in favor of Joseph Johnson, an independent contractor who was injured by an ungrounded electrical junction box while installing a door at a Wal-Mart store. Wal-Mart argued that it should not be held liable because Johnson was an independent contractor and the store did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the independent contractor defense does not apply when a property owner negligently creates or approves a dangerous condition of which it has actual or constructive knowledge. The court found that evidence supported the existence of such a condition, as the junction box was not compliant with the National Electrical Code and was located in a restricted area managed by Wal-Mart. Because the evidence supported an exception to the independent contractor defense, the trial court properly denied Wal-Mart's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict.
The court clarifies the application of the independent contractor defense in premises liability cases, specifically identifying the two exceptions where a property owner can be held liable for injuries to an independent contractor's employee: when the owner actively participates in or controls the work, or when the owner negligently creates or approves a dangerous condition of which it has actual or constructive knowledge.
The appellant challenged a supplemental judgment modifying timesharing and parental responsibility. The trial court's decision relied on a record that lacked a transcript. The appellate court provided the appellant with an opportunity to provide the missing transcript within 10 days under rule 9.200(f)(2). The appellant failed to do so and instead moved for an extension of time to create a statement of the evidence or proceedings under rule 9.200(b)(5). The court denied the motion for extension and affirmed the judgment. The court held that rule 9.200(f)(2) is intended to address omitted portions of an existing record and does not provide an opportunity to create a substitute for a missing transcript. The court further noted that the appellant was aware of the missing transcript months before the motion and failed to act promptly. The court concluded that the appellant waived the opportunity to supplement the record by failing to act promptly and that the delay was inconsistent with the expedited review typically afforded in cases involving children.
The court clarified that rule 9.200(f)(2) does not allow an appellant to substitute a statement of the evidence for a missing transcript and that failure to promptly seek to supplement the record after notice of a deficiency results in a waiver of that opportunity.
The court affirmed the conviction and sentences of the appellant for first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. The court rejected the appellant's double jeopardy claim regarding the two child abuse counts. Although the counts shared the same legal definition and overlapping time periods, the indictment contained separate factual allegations for each count. The court held that multiple punishments may be imposed for distinct acts arising from successive impulses to violate a single criminal prohibition during a single criminal episode. The court also rejected the appellant's challenge to the admission of autopsy photographs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion because the photos were probative of the severity of the injuries, the fact that the injuries were not accidental, and the timing of the injuries while the victim was in the care of the appellant. The court found that the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.
The court clarified that double jeopardy does not bar multiple punishments for distinct acts stemming from successive impulses during a single criminal episode. The court also upheld the admission of gruesome autopsy photos as probative evidence of the severity and timing of injuries.
Statutes construed: § 90.403