Alaska Statutes
Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025 (2026)
Sentencing procedures
✓ current as of July 2026
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Sec. 12.55.025. Sentencing procedures.
(a) When imposing a sentence for conviction of a felony offense or a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 90 days or upon a conviction of a violation of AS 04, a regulation adopted under AS 04, or an ordinance adopted in conformity with AS 04.21.010, the court shall prepare, as a part of the record, a sentencing report that includes the following:
(1) a verbatim record of the sentencing hearing and any other in-court sentencing procedures;
(2) findings on material issues of fact and on factual questions required to be determined as a prerequisite to the selection of the sentence imposed;
(3) a clear statement of the terms of the sentence imposed; if a term of imprisonment is imposed, the statement must include
(A) the approximate minimum term the defendant is expected to serve before being released or placed on mandatory parole if the defendant is eligible for and does not forfeit good conduct deductions under AS 33.20.010; and
(B) if applicable, the approximate minimum term of imprisonment the defendant must serve before becoming eligible for release on discretionary parole;
(4) any recommendations as to the place of confinement or the manner of treatment; and
(5) in the case of a conviction for a felony offense, information assessing
(A) the financial, emotional, and medical effects of the offense on the victim;
(B) the need of the victim for restitution; and
(C) any other information required by the court.
(b) The sentencing report required under (a) of this section shall be furnished within 30 days after imposition of sentence to the Department of Law, the defendant, the Department of Corrections, the state Board of Parole if the defendant will be eligible for parole, and to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board if the defendant is to be sentenced for a conviction of a violation of AS 04, a regulation adopted under AS 04, or an ordinance adopted under AS 04.21.010.
(c) Except as provided in (d) of this section, when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment, the term of confinement commences on the date of imposition of sentence unless the court specifically provides that the defendant must report to serve the sentence on another date. If the court provides another date to begin the term of confinement, the court shall provide the defendant with written notice of the date, time, and location of the correctional facility to which the defendant must report. A defendant shall receive credit for time spent in custody pending trial, sentencing, or appeal, if the detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed. A defendant may not receive credit for more than the actual time spent in custody pending trial, sentencing, or appeal. The time during which a defendant is voluntarily absent from official detention after the defendant has been sentenced may not be credited toward service of the sentence.
(d) A sentence of imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant is admitted to bail. If an appeal is taken and the defendant is not admitted to bail, the Department of Corrections shall designate the facility in which the defendant shall be detained pending appeal or admission to bail.
(e) [Repealed, § 7 ch 125 SLA 2004.]
(f) A sentence that the defendant pay money, either as a fine or in restitution or both, constitutes a lien in the same manner as a judgment for money entered in a civil action. Nothing in this section limits the authority of the court to otherwise enforce payment of a fine or restitution.
(g) [Repealed, § 7 ch 125 SLA 2004.]
(h) [Repealed, § 7 ch 125 SLA 2004.]
(i) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies to sentencing proceedings.
(j) The approximate minimum terms provided under (a)(3) of this section in the sentencing report are for information purposes only. The approximate minimum terms are not part of the sentence imposed and do not form a basis for review or appeal of the sentence imposed or provide a defendant with a right to any specific term of imprisonment or supervised release on mandatory parole.
(k) If a defendant intends to claim credit under AS 12.55.027 toward a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a treatment program as a condition of bail in connection with an offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, the defendant shall file notice with the court and the prosecutor 10 days before the sentencing hearing. The notice shall include the number of days the defendant is claiming. The defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the requirements of AS 12.55.027 are met before credit may be awarded. Except as provided in (l) of this section, except for good cause, a court may not consider a request for credit made under this subsection more than 90 days after the sentencing hearing.
(l) If a defendant intends to claim credit under AS 12.55.027 toward a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a treatment program as a condition of bail while pending appeal, the defendant shall file notice with the court and the prosecutor not later than 90 days after return of the case to the trial court following appeal. The notice shall include the number of days the defendant is claiming. The defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the requirements of AS 12.55.027 are met before credit may be awarded. Except for good cause, the court may not consider a request for credit made under this subsection after the deadline.
(m) When imposing a sentence for conviction of a felony offense or a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 90 days or, upon a conviction of a violation of AS 04, a regulation adopted under AS 04, or an ordinance adopted in conformity with AS 04.21.010, the court shall orally state on the record the terms of the sentence of imprisonment imposed and the approximate minimum sentence that must be served before the defendant may be eligible for mandatory parole and that the period of active incarceration may be reduced under other provisions of law.
(a) When imposing a sentence for conviction of a felony offense or a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 90 days or upon a conviction of a violation of AS 04, a regulation adopted under AS 04, or an ordinance adopted in conformity with AS 04.21.010, the court shall prepare, as a part of the record, a sentencing report that includes the following:
(1) a verbatim record of the sentencing hearing and any other in-court sentencing procedures;
(2) findings on material issues of fact and on factual questions required to be determined as a prerequisite to the selection of the sentence imposed;
(3) a clear statement of the terms of the sentence imposed; if a term of imprisonment is imposed, the statement must include
(A) the approximate minimum term the defendant is expected to serve before being released or placed on mandatory parole if the defendant is eligible for and does not forfeit good conduct deductions under AS 33.20.010; and
(B) if applicable, the approximate minimum term of imprisonment the defendant must serve before becoming eligible for release on discretionary parole;
(4) any recommendations as to the place of confinement or the manner of treatment; and
(5) in the case of a conviction for a felony offense, information assessing
(A) the financial, emotional, and medical effects of the offense on the victim;
(B) the need of the victim for restitution; and
(C) any other information required by the court.
(b) The sentencing report required under (a) of this section shall be furnished within 30 days after imposition of sentence to the Department of Law, the defendant, the Department of Corrections, the state Board of Parole if the defendant will be eligible for parole, and to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board if the defendant is to be sentenced for a conviction of a violation of AS 04, a regulation adopted under AS 04, or an ordinance adopted under AS 04.21.010.
(c) Except as provided in (d) of this section, when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment, the term of confinement commences on the date of imposition of sentence unless the court specifically provides that the defendant must report to serve the sentence on another date. If the court provides another date to begin the term of confinement, the court shall provide the defendant with written notice of the date, time, and location of the correctional facility to which the defendant must report. A defendant shall receive credit for time spent in custody pending trial, sentencing, or appeal, if the detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed. A defendant may not receive credit for more than the actual time spent in custody pending trial, sentencing, or appeal. The time during which a defendant is voluntarily absent from official detention after the defendant has been sentenced may not be credited toward service of the sentence.
(d) A sentence of imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant is admitted to bail. If an appeal is taken and the defendant is not admitted to bail, the Department of Corrections shall designate the facility in which the defendant shall be detained pending appeal or admission to bail.
(e) [Repealed, § 7 ch 125 SLA 2004.]
(f) A sentence that the defendant pay money, either as a fine or in restitution or both, constitutes a lien in the same manner as a judgment for money entered in a civil action. Nothing in this section limits the authority of the court to otherwise enforce payment of a fine or restitution.
(g) [Repealed, § 7 ch 125 SLA 2004.]
(h) [Repealed, § 7 ch 125 SLA 2004.]
(i) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies to sentencing proceedings.
(j) The approximate minimum terms provided under (a)(3) of this section in the sentencing report are for information purposes only. The approximate minimum terms are not part of the sentence imposed and do not form a basis for review or appeal of the sentence imposed or provide a defendant with a right to any specific term of imprisonment or supervised release on mandatory parole.
(k) If a defendant intends to claim credit under AS 12.55.027 toward a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a treatment program as a condition of bail in connection with an offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, the defendant shall file notice with the court and the prosecutor 10 days before the sentencing hearing. The notice shall include the number of days the defendant is claiming. The defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the requirements of AS 12.55.027 are met before credit may be awarded. Except as provided in (l) of this section, except for good cause, a court may not consider a request for credit made under this subsection more than 90 days after the sentencing hearing.
(l) If a defendant intends to claim credit under AS 12.55.027 toward a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a treatment program as a condition of bail while pending appeal, the defendant shall file notice with the court and the prosecutor not later than 90 days after return of the case to the trial court following appeal. The notice shall include the number of days the defendant is claiming. The defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the requirements of AS 12.55.027 are met before credit may be awarded. Except for good cause, the court may not consider a request for credit made under this subsection after the deadline.
(m) When imposing a sentence for conviction of a felony offense or a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 90 days or, upon a conviction of a violation of AS 04, a regulation adopted under AS 04, or an ordinance adopted in conformity with AS 04.21.010, the court shall orally state on the record the terms of the sentence of imprisonment imposed and the approximate minimum sentence that must be served before the defendant may be eligible for mandatory parole and that the period of active incarceration may be reduced under other provisions of law.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 105
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1981–2024 · leading case: Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).
Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “025(c) conflicts with the legislature's use of that term elsewhere in AS 12.55.025 and in other Alaska statutes.”
State v. Andrews, 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986). “The issue in these consolidated cases is the proper interpretation of AS 12.55.025(e) and (g). The State contends that an offender convicted of separate counts of sexual assault must be sentenced to consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms.”
State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “In the revisor’s notes to AS 12.55.025, it is stated: Alaska Statute 12.”
Jones v. State, 744 P.2d 410 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). “1985), we analyzed current AS 12.55.025 and concluded that AS 12.55.”
Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “See AS 12.55.025(e). 5 The *859 authority to impose consecutive sentences is not restricted to cases involving non-presumptive terms.”
Wells v. State, 706 P.2d 711 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “In this decision we hold that the sentencing court had discretion under AS 12.55.025 to impose concurrent sentences.”
Love v. State, 173 P.3d 433 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). “(We note that the Smith decision is listed in the annotations to AS 12.55.025 in the 2004 edition of the Alaska Statutes, Titles 10 to 12, page 622.”
Baker v. State, 110 P.3d 996 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). “Until 1982, AS 12.55.025(e) provided that if "the [sentencing] court does not specify, the [defendant's] sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.”
Tuttle v. State, 65 P.3d 884 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “125(c) is not one of the statutes listed in AS 12.55.025® as being an exception to the normal rule that sentencing issues are governed by the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof.”
Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). “" [8] In Nygren, this court set out to define what constituted "substantial restrictions on one's freedom of movement and behavior" which would qualify for credit for time served under AS 12.55.025(c). [9] We stated that the test was the "extent to which a person released on…”
Paige v. State, 115 P.3d 1244 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). “We hold that, under former AS 12.55.025(e), when a sentencing judge does not specify whether a defendant’s sentences are concurrent or consecutive, the sentences must be deemed concurrent.”
Smith v. State, 187 P.3d 511 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). “The legislature repealed the earlier statutory provisions governing this area of law-former AS 12.55.025(e), (g), and (h)-and, in their place, the legislature enacted AS 12.”
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(a) — 1 case
Houston v. State, 648 P.2d 1024 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(a)(2) — 3 cases
Dodd v. State, 686 P.2d 737 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Winona M. Fletcher v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
Winona M. Fletcher v. State of Alaska (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(c) — 33 cases
Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “025(c) conflicts with the legislature's use of that term elsewhere in AS 12.55.025 and in other Alaska statutes.”
Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). “" [8] In Nygren, this court set out to define what constituted "substantial restrictions on one's freedom of movement and behavior" which would qualify for credit for time served under AS 12.55.025(c). [9] We stated that the test was the "extent to which a person released on…”
Endell v. Johnson, 738 P.2d 769 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Coates v. State, 721 P.2d 655 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
Triplett v. State, 199 P.3d 1179 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(e) — 51 cases
State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “In the revisor’s notes to AS 12.55.025, it is stated: Alaska Statute 12.”
State v. Andrews, 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986). “The issue in these consolidated cases is the proper interpretation of AS 12.55.025(e) and (g). The State contends that an offender convicted of separate counts of sexual assault must be sentenced to consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms.”
Jones v. State, 744 P.2d 410 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). “1985), we analyzed current AS 12.55.025 and concluded that AS 12.55.”
Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “See AS 12.55.025(e). 5 The *859 authority to impose consecutive sentences is not restricted to cases involving non-presumptive terms.”
Baker v. State, 110 P.3d 996 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). “Until 1982, AS 12.55.025(e) provided that if "the [sentencing] court does not specify, the [defendant's] sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.”
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(g) — 14 cases
State v. Andrews, 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986). “The issue in these consolidated cases is the proper interpretation of AS 12.55.025(e) and (g). The State contends that an offender convicted of separate counts of sexual assault must be sentenced to consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms.”
State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “In the revisor’s notes to AS 12.55.025, it is stated: Alaska Statute 12.”
Griffith v. State, 675 P.2d 662 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Sababu Hodari, 996 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 2000).
Jennings v. State, 713 P.2d 1222 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(g)(1) — 2 cases
Wells v. State, 706 P.2d 711 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “In this decision we hold that the sentencing court had discretion under AS 12.55.025 to impose concurrent sentences.”
Buckwalter v. State, 23 P.3d 81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(g)(3) — 1 case
Dayton v. State, 120 P.3d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(g)(4) — 1 case
State v. Andrews, 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986). “The issue in these consolidated cases is the proper interpretation of AS 12.55.025(e) and (g). The State contends that an offender convicted of separate counts of sexual assault must be sentenced to consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms.”
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(g)(5) — 2 cases
Nukapigak v. State, 663 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1983).
Lewis v. State, 706 P.2d 715 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(h) — 2 cases
State v. Wagner, 835 P.2d 454 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Kitchens v. State, 898 P.2d 443 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(i) — 3 cases
Tuttle v. State, 65 P.3d 884 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). “125(c) is not one of the statutes listed in AS 12.55.025® as being an exception to the normal rule that sentencing issues are governed by the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof.”
State of Alaska v. Brennan Adam Grubb, 546 P.3d 586 (Alaska 2024).
Celesty Noel Farmer v. State of Alaska, 449 P.3d 1116 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 12.55.025(k) — 2 cases
Medina v. State, 418 P.3d 861 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). “025(c) conflicts with the legislature's use of that term elsewhere in AS 12.55.025 and in other Alaska statutes.”
Reese v. State, 930 P.2d 1295 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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