Alaska Statutes
Alaska Stat. § 11.81.350 (2026)
Justification: Use of force in defense of property and premises
✓ current as of July 2026
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Sec. 11.81.350. Justification: Use of force in defense of property and premises.
(a) A person may use nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by the other of an unlawful taking or damaging of property or services.
(b) A person may use deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of arson upon a dwelling or occupied building.
(c) A person in possession or control of any premises, or a guest or an express or implied agent of that person, may use
(1) nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by the other of criminal trespass in any degree upon the premises;
(2) deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be a burglary in any degree occurring in an occupied dwelling or building.
(d) [Repealed, § 7 ch 68 SLA 2006.]
(e) A person
(1) in a vehicle, or forcibly removed from a vehicle, may use deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be a carjacking of that vehicle at or about the time the vehicle is carjacked;
(2) outside of a vehicle may use deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the theft of that vehicle when another person, other than the perceived offender, is inside of the vehicle; this paragraph does not apply to a person outside of a vehicle who is involved in a dispute with a person inside of the vehicle who is a household member of that person; in this paragraph, “household member” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990.
(f) A person justified in using force under this section does not have a duty to leave or attempt to leave the area of the encounter before using force.
(g) In (e) of this section,
(1) “carjacking” means a robbery involving the taking or attempted taking of a vehicle from a person in possession of the vehicle;
(2) “vehicle” means a “motor vehicle” as defined in AS 28.90.990, an aircraft, or a watercraft.
(a) A person may use nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by the other of an unlawful taking or damaging of property or services.
(b) A person may use deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of arson upon a dwelling or occupied building.
(c) A person in possession or control of any premises, or a guest or an express or implied agent of that person, may use
(1) nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by the other of criminal trespass in any degree upon the premises;
(2) deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be a burglary in any degree occurring in an occupied dwelling or building.
(d) [Repealed, § 7 ch 68 SLA 2006.]
(e) A person
(1) in a vehicle, or forcibly removed from a vehicle, may use deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be a carjacking of that vehicle at or about the time the vehicle is carjacked;
(2) outside of a vehicle may use deadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary to terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the theft of that vehicle when another person, other than the perceived offender, is inside of the vehicle; this paragraph does not apply to a person outside of a vehicle who is involved in a dispute with a person inside of the vehicle who is a household member of that person; in this paragraph, “household member” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990.
(f) A person justified in using force under this section does not have a duty to leave or attempt to leave the area of the encounter before using force.
(g) In (e) of this section,
(1) “carjacking” means a robbery involving the taking or attempted taking of a vehicle from a person in possession of the vehicle;
(2) “vehicle” means a “motor vehicle” as defined in AS 28.90.990, an aircraft, or a watercraft.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2022 · leading case: Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). “340 (use of force in defense of a third person); AS 11.81.350 (use of force in defense of property and premises); AS 11.”
Woodward v. State, 855 P.2d 423 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). “We find the argument meritless for much the same reason that led us to reject Woodward’s claim that he did not extort the “property of another”: Woodward sought to collect money he thought was owed him; he was not trying to prevent the taking of specific and identifiable…”
Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska, 512 P.3d 665 (Alaska 2022). “39 AS 11.81.350. 40 AS 11.81.370-.390. 41 Id.”
Adams v. State, 440 P.3d 337 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019). “That pattern instruction is based on the wording of AS 11.81.350(c)(2) : "A person in possession or control of any premises .”
Palmer v. State, 770 P.2d 296 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). “Under these circumstances, Palmer argues that his use of deadly force would be authorized under AS 11.81.350, but not under AS 11.81.335.”
Jackson v. State, 657 P.2d 405 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). “See AS 11.81.350(a) (use of nondeadly force permitted in defense of property).”
Rhames v. State, 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “See AS 11.81.350(c)(2) (a property owner may use deadly force when necessary to terminate a burglary).”
Heather R. v. Justin L. (Alaska 2021). “20 See AS 11.81.350(a) (authorizing use of force in defense of property).”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.350(a) — 4 cases
Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). “340 (use of force in defense of a third person); AS 11.81.350 (use of force in defense of property and premises); AS 11.”
Woodward v. State, 855 P.2d 423 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). “We find the argument meritless for much the same reason that led us to reject Woodward’s claim that he did not extort the “property of another”: Woodward sought to collect money he thought was owed him; he was not trying to prevent the taking of specific and identifiable…”
Jackson v. State, 657 P.2d 405 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). “See AS 11.81.350(a) (use of nondeadly force permitted in defense of property).”
Heather R. v. Justin L. (Alaska 2021). “20 See AS 11.81.350(a) (authorizing use of force in defense of property).”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.350(c)(2) — 3 cases
Adams v. State, 440 P.3d 337 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019). “That pattern instruction is based on the wording of AS 11.81.350(c)(2) : "A person in possession or control of any premises .”
Palmer v. State, 770 P.2d 296 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). “Under these circumstances, Palmer argues that his use of deadly force would be authorized under AS 11.81.350, but not under AS 11.81.335.”
Rhames v. State, 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “See AS 11.81.350(c)(2) (a property owner may use deadly force when necessary to terminate a burglary).”
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