Alaska Statutes
Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900 (2026)
Definitions
✓ current as of July 2026
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Sec. 11.81.900. Definitions.
(a) For purposes of this title, unless the context requires otherwise,
(1) a person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person's conscious objective is to cause that result; when intentionally causing a particular result is an element of an offense, that intent need not be the person's only objective;
(2) a person acts “knowingly” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists; when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, that knowledge is established if a person is aware of a substantial probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes it does not exist; a person who is unaware of conduct or a circumstance of which the person would have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts knowingly with respect to that conduct or circumstance;
(3) a person acts “recklessly” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation; a person who is unaware of a risk of which the person would have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts recklessly with respect to that risk;
(4) a person acts with “criminal negligence” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(b) In this title, unless otherwise specified or unless the context requires otherwise,
(1) “access device” means a card, credit card, plate, code, account number, algorithm, or identification number, including a social security number, electronic serial number, or password, that is capable of being used, alone or in conjunction with another access device or identification document, to obtain property or services, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of property;
(2) “affirmative defense” means that
(A) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the defense; and
(B) the defendant has the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence;
(3) “animal” means a vertebrate living creature not a human being, but does not include fish;
(4) “benefit” means a present or future gain or advantage to the beneficiary or to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary;
(5) “building”, in addition to its usual meaning, includes any propelled vehicle or structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business; when a building consists of separate units, including apartment units, offices, or rented rooms, each unit is considered a separate building;
(6) “cannabis” has the meaning ascribed to it in AS 11.71.900(11), (12), and (15);
(7) “commercial sexual act” means a sexual act for which anything of value is given or received by any person;
(8) “conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state;
(9) “controlled substance” has the meaning ascribed to it in AS 11.71.900(5);
(10) “correctional facility” means premises, or a portion of premises, used for the confinement of persons under official detention;
(11) “credit card” means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, courtesy card, or identification card or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining property or services on credit;
(12) “crime” means an offense for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized; a crime is either a felony or a misdemeanor;
(13) “crime involving domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990;
(14) “criminal street gang” means a group of three or more persons
(A) who have in common a name or identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style of dress, or use of hand signs; and
(B) who, individually, jointly, or in combination, have committed or attempted to commit, within the preceding three years, for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the group, two or more offenses under any of, or any combination of, the following:
(i) AS 11.41;
(ii) AS 11.46; or
(iii) a felony offense;
(15) “culpable mental state” means “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly”, or with “criminal negligence”, as those terms are defined in (a) of this section;
(16) “dangerous instrument” means
(A) any deadly weapon or anything that, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury; or
(B) hands, other body parts, or other objects when used to impede normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or obstructing the nose or mouth;
(17) “deadly force” means force that the person uses with the intent of causing, or uses under circumstances that the person knows create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious physical injury; “deadly force” includes intentionally discharging or pointing a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction in which another person is believed to be and intentionally placing another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument;
(18) “deadly weapon” means any firearm, or anything designed for and capable of causing death or serious physical injury, including a knife, an axe, a club, metal knuckles, or an explosive;
(19) “deception” means to knowingly
(A) create or confirm another's false impression that the defendant does not believe to be true, including false impressions as to law or value and false impressions as to intention or other state of mind;
(B) fail to correct another's false impression that the defendant previously has created or confirmed;
(C) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property or service involved;
(D) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property and fail to disclose a lien, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether or not that impediment is a matter of official record; or
(E) promise performance that the defendant does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed;
(20) “defense”, other than an affirmative defense, means that
(A) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the defense; and
(B) the state then has the burden of disproving the existence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt;
(21) “defensive weapon” means an electric stun gun, or a device to dispense mace or a similar chemical agent, that is not designed to cause death or serious physical injury;
(22) “drug” has the meaning ascribed to it in AS 11.71.900;
(23) “dwelling” means a building that is designed for use or is used as a person's permanent or temporary home or place of lodging;
(24) “electronic smoking product”
(A) means
(i) any product containing or delivering nicotine or any other substance intended for human consumption that can be used by a person through inhalation of vapor or aerosol from the product, of any size or shape, whether the product is manufactured, distributed, marketed, or sold as an e-cigarette, e-cigar, e-pipe, e-hookah, vape pen, or any other product name or descriptor; or
(ii) a component, solution, alternative tobacco product, e-liquid, e-juice, vapor product, flavoring, or other related product of an electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, or other similar device of any size or shape used for, or to assist with, aerosolizing and inhaling chemical substances that may cause an adverse effect on human health;
(B) does not include marijuana as defined in AS 11.71.900;
(25) “explosive” means a chemical compound, mixture, or device that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing a chemical reaction resulting in a substantially instantaneous release of gas and heat, including dynamite, blasting powder, nitroglycerin, blasting caps, and nitrojelly, but excluding consumer fireworks and display fireworks as designated in a regulation adopted under AS 18.72.011(a), black powder, smokeless powder, small arms ammunition, and small arms ammunition primers;
(26) “felony” means a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year is authorized;
(27) “fiduciary” means a trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver, or any other person carrying on functions of trust on behalf of another person or organization;
(28) “firearm” means a weapon, including a pistol, revolver, rifle, or shotgun, whether loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable, designed for discharging a shot capable of causing death or serious physical injury;
(29) “force” means any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or the threat of imminent bodily impact, restraint, or confinement, “force” includes deadly and nondeadly force;
(30) “government” means the United States, any state or any municipality or other political subdivision within the United States or its territories; any department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing; an agency carrying out the functions of government; or any corporation or agency formed under interstate compact or international treaty;
(31) “gravity knife” means any knife that has a blade that opens or releases a blade from its handle or sheath by the force of gravity or by the application of centrifugal force; “gravity knife” does not include a knife that has a spring, detent, or other mechanism designed to create a bias toward closure that requires a person to apply exertion to the blade by hand, wrist, or arm to overcome the bias toward closure and open or release the blade;
(32) “highway” means a public road, road right-of-way, street, alley, bridge, walk, trail, tunnel, path, or similar or related facility, as well as ferries and similar or related facilities;
(33) “identification document” means a paper, instrument, or other article used to establish the identity of a person; “identification document” includes a social security card, driver's license, non-driver's identification, birth certificate, passport, employee identification, or hunting or fishing license;
(34) “includes” means “includes but is not limited to”;
(35) “incompetent person” means a person who is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency to the extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning that person;
(36) “intoxicated” means intoxicated from the use of a drug or alcohol;
(37) “law” includes statutes and regulations;
(38) “leased” includes “rented”;
(39) “metal knuckles” means a device that consists of finger rings or guards made of a hard substance and designed, made, or adapted for inflicting serious physical injury or death by striking a person;
(40) “misdemeanor” means a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year may not be imposed;
(41) “nondeadly force” means force other than deadly force;
(42) “offense” means conduct for which a sentence of imprisonment or fine is authorized; an offense is either a crime or a violation;
(43) “official detention” means custody, arrest, surrender in lieu of arrest, or actual or constructive restraint under an order of a court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding, other than an order of conditional bail release;
(44) “official proceeding” means a proceeding heard before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental body or official authorized to hear evidence under oath;
(45) “omission” means a failure to perform an act for which a duty of performance is imposed by law;
(46) “organization” means a legal entity, including a corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, joint stock company, foundation, institution, government, society, union, club, church, or any other group of persons organized for any purpose;
(47) “peace officer” means a public servant vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests, whether the duty extends to all offenses or is limited to a specific class of offenses or offenders;
(48) “person” means a natural person and, when appropriate, an organization, government, or governmental instrumentality;
(49) “physical injury” means a physical pain or an impairment of physical condition;
(50) “police dog” means a dog used in police work under the control of a peace officer;
(51) “possess” means having physical possession or the exercise of dominion or control over property;
(52) “premises” means real property and any building;
(53) “propelled vehicle” means a device upon which or by which a person or property is or may be transported, and which is self-propelled, including automobiles, vessels, airplanes, motorcycles, snow machines, all-terrain vehicles, sailboats, and construction equipment;
(54) “property” means an article, substance, or thing of value, including money, tangible and intangible personal property including data or information stored in a computer program, system, or network, real property, an access device, a domestic pet or livestock regardless of value, choses-in-action, and evidence of debt or of contract; a commodity of a public utility such as gas, electricity, steam, or water constitutes property, but the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of wires, pipes, conduits, or other equipment is considered a rendition of a service rather than a sale or delivery of property;
(55) “public place” means a place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access and includes highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement or business, parks, playgrounds, prisons, and hallways, lobbies, and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence;
(56) “public record” means a document, paper, book, letter, drawing, map, plat, photo, photographic file, motion picture, film, microfilm, microphotograph, exhibit, magnetic or paper tape, punched card or other document of any other material, regardless of physical form or characteristic, developed or received under law or in connection with the transaction of official business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by any agency, municipality, or any body subject to the open meeting provision of AS 44.62.310, as evidence of the organization, function, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the state or municipality or because of the informational value in it; it also includes staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect the public;
(57) “public servant” means each of the following, whether compensated or not, but does not include jurors or witnesses:
(A) an officer or employee of the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or a governmental instrumentality of the state, including legislators, members of the judiciary, and peace officers;
(B) a person acting as an advisor, consultant, or assistant at the request of, the direction of, or under contract with the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or another governmental instrumentality; in this subparagraph “person” includes an employee of the person;
(C) a person who serves as a member of the board or commission created by statute or by legislative, judicial, or administrative action by the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or a governmental instrumentality;
(D) a person nominated, elected, appointed, employed, or designated to act in a capacity defined in (A) — (C) of this paragraph, but who does not occupy the position;
(58) a “renunciation” is not “voluntary and complete” if it is substantially motivated, in whole or in part, by
(A) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
(B) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but similar objective;
(59) “semen” means fluid produced in the male reproductive organs, which may include spermatozoa.
(60) “serious physical injury” means
(A) physical injury caused by an act performed under circumstances that create a substantial risk of death; or
(B) physical injury that causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, protracted loss or impairment of the function of a body member or organ, or that unlawfully terminates a pregnancy;
(61) “services” includes labor, professional services, transportation, telephone or other communications service, entertainment, including cable, subscription, or pay television or other telecommunications service, the supplying of food, lodging, or other accommodations in hotels, restaurants, or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions, the use of a computer, computer time, a computer system, a computer program, a computer network, or any part of a computer system or network, and the supplying of equipment for use;
(62) “sexual act” means sexual penetration or sexual contact;
(63) “sexual contact” means
(A) the defendant's
(i) knowingly touching, directly or through clothing, the victim's genitals, anus, or female breast;
(ii) knowingly causing the victim to touch, directly or through clothing, the defendant's or victim's genitals, anus, or female breast; or
(iii) knowingly causing the victim to come into contact with semen;
(B) but “sexual contact” does not include acts
(i) that may reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities for a child, interactions with a child, or affection for a child;
(ii) performed for the purpose of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment that is reasonably adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the person being treated; or
(iii) that are a necessary part of a search of a person committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Family and Community Services;
(64) “sexual penetration”
(A) means genital intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or an intrusion, however slight, of an object or any part of a person's body into the genital or anal opening of another person's body; each party to any of the acts described in this subparagraph is considered to be engaged in sexual penetration;
(B) does not include acts
(i) performed for the purpose of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment that is reasonably adapted to promoting the physical health of the person being treated; or
(ii) that are a necessary part of a search of a person committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Family and Community Services;
(65) “solicits” includes “commands”;
(66) “switchblade” means any knife that has a blade that folds, closes, or retracts into the handle or sheath that opens automatically by pressure applied to a button or other device located on the handle or sheath; “switchblade” does not include a knife that has a spring, detent, or other mechanism designed to create a bias toward closure that requires exertion applied to the blade by hand, wrist, or arm to overcome the bias toward closure and open the blade;
(67) “threat” means a menace, however communicated, to engage in conduct described in AS 11.41.520(a)(1) — (7) but under AS 11.41.520(a)(1) includes all threats to inflict physical injury on anyone;
(68) “unborn child” means a member of the species Homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb;
(69) “violation” is a noncriminal offense punishable only by a fine, but not by imprisonment or other penalty; conviction of a violation does not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime; a person charged with a violation is not entitled
(A) to a trial by jury; or
(B) to have a public defender or other counsel appointed at public expense to represent the person;
(70) “voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort and determination, and includes the possession of property if the defendant was aware of the physical possession or control for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.
Title 12. Code of Criminal Procedure.
Chapter 05. Jurisdiction.
(a) For purposes of this title, unless the context requires otherwise,
(1) a person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person's conscious objective is to cause that result; when intentionally causing a particular result is an element of an offense, that intent need not be the person's only objective;
(2) a person acts “knowingly” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists; when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, that knowledge is established if a person is aware of a substantial probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes it does not exist; a person who is unaware of conduct or a circumstance of which the person would have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts knowingly with respect to that conduct or circumstance;
(3) a person acts “recklessly” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation; a person who is unaware of a risk of which the person would have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts recklessly with respect to that risk;
(4) a person acts with “criminal negligence” with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(b) In this title, unless otherwise specified or unless the context requires otherwise,
(1) “access device” means a card, credit card, plate, code, account number, algorithm, or identification number, including a social security number, electronic serial number, or password, that is capable of being used, alone or in conjunction with another access device or identification document, to obtain property or services, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of property;
(2) “affirmative defense” means that
(A) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the defense; and
(B) the defendant has the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence;
(3) “animal” means a vertebrate living creature not a human being, but does not include fish;
(4) “benefit” means a present or future gain or advantage to the beneficiary or to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary;
(5) “building”, in addition to its usual meaning, includes any propelled vehicle or structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business; when a building consists of separate units, including apartment units, offices, or rented rooms, each unit is considered a separate building;
(6) “cannabis” has the meaning ascribed to it in AS 11.71.900(11), (12), and (15);
(7) “commercial sexual act” means a sexual act for which anything of value is given or received by any person;
(8) “conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state;
(9) “controlled substance” has the meaning ascribed to it in AS 11.71.900(5);
(10) “correctional facility” means premises, or a portion of premises, used for the confinement of persons under official detention;
(11) “credit card” means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, courtesy card, or identification card or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining property or services on credit;
(12) “crime” means an offense for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized; a crime is either a felony or a misdemeanor;
(13) “crime involving domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990;
(14) “criminal street gang” means a group of three or more persons
(A) who have in common a name or identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style of dress, or use of hand signs; and
(B) who, individually, jointly, or in combination, have committed or attempted to commit, within the preceding three years, for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the group, two or more offenses under any of, or any combination of, the following:
(i) AS 11.41;
(ii) AS 11.46; or
(iii) a felony offense;
(15) “culpable mental state” means “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly”, or with “criminal negligence”, as those terms are defined in (a) of this section;
(16) “dangerous instrument” means
(A) any deadly weapon or anything that, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury; or
(B) hands, other body parts, or other objects when used to impede normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or obstructing the nose or mouth;
(17) “deadly force” means force that the person uses with the intent of causing, or uses under circumstances that the person knows create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious physical injury; “deadly force” includes intentionally discharging or pointing a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction in which another person is believed to be and intentionally placing another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument;
(18) “deadly weapon” means any firearm, or anything designed for and capable of causing death or serious physical injury, including a knife, an axe, a club, metal knuckles, or an explosive;
(19) “deception” means to knowingly
(A) create or confirm another's false impression that the defendant does not believe to be true, including false impressions as to law or value and false impressions as to intention or other state of mind;
(B) fail to correct another's false impression that the defendant previously has created or confirmed;
(C) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property or service involved;
(D) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property and fail to disclose a lien, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether or not that impediment is a matter of official record; or
(E) promise performance that the defendant does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed;
(20) “defense”, other than an affirmative defense, means that
(A) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the defense; and
(B) the state then has the burden of disproving the existence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt;
(21) “defensive weapon” means an electric stun gun, or a device to dispense mace or a similar chemical agent, that is not designed to cause death or serious physical injury;
(22) “drug” has the meaning ascribed to it in AS 11.71.900;
(23) “dwelling” means a building that is designed for use or is used as a person's permanent or temporary home or place of lodging;
(24) “electronic smoking product”
(A) means
(i) any product containing or delivering nicotine or any other substance intended for human consumption that can be used by a person through inhalation of vapor or aerosol from the product, of any size or shape, whether the product is manufactured, distributed, marketed, or sold as an e-cigarette, e-cigar, e-pipe, e-hookah, vape pen, or any other product name or descriptor; or
(ii) a component, solution, alternative tobacco product, e-liquid, e-juice, vapor product, flavoring, or other related product of an electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic pipe, or other similar device of any size or shape used for, or to assist with, aerosolizing and inhaling chemical substances that may cause an adverse effect on human health;
(B) does not include marijuana as defined in AS 11.71.900;
(25) “explosive” means a chemical compound, mixture, or device that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing a chemical reaction resulting in a substantially instantaneous release of gas and heat, including dynamite, blasting powder, nitroglycerin, blasting caps, and nitrojelly, but excluding consumer fireworks and display fireworks as designated in a regulation adopted under AS 18.72.011(a), black powder, smokeless powder, small arms ammunition, and small arms ammunition primers;
(26) “felony” means a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year is authorized;
(27) “fiduciary” means a trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver, or any other person carrying on functions of trust on behalf of another person or organization;
(28) “firearm” means a weapon, including a pistol, revolver, rifle, or shotgun, whether loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable, designed for discharging a shot capable of causing death or serious physical injury;
(29) “force” means any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or the threat of imminent bodily impact, restraint, or confinement, “force” includes deadly and nondeadly force;
(30) “government” means the United States, any state or any municipality or other political subdivision within the United States or its territories; any department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing; an agency carrying out the functions of government; or any corporation or agency formed under interstate compact or international treaty;
(31) “gravity knife” means any knife that has a blade that opens or releases a blade from its handle or sheath by the force of gravity or by the application of centrifugal force; “gravity knife” does not include a knife that has a spring, detent, or other mechanism designed to create a bias toward closure that requires a person to apply exertion to the blade by hand, wrist, or arm to overcome the bias toward closure and open or release the blade;
(32) “highway” means a public road, road right-of-way, street, alley, bridge, walk, trail, tunnel, path, or similar or related facility, as well as ferries and similar or related facilities;
(33) “identification document” means a paper, instrument, or other article used to establish the identity of a person; “identification document” includes a social security card, driver's license, non-driver's identification, birth certificate, passport, employee identification, or hunting or fishing license;
(34) “includes” means “includes but is not limited to”;
(35) “incompetent person” means a person who is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency to the extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning that person;
(36) “intoxicated” means intoxicated from the use of a drug or alcohol;
(37) “law” includes statutes and regulations;
(38) “leased” includes “rented”;
(39) “metal knuckles” means a device that consists of finger rings or guards made of a hard substance and designed, made, or adapted for inflicting serious physical injury or death by striking a person;
(40) “misdemeanor” means a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year may not be imposed;
(41) “nondeadly force” means force other than deadly force;
(42) “offense” means conduct for which a sentence of imprisonment or fine is authorized; an offense is either a crime or a violation;
(43) “official detention” means custody, arrest, surrender in lieu of arrest, or actual or constructive restraint under an order of a court in a criminal or juvenile proceeding, other than an order of conditional bail release;
(44) “official proceeding” means a proceeding heard before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental body or official authorized to hear evidence under oath;
(45) “omission” means a failure to perform an act for which a duty of performance is imposed by law;
(46) “organization” means a legal entity, including a corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, joint stock company, foundation, institution, government, society, union, club, church, or any other group of persons organized for any purpose;
(47) “peace officer” means a public servant vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests, whether the duty extends to all offenses or is limited to a specific class of offenses or offenders;
(48) “person” means a natural person and, when appropriate, an organization, government, or governmental instrumentality;
(49) “physical injury” means a physical pain or an impairment of physical condition;
(50) “police dog” means a dog used in police work under the control of a peace officer;
(51) “possess” means having physical possession or the exercise of dominion or control over property;
(52) “premises” means real property and any building;
(53) “propelled vehicle” means a device upon which or by which a person or property is or may be transported, and which is self-propelled, including automobiles, vessels, airplanes, motorcycles, snow machines, all-terrain vehicles, sailboats, and construction equipment;
(54) “property” means an article, substance, or thing of value, including money, tangible and intangible personal property including data or information stored in a computer program, system, or network, real property, an access device, a domestic pet or livestock regardless of value, choses-in-action, and evidence of debt or of contract; a commodity of a public utility such as gas, electricity, steam, or water constitutes property, but the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of wires, pipes, conduits, or other equipment is considered a rendition of a service rather than a sale or delivery of property;
(55) “public place” means a place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access and includes highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement or business, parks, playgrounds, prisons, and hallways, lobbies, and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence;
(56) “public record” means a document, paper, book, letter, drawing, map, plat, photo, photographic file, motion picture, film, microfilm, microphotograph, exhibit, magnetic or paper tape, punched card or other document of any other material, regardless of physical form or characteristic, developed or received under law or in connection with the transaction of official business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by any agency, municipality, or any body subject to the open meeting provision of AS 44.62.310, as evidence of the organization, function, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the state or municipality or because of the informational value in it; it also includes staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect the public;
(57) “public servant” means each of the following, whether compensated or not, but does not include jurors or witnesses:
(A) an officer or employee of the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or a governmental instrumentality of the state, including legislators, members of the judiciary, and peace officers;
(B) a person acting as an advisor, consultant, or assistant at the request of, the direction of, or under contract with the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or another governmental instrumentality; in this subparagraph “person” includes an employee of the person;
(C) a person who serves as a member of the board or commission created by statute or by legislative, judicial, or administrative action by the state, a municipality or other political subdivision of the state, or a governmental instrumentality;
(D) a person nominated, elected, appointed, employed, or designated to act in a capacity defined in (A) — (C) of this paragraph, but who does not occupy the position;
(58) a “renunciation” is not “voluntary and complete” if it is substantially motivated, in whole or in part, by
(A) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
(B) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but similar objective;
(59) “semen” means fluid produced in the male reproductive organs, which may include spermatozoa.
(60) “serious physical injury” means
(A) physical injury caused by an act performed under circumstances that create a substantial risk of death; or
(B) physical injury that causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, protracted loss or impairment of the function of a body member or organ, or that unlawfully terminates a pregnancy;
(61) “services” includes labor, professional services, transportation, telephone or other communications service, entertainment, including cable, subscription, or pay television or other telecommunications service, the supplying of food, lodging, or other accommodations in hotels, restaurants, or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions, the use of a computer, computer time, a computer system, a computer program, a computer network, or any part of a computer system or network, and the supplying of equipment for use;
(62) “sexual act” means sexual penetration or sexual contact;
(63) “sexual contact” means
(A) the defendant's
(i) knowingly touching, directly or through clothing, the victim's genitals, anus, or female breast;
(ii) knowingly causing the victim to touch, directly or through clothing, the defendant's or victim's genitals, anus, or female breast; or
(iii) knowingly causing the victim to come into contact with semen;
(B) but “sexual contact” does not include acts
(i) that may reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities for a child, interactions with a child, or affection for a child;
(ii) performed for the purpose of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment that is reasonably adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the person being treated; or
(iii) that are a necessary part of a search of a person committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Family and Community Services;
(64) “sexual penetration”
(A) means genital intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or an intrusion, however slight, of an object or any part of a person's body into the genital or anal opening of another person's body; each party to any of the acts described in this subparagraph is considered to be engaged in sexual penetration;
(B) does not include acts
(i) performed for the purpose of administering a recognized and lawful form of treatment that is reasonably adapted to promoting the physical health of the person being treated; or
(ii) that are a necessary part of a search of a person committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Family and Community Services;
(65) “solicits” includes “commands”;
(66) “switchblade” means any knife that has a blade that folds, closes, or retracts into the handle or sheath that opens automatically by pressure applied to a button or other device located on the handle or sheath; “switchblade” does not include a knife that has a spring, detent, or other mechanism designed to create a bias toward closure that requires exertion applied to the blade by hand, wrist, or arm to overcome the bias toward closure and open the blade;
(67) “threat” means a menace, however communicated, to engage in conduct described in AS 11.41.520(a)(1) — (7) but under AS 11.41.520(a)(1) includes all threats to inflict physical injury on anyone;
(68) “unborn child” means a member of the species Homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb;
(69) “violation” is a noncriminal offense punishable only by a fine, but not by imprisonment or other penalty; conviction of a violation does not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime; a person charged with a violation is not entitled
(A) to a trial by jury; or
(B) to have a public defender or other counsel appointed at public expense to represent the person;
(70) “voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort and determination, and includes the possession of property if the defendant was aware of the physical possession or control for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.
Title 12. Code of Criminal Procedure.
Chapter 05. Jurisdiction.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 397
cases (36 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “AS 11.81.900(a)(2) defines the term "knowingly" as follows: (2) a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists;…”
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.81.900 provides in relevant part: (a) for purposes of this title, unless the context requires otherwise, (1) a person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result described by a provision of law defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause that result .”
Comeau v. State, 758 P.2d 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(3) and (4). [4] Under the current statutory definitions, the level of risk necessary for both recklessness and criminal negligence is identical: both standards require conduct that creates "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that is, [t]he risk must be…”
Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See the legislative commentary to AS 11.81.900(a): 1978 Senate Journal, Supp.”
Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). “040(a)(5), this does not appear to be a likely construction of the statute.”
Gregory v. State, 717 P.2d 428 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). “Gregory argues that the court erred in rejecting the instructions he proposed, under which the jury would have been told that it had to find that Gregory "knew or recklessly disregarded the circumstance" of suspension, and that: A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a…”
State v. Abc Towing, 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “130(a), so that it could be held liable for its employee’s discharge of gasoline? AS 11.81.900(b)(39) defines the term “organization” for purposes of Title 11.”
Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.81.900. 29 In the present case, the evidence presented to the sentencing court established that, in beating his victim, Juneby inflicted visible and painful injuries.”
Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “But this argument overlooks the fact that the term "violation" is separately defined in AS 11.81.900 as "a noncriminal offense punishable only by a fine , but not by imprisonment or other penalty [.”
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “If the force used in self-defense rises to the level of deadly force as defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(12), then a claim of self-defense must additionally satisfy the requirements of AS 11.”
Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 1063 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “The interpretation espoused by Andrew misconstrues the plain terms of AS 11.81.900(a)(3). This statute is expressly applicable whenever “a person acts ‘recklessly’ with respect to .”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(12) — 1 case
State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(15) — 1 case
Yi v. Yang, 282 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(15)(B) — 1 case
Hess v. State, 435 P.3d 876 (Alaska 2018).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(18) — 1 case
Casciola v. F.S. Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059 (Alaska 2005).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(2) — 3 cases
ARCTEC Servs. v. Cummings, 295 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2013).
Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Baum v. State, 24 P.3d 577 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(2)(2) — 1 case
Strane v. State, 16 P.3d 745 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(2)(8) — 2 cases
Jordan & Letendre v. State, 367 P.3d 41 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
Schlosser v. State, 372 P.3d 272 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(2)(8B) — 1 case
Smith v. State, 28 P.3d 323 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(21) — 1 case
Houston v. Mun. of Anchorage, 59 P.3d 773 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(3) — 4 cases
Lamb v. Anderson, 147 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2006).
Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Lamb v. Anderson, 126 P.3d 132 (Alaska 2005).
Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1222 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(3)(2) — 1 case
Strane v. State, 16 P.3d 745 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(32)(8) — 1 case
Waterman v. State, 342 P.3d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(49) — 2 cases
Erhart v. State, 656 P.2d 1199 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Erhart v. State, 656 P.2d 1195 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(54)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Nat'l Chiropractic Mut. Ins. v. Doe, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Alaska 1998).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(56) — 1 case
Yi v. Yang, 282 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(6)(63) — 1 case
Godfrey v. State, Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 175 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2007).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a) — 10 cases
Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2006).
Nathanial L. Kangas v. State of Alaska, 463 P.3d 189 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See the legislative commentary to AS 11.81.900(a): 1978 Senate Journal, Supp.”
Il Seung Yang v. State, 107 P.3d 302 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(1) — 38 cases
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.81.900 provides in relevant part: (a) for purposes of this title, unless the context requires otherwise, (1) a person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result described by a provision of law defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause that result .”
Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See the legislative commentary to AS 11.81.900(a): 1978 Senate Journal, Supp.”
McKillop v. State, 857 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
In the Disciplinary Matter Involving Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(2) — 50 cases
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “AS 11.81.900(a)(2) defines the term "knowingly" as follows: (2) a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists;…”
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.81.900 provides in relevant part: (a) for purposes of this title, unless the context requires otherwise, (1) a person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result described by a provision of law defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause that result .”
Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See the legislative commentary to AS 11.81.900(a): 1978 Senate Journal, Supp.”
Moore v. State, 123 P.3d 1081 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(3) — 60 cases
Comeau v. State, 758 P.2d 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(3) and (4). [4] Under the current statutory definitions, the level of risk necessary for both recklessness and criminal negligence is identical: both standards require conduct that creates "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that is, [t]he risk must be…”
Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 1063 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “The interpretation espoused by Andrew misconstrues the plain terms of AS 11.81.900(a)(3). This statute is expressly applicable whenever “a person acts ‘recklessly’ with respect to .”
Panther v. State, 780 P.2d 386 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “AS 11.81.900(a)(2) defines the term "knowingly" as follows: (2) a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists;…”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(34) — 1 case
Maynard v. State, 652 P.2d 489 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(35) — 1 case
LeFever v. State, 877 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(4) — 15 cases
Gregory v. State, 717 P.2d 428 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). “Gregory argues that the court erred in rejecting the instructions he proposed, under which the jury would have been told that it had to find that Gregory "knew or recklessly disregarded the circumstance" of suspension, and that: A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a…”
In Re Est. of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006).
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “AS 11.81.900(a)(2) defines the term "knowingly" as follows: (2) a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists;…”
In the Disciplinary Matter Involving West, 805 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1991).
Comeau v. State, 758 P.2d 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(3) and (4). [4] Under the current statutory definitions, the level of risk necessary for both recklessness and criminal negligence is identical: both standards require conduct that creates "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that is, [t]he risk must be…”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(50) — 1 case
Christopher R. Stacy v. State of Alaska, 500 P.3d 1023 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(59) — 1 case
State, Dept. of Pub. Saf. v. Doe I, 425 P.3d 115 (Alaska 2018).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(60) — 1 case
Baker v. State, 22 P.3d 493 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(8) — 3 cases
Russell v. State, 934 P.2d 1335 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Wolfe v. State, 24 P.3d 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Schlosser v. State, 372 P.3d 272 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(d) — 2 cases
Waterman v. State, 342 P.3d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
Harapat v. State, 174 P.3d 249 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(d4) — 1 case
Waterman v. State, 342 P.3d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(l) — 2 cases
Willis v. State, 57 P.3d 688 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Knutson v. State, 736 P.2d 775 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b) — 23 cases
Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183 (Alaska 2009).
Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). “040(a)(5), this does not appear to be a likely construction of the statute.”
Charles S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. , Off. of Child.'s Servs., 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019).
Sapp v. State, 379 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
Wells v. State, 102 P.3d 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(1) — 15 cases
Lawrence v. State, 269 P.3d 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
Brandon Lee Baer v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1037 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Kankanton v. State, 342 P.3d 840 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
Bachlet v. State, 941 P.2d 200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(1)(A) — 1 case
Degler v. State, 741 P.2d 659 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(1)(B) — 5 cases
Degler v. State, 741 P.2d 659 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Folsom v. State, 734 P.2d 1015 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
McLaughlin v. State, 737 P.2d 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Brown v. Mun. of Anchorage, 915 P.2d 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Yancy v. State, 733 P.2d 1058 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(11) — 7 cases
Wettanen v. State, 656 P.2d 1213 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
State v. Richards, 720 P.2d 47 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Wesolic v. State, 837 P.2d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Burks v. State, 706 P.2d 1190 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(12) — 5 cases
Carson v. State, 736 P.2d 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “If the force used in self-defense rises to the level of deadly force as defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(12), then a claim of self-defense must additionally satisfy the requirements of AS 11.”
State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
Konrad v. State, 763 P.2d 1369 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Carson v. State, 742 P.2d 782 (Alaska 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(13) — 3 cases
Linn v. State, 658 P.2d 150 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
State v. Richards, 720 P.2d 47 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
Rhames v. State, 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(14) — 3 cases
Linne v. State, 674 P.2d 1345 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Smith v. State, 28 P.3d 323 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Hutchings v. State, 53 P.3d 1132 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(14)(A) — 1 case
Linne v. State, 674 P.2d 1345 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(15) — 16 cases
Lewandowski v. State, 18 P.3d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
Reeve v. State, 764 P.2d 324 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(15)(A) — 6 cases
Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1984).
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “If the force used in self-defense rises to the level of deadly force as defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(12), then a claim of self-defense must additionally satisfy the requirements of AS 11.”
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Olson v. State, 264 P.3d 600 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Rupeiks v. State, 263 P.3d 57 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(15)(B) — 8 cases
Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1984).
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Eluska, 698 P.2d 174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Brown v. Mun. of Anchorage, 915 P.2d 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Matthew Foy v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2022).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(15)(a) — 1 case
Johnson v. State, 268 P.3d 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(16) — 4 cases
Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska, 512 P.3d 665 (Alaska 2022).
Silvera v. State, 244 P.3d 1138 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
Smith v. State, 28 P.3d 323 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Hosier v. State, 1 P.3d 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(17) — 4 cases
Morrell v. State, 216 P.3d 574 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
Liddicoat v. State, 268 P.3d 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Moore v. State, 218 P.3d 303 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
Louie C. Dulier Sr. v. State of Alaska, 451 P.3d 790 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(18)(4) — 1 case
Lacey v. State, 54 P.3d 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(18)(A) — 4 cases
Lacey v. State, 54 P.3d 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Byron F. Geisinger v. State of Alaska, State of Alaska v. Byron F. Geisinger, 498 P.3d 92 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Delay-wilson v. State, 264 P.3d 375 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Warlick v. State, 330 P.3d 946 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(19) — 6 cases
McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2007).
Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska, 446 P.3d 797 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Solomon v. State, 227 P.3d 461 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(19)(A) — 1 case
Muller v. State, 196 P.3d 815 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(2) — 3 cases
Bachlet v. State, 941 P.2d 200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Brigman v. State, 64 P.3d 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Peter R. v. B.M.R., a Minor (Alaska 2025).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(2)(A) — 5 cases
Lacey v. State, 54 P.3d 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2007).
Allen v. State, 123 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Garrison, 171 P.3d 91 (Alaska 2007).
Muller v. State, 196 P.3d 815 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(2)(B) — 5 cases
McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2007).
State v. Garrison, 171 P.3d 91 (Alaska 2007).
Rusty J. Redding v. State of Alaska, 451 P.3d 1193 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Tyler Cue v. Desiree Challans (Alaska 2026).
Clinton R. Strong v. State of Alaska, Tuie Strong v. State of Alaska, 508 P.3d 1127 (Alaska Ct. App. 2022).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(20) — 3 cases
Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). “040(a)(5), this does not appear to be a likely construction of the statute.”
Howarth v. State, Pub. Def. Agency, 925 P.2d 1330 (Alaska 1996).
Liddicoat v. State, 268 P.3d 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(21) — 1 case
Kinnish v. State, 777 P.2d 1179 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(22) — 8 cases
Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Juneby v. State, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
State v. Jones, 750 P.2d 828 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
Marker v. State, 692 P.2d 977 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(23) — 2 cases
Xi Van Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). “If the force used in self-defense rises to the level of deadly force as defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(12), then a claim of self-defense must additionally satisfy the requirements of AS 11.”
Liddicoat v. State, 268 P.3d 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(23)(A) — 1 case
Ronald Phillip Alleva v. State of Alaska, Grubstake Auction Co., Inc. v. State of Alaska, 479 P.3d 405 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(24) — 2 cases
Lewandowski v. State, 18 P.3d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Dague, 143 P.3d 988 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(26) — 2 cases
Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
Butts v. State, 53 P.3d 609 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(27) — 8 cases
Eide v. State, 168 P.3d 499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
Shorty v. State, 214 P.3d 374 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
Edgmon v. State, 702 P.2d 643 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Leu v. State, 251 P.3d 363 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(28) — 4 cases
Inga v. State, 440 P.3d 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska, 512 P.3d 665 (Alaska 2022).
State of Alaska v. Thomas A. Mayfield, 442 P.3d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Richard Dorsey v. State of Alaska, 480 P.3d 1211 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(3) — 6 cases
Wesolic v. State, 837 P.2d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). “040(a)(5), this does not appear to be a likely construction of the statute.”
Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Plant v. State, 724 P.2d 536 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
Pushruk v. State, 780 P.2d 1044 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(30) — 1 case
Kankanton v. State, 342 P.3d 840 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(31) — 2 cases
Rollins v. State Ex Rel. Mun. of Anchorage, 748 P.2d 767 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Kankanton v. State, 342 P.3d 840 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(32) — 1 case
Brandon Lee Baer v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1037 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(33) — 2 cases
Fagan v. State, 779 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
State v. Eluska, 698 P.2d 174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(34) — 6 cases
Beckman v. State, 689 P.2d 500 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Crosby, 770 P.2d 1154 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Jacobson v. State, 786 P.2d 388 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
Martin v. State, 704 P.2d 1341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Andrejko v. State, 695 P.2d 246 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(35) — 2 cases
State v. Jones, 750 P.2d 828 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
State of Alaska v. Thomas A. Mayfield, 442 P.3d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(36) — 2 cases
Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
Liddicoat v. State, 268 P.3d 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(38) — 1 case
Silvera v. State, 244 P.3d 1138 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(39) — 3 cases
State v. Abc Towing, 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). “130(a), so that it could be held liable for its employee’s discharge of gasoline? AS 11.81.900(b)(39) defines the term “organization” for purposes of Title 11.”
United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Alaska 1992).
MacDonald v. State, 83 P.3d 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(4) — 3 cases
Timothy v. State, 90 P.3d 177 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
Winters v. State, 646 P.2d 867 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Butts v. State, 53 P.3d 609 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(40) — 14 cases
Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “But this argument overlooks the fact that the term "violation" is separately defined in AS 11.81.900 as "a noncriminal offense punishable only by a fine , but not by imprisonment or other penalty [.”
Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Juneby v. State, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Marker v. State, 692 P.2d 977 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(41) — 4 cases
Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
Y.J. v. State, 130 P.3d 954 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
Chawn D. Summerall v. State of Alaska, 553 P.3d 1255 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024).
YJ v. State, 130 P.3d 954 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(42) — 2 cases
Barber v. State, 386 P.3d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
Alex Trenton Beltz v. State of Alaska, State of Alaska v. Lesli Renee Richardson, 551 P.3d 583 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(44) — 1 case
Shoemaker v. State, 716 P.2d 391 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(45) — 4 cases
Sapp v. State, 379 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
Hutchings v. State, 53 P.3d 1132 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Sapp v. State (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
Sapp v. State (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(46) — 2 cases
Dawson v. State, 264 P.3d 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Eaklor v. State, 153 P.3d 367 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(47) — 5 cases
Haines v. Comfort Keepers, Inc., 393 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2017).
Bachlet v. State, 941 P.2d 200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Adam Charles Dere v. State of Alaska, 444 P.3d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Patrick Dale Burton-Hill v. State of Alaska, Jerald Dwayne Burton Jr. v. State of Alaska, Marcus Djaun Howard v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
Kierston R. v. Eugene R. (Alaska 2016).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(48) — 5 cases
Charles S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. , Off. of Child.'s Servs., 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019).
Bachlet v. State, 941 P.2d 200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
State v. Mullin, 778 P.2d 233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Allridge v. State, 969 P.2d 644 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
Lapitre v. State, 233 P.3d 1125 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(483) — 1 case
Sickel v. State, 363 P.3d 115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(49) — 5 cases
Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “AS 11.81.900. 29 In the present case, the evidence presented to the sentencing court established that, in beating his victim, Juneby inflicted visible and painful injuries.”
James v. State, 671 P.2d 885 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Frankson v. State, 645 P.2d 225 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Timothy v. State, 90 P.3d 177 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
Peter R. v. B.M.R., a Minor (Alaska 2025).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(5) — 2 cases
Coleman v. State, 407 P.3d 502 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).
Patterson v. State, 708 P.2d 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(50) — 5 cases
Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Willett v. State, 836 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2018).
State of Alaska v. Falealo Manuele Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211 (Alaska 2020).
Carson v. State, 736 P.2d 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(50)(A) — 1 case
Konrad v. State, 763 P.2d 1369 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(50)(B) — 1 case
Willett v. State, 836 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(51) — 11 cases
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Boggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Nicholson v. State, 656 P.2d 1209 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Bright v. State, 875 P.2d 100 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(51)(A) — 1 case
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(52) — 8 cases
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “See AS 11.81.900(a)(1). [9] The decision of a majority of this court to reverse, renders it unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues except insofar as they effect Flink's sentence for first-degree sexual assault.”
State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Stephan v. State, 810 P.2d 564 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(52)(A) — 3 cases
Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Sullivan v. State, 766 P.2d 51 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(52)(B) — 1 case
Van Meter v. State, 743 P.2d 385 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(53) — 8 cases
Lepley v. State, 807 P.2d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
Braun v. State, 911 P.2d 1075 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Williams, 855 P.2d 1337 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
S.B. v. State, 706 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(53)(A) — 2 cases
Braun v. State, 911 P.2d 1075 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Davidson v. State, 975 P.2d 67 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(53)(B) — 1 case
Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(53)(B)(i) — 2 cases
Braun v. State, 911 P.2d 1075 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Williams, 855 P.2d 1337 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(54) — 2 cases
Patrick Dale Burton-Hill v. State of Alaska, Jerald Dwayne Burton Jr. v. State of Alaska, Marcus Djaun Howard v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
Warlick v. State, 330 P.3d 946 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(55) — 3 cases
Wells v. State, 102 P.3d 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Beltz v. State, 980 P.2d 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(56) — 10 cases
Parks v. Parks, 214 P.3d 295 (Alaska 2009).
Williams v. Barbee, 243 P.3d 995 (Alaska 2010).
Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Morrell v. State, 216 P.3d 574 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
Spencer v. State, 164 P.3d 649 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(56)(A) — 2 cases
Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
Jonathan Clark v. Perlita Clark (Alaska 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(56)(B) — 1 case
Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(57) — 4 cases
John E. v. Andrea E., 445 P.3d 649 (Alaska 2019).
Booth v. State, 903 P.2d 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
Ritter v. State, 97 P.3d 73 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
Ritter v. State, 16 P.3d 191 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(57)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Ritter v. State, 16 P.3d 191 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(58) — 1 case
State v. Dutch Harbor Seafoods, Ltd., 965 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1998).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(58)(B) — 1 case
Louie C. Dulier Sr. v. State of Alaska, 451 P.3d 790 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(59) — 8 cases
Byron F. Geisinger v. State of Alaska, State of Alaska v. Byron F. Geisinger, 498 P.3d 92 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Vigue v. State, 987 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
Joseph v. State, 293 P.3d 488 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
RJM v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(59)(A) — 2 cases
State, Dept. of Pub. Saf. v. Doe I, 425 P.3d 115 (Alaska 2018).
Joseph v. State, 293 P.3d 488 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(59)(B) — 3 cases
Byron F. Geisinger v. State of Alaska, State of Alaska v. Byron F. Geisinger, 498 P.3d 92 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Borchgrevink v. State, 239 P.3d 410 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
Hunter Hedrick v. State of Alaska, 474 P.3d 4 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(6) — 1 case
State v. Resek, 706 P.2d 706 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(60) — 3 cases
Baker v. State, 22 P.3d 493 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
State of Alaska v. Thomas A. Mayfield, 442 P.3d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Thompson v. State, 378 P.3d 707 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(60)(A) — 2 cases
Jackson v. State, 342 P.3d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Thompson, 435 P.3d 947 (Alaska 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(60)(A)(i) — 2 cases
Inga v. State, 440 P.3d 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
Doe v. Univ. of Alaska Bd. of Regents (D. Alaska 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(61) — 1 case
Lincoln N. Riley v. State of Alaska, 515 P.3d 1259 (Alaska Ct. App. 2022).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(61)(A) — 1 case
Lincoln N. Riley v. State of Alaska, 515 P.3d 1259 (Alaska Ct. App. 2022).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(61)(A)(i) — 3 cases
Richard Dorsey v. State of Alaska, 480 P.3d 1211 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Keith Roscoe Bartman v. State of Alaska, 563 P.3d 121 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
Brad S. (Father) v. State of Alaska, DHSS, OCS (Alaska 2025).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(61)(B)(i) — 1 case
Brad S. (Father) v. State of Alaska, DHSS, OCS (Alaska 2025).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(62) — 4 cases
State v. Simpson, 53 P.3d 165 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Mooney v. State, 105 P.3d 149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
Laurel Lee v. State of Alaska, 503 P.3d 811 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
YJ v. State, 130 P.3d 954 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(62)(A) — 1 case
Keith Roscoe Bartman v. State of Alaska, 563 P.3d 121 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(63) — 1 case
Godfrey v. State, Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 175 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2007).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(63)(B) — 1 case
Godfrey v. State, Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 175 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2007).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(65) — 2 cases
Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “But this argument overlooks the fact that the term "violation" is separately defined in AS 11.81.900 as "a noncriminal offense punishable only by a fine , but not by imprisonment or other penalty [.”
State v. Thompson, 425 P.3d 166 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(66) — 2 cases
Pulusila v. State, 425 P.3d 175 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).
Wagner v. State, 390 P.3d 1179 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(67) — 1 case
State of Alaska v. Kai Davidson Meyers, 479 P.3d 840 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(68) — 2 cases
State of Alaska v. Falealo Manuele Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211 (Alaska 2020).
Alex Trenton Beltz v. State of Alaska, State of Alaska v. Lesli Renee Richardson, 551 P.3d 583 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(7) — 6 cases
State v. Crosby, 770 P.2d 1154 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Martin v. State, 704 P.2d 1341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
Chawn D. Summerall v. State of Alaska, 553 P.3d 1255 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024).
Bridge v. State, 258 P.3d 923 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(8) — 1 case
State v. Morgan, 985 P.2d 1022 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(9) — 7 cases
Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Constantine v. State, 739 P.2d 188 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1988).
Fagan v. State, 779 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Bridge v. State, 258 P.3d 923 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(ll) — 13 cases
Konrad v. State, 763 P.2d 1369 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Willett v. State, 836 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
S.R.D. v. State, 820 P.2d 1088 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Siggelkow v. State, 648 P.2d 611 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(g)(2) — 1 case
Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). “See the legislative commentary to AS 11.81.900(a): 1978 Senate Journal, Supp.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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