A. Except as otherwise provided in this article, if two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
B. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
C. There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who the trier of fact finds has intentionally, wilfully or wantonly caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death.
D. A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
E. A liability insurer, which by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability. This subsection does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
F. This section and sections 12-2502, 12-2503, 12-2504, 12-2508 and 12-2509 do not:
1. Impair any right of indemnity under existing law. If one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from any obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
2. Apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.
3. Create a right of contribution against an employer or other person who has paid or who is liable for workmen's compensation in connection with an injury or death pursuant to title 23, chapter 6, unless the employer or other person is subject to direct suit under section 23-1022. For purposes of determining the amount of pro rata shares under this article, any employer or other person who has paid or who is liable for workmen's compensation shall not be considered unless the employer or other person is subject to direct suit under section 23-1022.
G. As used in this article, "property damage" means both physical damage to tangible property and economic loss proximately caused by a breach of duty.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
83
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1984–2026 · leading case:
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991).
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991).
· cites it 29× “We accepted certification because the issue is one of first impression and requires interpretation of Arizona’s version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 et seq. We have jurisdiction under A.”
Stand. Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 12× “art 18, § 5; and we are now a state of several liability and comparative fault, see A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to - 2506. SC argues that, even after the adoption of comparative negligence, to allocate fault to the auditor’s client would “emasculate[ ] the role of auditors as independent…”
Parker v. Vanell, 824 P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1992).
· cites it 28× “This case requires us to construe for the first time the phrase "common liability" as used in various provisions of Arizona's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509. Because this is an issue of first impression, and because UCATA's…”
City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 374 (Ariz. 1990).
· cites it 17× “See A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq. We granted review to determine whether a non-settling tortfeasor is bound by the amount of damages that the settling tortfeasors paid in “good faith” to obtain the injured parties’ complete release of all defendants.”
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano, 375 P.3d 69 (Ariz. 2016).
· cites it 8× “A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 through -2509. Under the OTR, Munguia asserts, Cramer “cannot escape or reduce her liability by claiming harm was caused by non-party Dr.”
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight Sys., Inc., 717 P.2d 434 (Ariz. 1986).
· cites it 6× “The question concerns the constitutionality of Arizona’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-2501—12-2509 (1984) (the “Act”).”
John Munic Enter., Inc. v. Laos, 326 P.3d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× ““The right to contribution under §§ 12-2501 through 12-2504 applies to all tortfeasors whose liability is based on negligence, strict liability in tort or any product liability action, as defined in § 12-681, including warranty.”
Herstam v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 919 P.2d 1381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 10× “A.R.S. § 12-2501. In making that determination, the fact finder must determine the pro rata share of each tortfeasor in the entire liability.”
Unique Equip. Co. v. TRW Veh. Saf. Sys., Inc., 3 P.3d 970 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 7× “Farley rule of harmonious construction, we find guidance for our decision in a portion of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCA-TA), A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1998), that addresses claims against covered employers.”
Amanda Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944 (Ariz. 2016).
· cites it 2× “We further conclude that the LID is not displaced by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 through -2509. Finally, we hold that prescription drugs are “merchandise” for purposes of the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), A.”
PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz. 1995).
· cites it 9× “Thereafter, appellants sought contribution from appellees pursuant to AR.S. § 12-2501. The United States District Court dismissed the action on the ground that AR.”
Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 842 P.2d 1355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 5× “The question was whether General Electric could name the plaintiff’s employer as a nonparty at fault for purposes of apportioning damages, and the resolution of that question depended upon the interplay between the statute abolishing joint and several liability and another…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(A) — 7 cases
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991).
“We accepted certification because the issue is one of first impression and requires interpretation of Arizona’s version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 et seq. We have jurisdiction under A.”
John Munic Enter., Inc. v. Laos, 326 P.3d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
““The right to contribution under §§ 12-2501 through 12-2504 applies to all tortfeasors whose liability is based on negligence, strict liability in tort or any product liability action, as defined in § 12-681, including warranty.”
Stand. Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
“art 18, § 5; and we are now a state of several liability and comparative fault, see A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to - 2506. SC argues that, even after the adoption of comparative negligence, to allocate fault to the auditor’s client would “emasculate[ ] the role of auditors as independent…”
Parker v. Vanell, 824 P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1992).
“This case requires us to construe for the first time the phrase "common liability" as used in various provisions of Arizona's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509. Because this is an issue of first impression, and because UCATA's…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(B) — 10 cases
Parker v. Vanell, 824 P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1992).
“This case requires us to construe for the first time the phrase "common liability" as used in various provisions of Arizona's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509. Because this is an issue of first impression, and because UCATA's…”
Herstam v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 919 P.2d 1381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
“A.R.S. § 12-2501. In making that determination, the fact finder must determine the pro rata share of each tortfeasor in the entire liability.”
City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 374 (Ariz. 1990).
“See A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq. We granted review to determine whether a non-settling tortfeasor is bound by the amount of damages that the settling tortfeasors paid in “good faith” to obtain the injured parties’ complete release of all defendants.”
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991).
“We accepted certification because the issue is one of first impression and requires interpretation of Arizona’s version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 et seq. We have jurisdiction under A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(C) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(D) — 6 cases
Parker v. Vanell, 824 P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1992).
“This case requires us to construe for the first time the phrase "common liability" as used in various provisions of Arizona's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509. Because this is an issue of first impression, and because UCATA's…”
City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 374 (Ariz. 1990).
“See A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq. We granted review to determine whether a non-settling tortfeasor is bound by the amount of damages that the settling tortfeasors paid in “good faith” to obtain the injured parties’ complete release of all defendants.”
PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz. 1995).
“Thereafter, appellants sought contribution from appellees pursuant to AR.S. § 12-2501. The United States District Court dismissed the action on the ground that AR.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(F) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(F)(1) — 3 cases
Unique Equip. Co. v. TRW Veh. Saf. Sys., Inc., 3 P.3d 970 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“Farley rule of harmonious construction, we find guidance for our decision in a portion of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCA-TA), A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1998), that addresses claims against covered employers.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(F)(3) — 1 case
Unique Equip. Co. v. TRW Veh. Saf. Sys., Inc., 3 P.3d 970 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“Farley rule of harmonious construction, we find guidance for our decision in a portion of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCA-TA), A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1998), that addresses claims against covered employers.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(G) — 5 cases
Stand. Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
“art 18, § 5; and we are now a state of several liability and comparative fault, see A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to - 2506. SC argues that, even after the adoption of comparative negligence, to allocate fault to the auditor’s client would “emasculate[ ] the role of auditors as independent…”
John Munic Enter., Inc. v. Laos, 326 P.3d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
““The right to contribution under §§ 12-2501 through 12-2504 applies to all tortfeasors whose liability is based on negligence, strict liability in tort or any product liability action, as defined in § 12-681, including warranty.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2501(H) — 4 cases
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991).
“We accepted certification because the issue is one of first impression and requires interpretation of Arizona’s version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 et seq. We have jurisdiction under A.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.