Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1993). · Go Syfert
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Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
42 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jacob A. Marquez v. Dawn L. Marquez, Dawn L. Marquez v. Jacob A. Marquez (alaska, 2026-04-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jacob A. Marquez v. Dawn L. Marquez, Dawn L. Marquez v. Jacob A. Marquez
Alaska · 2026 · confidence medium
He did not offer evidence of value for the items that Dawn took from the shed. “[I]t is the duty of the parties, not the court, to ensure that all necessary evidence is before the court in divorce proceedings.”32 In appealing the superior court’s findings, a party is “not in a position to claim the trial court erred in using the figures they supplied.” 33 Therefore, “a party who fails to present sufficient evidence [in a divorce proceeding] may not later challenge the adequacy of the evidence on appeal.” 34 The superior court did not clearly err by assigning no value to items for…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dundas v. Dundas
Alaska · 2015 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993) (holding that if significant marital asset has been identified but no evidence has been presented as to its value, "the best practice is for the trial court to direct the parties ... to fill the evidentiary void"). 33 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amy Rebecca Reedy-Huffman v. Patrick Clifford Huffman
Alaska · 2015 · confidence medium
She asserts that where neither party presents evidence of the value of a business, the court should direct the party who has the best access to proof of its value “to fill the evidentiary void.”4 But as Patrick correctly argues, an evidentiary void only exists “where neither party presents any evidence on a material issue.” For example, in Hartland v. Hartland, a wife presented evidence regarding the value of the marital asset at issue, which the husband failed to rebut or otherwise offer any evidence about its value.5 The husband argued that the trial court’s valuation of the asset …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael C. Hughes v. Dora J. Hughes
Alaska · 2013 · confidence medium
There was no testimony showing that NAG was used for any 32 Brotherton v. Brotherton, 941 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993)). 33 Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707, 719 (Alaska 2010). 34 Root, 851 P.2d at 69. 35 See Harrower, 71 P.3d at 858 (noting that transmutation converts the entire asset to marital property). -11- 1457 marital purpose, that it was held jointly, that Dora contributed any work or credit toward it, or that she took any part in its management.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burts v. Burts
Alaska · 2011 · confidence medium
Id. at 1093-94 (" is the duty of the parties, not the court, to ensure that all necessary evidence is before the court in divorce proceedings and ... a party who fails to present sufficient evidence may not later challenge the adequacy of the evidence on appeal.' " (quoting Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993))). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ethelbah v. Walker (2×)
Alaska · 2010 · confidence medium
Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993). 56 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hicks v. Pleasants (2×)
Alaska · 2007 · confidence medium
See also Inman v. Inman, 67 P.3d 655, 659 (Alaska 2003); Faulkner v. Goldfuss, 46 P.3d 993, 996 (Alaska 2002); Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 68 (Alaska 1993); Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 223-24 (Alaska 1986). 37 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forshee v. Forshee (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Alaska · 2006 · confidence medium
Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099 . 22 . 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993). 23 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Edelman v. Edelman
Alaska · 2002 · confidence medium
Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 68 (Alaska 1993). 15 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brotherton v. Brotherton
Alaska · 1997 · confidence medium
The only evidence Douglas presented to the court was the June 30 property values. “[This court has] previously held that it is the duty of the parties, not the court, to ensure that all necessary evidence is before the court in divorce proceedings and that a party who fails to present sufficient evidence may not later challenge the adequacy of the evidence on appeal.” Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993); see also Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 640 (Alaska 1989) (party who failed to present sufficient evidence at trial could not challenge adequacy of evidence on appeal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kendrick v. Kendrick
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 68 (Alaska 1993); Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272 , 569 P.2d 214, 216 (1977); Jones v. Stevenson, 149 Cal.App.3d 560 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 25 , 27 (1983) (dicta); In Marriage of Hunt, 868 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Colo.Ct.App.1993); Memmolo v. Memmolo, 576 A.2d 181, 182 (Del.1990) (dicta); Salazar v. Salazar, 583 So.2d 797, 797 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27 , 354 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1987) (dicta); Linson v. Linson, 1 Haw.App. 272 , 618 P.2d 748 , 751 (1980); In re Marriage of Korper, 131 Ill.App.3d 753 , 86 Ill.Dec. 766, 767 , 475 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (1985); I…
discussed Cited "see" Fortson v. Fortson
Alaska · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brotherton v. Brotherton, 941 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Alaska 1997) ("[This court has] previously held that it is the duty of the parties, not the court, to ensure that all necessaiy evidence is before the court in divorce proceedings and that a party who fails to present sufficient evidence may not later challenge the adequacy of the evidence on appeal.”) (quoting Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993)); see also Hartland v. Hartland, 111 P.2d 636, 640 (Alaska 1989) ("[It] is the parties' obligation to present the court with sufficient evidence of the value of the property.
discussed Cited "see" Foster v. Foster
Alaska · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 69 (Alaska 1993) (court should direct parties to supply evidence concerning value of significant assets).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bender v. Bender
Conn. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1993); Glidewell v. Glidewell, 859 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. App. 1993).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cohen v. Cohen
Tenn. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1993); Cooper v. Cooper, 167 Ariz. 482 , 808 P.2d 1234 (App.1990); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838 , 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 637 , 544 P.2d 561, 565 (1976); In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 51 (Colo.1988); In re Marriage of Hunt, 868 P.2d 1140 (Colo.App.1993); Krafiek v. Krafiek, 234 Conn. 783 , 663 A.2d 365 (1995) (dicta); Donovan v. Donovan, 494 A.2d 1260 (Del.Super.Ct.1985); Dozier v. Dozier, 606 So.2d 477 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27 , 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987) (dicta); Stouffer v. Stouffer, 10 Haw.App. 267 , 867 P.2d 2…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Judith A. ROOT, Appellant,
v.
Leslie R. ROOT, Appellee
S-4901.
Alaska Supreme Court.
Apr 30, 1993.
851 P.2d 67
Kenneth P. Jacobus, P.C., Anchorage, for appellant., Leslie R. Root, pro se.
Moore, Witz, Burke, Matthews, Compton.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

MOORE, Chief Justice.

In this property division appeal, Judith Root contends that the trial court’s decision to award Leslie Root his nonvested military retirement pension is contrary to this court’s holding in Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987). We agree.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

After a twenty-year marriage, Judith Root filed for divorce in January 1991.[*68] The only contested issue at trial concerned the equitable division of the marital estate.

At the time of divorce, the parties’ only significant marital assets were the Anchorage family home, Judith’s thrift account, Judith’s vested PERS pension and Leslie’s nonvested military retirement benefits. The estimated equity in the family home ranged from $26,098 to $36,098. [1] Judith’s thrift savings account had a balance of approximately $4,187.54. The value of Judith’s vested PERS pension plan was not established at trial. Similarly, Leslie’s non-vested military retirement benefits were not valued at trial. [2]

The trial court entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law in October 1991. It awarded the family home to Judith along with the associated debt. It also awarded Judith all of the funds in her thrift account and in her unvalued PERS pension plan, as well as various items of personal property worth approximately $23,865. The court awarded Leslie his un-valued nonvested military retirement benefits and various items of personal property worth approximately $22,505. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The division of property in a divorce action involves a three-step process— the trial court must (1) determine what property is available for distribution, (2) value the property, and (3) determine the most equitable allocation. Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 223-24 (Alaska 1986). The identification of the property available for distribution is reviewed under the “abuse of discretion standard, although it may involve legal determinations to which this court applies its independent judgment.” Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). The valuation of the marital property is a factual determination, and will be reversed only if clearly erroneous. Id. We will reverse an allocation decision only for abuse of discretion and only if the allocation is clearly unjust. Id.

B. Equitable Distribution of Nonvest-ed Pension Benefits

Relying on Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987), Judith contends that the trial court erred in distributing Leslie’s nonvested military pension to Leslie. In Laing, we held that nonvested retirement benefits are marital assets subject to division by the trial court. [3] Id. at 656. We observed that:

[T]he contingent nature of a nonvested pension presents simply a valuation problem, not bearing on the non-employee spouse’s entitlement to a just share of the marital assets. Pension benefits are generally viewed as deferred compensation for services rendered and the employee spouse’s right thereto is a contractual right.

Id. (citations omitted). We then adopted the following approach for dividing non-vested pension rights:

First, because the nonvested pension may, by definition, be forfeited in its entirety, it should not be considered when the trial court makes the initial property division at the time of the divorce. If and when the employee spouse’s pension rights vest and if the parties are unable to reach an agreement on their own, the non-employee spouse may at any time thereafter seek an order[*69] dividing the pension. This is to be done in the same manner as if the pension had been vested at the time of the divorce. ... Once the pension has vested, the trial court can determine whether the present value or the retained jurisdiction approach is appropriate in a given case and adapt that approach to the specific circumstances presented.

Id. at 658; see also Thomas v. Thomas, 815 P.2d 374, 375-76 (Alaska 1991) (holding that trial court should follow the Laing procedure unless it specifically finds that the pension will not vest and that the employee’s contributions will be refunded — in which case the court should value and divide the marital portion of the employee’s contributions upon divorce).

Under Laing, the trial court clearly erred in awarding Leslie his nonvested retirement benefits at the time of divorce. The trial court apparently felt that Judith would be best served by an award of all of the equity in the family home in lieu of a share of Leslie’s retirement benefits because this division would provide her with a lump sum with which to pursue her educational goals. The court also believed that this distribution scheme would best achieve our policy of disentangling the financial affairs of those seeking divorce.

However, Judith will only receive this lump sum after the current leasehold expires in June 1993 and the house is sold. Leslie’s retirement benefits vest in April 1993. Thus the trial court could have achieved the same result by retaining jurisdiction over Leslie’s nonvested pension and equitably dividing the remaining marital assets. Once Leslie’s pension vested, the court could then have determined the present value of the vested pension and awarded Judith a lump sum (possibly out of Leslie’s share of the house equity when sold) as her share of the pension. See Thomas, 815 P.2d at 376 n. 2; Laing, 741 P.2d at 657-58 (once vesting occurs, the marital portion of the pension may, in appropriate cases, be made payable in a lump sum or in installments without regard to when the pension benefits are actually received).

C. Necessity for Adequate Evidence at Trial

The trial court’s error in distributing Leslie’s nonvested retirement benefits is aggravated by the fact that Leslie failed to present evidence indicating the present value of these benefits. See Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570 (Alaska 1983) (trial court must determine the value of the marital assets available for distribution). Similarly, Judith failed to present any evidence of the value of her vested PERS pension. We have previously held that it is the duty of the parties, not the court, to ensure that all necessary evidence is before the court in divorce proceedings and that a party who fails to present sufficient evidence may not later challenge the adequacy of the evidence on appeal. Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 640 (Alaska 1989). However, in cases such as this one, where a party identifies a significant marital asset but presents no evidence as to its value, the best practice is for the trial court to direct the parties, or the delinquent party, or the party having the best access to the proof, to fill the evidentiary void.

REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

. The house, valued between $145,000 and $135,000, has an outstanding mortgage of $108,-902. However it cannot be sold until the current leasehold expires in June 1993.

2

. Leslie’s military retirement benefits do not vest until April 1993 when he will complete 20 years of service with the army. The amount of the benefit will be one half of Leslie's base pay at the time of retirement. The parties do not dispute that approximately 68% of these retirement benefits are part of the marital estate.

3

.Leslie cites outdated case law to argue that military retirement benefits are not available for equitable division. Following the 1982 enactment of the Uniformed Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act, we held that military retirement benefits may be equitably divided under state law. Chase v. Chase, 662 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1983).